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
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Russell

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THE HISTORY
OF
ANCIENT EUROPE.

WITH A
VIEW OF THE REVOLUTIONS

IN
ASIA AND AFRICA.

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James M^c Culey.
OF

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WITH A
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IN
ASIA AND AFRICA.

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS
TO A YOUNG NOBLEMAN.

BY WILLIAM RUSSELL, L. L. D.
AUTHOR OF THE HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE.

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THE HISTORY
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LETTER IX.

THE REVOLUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA, FROM THE SUBVERSION OF THE OLD ASSYRIAN EMPIRE TO THE TAKING OF BABYLON BY CYRUS THE GREAT; WITH A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF THE STATE OF SYRIA AND EGYPT, IN MORE EARLY TIMES.

AFTER the subversion of the Assyrian empire, Cyaxares and Nabocolassar, or Nebuchadnezzar, the warlike kings of Media and Babylon, who had destroyed Nineveh, threatened the whole earth with subjection. The exulting victors immediately reduced to obedience, either conjunctly or separately, all the nations that had, at any time, owned the sway of the haughty monarchs of Assyria¹; and extended their

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IX.**



1. The greatness and fall of the Assyrian empire are finely described by the prophet Ezekiel, under the similitude of a tree. "Behold, the Assyrian was a cedar in Lebanon with fair branches, and with a shadowing

PART I. their dominion from the borders of Egypt, to the frontiers of India.

In the prosecution of these conquests, Nebuchadnezzar directed his arms chiefly against the nations to the west of the Euphrates, and Cyaxares against those to the east of the Tygris; where, after having subdued all the countries in the neighbourhood of the Caspian sea, he chased the Scythians into the wilds of Sarmatia². Concerning the state of the vast regions to the east of the Tygris, at this early period, we have little information, that can be depended on. But the case is very different, in regard to the countries to the west of the Euphrates. There the most interesting spectacles are presented to our view, by historians both sacred and civil, during the century that preceded the destruction of Nineveh.

The Assyrian monarchs, from the foundation of their empire, appear to have claimed dominion, and

“ shadowing shroud, and of an high stature, and his top was among
 “ the thick boughs. The waters made him great; the deep set him
 “ upon high, with her rivers running round about his plants, and sent
 “ out her little rivers unto all the trees of the field. Therefore his
 “ height was exalted above all the trees of the field, and his boughs
 “ were multiplied, and his branches became long, because of the multi-
 “ tude of waters, when he shot forth. All the fowls of heaven made
 “ their nests in his boughs, and under his branches did all the
 “ beasts of the field bring forth their young, and under his shadow
 “ dwelt all great nations. Thus was he fair in his greatness, in the
 “ length of his branches; for his root was by great waters” (Ezek.
 “ chap. xxxi. ver. 3—7.). “ But, because his heart is lifted up in his
 “ height,” adds the prophet, in the name of the Lord, “ I have de-
 “ livered him into the hand of the mighty one of the heathen. And
 “ strangers, the *terrible of the nations*, have cut him off. Upon the
 “ mountains, and in all the valleys, his branches are fallen, and his
 “ boughs are broken by all the rivers of the land; and all the people
 “ of the earth are gone from under his shadow, and have left him.
 “ In the day when he went down to the grave, I caused a mourning;
 “ when I cast him into the pit, I made *the nations shake at the sound*
 “ of his fall.” Ezekiel, chap. xxxi. ver. 10—16.

2. *Ancient Univ. Hist.* vol. iv. et auct. cit.

latterly

latterly had rigorously maintained it, over all the countries between the Euphrates and Nile. These claims descended to Nebuchadnezzar, on the subversion of the Assyrian empire, and the rise of the Babylonian grandeur on its ruins. And he did not fail to assert them, or to punish such nations as attempted to dispute his sway. But before I relate the future progress of the arms of this mighty conqueror, whose sword smote so many kingdoms, and the terror of whose name was so great upon the face of the earth, it will be proper to take a retrospective survey of the state of Syria and Egypt.

Under the name of Syria I comprehend, for the sake of perspicuity, the whole country from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean sea, and from the foot of mount Taurus to Arabia Pétrea, and the frontiers of Egypt³. From the southern part of this fine country, as I have formerly had occasion to observe⁴, the Israelites or Hebrews, under Joshua, drove the Canaanites of the inland country to the maritime district, afterward known by the name of Phœnicia; while they gave to the Land of Promise, or the territory in which they settled, the name of *Judea*, and the Greeks, that of *Palestine*. The northern part, or *Syria Proper*, was chiefly subject to the kings of Damascus; who, like all the other Syrian princes and states, were in some measure dependent on the Assyrian emperors.

The supine successors of Ninus and Semerimis, however, until roused to exertion by the revolt of the Medes and Babylonians (after the lapse of five hundred years), had but imperfectly maintained their

Ant. Chr.
747.
Nabonass.
æra 1.

3. Strabo (*Geog.* lib. xvi.) gives nearly the same extent to Syria; and Herodotus, in more ancient times, talks familiarly of the Syrian *Palestine* (*Historiar.* lib. i.), of *Azotus* in Syria, and of the boundaries between Syria and Egypt. Herodot. lib. ii.

4. Lett. I.

THE HISTORY OF

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sovereignty over the western provinces of their empire. Of the exercise of such sovereignty, before this memorable æra, we have accordingly but one instance on good authority. When Pul, emperor of Assyria, appeared on the confines of Palestine, Menahem king of Israel gave that prince a thousand talents of silver, exacted from his own subjects, to *confirm* him in the *kingdom*, which he had usurped⁵. This circumstance happily brings under our observation the state of the people of God.

During the long period of Assyrian indolence, and before the Egyptian monarchs attempted to extend their dominion beyond the bottom of the Arabian gulf, the Syrian princes acted as independent sovereigns, and waged continual wars with each other⁶. In the course of those wars the Israelites, after having been often subjected to servitude by the neighbouring nations⁷, rose to a distinguished height in wealth and power, under their two celebrated kings, David and Solomon⁸. David, who was a profound politician, and a great captain, rendered many of the Syrian princes tributary to him, at the same time that he extended the bounds of the kingdom of Palestine; and Solomon, his son and successor, still renowned for his wisdom and splendour, beautified the city and built the temple of Jerusalem, while he civilized his subjects, by introducing among them the arts of peace⁹.

Solomon, however, was not supplied merely by his territorial revenues with that wealth which has appeared incredible; which enabled him to live in such

5. *2 Kings*, chap. xv. ver. 19, 20. And the power of the Assyrian emperors, in more ancient times, to "set up and pull down, whomsoever they thought proper," we also learn from scripture, had been great in Syria. *2 Kings*, chap. xix. ver. 25, 26.

6. See the books of *Judges* and *Samuel* throughout.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *2 Sam.* and *1 Kings*, *passim*.

9. *Id. ibid.*
pomp,

pomp, and to finish and furnish so many superb buildings, but by an extensive and lucrative commerce. His father David having conquered the land of Edom, or Idumea, perceived the advantages that might be made of its two harbours, Elath and Eziongaber, on the eastern coast of the Arabian gulf, or Red Sea; whence he appears to have carried on trade with success¹⁰. And the profits of that trade, added to the accumulated spoils of his vanquished enemies, with their annual tributes, swelled before his death to an immense treasure¹¹.

This treasure devolved to Solomon; whose enlightened mind furnished him with the widest views, and whose pacific reign allowed him leisure to extend and increase the trade from Elath and Eziongaber. And the measures which he pursued, for these ends, were worthy of his high reputation for wisdom. He settled in those advantageous ports colonies of sea-faring people, from the coasts of Palestine and Phœnicia; and there, by the assistance of Hiram, king of Tyre, his friend and ally, who furnished him with naval stores, ship-builders, and expert mariners, he fitted out fleets¹²; which seem to have traded to the eastern coast of Africa, the southern coast of Arabia, to Persia, and the hither India¹³.

Solomon, in a word, may be said to have formed the first African and India companies; for, although the principal, he cannot be supposed to have been the sole adventurer and proprietor. Hiram, king of Tyre,

10. See Prideaux *Hist. of the Jews and Neighbouring Nations*, book i. et auct. cit.

11. 1 *Chron.* chap. xxii. ver. 14.

12. 1 *Kings*, chap. xi. 2 *Chron.* chap. viii.

13. See Prideaux, *ubi sup.* The fleets of Solomon, though chiefly calculated for commerce, appear also to have been designed to act offensively, in case of resistance, and in that case to have pillaged. 2 *Chron.* chap. viii. ver. 18.

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at least, we know had a share in the trade from Elath and Eziongaber¹⁴. And without the assistance of the Phœnicians the king of Jerusalem could not possibly have furnished the articles of exchange for that trade. One of the most considerable of those articles must have been wrought silver; of which the eastern nations have, in all ages, been remarkably fond, and which then could not fail to bring great returns, as the fleets of Solomon did. And those returns, we find, were chiefly made in gold¹⁵.

The vast abundance of the precious metals in Palestine, during the reign of this great prince, according to the narration in the sacred books, has afforded occasion of triumph to infidel writers, and given much trouble to christian commentators. But a certain degree of candour is only necessary on one side, and a competent share of historical knowledge on the other, to admit and establish the credibility of the Jewish records. The countries conquered by David, and subject to Solomon, as well as those to which he traded, have always abounded in gold. We accordingly learn, that his annual revenue, paid in that metal, was immense, exclusive of the imposts arising from internal traffic and foreign commerce¹⁶.

From Spain the Phœnicians of Tyre imported silver in whole ship loads¹⁷; the Spaniards being then utterly ignorant of its value, and giving it freely in exchange for toys, or permitting it to be dug out of the mine without jealousy¹⁸. Part of their bullion the Tyrians wrought into vessels and utensils of various kinds, for the purposes of trade or private use; yet enough would remain, we may fairly presume,

14. 1 *Kings*, chap. x. ver. 11. 2 *Chron.* chap. viii. ver. 17, 18; and chap. ix. ver. 21.

15. 1 *Kings*, chap. ix. ver. 28.

16. 2 *Chron.* chap. ix. ver. 13, 14.

17. Diod. Sicul. lib. v. Strabo, lib. iii.

18. Id. *ibid.*

to keep the proportional value of silver as far below that of gold, in Syria, during the reign of Solomon, as in any other country in ancient or modern times. The Jewish monarch, whose treasury overflowed with gold, could therefore procure what quantity of silver he thought proper with that more precious metal. Hence silver is figuratively said to have been at Jerusalem, in the days of Solomon's grandeur, as plenty as stones¹⁹. No wonder, therefore, so opulent and ostentatious a prince thought it too base to form the drinking vessels, or ornamental furniture of his palace²⁰.

But the grandeur of the Israelites or Hebrews, as they are indifferently called, was of short continuance. During the reign of Rehoboam, the son and successor of the magnificent Solomon, Palestine became a prey to civil dissensions, and was divided into two kingdoms; namely, the kingdom of Israel, of which Samaria became the capital; and the kingdom of Judah, the metropolis of which was Jerusalem, the former seat of government²¹. In consequence of this division, which weakened the Hebrew nation, Palestine was frequently plundered by the kings of Damascus; but especially by Hazael and Rezin, the most powerful princes that had ever reigned in Syria²².

Hazael

19. 1 *Kings*, chap. x. ver. 27.

20. 2 *Cbron.* chap. ix. ver. 15—20.

21. 1 *Kings*, chap. xii. 2 *Cbron.* chap. xxi.

22. The manner in which Hazael ascended the throne of Damascus was not a little remarkable. The language of sacred history only can do justice to the narration. "And Elisha came to Damascus, and Benhadad the king of Syria was sick, and it was told him, saying, The man of God is come hither. And the king said unto Hazael, take a present in thine hand, and go meet the man of God, and inquire of the Lord by him, saying, Shall I recover of this disease!— So Hazael went to meet him, and took a present with him, even of every good thing in Damascus, forty camels burden, and came and stood before him, and said, Thy son Benhadad, king of Syria, hath

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Hazael not only subdued the kingdom of Israel, but tyrannised over it during the greater part of his reign²³. And the hostile demonstrations of Rezin, who had extended his sway as far as the Arabian gulf, where he took Elath, so much alarmed Ahas, king of Judah, for the safety of Jerusalem, that he applied, in the most abject terms, for assistance from Tilgath-pileser, emperor of Assyria; whom he acknowledged as his superior sovereign, by a present, and bound himself to obey²⁴. Glad of an opportunity of asserting his dominion over the rebellious and warlike provinces to the west of the Euphrates, the Assyrian monarch entered the territory, and appeared before the city of Damascus with a formidable army; and having made himself master of the place, finally subverted that famous kingdom; slew Rezin, and transplanted the inhabitants to a distant part of his empire, on the eastern side of the Tygris²⁵.

Ant. Chr.
740
Nabonass.
æra 7.

“hath sent me to thee, saying, Shall I recover of this disease? And
 “Elisha said unto him, go say unto thy master thou mayest certainly
 “recover: howbeit, the Lord hath shewed me, that he shall surely
 “die. And he settled his countenance steadfastly, until he was
 “ashamed: and the man of God wept. And Hazael said, why
 “weepeth my lord? And he answered, Because I know the evil
 “that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel. Their strong holds
 “wilt thou set on fire, and their young men wilt thou slay with the
 “sword; and wilt dash their children in pieces, and rip up their
 “women with child. And Hazael said, but what is thy servant a
 “dog, that he should do this great thing? And Elisha, answered,
 “the Lord hath shewed me that thou shalt be king over Syria. So he
 “departed from Elisha, and came to his master, who said to him,
 “what said Elisha to thee? And he answered, he told me that thou
 “shouldest surely recover. And it came to pass on the morrow
 “that he took a thick cloth, and dipt it in water, and spread it on
 “the face of Benhadad: so that he died. And Hazael reigned in
 “his stead.” *2 Kings*, chap. viii. ver. 7—15.

23. *2 Kings*, chap. x. ver. 32, 33. chap. xiii. ver. 3, 7. 22. Hazael also oppressed the kingdom of Judah, *2 Kings*, chap. xii. ver. 17, 18.

24. *2 Kings*, chap. xvi. ver. 7.

25. *2 Kings*, ver. 9. and Prideaux, *Connect.* book i.

The

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Ant. Chr.
728.
Nabonass.
æra 19.

Ant. Chr.
721.
Nabonass.
æra 26.

Ant. Chr.
714.
Nabonass.
æra 33.

The same policy was pursued by the successors of Tilgath-pileser. His son Salmaneser, who had in the beginning of his reign asserted his sovereignty over the Syrian provinces, finding that Hoshea, king of Israel, did not pay him the customary tribute, entered Palestine at the head of a mighty host, and invested Samaria. Hoshea, who had been encouraged in his obstinacy by So or Sabaco, king of Egypt and Æthiopia, made a gallant defence, but received no succours: so that Samaria, after a siege of three years, was compelled to submit to the law of the conqueror²⁶. And the king of Israel and his subjects, after having seen their capital sacked, were carried captives into Assyria²⁷. Hoshea was loaded with chains, and thrown into prison at Nineveh, and the Israelites were planted in different districts, toward the frontiers of Media²⁸; while their former country was peopled with the Cusheans, and other rude tribes, brought from the less remote provinces of the Assyrian empire²⁹.

Immediately after the subversion of the kingdom of Israel, Salmaneser received the submissions of all the cities in Phœnicia, except Tyre. Against that city, therefore, he pointed his vengeance, as soon as he had settled his affairs in Assyria³⁰. He made his first attempt by sea, with a fleet which he had fitted out on the coast of Syria Proper. Being worsted by the Tyrians on their natural element, he invested their capital by land. During a siege of five years they baffled all the efforts of his army³¹. But his death, and other unforeseen events, only perhaps saved Tyre from the speedy execution of the awful

26. 2 *Kings*, chap. xvii. ver. 3—6. chap. xviii. ver. 9, 10, 11.

27. 2 *Kings*, chap. xvii. ver. 6. chap. xviii. ver. 11. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. ix.

28. *Kings*, chap. xvii. ver. 6.

29. 2 *Kings*. chap. xvii. ver. 24. and Prideaux, *Connect.* book i.

30. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. ix. and Prideaux, *Connect.* book i.

31. Id. *ibid.*

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judgment denounced against it by the Jewish prophets, and which we shall afterward see executed; a doom that had already overtaken Damascus and Samaria³², and which hung suspended over Jerusalem³³.

Hezekiah, king of Judah, having withdrawn his allegiance from the emperor of Assyria³⁴; and formed, for support in his rebellion, an alliance with the king of Egypt, Sennacherib, the son of Salmaneser, came against him with a strong army, and reduced many of his fortified towns³⁵; notwithstanding the precautions he had taken to prevent the approach of the enemy, by desolating his country. Alarmed at this rapid progress, Hezekiah sent the Assyrian monarch a submissive embassy; and afterward a present of three hundred talents of silver, and thirty of gold, and agreed to pay the same sum annually for the holding of his kingdom³⁶. Sennacherib accepted the money and the submission of the king of Judah; but afterward learning, it appears, his alliance with the king of Egypt, the Assyrian forces were ordered to invest Jerusalem³⁷.

In the meantime, the Egyptian army being put in motion, Sennacherib advanced against it, overthrew

32. That many of the predictions of the Jewish prophets led to their own completion, no man of sound understanding can doubt, after reading the sacred history; so many, indeed, that were we not taught to consider those holy men as the heralds of God's judgments, we might often suppose them the trumpeters of war, rebellion, usurpation, and the remote causes of all the horrid consequences of such disorders; the murder of princes, the slaughter of armies, the desolation of kingdoms, and the sacking of cities. But as they were merely the organs of the will of Heaven, they must stand exempt from blame.

33. *Isaiab*, chap. xxix. ver. 1—8.

34. *2 Kings*, chap. xviii. ver. 7.

35. *Ibid.* ver. 13.

36. *2 Kings*, chap. xviii. ver. 14, 15, 16. In regard to the annual tribute, the words are express: "that which thou puttest on me, I will bear."

37. *Ibid.* ver. 17—24.

it;

it; and after having ravaged Egypt, proposed to renew the siege of Jerusalem³⁸. Hezekiah, however, was delivered from the danger that threatened him, by a burning blast from the Arabian desert, or a pestilential distemper, which broke out in the Assyrian camp; cut off great part of the army, and obliged Sennacherib to retire in disgrace to Nineveh³⁹. This blast, or plague, is called, in the strong language of Scripture, the stroke of the angel of God⁴⁰.

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Ant. Chr.
710.
Nabonass.
æra 37.

Esar-haddon, the son and successor of Sennacherib, having reunited, as formerly related⁴¹, the kingdom of Babylon to the Assyrian empire, asserted his right of dominion over the kingdom of Judah; transplanted into Assyria the remainder of the inhabitants of the kingdoms of Israel and Damascus, and supplied their place with foreigners; took Manasseh the Jewish king prisoner, because of his defection; bound him with fetters, and sent him captive to Babylon⁴².

Ant. Chr.
680.
Nabonass.
æra 67.

Meanwhile the Assyrian monarch prosecuted his march toward the Nile, every where commanding unconditional obedience; reduced Azotus, and entered Egypt⁴³. Having plundered that rich country, he returned loaded with prisoners and treasure, through the countries he had subjected to his sway. And finding, on his arrival at Babylon, Manasseh sufficiently humbled, he restored him to the tributary throne of Judah⁴⁴.

38. 2 *Kings*, chap. xix. ver. 33. *Isaiab*, chap. xxxvii. ver. 18, 19, 33, 34.

39. 2 *Kings*, chap. xix. ver. 35, 36. *Isaiab*, chap. xxxvii. ver. 36, 37. 2 *Chron.* chap. xxxii. ver. 21.

40. Id. *ibid*.

41. Lett. I.

42. 2 *Chron.* chap. xxxiii, ver. 11. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. x. See also Prideaux, *Connect.* book. i. et auct. cit.

43. Id. *Ibid*.

44. Compare Joseph, et Prideaux, ubi sup. with 2 *Chron.* chap. xxxiii. ver. 12, 13.

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The terror of the Assyrian arms being thus spread wide, and the Assyrian power exalted above that of every other people, the nations between the Euphrates and the Nile seem to have made no attempt to recover their independency for almost fifty years, after the expedition of Esar-haddon. During this period, however, the Egyptian monarchy, having gathered new strength, its sovereigns not only recovered what they had lost in Syria, but endeavoured to extend their dominion as far as the frontiers of Babylonia⁴⁵. These circumstances naturally lead me to recal your lordship's attention to the affairs of Egypt.

The history of this venerable kingdom was formerly brought down to the reign of Psammitichus⁴⁶; one of the twelve chiefs, among whom the government was divided, after the anarchy that followed the death of Sethon⁴⁷. The means by which he rose to power⁴⁸, and the particulars of the revolution that gave him possession of the throne⁴⁹, I shall now relate, according to promise, as an introduction to the second, and more credible part of the history of the Egyptian monarchy.

Psammitichus, who kept his court at Sais, in Lower Egypt, and under whose jurisdiction was the sea-coast, seems to have been the first Egyptian prince that cultivated commerce, or who shook off the narrow prejudices of his country⁵⁰. The ancient Egyptians having a superstitious horror against maritime

45. 2 *Kings*, chap. xxiii. ver. 29.

46. Lett. I.

47. Ibid.

48. Vid. Herodotus, lib. i. cap. cli—cliv.

49. Id. ibid.

50. Herodot. lib. ii. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. If Sesostris endeavoured to overcome those prejudices, and enlarge commerce, as some authors give us reason to believe, his example seems to have had no influence upon his successors.

affairs, and being restrained by their religion from mingling with other nations, the foreign trade of Egypt had hitherto been carried on, and monopolized by the Phœnicians⁵⁵; who submitted to many mean compliances for the favour they enjoyed, and yet were allowed to land only at the port of Naucratis, on the western branch of the Nile⁵⁶. Psammitichus encouraged the Greeks to visit his harbours, and enter into competition with the Phœnicians; while he took the utmost care to promote industry, and awaken a spirit of commerce among the people immediately under his government⁵⁷. By this liberal policy, he so greatly increased in wealth and power, as to excite the jealousy of all the other Egyptian chiefs⁵⁸. They first confined him to his own district, as formerly observed, excluding him from any share in the general government of the kingdom; and afterward entered into a league for his destruction⁵⁹.

In order to avert the danger that threatened him, Psammitichus naturally applied to the people with whom he was connected by trade, and who, consequently, were interested in his fortune. He was accordingly enabled to reinforce his native troops with a

55. Id. *ibid.* Strabo, lib. xvii. Plut. *Isid. et Osir.* This neglect of navigation on the part of the Egyptians, and their intimate connexion with the Phœnicians, in consequence thereof, enable us to account, in a satisfactory manner, why all the Egyptian emigrations of Greece, and the islands of the *Ægean* sea, were made from the coast of Phœnicia or from the Nile, in Phœnician vessels. Want of attention to these circumstances, has involved the narration of several historians, both ancient and modern, in much confusion, and bewildered many antiquarians.

56 Herodot. *ubi sup.*

57. Diod. Sicul. lib. i.

58. Id. *ibid.*

59. Compare Herodot. lib. ii. with Diod. Sicul. lib. i. I have chosen, in general, to follow the account given by Diodorus of the revolution accomplished by this prince, as being more consistent and probable than that of Herodotus.

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Ant. Chr.
670.
Nabonass.
æra 77.

body of Arabian mercenaries, probably in Phœnician pay. He was also furnished with a body of Ionians and Carians, from Asia Minor; and who, being clad in complete armour, were terrible to the Egyptians⁶⁰. With an army composed of these combined forces, he marched toward Memphis; totally defeated his antagonists, who were all either slain in battle or obliged to seek refuge in exile; took possession of that superb capital, and became master of all Egypt⁶¹. This revolution was accomplished, as formerly observed⁶², in the year six hundred and seventy before the christian æra.

Psammitichus, when seated on the Egyptian throne, adhered to the same maxims of policy that had contributed to his aggrandizement. He continued to cultivate commerce; opened his ports to all nations, but shewed particular favour to the Greeks⁶³; formed an alliance with Athens and other Grecian states⁶⁴; gave liberal encouragement to foreign emigrant⁶⁵ and settled his Ionian and Carian auxiliaries on both sides of the eastern branch of the Nile, between Bubastis and Pelusium⁶⁵. There confined to the profession of arms, conformable to the Egyptian polity, which obliged the son to follow the occupation of his father, these successful soldiers and their descendants long maintained their military character; and being joined by other adventurers of the same description, and employed as the royal guard, the Grecian mercenaries became the support of this prince and his successors in seasons of danger and tumult⁶⁶.

60. Diod. Sicul. et Herodot. ubi sup.

61 Id. ibid.

62. Lett. I.

63. Herodot. lib. i. Diod. Sicul. lib. i.

64. Diod. Sicul. lib. i.

65. Herodot. et Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

66. Id. ibid.

Yet farther to facilitate intercourse, and eradicate prejudices, Psammitichus put a number of Egyptian boys under the tuition of the more enlightened Greeks, settled in Egypt; in order to be instructed in the Grecian language and discipline⁶⁷. So that the transactions of Egypt were thenceforth intimately known to the people of Greece, who traded to great advantage with that country; and the Egyptians came gradually to have less aversion against strangers, when they grew better acquainted with them.

If the wisdom of Psammitichus was conspicuous in civil, it was equally so in military affairs. As soon as he had settled the interior government and police of his kingdom, he led an army into Syria; with a view of recovering the frontier towns, which the Assyrian emperors had taken from his predecessors. He accordingly invested Azotus or Ashdod, while his generals subdued the neighbouring country; and made himself master of that important place after a siege or blockade of twenty-nine years⁶⁸.

The extraordinary length of this siege can only be accounted for, by the intervention of certain unforeseen events, which threatened the Egyptian monarch with utter ruin. Two hundred thousand of his native troops deserted in a body; because he had given the post of honour and of danger to his Grecian mercenaries, in whose valour he could best confide⁶⁹. Perceiving his error, he endeavoured to conciliate them by concessions, but in vain. They refused to return to the army, and continued their march into their own country. He followed them; and strove, by threats, to subdue their refractory spirit. But

67. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. Herodot. lib. ii.

68. Id. ibid.

69. Diod. Sicul. lib. i.

PART I. finding them obstinate in disobedience, he prudently permitted them to retire into Ethiopia, rather than combat their despair⁷⁰.

Ant. Chr.
632.
Nabonass.
era 115.

That revolt was followed by the approach of a powerful and barbarous enemy. The Scythians, who had, as formerly related⁷¹, vanquished the Medes under their warlike king Cyaxares; having ravaged all the countries contiguous to the Euphrates and Tygris, were advancing toward the Nile, when the sagacity of Psammitichus saved Egypt from their hostile fury. Instead of attempting to obstruct their progress, by offering them battle, he advanced into Palestine to meet them, loaded with rich presents, recommended by soothing words: and thus diverted the storm that was ready to break upon his kingdom⁷².

Ant. Chr.
616.
Nabonass.
era 131.

Nechoh, the son and successor of Psammitichus, pursued the political system of his father, both with respect to naval and military affairs. In his ardour for commercial intercourse he attempted to cut a navigable canal, from the Nile to the Arabian gulf. But in that great project he failed, after the loss of an hundred and twenty thousand men, and a vast expense of treasure⁷³.

This enlightened monarch, however, was more fortunate in another bold undertaking, intimately connected with the former. Having built a fleet in the ports of the Arabian gulf, he put it under the conduct of Phœnician navigators, whom he ordered to discover the extreme point of Africa toward the south, or what is now known by the name of the Cape of Good Hope. And these navigators, after a coasting voyage

70. Id. ibid. et Herodot. lib. ii.

71. Lett. I.

72. Herodot. lib. i. cap. cv.

73 Herodot. lib. ii.

of two years, sailed round the African continent, and returned to Egypt, in the third year, by the mouth of the Mediterranean sea⁷⁴. This is the first voyage of discovery mentioned in history, and one of the most successful. It made known a geographical truth of the utmost importance in navigation, but of which the ancients took little advantage; namely, that Africa is surrounded on all sides by the sea, except at the narrow isthmus that connects it with Asia.

While that grand discovery was making, Nechaoh was not inactive. He had equipped a strong fleet on the Mediterranean, as well as on the Red sea, and entered Syria at the head of a formidable army⁷⁵. The object of this expedition seems to have been nothing less than the conquest of the whole country from the frontiers of Egypt to the Euphrates. Nor was the idea extravagant. The Assyrian power, as Nechaoh no doubt knew, having been shaken by the Medes before the Scythian invasion, and weakened by the revolt of Nabopolassar, governor of Babylon, was then bending toward its fall, and incapable of any vigorous effort⁷⁶. The Scythians still hung upon the northern frontier of the empire, and the Medes and


Ant. Chr.
610.
Nabonass.
era 137.

74. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. xlii.

75. Herodot. lib. ii. Joseph. lib. x.

76. I am sensible that Josephus (*Antiq.* lib. x.) has represented the Assyrian empire as already subverted; and makes Nechaoh march into Syria, in order to repress the growing greatness of the Medes and Babylonians, "who had dissolved that empire" (*Id. ibid.*). But this account is as inconsistent with political probability, as with the general scope of history. Yet have the bold assertions of the Jewish historian (who lived in too late an age to be entitled to assume the tone of confidence, in regard to such ancient matters) misled many modern writers, and among others the learned Prideaux. A proper attention to sacred history, however, would have preserved them from this error; for there we are told, that "*Pbaraob-Nechaob*, king of Egypt, came up against the king of Assyria." *2 Kings*, chap. xxiii. ver. 29.

Babylonians

PART I.  Babylonians were ready to seize the first opportunity to accomplish its ruin.

The good Josiah, king of Judah, however, faithful in his allegiance to his superior sovereign, took arms to obstruct the progress of the Egyptian monarch; although no attempt had been made to disturb his repose, and many remonstrances were offered to induce him to remain quiet⁷⁷. Obstinate in his purpose, he accordingly posted himself with his forces in the valley of Megiddo; where he was mortally wounded, and obliged to retreat⁷⁸. And the king of Egypt prosecuted his march toward the Euphrates.

Having taken the city of Charchemish, near that river, and reduced under his obedience all the northern part of Syria, Nechaoh returned into Palestine; degraded Jehoiahaz, the younger son of Josiah, who had assumed the sovereignty, and placed Eliakim, the elder brother, whose name he changed to Jehoiakim, upon the throne of Judah; imposed upon the kingdom an annual tribute of one hundred talents of silver, and a talent of gold; then retired into Egypt, carrying along with him Jehoiahaz in chains⁷⁹.

But Nechaoh had the mortification, before the close of his reign, to see himself stripped of all his Syrian conquests. Nabopolassar finding himself firmly seated on the throne of Babylon, and strengthened by the alliance of Cyaxares I. king of Media, sent his son Nebuchadnezzar with an army into Syria⁸⁰. And that youthful commander, whom his father had associated with himself in the supreme power, reduced the gar-

⁷⁷. 2 *Kings*, chap. xxiii, ver. 29, 30. 2 *Chron.* chap. xxxv. ver. 20, 21.

⁷⁸. 2 *Chron.* chap. xxxv. ver. 22, 23.

⁷⁹. 2 *Kings* chap. xxiii. ver. 33, 34. 2 *Chron.* chap. xxxvi, ver. 1—4.

⁸⁰. Alex. Polyhist. ap. Synceel. Joseph. Antiq. lib. x.

riſon of Carchemiſh, in defiance of all the force of Egypt, and drove the Egyptians from every place which they held, from the Euphrates to the bottom of the Arabian gulf⁸¹. The name of this warlike prince, whoſe exploits we have already had occaſion to mention, recalls us to the great line of oriental hiſtory.

LETTER
IX.

Ant. Chr.
607.
Nabonaſſ.
æra 140.

Nebuchadnezzar, in expelling the Egyptians from Syria, had brought under his dominion the tributary kingdom of Judah. Having taken Jeruſalem, and made Jehoiakim priſoner, he plundered the temple of its moſt precious veſſels, and ſent them to Babylon⁸². He alſo ſent thither many captives of high rank, and threatened to include the king of Judah among the number. But on the humble ſubmiſſion of that prince to the conqueror, he was permitted to retain the Jewish ſceptre, and left as a kind of viceroy over the kingdom⁸³.

Ant. Chr.
606.
Nabonaſſ.
æra 141.

Before Nebuchadnezzar had completed the conqueſt of Syria, he received an account of the death of his father⁸⁴. This event made his preſence neceſſary at Babylon; where, and in the neighbouring country, he ſpent ſome years, in fortifying and adorning that city, and in regulating the government of the kingdom of which it was the metropolis⁸⁵. Meantime, Cyaxares having freed his territories from the incurſions of the Scythians, by the maſſacre of their chieftains⁸⁶; and terminated, through the mediation of Nebuchadnezzar, whom Herodotus calls Labynetus,

81. 2 Kings, chap. xxiv. ver. 7. Jeremiah, chap. xlv. ver. 2.

82. 2 Kings, chap. xxiv. ver. 1. 2 Chron. chap. xxxvi. ver. 6, 7. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. x.

83. Id. *ibid.*

84. Beros. ap. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. x.

85. Id. *ibid.*

86. Herodot. lib. i.

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
600.Nabonass.
era 147.

a war in which the Scythians had involved him with the Lydians⁸⁷, the kings of Media and Babylon, with their joint forces, subverted the Assyrian empire, and accomplished the destruction of Nineveh, in the manner we have seen⁸⁸.

History, as I have formerly had occasion to observe, has furnished us with no particulars of the siege of Nineveh. Nor do we know, with certainty, any thing concerning the structure of its buildings, or the manners of its inhabitants; for no ancient historian or geographer, who speaks of it, had seen it before it was destroyed. That it was utterly demolished, Strabo bears witness⁸⁹. All ancient authors however agree, that Nineveh was as large, if not larger, and as populous and superb as Babylon, when it was conquered by Cyrus the great, or entered by Alexander the Macedonian; and consequently one of the greatest and most magnificent cities in the ancient world⁹⁰. It was situated on the eastern bank of the Tygris, in a large plain, between that river and the Lycus⁹¹.

While Nebuchadnezzar was employed in subduing the Assyrian provinces to the east of the Euphrates,

87. Id. *ibid*.

88. Lett. I.

89. *Geog.* lib. xvi. init.

90. Diod. Sicul. lib. ii. Strabo, lib. xvi. Plin. lib. vi. According to the prophet Jonah, the only person we read of that ever visited Nineveh during its grandeur, it was "a great city of three days journey;" (Jonah, chap. iii. ver. 3.) or about sixty miles, by common computation, in circumference; and contained one hundred and twenty thousand souls "that could not discern between their right hand and their left;" (Id. chap. iv. ver. 2.) so that the whole number of inhabitants, by the most moderate calculation, must have been about one million. Diodorus Siculus (lib. ii.) gives Nineveh nearly the same dimensions as Babylon. Strabo only says, in general terms, (*Geog.* lib. xvi. init.) that it was larger than that city.

91. Strabo, lib. xvi. init.

Jehoiakim,

Jehoiakim, king of Judah, threw off the Babylonian yoke⁹². But he paid dear for his temerity. Harassed by enemies on all sides, from the Syrian provinces, that preserved their allegiance to the king of Babylon; and whose governors, at last, invaded Palestine with their collected forces, he was slain in the neighbourhood of his capital; and his body being denied the honours of sepulture, was exposed in the high-way⁹³.

Jerusalem, which had long been threatened and insulted, was now formally invested; and after the siege had continued about three months, Nebuchadnezzar, in person, led an army against it. Jehoiachin, the son of the deceased king, who had assumed the royal dignity, conscious of his inability to hold out, attempted, by submission, to deprecate the vengeance of the incensed monarch. He accordingly walked out in the form of a suppliant, attended by his mother; and his whole court. But his submission availed him nothing beyond the sparing of his life. He was put in chains; and Zedekiah, the son of Josiah, was placed on the tributary throne of Judah⁹⁴. Nor was this all: Nebuchadnezzar pillaged a second time the temple, and also the palace of Jerusalem, and carried captive to Babylon the degraded king, Jehoiachin, with his wives, his nobles, and officers both civil and military; seven thousand men habituated to the use of arms, and one thousand artificers⁹⁵.


This victorious monarch, after his return to his capital, seems to have spent, as formerly, several years of peace in adorning the seat of his power, and in enjoying the glory of greatness, and the pride of

92. 2 *Kings*, chap. xxiv. ver. 1, 2. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. x.

93. *Id.* *ibid.* Jeremiah, chap. xxxvi. ver. 30.

94. 2 *Kings*, chap. xxiv. ver. 10—17.

95. *Id.* *ibid.*

PART I.  dominion, in the midst of his courtiers and tributary princes. But he was again roused to arms by the revolt of the Jews.

Zedekiah, king of Judah, in violation of his oath of fealty to the king of Babylon, had been for some time forming a plan of independency with the neighbouring princes; and persisted in his negociation with those princes, notwithstanding the strong declaration of the prophet Jeremiah, "That the Lord of Hosts, the God of the whole earth, had doomed them all to be servants to Nebuchadnezzar; that they should all serve him, his son, and his son's son; that such as should offer to dispute his sway, the Lord would punish with the sword, with famine, and with pestilence; but that those who quietly submitted their necks to the yoke of the king of Babylon, should be spared, and permitted to dwell in their own land, and to cultivate it⁹⁶." Regardless of this declaration, and other prophecies, particularly respecting the kingdom of Judah, Zedekiah, having engaged his principal subjects to enter into his views, and received assurances of support from the king of Egypt, broke out into open rebellion against the authority of the king of Babylon⁹⁷.

The Jewish king's alliance with the rival power of Egypt, from which the sovereignty of Syria had been formerly wrested, as we have seen, by the youthful arms of Nebuchadnezzar, more than every other circumstance, may be supposed to have provoked the vengeance of that haughty monarch. For Apries or Hophra, the grandson of Nechaoh, who now filled the Egyptian throne, was an ambitious prince; and for-

96. Jeremiah, chap. xxvii. ver. 4—11.

97. 2. Chron. chap. xxxvi. ver. 12, 13.

midable both by land and sea⁹⁸. The enraged Babylonian conqueror, therefore, as if guided by the hand of God, for the correction of his chosen, but sinful and perverse people, and animated by the voice of his prophets, entered Palestine, breathing terror, at the head of a vast body of forces in hostile array; bore down all resistance in the field, and invested Jerusalem⁹⁹.

LETTER
IX.

Ant. Chr.
590.
Nabonass.
æra 157.

The king of Judah and his subjects, who had hitherto proved obstinately hardened against the remonstrances of the prophet Jeremiah, forewarning them of the fatal consequences of a breach of faith, no sooner saw the holy city formally besieged, than they became sensible of their folly and impiety. They affected repentance, and entered into a solemn covenant with the Lord their God; by which they engaged to worship him only, and faithfully to observe all his laws¹⁰⁰.

The approach of an Egyptian army, however, dissipated the melancholy apprehensions of the Jews, and inspired them with new confidence; gave them the prospect of recovering their independency, or at least of changing their master. They accordingly reverted to their former mode of thinking; and, during the first moments of illusive hope, broke the covenant which they had made with the Lord, through fear¹⁰¹. And their fate was worthy of such a fickle and faithless people; a people ever equally regardless of their engagements, sacred and civil.

Ant. Chr.
589.
Nabonass.
æra 158.

Nebuchadnezzar, as soon as he was informed of the approach of the Egyptian forces, had raised the

98. Herodot. lib. ii. Diod. Sicul. lib. i.

99. 2 Kings, chap. xxv. ver. i.

100. Jeremiah, chap. xxxiv. ver. 8, 9, 10.

101. Ibid. ver. 11—20.

siege

PART I.

siege of Jerusalem, and marched against the generals of Apries¹⁰². Hence the renewed confidence and impiety of the Jews, who flattered themselves the Babylonians would molest them no more. But they were miserably disappointed. The Egyptians, intimidated at the appearance of so numerous and well appointed an army, as that under the king of Babylon, retired toward their own frontier, without hazarding a battle; and the redoubted Nebuchadnezzar returned to his station before Jerusalem, and resumed the siege of that sacred and venerable city¹⁰³,

No besieged place had ever less chance of escaping the calamities with which it was threatened, than the metropolis of Judea; whether we consider the state of the garrison by which it was defended, or that of the army with which it was invested.

The forces of Nebuchadnezzar, equal to the greatest enterprise by their numbers, their experienced valour, their weapons and warlike engines, were elated with the flight of the Egyptians before them, the only enemy they had to fear; and now considered the plunder of Jerusalem as their certain prey. The king of Judah and his nobles were not destitute of courage; but the soldiers and citizens were in danger of being driven to desertion or despondency, by the disheartening prophecies of Jeremiah; who publicly declared, in the name of the Lord, That every one who remained in the city should perish by the sword, by famine, or by pestilence; but that such as went out, and submitted to the king of Babylon, should be safe¹⁰⁴.

After such a declaration, your lordship will not be surprised, I presume, that the Jewish princes and nobles said to the king, "We beseech thee let this man

102. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. x. Jeremiah, chap. xxxvii. ver. 5—10.

103. Id. *ibid.*

104. Jeremiah, chap. xxxviii. ver. 2.

“ be put to death; for thus he weakeneth the hands of
 “ the men of war that remain in the city, and the
 “ hands of all the people, in speaking such words
 “ unto them!—He seeketh not the welfare of this
 “ people, but the hurt¹⁰⁵!”

LETTER
 IX.

The sacred character of prophet, however, and the irresolute temper of Zedekiah, saved Jeremiah from that punishment which rigid policy, at such a crisis, would otherwise instantly have inflicted; as the just reward of his spiritual audacity, and seditious prognostics. He was only thrown into prison, where he acquired the virtue of silence; and was made sensible, that his heavenly mission ought not to exempt him from his duty as a subject¹⁰⁶. But his former predictions could not fail to have their influence upon the minds of the citizens, or to break the nerve of the valour of the soldiers, as their leaders had foreseen.

Yet Jerusalem, under all these disadvantages, sustained a close siege of twelve months, against the great and formidable host by which it was invested, without offering to capitulate. At length it was taken by storm¹⁰⁷. The king made his escape at one of the gates, surrounded by his guards and chief officers. But he was overtaken by the Babylonians in the plains of Jericho, and made prisoner along with his sons and principal attendants¹⁰⁸. They were all carried to Ribla in Syria, where Nebuchadnezzar then resided. And that incensed monarch cruelly ordered the sons of Zedekiah, and all the captive nobles of Judah, to be slain in his presence; and after this awful spectacle, (the last he was to behold) the eyes of Zedekiah were

Ant. Chr.
 588.
 Nabonass.
 zra 159.

105. Ibid. ver. 4.

106. Jeremiah, chap. xxxviii. ver. 27. “ Then came all the princes
 “ unto Jeremiah and he told them, according to the words that the
 “ king had commanded.” Id. ibid.

107. 2. Kings chap. xxv. ver. 4—7.

108. Id. ibid.

PART I. put out, and he was bound with fetters of brass, and sent in that condition to Babylon¹⁰⁹.

Meanwhile Jerusalem suffered all the horrors of an Asiatic city taken by storm, in ancient times, and which the conqueror was determined to brand with exemplary vengeance. The Babylonian sword, reeking with the blood of the brave, smote the unresisting from house to house, and from street to street, without regard to age, sex, condition or sanctuary¹¹⁰. Fire followed with its devouring rage, and consumed every public and private building. The temple and palace were pillaged and destroyed, and the walls of the city were thrown down¹¹¹. Such of the inhabitants as escaped in the general massacre, were carried captive to Babylon¹¹²: and Jerusalem, reduced to a heap of ruins, was left utterly desolate¹¹³.

From the calamities attending the extinction of the kingdom of Judah, and the destruction of the holy city, the prophet Jeremiah was in some measure exempted. Nebuchadnezzar, sensible that much was due to the man who had foretold his success, and endeavoured to enforce obedience to his sway, gave his general particular instructions concerning the safety of his sacred person¹¹⁴; ordered a reward to be given him, with the offer of an opulent station at Babylon; or, if he should not be disposed to leave his own country, he was consoled with the liberty of residing in whatever part of it he might think proper¹¹⁵. He chose the latter indulgence; and lived at Mizah, with Gedaliah, whom the king of Babylon had made

109. 2 Kings, ubi sup. Jeremiah, chap. xxxix. ver. 4—7.

110. 2 Chron. xxxvi. ver. 17.

111. Ibid. ver. 18, 19. Jeremiah, chap. xxxix. ver. 8.

112. 2 Chron. chap. xxxvi. ver. 20, 21.

113. Id. ibid. and Lamentations, chap. i. ver. 1—4.

114. Jeremiah, chap. xxxix. ver. 11, 12.

115. Id. chap. xl. ver. 4, 5, 6.

governor over the land of Judah¹¹⁶. Gedaliah was the son of Ahikam, the prophet's former protector, and perhaps owed his elevation to that circumstance.

LETTER
IX.



But the good fortune of Jeremiah was of short continuance. Gedaliah was slain in the second or third month of his government, by Ishmael, a Jewish prince of the blood royal, and other refugees, who had returned from the neighbouring countries into Palestine; and who were envious of his greatness, or intemperately zealous of freeing their nation from the Babylonian yoke¹¹⁷. They also slew all Gedaliah's guards and attendants, both Jewish and Babylonian¹¹⁸.

These barbarities completed the expulsion or removal of the whole Jewish nation. For, although Ishmael and his followers were again obliged to seek safety in exile, the Jewish chiefs, who had expelled them, were so much afraid of the resentment of the king of Babylon, for the massacre of his officers and troops, that they assembled the miserable remnant of the people; man, woman, and child, and conducted them into Egypt¹¹⁹. And they carried along with them the prophet Jeremiah; although he had persisted in remonstrating against their flight, and assured them of better days, if they would remain in their own land¹²⁰. "No!"—said they:—"we will go into the land of Egypt, where we shall see no war; nor hear the voice of the trumpet, nor have hunger of bread; and there will we dwell."

Ant. Chr.
587.
Nabonass.
era 160.

What fortune afterward attended Jeremiah is uncertain; But many of the fugitive Jews obtained settlements in different parts of the kingdom of Egypt¹²¹.

116. Id. *ibid*.

117. Jeremiah, chap. xli. ver. 1, 2.

118. *Ibid*. ver. 3.

119. Jeremiah, chap. xli. xlii throughout, and chap. xliii. ver. 1—7.

120. Id. *ibid*.

121. Jeremiah, chap. xliv. ver. 1.

And

PART I. And there they worshipped, as formerly, Astarte, Isis, or the queen of heaven, in defiance of all the exhortations of the prophet¹²².

In the meantime Nebuchadnezzar, whose throne was exalted above that of every other potentate, and whose pride was boundless as his ambition, seems to have aspired at divine honours; or at least to have attempted to make all the nations that owned his sway bow to a colosseal statue, which he had set up in the province of Babylon (and most probable an image of himself, under the character of the god Belus) as the object of their adoration¹²³. But the firmness of certain Jewish captives, belonging to his household, diverted him from this vain-glorious project, and made him sensible of his folly and impiety¹²⁴. And Ezekiel, a Jewish prophet, in his dominions, awakened anew his martial ardour, and pointed his arms against the rich commercial city of Tyre¹²⁵. Thus are we led, by the course of events, to resume the history of the Phœnicians.

Before the Phœnicians or Canaanites were expelled the more fertile part of their country by the Hebrews¹²⁶, Sidon appears to have been a great city, in possession of extensive commerce¹²⁷; and about two hundred years after, we find the Sidonians so powerful, as to oppress the Hebrews in their turn¹²⁸. But the glory and grandeur of the Sidonians was to arise from arts, not from arms.

We have formerly seen that the Phœnicians were very early acquainted with the art of writing, of keep-

122. Jeremiah, chap. xlv. ver. 15—19.

123. Daniel, chap. iii. ver. 1—7.

124. Ibid. ver. 8—29

125. Ezek. chap. xxvi. ver. 1—14.

126. See Lett. I.

127. Joshua, chap. xi. ver. 8. Bochart, in Phaleg. lib. iv. et auct. cit.

128. Judges, chap. x. ver. 12.

ing accòmpts, and with navigation¹²⁹. These fitted them for foreign trade, and the regular conduct of commercial transactions; and the people that poured down upon the sea-coast, on the invasion of the inland country by the conquering Hebrews, under Joshua, enabled the Sidonians and Tyrians to plant colonies in various countries; as well as to build new cities, and open new ports in their own maritime territory, behind the mountains of Libanus¹³⁰.

Tyre, which is called the Daughter of Sidon¹³¹, favoured with an excellent harbour, became soon more populous than the parent city. As the Sidonians excelled in the weaving of fine linen, tapestry, beautiful veils, and in the manufacture of glass, which they invented, and knew how to stain, the Tyrians, also, famous in the labours of the loom, were distinguished by their skill in dying their rich stuffs and woollen cloths as well as their linen fabrics, all kinds of bright and deep colours, but especially purple¹³². And the artists of both cities were celebrated for their ingenuity in blending metals and working them into all sorts of vessels and utensils; and in giving to gold and silver ware, and likewise to furniture of wood and ivory, both useful and ornamental, the most elegant fashion and polish¹³³.

In what age Tyre was founded, ancient historians are not agreed. But it must have had its beginning long before the invasion of Canaan by the Hebrews, as it was then a strong city. Yet Homer, who speaks frequently with admiration of Sidon; of the ingenuity of its artists, and the skill of its navigators¹³⁴, makes

129. Lett. I. et auct. cit.

130. Bochart. ubi sup. et in *Canaan*, lib. ii.

131. Isaiah, chap. xxiii. ver. 12.

132. Bochart. in *Phaleg*. lib. iv. et auct. cit.

133. Id. *ibid*.

134. *Iliad*, et *Odyss*. passim.

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no mention of Tyre. In the reign of Hiram, however, who was contemporary, as we have seen, with David and Solomon, and consequently lived only about a century later than the Trojan war, Tyre was a rich commercial city, flourishing in arts and manufactures¹³⁵. And from that æra forward the Tyrians seem to have increased in wealth and power, until their capital was invested by Salmanaser, about three hundred years after the death of Hiram.

But antiquity has left us almost utterly ignorant of the Phœnician transactions during this long period. We only learn, from the history of the neighbouring nations, that the Phœnicians continued to preserve their independency, and to prosecute the arts of peace; while the bordering countries were desolated with war, or the people subjected to a foreign yoke¹³⁶. And during this period it was, that a Phœnician colony from Tyre founded the famous city of Carthage, on the coast of Africa, nearly where the piratical Tunis now stands¹³⁷.

Of Carthage, which soon became the capital of a great commercial state, and the rival of Rome in arms, I shall afterward have occasion to speak. At present, the commercial progress of the Phœnicians must engage our attention.

In the most early ages of which history has furnished us with any records, this industrious people possessed the whole commerce, and enjoyed the sovereignty of the Mediterranean sea¹³⁸. Sidon, which afterward

135. 1 *Kings*, chap. v. 9. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. viii.

136. The Phœnicians were probably indebted to their pacific disposition partly, and partly to well-timed presents made to hostile powers, for the quiet they enjoyed.

137. Justin, lib. xviii. Appian, de *Bell. Pun.* init. Strabo, *Geog.* lib. xvii.

138. Pomp. Mela, lib. i. Bochart, in *Phaleg.* lib. iv.

became

became subject to the kings of Tyre, was then the capital of Phœnicia, and its principal sea-port¹³⁹. We accordingly find, during the heroic times in Greece, that every thing elegant or sumptuous, fit to adorn the person or the palaces of princes, was *Sidonian*¹⁴⁰,

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IX.

From Greece, and the islands of the Archipelago, or Ægean sea, where they had planted colonies, and established commercial stations, the Phœnicians entered the Euxine sea, and navigated its most eastern shores¹⁴¹. And from the Phasis and the Cimmerian Bosphorus, they extended the trade westward to the Herculean strait and the mouth of the Tagus; and thence northward, to the coast of Gaul and Britain¹⁴². From Britain they imported tin; and from Spain, where they settled factories, and built forts, they procured, in exchange for toys and articles of dress, immense quantities of silver, with which they not only enriched themselves, but all the Syrian nations¹⁴³. For the eastern and western coasts of the Spanish peninsula, or the present kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, were the Mexico and Peru of the ancient world¹⁴⁴,

Solomon, as we have already seen, opened to the Phœnicians the ports of the Red Sea, with the maritime trade of Arabia, Persia, India, and Ethiopia. And in possession of some of those ports, and the trade to which they led, the Tyrians seem to have remained, until the destruction of their city, and the building of Alexandria by the Macedonian conqueror. To the same æra, the Phœnicians also retained

139. Id. *ibid.*

140. Hom. *Iliad.* et *Odys.* Strabo, lib. i.

et auct. cit.

141. Mela, et Strabo, ubi sup.

142. Diod. Sicul. lib. v. Strabo, lib. i. iii. Bochart. in *Phalæg.* lib. iii. *Canaan*, lib. i.

143. Strabo et Bochart, ubi sup.

144. I mean, in regard to the abundance of the precious metals, and the facility with which they were obtained from the natives.

a great

PART I. a great share of the trade of Egypt, which they had long engrossed. And when Tyre was assailed by Salmanaser, all these sources of wealth were open to its citizens.

That great master of empire, aware of the difficulty of reducing the strong city of Tyre, unless he could cut off its communication with the sea, fitted out a fleet of sixty sail on the coast of Syria Proper; and where Sidon and every other city had submitted to his arms¹⁴⁵. But the Tyrians, with twelve ships, defeated the whole naval force of the Assyrian monarch, and resisted all his efforts by land, during a siege of five years¹⁴⁶. His death, as we have seen, rescued them from the ruin with which they were threatened. And from the time of that deliverance, until it was invested by Nebuchadnezzar, Tyre seems to have increased in riches and grandeur.

Of this grandeur, and the extent of the Tyrian commerce, at the latter æra, the prophet Ezekiel gives us a magnificent description. “O Tyre!” exclaimed he, “thou hast said in thy streets I am a “city of perfect beauty,—Thy neighbours, who built “thee, have omitted nothing to embellish thee. They “have made the hull and the diverse stories of thy “ships, of the fir-trees of Senir. They have taken “a cedar from Lebanon, to make thee a mast. They “have polished the oaks of Bashan, to make thine “oars. They have employed the ivory of the Indies “to make benches for thy rowers. Fine linen, with “brodered work from Egypt, was that which thou “spreadest forth for thy sail. Hyacinth and purple, “from the isles of Elisha, have made thy flag. The “inhabitants of Sidon and Arvad were thy rowers; “and thy wise men, O Tyre! became thy pilots.

145. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. ix

146. Id. *ibid.*

“ All the ships of the sea, and all their mariners,
 “ occupied thy commerce and thy merchandise. The
 “ Carthaginians trafficked with thee, and filled thy
 “ marts with silver, with tin, and lead. Javan, Tu-
 “ bal, and Meshech, were also thy merchants, and
 “ brought to thy people slaves and vessels of brass.
 “ They of Togarmah traded in thy fairs with horses
 “ and mules. The children of Dedan trafficked with
 “ thee. Thy commerce extended to many islands;
 “ and they gave thee, in exchange for thy wares,
 “ magnificent carpets, ivory, and ebony. The Syri-
 “ ans were thy merchants, because of the multitude
 “ of thy manufactures; and they exposed to sale in
 “ thy fairs, pearls, and purple, embroidered works of
 “ byssus, silk, and all sorts of precious merchandise.
 “ The people of Judah and Israel were also thy mer-
 “ chants: they traded with thee in pure wheat, in
 “ balm, honey, oil, and rosin. Damascus, in ex-
 “ change for thy wares, so various and so excellent,
 “ brought thee great riches; choice wines, and wool
 “ of a bright colour. Dan, Greece, and Mosel
 “ traded in thy markets with iron works, myrrh, and
 “ calamus. Arabia, and the princes of Kedar were
 “ likewise thy merchants: they brought thee their
 “ lambs, and rams, and goats. Shebah and Raamah
 “ came also to traffick with thee: they traded in thy
 “ markets with the most exquisite perfumes, pre-
 “ cious stones, and gold. Thine were the most dis-
 “ tinguished of all the ships of the sea. Thy mari-
 “ ners conducted them upon the great waters. Thou
 “ hast been loaded with riches and glory: never was
 “ any city equal to thee. Thy commerce enriched
 “ the nations, and the kings of the earth. Thou wast
 “ the queen of the ocean: and thy seafaring men
 “ were the terror of all that haunt it¹⁴⁷.”

147. Ezekiel, chap. xxvi. xxvii. xxviii. passim.

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Ant. Chr.
585.

Nabonass.
era 162.

Ant. Chr.
572.

Nabonass.
era 175.

Such was the city against which Nebuchadnezzar advanced with the whole strength of the Babylonian monarchy. Ithobal II. a wise and enlightened prince was then upon the throne of Tyre¹⁴⁸: and a siege of thirteen years, which that city sustained, sufficiently demonstrates his military capacity and the greatness of his resources. He appears to have fallen in defence of his capital¹⁴⁹; which was, at last, taken by the irresistible force, and unremitted operations of Nebuchadnezzar, who laid it in ruins¹⁵⁰.

But the king of Babylon found nothing in Tyre to defray the expense of his armament; or to use the language of Scripture, "he had no wages, nor his army, for the great service he had caused it to serve against Tyre; until every head was bald, and every shoulder was peeled."¹⁵¹ The Tyrians had previously retired, with their most valuable effects, to an island that formed their spacious harbour, and had there built a new city, beyond the reach of the victorious monarch¹⁵². They seem, however, to have made submission to the conqueror; as we find them soon after in possession of their continental territory, and flourishing under a republican form of government¹⁵³.

This revolution makes a few observations necessary. The Phœnicians, like all the other Syrian nations, had hitherto been governed by kings. But those kings were not absolute princes; they were only a kind of chief magistrates, similar to the Grecian chieftains in the heroic times, who could do nothing with-

148. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. x. Ezekiel, chap. xxviii. ver. 2—5.

149. Ezek. chap. xxviii. ver. 8—10.

150. Ezek. chap. xxvi. ver. 4—12. Joseph. *Cont. Apion.* lib. i. et *Antiq.* lib. x.

151. Ezek. chap. xxix. ver. 18.

152. Prideaux, *Connect.* part i. book ii. et. auct. cit.

153. Id. *ibid.* et Joseph. *ubi sup.*

out the consent of the people¹⁵⁴. Commerce has ever been favourable to the spirit of liberty, and the sense of equality. We accordingly find the Tyrians in their new city governed for a time, by suffetes or judges; a kind of magistrates that were also established at Carthage, as we shall have occasion to notice; and who probably, therefore, had subsisted at Tyre, under its former kings, as a check upon regal authority¹⁵⁵.

The same prophet, who had turned the sword of Nebuchadnezzar against Tyre, pointed out to him the means of reimbursing himself, for his prodigious expenditure, and of requiting the hard and unprofitable service, which his troops had undergone, during the siege of that city:—Ezekiel directed him to the invasion of Egypt; which was then in a disordered state, and promised him the spoils of that rich country as a recompense “for his waste of *labour*¹⁵⁶, and as “*wages for his army.*” And the king of Babylon did not slight the words of the divine monitor; as he found they were dictated by sound policy as well as by the spirit of prophecy.

Apries, the grandson of Nechaoh, who still filled the Egyptian throne, was a proud and arrogant prince¹⁵⁷. Having been successful in the beginning of his reign, in an expedition into lower Syria, and in a naval enterprise against the island of Cyprus¹⁵⁸, he thought nothing able to withstand his power, and seems to have projected the conquest of the whole

154. *Gen. Joshua, Judges, passim.*

155. I speak with diffidence on this subject, as the Tyrian records are utterly lost, and imperfect transcripts only remain in the *Jewish Antiquities* of Josephus.

156. *Ezek. chap. xxix. ver. 18—21.*

157. *Herodot. lib. ii. Ezek. chap. xxix. ver. 3.*

158. *Diod. Sicul. lib. i. Herodot. lib. ii.*

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country from the Nile to the Euphrates¹⁵⁹. But afterward finding his forces unable to make head against those of Nebuchadnezzar, he relinquished his ambitious views on that side, and turned them toward Lybia. And thither we must direct our observation.

In early times a Grecian colony, originating from Laconia, had been planted in the maritime parts of Lybia, on the eastern side of the greater Syrtican gulf, and had there founded the city of Cyrene. This city became soon the parent of several others, and the capital of an opulent and potent state, under a regal form of government¹⁶⁰. The prosperity of the Cyrenians, who were continually extending their territory, naturally excited the jealousy of their neighbours. And the number of Grecian adventurers, who poured in upon that part of the coast of Africa in quest of lands, during the reign of Battus, surnamed the *Happy*, king of Cyrenaica, induced the Lybians to apply for assistance to Apries, king of Egypt; and offer to put themselves under his protection, as they seemed in danger of being utterly expelled their country¹⁶¹.

Glad of an opportunity of extending his sway to the west of the Nile, the Egyptian monarch sent a powerful army into Lybia. But that army, unable to resist the hardy valour, and bold courage of the rapacious Greeks, was almost wholly cut off in the first engagement. And this bloody defeat appeared so unaccountable to the proud and opinionated Egyptians, that the remainder of the forces of Apries revolted; believing that their companions had been devoted to certain destruction¹⁶².

159. This is presumable from his negotiations with Zedekiah, king of Judah, and other Syrian princes, whom he induced to throw off their allegiance to the king of Babylon.

160. Herodot. lib. iv.

161. Id. *ibid*.

162. Herodot. lib. ii.

The despotic character of the king of Egypt made the same opinion gain ground among the people; who conjectured he had contrived the slaughter of his native troops, in order that he might govern more arbitrarily by means of his foreign mercenaries¹⁶³. and the tyrannical behaviour of Apries, after the revolt of his army, completed the defection of his subjects of every class.

He sent Amasis, one of his officers, to require the troops to return to their obedience. Amasis, however, finding the dissatisfaction incurable, accepted the title of king, with which he was saluted by a leader of the malecontents, and became their head. Enraged at hearing of this treachery, the indignant monarch ordered Patarbemis, an Egyptian nobleman of high reputation, and the only man of rank that adhered to him, to go to the rebellious camp, and bring Amasis to him alive. Patarbemis obeyed to the utmost of his power. But Amasis, when desired to pay his attendance at court, treated the message with disdain; and Apries, in the first transports of anger and disappointment, commanded the nose and the ears of Patarbemis to be cut off because he had returned without the rebel chief¹⁶⁴.

The consequence of these tyrannical proceedings was a civil war; for which both parties prepared themselves with vigour. Apries assembled, in the plains of Momemphis, an army of thirty thousand Grecian mercenaries; while Amasis collected an immense body of Egyptian forces, and marched against his antagonist. The two armies joined battle, and fought with great fury. At length the troops of Apries, oppressed by numbers, were obliged to quit the field, after a desperate struggle for victory, and the king

Ant. Chr.
570.
Nabonass.
era 177.

163. Id. ibid.

164. Herodot. ubi sup.

PART I. was made prisoner¹⁶⁵. The conqueror treated him with much humanity; but his offended subjects demanded his blood. He was delivered up to them; and his public execution, by strangling, confirmed Amasis in the government of Egypt, and the Egyptians in their rights¹⁶⁶.

During the troubles which preceded this revolution, it was that Nebuchadnezzar invaded Egypt; extended his ravages to the frontiers of Ethiopia, and carried off a booty so vast, as proved a sufficient compensation for his disappointment in the plunder of Tyre, and "wages for his army" (to repeat the words of the prophet Ezekiel), every soldier being loaded with spoil¹⁶⁷.

Ant. Chr. Thus victorious on all sides, this great and war-like monarch returned in triumph to Babylon, which his munificence had raised to an astonishing pitch of grandeur. There, in the height of his pride and exultation, as he was walking on the balcony of his superb palace, and surveying his magnificent capital, he was deprived of the use of his understanding, and remained in a state of insanity for seven years¹⁶⁸. Soon after

569.
Nabonass.
era 178.

165. Id. *ibid*.

166. Herodot. lib. ii. Diod. Sicul. lib. i.

167. Ezek. chap. xxix. xxx. xxxi. xxxii. *passim*. It may seem extraordinary to certain severe thinkers, that I should, on this and other occasions, quote the effusions of the Jewish prophets as historical evidence. My answer, however, is ready. Such as believe the Jewish prophets to have been divinely inspired, will believe that they foretold nothing but what came to pass; while they, who think otherwise will admit that those prophets were well acquainted with the transactions of the neighbouring nations; and that what their political sagacity did not distinctly foresee, before the events they predicted took place (for they seldom died during the interval), their subsequent information enabled them to correct; and consequently to give to their written prophecies historical accuracy, which is the point in question.

168. Daniel, chap iv. ver. 30—36. The words of the prophet are not

after his recovery he died, and was succeeded by his son Evilmerodach¹⁶⁹.

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IX.

Ant. Chr.
561.
Nabonass.
era 186.

From the accession of this prince, who is said to have been both weak and wicked, and who was dethroned and murdered, in the second year of his reign, by his sister's husband, Neriglissar¹⁷⁰, the history of the Babylonian monarchy is involved in confusion and obscurity, until its final subversion by the Medes and Persians under Cyrus. I shall, therefore, my lord, hasten forward to that great event, the most memorable in the revolutions of ancient Asia, without attempting to dispel the cloud with which the intervening period is covered¹⁷¹. In the meantime we must take a retrospective view of the history of the Medes, and Persians, as an introduction to the reign of the illustrious Cyrus; the conqueror of so many kingdoms, and the founder of the Persian empire.

Cyaxares I. king of Media, who acted in conjunction with Nebuchadnezzar, as we have seen, in

not a little remarkable: "There fell a voice from heaven, saying, "O king Nebuchadnezzar! to thee it is spoken the kingdom is departed from thee. And they shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field. They shall make thee to eat grass as oxen; seven times shall pass over thee, until thou know, that the Most High dwelleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whosoever he will. The same hour was the thing fulfilled on Nebuchadnezzar; and he was driven from men, and did eat grass as oxen; and his body was wet with the dew of heaven, till his hairs were grown as eagles feathers, and his nails like birds claws." Id. *ibid*.

169. 2. *Kings*, cap. xxv. ver. 27. Beros. ap. Joseph. *Cont. Appian*. lib. i.

170. Beros. *ubi sup*. Joseph. *Antiq.* lib. x. Ptolem. *Canon. Astronom.*

171. Such an attempt had been made by the learned and laborious Prideaux; who has, with much ingenuity, endeavoured to reconcile the contradictions of ancient historians and chronologers (*Connect.* book ii.). An attempt of the same kind has also been made, with great learning and industry, by the candid and inquisitive Dupin, who pursues a different hypothesis. *Univ. Lib. des Histor.* tom. ii.

accomplishing

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accomplishing the subversion of the Assyrian empire, seems to have held under his dominion all the provinces of that empire to the east of the Tygris, as well as the kingdom of Persia, which had been conquered by his father Phraortes¹⁷². This extensive monarchy, comprehending Media, Persia, Armenia, and all the countries in the neighbourhood of the Euxine and Caspian seas, Cyaxares was enabled to hold in subjection by his great military talents. For we are told by Herodotus, as I have had occasion to notice, that he first formed into distinct bodies of spearmen, cavalry, and archers, the people of Upper Asia; who had been accustomed, before his time, to join battle in a confused manner¹⁷³.

So great an improvement, in the military art, could not fail being attended with the most important consequences. And to the troops thus formed and trained, more than to a family alliance, we may conclude Cyaxares was indebted for his security against the arms, and the ambition of that tremendous conqueror, Nebuchadnezzar.

Astyages, the son and successor of Cyaxares, also maintained his ground against the king of Babylon. And in order, it should seem, to strengthen his interest; and conciliate the affections of the most warlike and powerful nation that owned his sway, he gave his daughter Mandane in marriage to Cambyses, the son of Achæmenes, tributary king of Persia¹⁷⁴. From this marriage sprung the gallant Cyrus¹⁷⁵. Astyages died the same year that Neriglissar usurped the throne of Babylon, and was succeeded in the civil administration of the Median monarchy by his son, Cyaxares II. and

172. Herodot. lib. i. cap. cii.

173. Id. ibid.

174. Xenop. *Cyropædia*, lib. i.

175. Id. ibid. et Herodot. lib. i.

by his grandson Cyrus, in the military establishment¹⁷⁶.

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IX.

Cyrus,

176. This at least may be inferred from the narration of Xenophon, which I have here preferred to that of Herodotus, and shall chiefly follow in whatever relates to the character or actions of Cyrus. As my apology for so doing, I cannot acquit myself better, than by quoting the arguments of the learned and candid Prideaux, in favour of the veracity of the *Cyropædia*. "Plato and Cicero," says he, "have insinuated, "that Xenophon's *History of Cyrus* was rather a description of what a great and good prince ought to be, than a true history of what that prince really was." It must be acknowledged, adds he, "that Xenophon being a great commander, did graft many of his maxims of war and policy into that history; and to make it a vehicle for these, was perhaps his chief design in writing it. But it doth not hence follow, but that the events contained in the work may all be true history. That he intended it for such, he declares; and that it was so, its agreeableness to *holy writ* doth abundantly prove. Therefore, bating the military and political reflections interspersed in that work, the digressions and speeches of a philosophic nature, the remaining bare matters of fact, I take, to have been related by Xenophon, as the true history of Cyrus. And thus far, I take him to have been an historian of much better credit, in this matter, than *Herodotus*. For Herodotus having travelled through Egypt, Syria, and several other countries, in order to the writing of his history, did, as travellers are wont to do, put down all relations upon trust, and no doubt was imposed upon in many of them. But Xenophon was a man of another character; a man who, wrote all things with great judgment, and due consideration; and who, having lived in the court of Cyrus the younger, a descendant of the Cyrus of whom we now speak, had an opportunity of being better informed of what he wrote concerning this great prince." Prideaux, *Connect.* book ii.

A similar observation had been made by sir Walter Raleigh, whose learning, genius, and ability to investigate such matters, no man will dispute; he having been a soldier and a statesman, before he assumed the character of an historian. "As it is true," says he, "that Xenophon described in Cyrus the pattern of a most heroical prince, with much poetical addition; so it cannot be denied, but that the bulk and gross of his narration was founded upon mere historical truth. Putting, therefore, apart the moral and political discourse, and examining but the history of things done, it will easily appear, that Xenophon hath handled his undertaken subject in such sort, that, by beautifying the surface thereof, he hath not in any sort corrupted the body." Raleigh, *Hist. of the World*, book iii. chap. ii. sect. iii.

I am

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
559.Nabonass
era 188.

Cyrus, who was forty years of age at the death of his grandfather Astyages, and only two years younger than his uncle Cyaxares, united the rigid temperance, and hardy valour of the Persians, to the civil and military accomplishments of the more refined and luxurious Medes. And these attainments were accompanied with great sweetness of temper, with humanity, generosity, and every noble virtue; all recommended by a handsome person, and a graceful mien¹⁷⁷. So that Cyrus, having resided sometimes in Media, sometimes in Persia, was equally popular in both countries¹⁷⁸. He seems, however, to have been most attached to the plain manners of Persia; and to his countrymen the Persians, as we shall have occasion to see, he was chiefly indebted for his future greatness.

The province of Persis, or the most ancient kingdom of Persia, was a mountainous district; bounded on the north by Media, on the west by Susiana, on the east by the desert of Caramania, and on the south by the Persian gulf¹⁷⁹. The people of this dry and rugged country, which produced few of the luxuries of life, were a frugal and hardy race of men, and greatly superior in activity and courage to the voluptuous inhabitants of the rich Asiatic plains, in their corrupted state. Their armies, like those of all mountaineers, consisted wholly of infantry¹⁸⁰; which, both in ancient and modern times,

I am not unacquainted with the objections of M. l'Abbe Fraquier, in his ingenious *Dissertat, sur la CYROPEDE de Xenophon*; but they do not affect the credibility of the historical part of that work, and are more than obviated by the above remarks. Had Xenophon been disposed to violate the truth of history, in order to exalt the character of his hero, he might have found many occasions of so doing, which he has obviously slighted, from a scrupulous adherence to facts.

177. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. i. viii.178. Id. *ibid.*179. Ptolem. *Geog.* lib. vi.180. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. i. v.

have ever proved the most serviceable troops; unless in a predatory war, such as that carried on by the ancient Scythians and modern Tartars¹⁸¹. And they have also effected the most permanent conquests.

When Cyrus was called into Media, on the death of his grandfather, he carried with him thirty thousand Persian infantry, completely armed and disciplined¹⁸². This body of choice troops, added to the Median forces, which had been long formidable by their numbers, their valour, and their prowess, inflamed the jealousy of Neriglissar, king of Babylon. That prince had shewn a desire of repressing the growing power of the Medes, as soon as he usurped the Babylonian throne; and, in order to infuse the same jealousy into the other Asiatic potentates, and thereby engage them to enter into his views, he attempted to work upon their fears. He represented to them the danger to which they were exposed from the ambition of the Medes and Persians, united in arms under so able a commander as Cyrus; whose fame was already great in the east, and whom no single power could withstand. All the independent princes on the frontiers of the Babylonian empire, and in the peninsula of Asia Minor, were accordingly induced to form a confederacy with Neriglissar. Among these was Cræsus king of Lydia¹⁸³.

Ant. Chr.
558.
Nabonass.
era 189.

Thus are we naturally led to consider the rise and exaltation of the Lydian monarchy. The Ly-

181. It is not a little surprising Dr. Gilles should affirm (*Hist. Greece*, chap. vii.), that the ancient Scythians fought on foot; whereas it is evident from Herodotus, the most early historian who speaks of them, and who had access to the best information, that they fought chiefly, if not solely, upon horse-back, and that they used, in battle, the scymetar or curved sword, after discharging a flight of arrows and a javelin. Herodot. lib. iv. passim.

182. Xenoph. *Cyropaed.* lib. i. ii.

183. Id. lib. ii.

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dians, as we have formerly had occasion to observe¹⁸⁴, had made considerable progress in arts and civility, at the time of the Trojan war. Assisted by a fertile territory, which abounded in the precious metals, they continued to advance in wealth and power, under three races of kings, the second of which took their descent from Hercules¹⁸⁵; but without performing any thing memorable, that history has transmitted to us, until the reign of Alyattes, the father of Cræsus, who was an ambitious and war-like prince.

The circumstances attending the revolution, by which the descendants of Hercules were deprived of the Lydian crown, are worthy of being preserved among the anecdotes of ancient Asiatic courts. Candaules, the last prince of the Herculean race, was so vain of the beauty of his wife's person, that the voluptuous enjoyment of it in private did not seem to him enough. He was willing that the world should be made acquainted with his happiness; and therefore contrived, without the knowledge of his consort, to shew her naked charms to Gyges, the captain of his guards. The queen, however, discovered the indignity to which she had been exposed, and severely chastised her husband's indiscretion. She offered herself in marriage to the man to whom the sight of her secret beauties had been prostituted; and concerted with him the murder of the king, and the means of usurping the throne¹⁸⁶. Alyattes was the great-grandson of Gyges.

This martial prince, who swayed the Lydian sceptre fifty-seven years, expelled the Cimmerians out of Asia Minor; which they had continued to

184. Lett. III.

185. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. i.

186. Id. lib. i. cap. viii—xii.

ravage from the first irruption of the Scythians, by whom they had been expelled, as we have seen, from the Chersonesus Taurica, now known by the name of the *Crim Tartary*. He also waged war for five years, with various success, against Cyaxares I. king of Media, in favour of some Scythian chieftains, who had sought shelter in his dominions. And he attempted to bring under his dominion, though without finally accomplishing his purpose, the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast¹⁸⁷.

Cræsus, who ascended the throne of Lydia five hundred and sixty-two years before the christian æra, pursued the ambitious designs of his father Alyattes; and not only subdued the Grecian colonies in his neighbourhood, but extended his sway over all the nations of Asia Minor, the Lycians and Cilicians excepted; from the river Halys to the Hellespont, and from the Euxine to the Mediterranean sea¹⁸⁸. These conquests he was enabled to prosecute by the internal wealth of his native kingdom. The particles of gold rolled down by the river Pactolus, which ran through Sardis, his capital, and the gold mines found near the city of Artaneus¹⁸⁹, furnished him with such a quantity of treasure as made his riches proverbial; beside pay for a great body of forces, and the expenses of a splendid court¹⁹⁰.


Cræsus was worthy of his good fortune. No prince seems ever to have treated with more lenity the people whom he had reduced under his dominion, or to have contributed more to the ease and happiness of his subjects of all denominations. He was,

187. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. i. cap. xvi—xxv.

188. Id. lib. i. cap. xxvi—xxviii.

189. Strabo, lib. xiii. xiv.

190. Herodot. lib. i.

PART I.  at the same time, a generous patron of every liberal and ingenious art; so that the Asiatic Greeks, among whom those arts were successfully cultivated, and who were permitted to enjoy their own laws and republican government, flourished greatly during his reign¹⁹¹.

But the prosperity of the Lydian monarchy was soon to suffer a check, and the glory of Cræsus to be obscured. Though disposed to cherish the blessings of peace, and apprehensive of the consequences of foreign war, he saw the necessity of supporting the king of Babylon against the forces of the Medes and Persians, under the conduct of Cyrus. He therefore led into Assyria an army, consisting of forty thousand light-armed foot, and ten thousand horse¹⁹².

Meanwhile Cyrus had not been idle. Having reduced to obedience the Armenians, who had attempted to throw off the Median yoke, in hopes of recovering their independency, by joining in the general league, he was ready to make head against all his enemies before the arrival of Cræsus. He accordingly entered the Babylonian territories, which he prudently resolved to make the scene of war, and found the confederates posted in a large plain, with their camp strongly fortified¹⁹³. For some days after his approach, they continued within their entrenchments. At length they came out in order of battle, and a hot engagement took place. But the combat was unequal. The front battalions of the confederate army were soon broken, and the whole body of infantry routed, though vastly superior in numbers, by the vigorous shock of the Persian foot;

Ant. Chr.
554.
Nabonass.
era 193.

191. Id. *ibid.* Thucyd. lib. i.

192. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. iii.

193. *Cyropæd.* lib. iv.

all armed for close fight, with swords and pikes. The Median horse, in like manner, broke the cavalry of the confederates; and, during the conflict, Neriglissar king of Babylon was slain¹⁹⁴.

Notwithstanding these advantages, Cyrus did not think it prudent, on the evening of battle, to endeavour to force the enemy's camp. He therefore ordered a retreat. Next morning, however, he returned to the charge; drove the Babylonians, and their allies, from their fortified station, in spite of all the efforts of Cræsus, king of Lydia, who had assumed the chief command on the death of the king of Babylon; took many prisoners, and seized an immense booty¹⁹⁵.

The Babylonians in the death of Neriglissar, who was a brave and able usurper, sustained a great misfortune; especially as his son, Laborosoarchod, proved a weak and worthless despot. Gobrias and Gadates, two of the provincial governors of this tyrannical young king, revolted, because of the wrongs they had suffered; and if his violences and

194. Id. *ibid*.

195. Xenoph. *ubi sup*. The trophies of war, and the richest part of the booty, Cyrus sent to Cyaxares. But he reserved for himself all the horses that were captured, in order to form for his Persian army a body of cavalry, which hitherto it had wanted (*Cyropæd*, lib. v.); a circumstance not a little remarkable, as Media abounded with excellent horses, and long supplied almost all Asia with them (Polyb. lib. x. Excerpt. iv.). The prisoners, after delivering up their arms, were permitted by Cyrus to return to their respective countries. Nor did he impose upon them, any other obligation, than a promise not to engage in hostilities against him or his allies (*Cyropæd*. lib. v.). Among those prisoners was a princess of singular beauty, whom the victorious army had set apart for the conqueror. She was named Panthæa, and was the wife of Abradates, king of Susiana. When informed of her captivating charms, Cyrus refused to see her, lest he should be tempted to abuse the rights of conquest, or to relax in the prosecution of those great designs he had formed. Id. *ibid*.

PART I. cruelties had not provoked his subjects to murder him, Cyrus might soon have made himself master of the whole Babylonian empire ¹⁹⁶.

That such would have been the event, is, at least, highly probable. For although Nabonadius or Belshazzar, the successor of Laborosoarchod, appears to have been a dissolute prince, he was less obnoxious to his subjects; and, if no wiser, he was better advised in regard to the government of his kingdom ¹⁹⁷. Cyrus, who had penetrated to the walls of Babylon, therefore laid aside all thoughts of the immediate reduction of that city; and having, after his return to Ecbatana, married the daughter and only child of Cyaxares, he employed himself for several years in recruiting his forces, both in Media and Persia, and in forming his armies for every kind of military service ¹⁹⁸.

In the meantime Cræsus, having arrived safe in Lydia with the shattered remains of his army,

196. *Cyropædia*, lib. v.

197. Prideaux, *Connect.* book ii. et auct. cit.

198. *Cyropæd.* ubi sup. Xenophon relates an anecdote of Cyrus, during his first Babylonian expedition, which does great honour to the character of his hero, if true; and at any rate shews the refined sentiments of the philosophical historian. When the Persian conqueror entered the palace of the satrap Gobryas, who had embraced his cause, he was struck with the magnificence of that nobleman's furniture; but more especially with the rich dress, and rare beauty of his daughter. Gobryas, who had watched, but misunderstood the looks of his royal guest, presented him with several purses of gold, and begged that he would take the young lady under his protection; a genteel mode of offering her, as one of his concubines. "I accept," said Cyrus, "the money, which I give to your daughter, to increase her dowry; not doubting but she will find, among the officers of my army, a husband worthy of her good qualities. For without these, wealth and beauty would be of small estimation with them; of so little with many of them, that all the treasures of Babylon could not influence them in the choice of a wife, unless she were adorned with virtue and merit." *Id.* *ibid.*

forgot in the elegant pleasures of the court of Sardis, the loss he had sustained in the plains of Assyria. Here, surrounded with riches and splendour, he enjoyed the conversation of men of learning and genius from all countries, but especially from Greece¹⁹⁹. That happiness, however, was interrupted by the death of his beloved son Atys²⁰⁰; and before he recovered from

199. Herodot. lib. i.

200. Id. ibid. Immediately before this misfortune, and during the highest lustre of the Lydian court, is supposed to have happened the memorable conversation between Cræsus and Solon the Athenian legislator, on human happiness; though, as I formerly observed, (Lett. VI.) Solon must have been dead before Cræsus reached such a height of grandeur. But that conversation, which seems first to have been framed by some Grecian sage, and afterward ingrafted by Herodotus into his narrative, abounds with so much good sense, and is so well calculated to display the character of Cræsus, that I shall here give it in substance, as a moral dialogue.

After Cræsus had ostentatiously shewed Solon, says the father of history, the magnificence of his palace, the immensity of his treasures, and the pompous crowd of courtiers by whom he was attended, he asked, in the exultation of his heart, his Athenian guest, who, in the course of his travels and extensive observation, might be accounted the most happy man he had ever seen?—expecting, no doubt, that the decision would be in his own favour. But Solon, too little of a courtier to read the king's meaning, or too much of a philosopher to flatter him, bluntly answered, "Tellus the Athenian."—"What entitled Tellus to this distinction?"—replied Cræsus, with an air of surprise, mingled with chagrin, arising from mortified pride.—"He had the good fortune," said Solon, "to live under a free government; to enjoy good health, and be in no want of the necessities of life; to have sons, and grandsons, brave and virtuous, who survived him; and to crown all, when he had lived to an advanced age, in as much felicity as the condition of human affairs will admit, he had the happiness to come to the assistance of his countrymen in a hot and hazardous engagement; to turn the tide of battle, and die on the field of victory; where he was buried, and his funeral honours gratefully celebrated by his fellow-citizens."—"Who then do you esteem," inquired Cræsus anxiously, hoping at least to obtain the second place, "who do you esteem to have been next in happiness to Tellus?"—"Cleobis and Biton," answered Solon firmly; "two Argive youths, remarkable for their brotherly

PART I. from his deep sorrow, he was alarmed for the independency of his crown, by daily reports of the formidable power of the Medes and Persians, under their victorious leader.

While the Lydian monarch was deliberating what course he should pursue, in order to avert the threatening danger; whether he should solicit the friendship, or attempt to oppose the arms of Cyrus—he received a visit from the king of Babylon. The remonstrances of Nabonadius, enforced by rich presents, and certain ambiguous responses of the Delphic oracle, determined Cræsus in the choice of war, though strongly inclined to peace²⁰¹. A new con-

“ brotherly kindness; who possessed a plentiful fortune, and such
 “ strength of body and personal address, to say nothing of their
 “ mental accomplishments, that they were both eminently victorious
 “ in the Olympic games; who did peculiar honour to their mother,
 “ by drawing her in her chariot to the temple of Juno, on a solemn
 “ festival, when her cattle could not be found, amid the acclama-
 “ tions of their admiring countrymen; and who, falling quietly asleep
 “ in the temple, died there the same night, without grief or pain.”
 “ And is our condition,” cried Cræsus, now keenly incensed at such
 want of courtesy, “ so contemptible in your eyes, Athenian stranger!
 “ as not to be thought equal to that of private men?”—“ King of
 “ Lydia!” replied Solon, “ as the gods have given the Greeks but a
 “ moderate portion of riches, they have bestowed on us an indepen-
 “ dent spirit, and a liberal turn of mind, which sets no value upon
 “ the splendours of royalty. We are beside so sensible of the vicis-
 “ situdes of human life, as not to be elated with any present flow of
 “ fortune, or to adore that felicity which is liable to change. Futu-
 “ rity carries in its bosom, for every man, many uncertain events.
 “ He, therefore, whom heaven blesses with success to the last, can
 “ only, in our opinion, be esteemed a happy man. For the happiness
 “ of the man who still lives, however elevated his condition, appears
 “ to us no greater than that of a champion before the combat is de-
 “ cided, and while the victory remains doubtful. In a word, since
 “ the gods frequently bring to utter destruction, those whom they
 “ have shewn to the world in the highest walks of grandeur, and in
 “ all the pomp of prosperity, he only deserves the name of *happy*,
 “ who finishes his prosperous course in perfect serenity of mind.”

Herodot. lib. i. Plut. *Vit. Solon*.

201. Herodot. lib. i. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. vi.

federacy

federacy was accordingly formed, in which the king of Arabia, and Amasis king of Egypt, were included; and Cræsus, as commander in chief of the forces of the league, under the authority of the king of Babylon, made great preparations for invading the Median territories²⁰².

Fully informed of these preparations, of the strength of the Lydian army, and the place of rendezvous, Cyrus acted with his usual vigour and promptitude. He led his forces into Asia Minor, and attacked Cræsus in the plain of Thymbra, where he had mustered his troops, before he was prepared for action. The battle, however, was obstinate and bloody; but, at length, the king of Lydia was obliged to give ground²⁰³.

Ant. Chr.
548.
Nabonass.
æra 199.

Cyrus remained all night on the field of victory, and advanced next morning toward Sardis. Though Cræsus did not expect so sudden a visit, he took measures for the defence of his capital, and hazarded a second engagement beneath its walls. He was again defeated, and Sardis was taken the following night, through the treachery of a Persian slave, in the Lydian service²⁰⁴.

The generous conqueror, however, saved the city from pillage, and spared the lives of the inhabitants; but ordered them, as a ransom, to deliver up all their gold and silver. Cræsus gave the example, by bringing forth his immense treasures; and Cyrus, charmed with such ready compliance, shewed the greatest indulgence to the captive monarch²⁰⁵; upon
farther

202. Id. *ibid*.

203. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. vii.

204. Id. *ibid*.

205. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. vii. The singular story told by Herodotus,

PART I. farther acquaintance, admitted him into his friendship, and ever afterward treated him as a companion and counsellor²⁰⁶.

No sooner did the Grecian colonies, in Asia Minor, see Cyrus master of Sardis, than they offered to submit to him on the same conditions, which had been granted them by Cræsus. But he treated their advances with disdain, and demanded unconditional submission; because they had refused to treat with him, before his victory over the Lydian monarch²⁰⁷. They had, therefore, recourse to arms, and to the assistance of their European brethren. Cyrus, however, broke the Ionian confederacy, consisting of twelve cities or states, by detaching from it the opulent and powerful city of Miletus and its territory, which he politically took into his friendship and protection²⁰⁸. And his generals, Mazares and Harpagus, reduced under the Persian dominion all the other Grecian cities and states on the Asiatic coast, Ionian, Dorian, or Æolian; while he himself pursued a more important object, the conquest of the Babylonian empire.

dotus (who was fond of the marvellous), of Cræsus being ordered to be burnt alive, and placed upon a lighted pile of wood for that punishment, along with fourteen young Lydians, though we are not informed of any crime that he or they had been guilty of, is here purposely omitted; as utterly void of probability, and inconsistent with the character of Cyrus, even as drawn by that venerable historian. The absurdity of this story did not escape the discernment of sir Walter Raleigh; who tells us, that the moral part of it hath given it currency, "as to many the like it often doth" (*Hist. of the World*, book iii. chap. iii. sect. iv.). This is the truth, but not the whole truth:—the story was evidently told by Herodotus, in order more fully to exemplify the justice of the moral reflections ascribed to Solon, in his supposed conversation with Cræsus. And it has been retailed by fanciful historians, in all ages, with a view to the elucidation of the same conversation; though that conversation, as I have endeavoured to shew, never did, or could take place.

206. Xenoph. ubi sup. Herodot. lib. i.

207. Herodot. lib. i.

208. Id. ibid.

Of all the Grecian cities in Asia Minor, Phocæa was expected to make the most obstinate resistance. The Phocæans had been distinguished by their early and successful application to maritime affairs, and were accustomed to visit the coasts of Italy, Spain, and Gaul. Become rich by commerce, they had fortified their city in a manner deemed impregnable in that age; and which they flattered themselves would long withstand the Persian power, and baffle all the military skill of Harpagus, who had succeeded to the chief command on the death of Mazares. But they found themselves deceived on his approach, Convinced of their inability to resist so great a force, directed by so able a general, they demanded a truce for one day, in order to consider of a capitulation²⁰⁹. That time the Phocæans made use of to embark on board their ships, with their wives, children, and most valuable effects; leaving nothing but empty houses and deserted walls to the besiegers²¹⁰. And, after settling unsuccessfully in different places, the most resolute of the fugitive adventurers sailed to the southern coast of Gaul, where they founded the city of Massilia²¹¹; which became, as we shall have occasion to see, the capital of a potent and wealthy commercial republic.

Nor were the Phocæans the only body of the Asiatic Greeks, who chose to abandon their country, rather than submit to the absolute will of a master. The Teians, who had made a gallant defence against the victorious enemy, finding their most vigorous efforts insufficient to preserve their city, also embarked on board their ships, and built at Abdera on the coast of Thrace²¹²; where their descendants

209 Herodot. ubi sup.

210. Id: ibid.

211. Pausan. lib. x. Strabo, lib. iv.

212. Herodot. lib. i.

PART I. long resided. And a resolution still more desperate was embraced by the inhabitants of Xanthus, in Lycia.

After Harpagus had conquered Ionia, and reduced Cnydus, Halicarnassus, and other cities in the Dorian promontory, he invaded Caria and Lycia²¹³. These countries, and all the inland parts of Asia Minor, he likewise subjected to the Persian sway, but not without many violent struggles. The Carians of Pedasa took post upon a mountain, which they fortified, and there long defended themselves with great bravery²¹⁴. And the Lycians of Xanthus had the boldness to quit their fortifications, and give the Persians battle in a plain, in the neighbourhood of their city. There they fought with resolute courage; but finding themselves in danger of being overpowered by numbers, and disdaining to submit, they took shelter within their walls; and having shut up their wives, children, and all their riches in the citadel, they set fire to the place; then rushing out upon the enemy, they renewed the combat, and fought to the last man, with their swords in their hands²¹⁵. The Lycians of Xanthus were a Cretan colony.

While the Persian arms under Harpagus were thus employed, in completing the conquest of the large and beautiful promontory of Asia Minor, Cyrus had extended his dominion over all the provinces of the Babylonian empire, from the coast of Syria to the banks of the Euphrates and Tygris, and from the Persian gulf to the mountains of Armenia. The reduction of Babylon, the great object of his ambition, alone remained to crown his glory and establish his sway. But that proud metropolis, the chief seat of oriental empire, since the destruction of Nineveh, still ventured to set him at defiance, and treated with derision his most skilful approaches²¹⁶.

213. Id. *ibid.*214. Herodot. *ubi sup.*215. Id. *ibid.*216. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. vii. Herodot. lib. i.

Nor were the Babylonians to be accused of presumption, in thinking they could singly repel the efforts of so mighty a conqueror. The strength of their capital, and its internal resources, justified their confidence.

The city of Babylon stood in the great plain of Assyria, or Aturia; near the banks of the Euphrates, and on both sides of that majestic river²¹⁷. It was built so as to form an exact square, and was about sixty miles in compass²¹⁸. This immense space, however, was not altogether filled with houses, temples, or palaces; though these were numerous, and superb beyond any thing known even in ancient Asia²¹⁹. Extensive gardens also occupied a part; and those, in conjunction with capacious magazines of corn and other provisions, which it was computed could maintain the inhabitants for twenty years, rendered Babylon fit to sustain a long siege, without injury to the health of the garrison or citizens²²⁰.

The whole city, on both sides of the Euphrates, was surrounded with a wide and deep ditch, or moat, at all times filled with water, and defended by a wall of brick cemented with bitumen, as hard and firm as solid rock, three hundred feet in height, and seventy-five in thickness²²¹. Behind this formidable rampart, which was fortified with towers, stood another wall of almost equal strength²²². These walls were brought down to the banks of the Euphrates, with some inflexion at the extremities; and thence a wall, of the same solid materials was extended on both sides of the river²²³.

When

217. Strabo, *Geog.* lib. xvi. init. Herodot. lib. i.

218. Id. *ibid.*

219. Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxxviii.

220. Xenoph. et Herodot. ubi sup. Quint. curt. lib. v. cap. i.

221. Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxxviii.

222. Id. *Historiar.* cap. clxxix.

223. Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxxx. As Herodotus had seen the fortifications

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
540.

Nabonass.
æra 207.

When Cyrus advanced toward Babylon, the king had met him at the head of his forces. But the Babylonians being unable to withstand the victorious army of the Persian conqueror, Nabonadius took refuge in his capital²²⁴. Cyrus at first attempted to storm the place, by raising against it towers still higher than the walls. Finding, however, that mode of attack impracticable, he turned the siege into a blockade; in hopes of obliging the Babylonians to surrender, through famine²²⁵. Almost two years had his army occupied the lines, which he had drawn around the city, without beholding any signs of want or weakness, when certain circumstances encouraged him to think it might be taken by surprise.

From the main stream of the Euphrates which ran through Babylon, and over which was built a stupendous bridge, a navigable canal, called the *Royal-River*, was cut above the city, and carried to the stream of the Tygris²²⁶. Beside this great canal a smaller one was also cut in the same direction, from the bed of the Euphrates above Babylon, in order to prevent the waters of that river, which annually overflows its banks, like the Nile, from deluging the country; and a large one was opened nearer the city, on the western side of the river, and which emptied itself into an immense artificial lake, that served as a reservoir for the benefit of the neighbouring lands, in time of drought, as well as a re-

fications of Babylon in a more perfect state than any other ancient historian or geographer, his description is here followed, in preference to that of Diodorus or Strabo; who lived almost five hundred years later, when those fortifications were in ruins, and when all information concerning them must have been very imperfect among the Babylonians.

224. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. vii. Herodot. lib. i.

225. Id. *ibid.*

226. Herodot. lib. i. Abydenus ap Euseb. *Præp. Evangel.*

sepectacle for the superabounding waters at other times²²⁷. The mouths of those two canals were shut with strong mounds, when the stream of the Euphrates could be confined within its banks, and opened only when it was in danger of overflowing²²⁸.

Cyrus having surveyed these laborious works, and sounded the depth of the river, saw the practicability of removing the mounds of all the canals, and of hollowing that which fed the great lake; in such a manner as to make it carry off the remaining waters of the Euphrates, and leave the channel fordable, where it entered and left the walls of Babylon²²⁹.

While occupied with this idea, the Persian hero was informed, That the Babylonians were soon to be employed in celebrating a solemn festival, during which they were accustomed to spend the night in revelling and drinking. That opportunity he seized to divert the current, and drain the channel of the Euphrates. And having posted one body of his troops at the termination of the walls above, and another at the same place below the city, with orders to notice the decrease of the waters, they both entered the bed of the river at the same time, under the conduct of Gobrias and Gadates, their Babylonian guides; passed, without opposition, the gates in the wall along the banks of the Euphrates, which had been left open, through negligence, in the general festivity; marched unobserved to the palace; and there assembling, according to concert, surprised and cut to pieces the guards of Nabonadius²³⁰. Roused by the clashing of arms, the king rushed to the door of his banquetting room, attended by his guests; and drawing his sword, died in a manner worthy of a


Ant. Chr.
538.
Nabonass.
era 209.

227. Id. ibid.

228. Abyden. ubi sup.

229. Herodot. lib. i. cap. cxci.

230. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. vii. Herodot. ubi sup.

PART I. more illustrious prince²³¹. Most of his nobles are
 said to have fallen by his side.

The death of the king of Babylon and his nobility, was followed by the submission of his army; and Cyrus, next morning, saw himself master of the richest and most magnificent city in the ancient world, and lord of the greatest empire that had ever been formed on the face of the earth. The full establishment, and future growth of this empire, which acquired the name of *Persian*, from the country of Cyrus its founder, must next engage your lordship's attention.

These subjects will furnish scope for another stage in our historical tour, and naturally bring us back to the affairs of Europe. And happily for us, the paths of history, hitherto rugged and obscure, henceforth become more smooth and obvious. Having thrown behind us the barren deserts of chronology, and the wild labyrinths of fable, we now enter upon a cultivated country; in which the roads are distinctly marked, and where interesting objects, on every side present themselves to view.

231. Id. *ibid*.

LETTER X.

THE REVOLUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA CONTINUED,
FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE TO
THE REIGN OF DARIUS HYSTASPES.

THE subversion of the kingdom of Babylon, or *second* Assyrian Empire, by Cyrus, is the first great event in the ancient world, in regard to the date of which all historians and chronologers, both civil and sacred, are agreed. This great event happened in the two hundred and ninth year of the Nabonassarean æra, in the third year of the sixtieth Olympiad, and five hundred and thirty-eight years before the christian æra.

LETTER
X.

Ant. Chr.
538.
Olymp.
lx. 3.

As soon as Cyrus had settled his affairs at Babylon, and rewarded his conquering army, he paid a visit to Persia, his native kingdom¹. On his return, he brought along with him his uncle, Cyaxares, understood to be *Darius the Mede* of scripture, who took up his residence at Babylon². This prince died after a reign of two years over the Babylonians; and Cyrus succeeded to the throne of Media, as well as to the undivided sovereignty of the vast empire which he had conquered³; all thenceforth known, as already observed, by the name of the *Persian Empire*.

The first year of the reign of Cyrus, as sole head of that empire, is rendered memorable by the famous edict which he issued in favour of the captive Jews;

Ant. Chr.
536.
Olymp.
lxi. 1.

1. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. viii.

2. Prideaux, *Connect.* part. I. book ii. et. auct. cit.

3. Id. *ibid.*

PART I.

giving them not only liberty to return into their own country with all their property, and authorising them to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem, but restoring to them the sacred vessels which had been carried away by Nebuchadnezzar, and placed in the temple of Belus at Babylon⁴.

This edict is supposed to have been procured through the influence of the prophet Daniel, who was among the number of the Jewish captives; and who having been carried to Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar in early life, and made an eunuch, had risen to honour and power under that prince and his Assyrian successors⁵. He had also maintained his credit under Cyaxares II. or *Darius the Mede*, who advanced him to the rank of chief governor⁶; and Cyrus retained him in office, as an experienced minister, as well as a faithful servant⁷.

That Daniel used his influence with the Persian monarch, in favour of his transplanted countrymen, cannot be doubted. But Cyrus, in restoring the Jews to the possession of their former country, may also be supposed to have indulged that beneficent disposition, which prompted him to seek the happiness of all his subjects; and to have pursued that liberal line of policy, which distinguished him from almost every eastern conqueror; in resting the security of his throne, and the preservation of his dominion, not on the fear, but on the love of the nations under his sway⁸. For authorising the re-establishment of the Jewish worship, he might be actuated by other and higher motives.

4. 2. *Chron.* chap. xxxvi. ver. 22, 23. *Ezra*, chap. i. ver. 1—7.

5. *Daniel*, chap. i.—v.

6. *Daniel*, chap. vi. ver. 1, 2, 3.

7. *Prideaux*, ubi sup. et auct. cit.

8. *Xenoph. Cyropæd.* lib. viii. *Herodot.* lib. i.

Though

Though the Jews in their own land, before the Babylonish captivity, had shewn a strange propensity to abandon the pure worship instituted by Moses⁹, and to adopt the idolatrous superstitions of the neighbouring nations¹⁰, they had discovered great firmness, after they were carried captives to Babylon, in resisting every species of idolatry, and in adhering to the worship of one God, to whom they confidently looked up for deliverance from all their calamities¹¹.

This firmness, of which Daniel was a memorable example¹², could not be unknown to Cyrus, nor could he fail to admire it; for the religion of the ancient Persians was not less pure than that of Moses, and the disciples of Zoroaster had a more fixed abhorrence against the worship of idols, than those of the Jewish legislator.

In what age Zoroaster, or Zurdusht, the Persian prophet and philosopher lived, or whence he derived his knowledge, ancient historians have not been able to inform us. But they refer the promulgation of his doctrines to a very remote antiquity¹³. And fortunately we are not left ignorant of his theological tenets, or of the religion of the Persians during the reign of Cyrus and his immediate successors.

“The Persians,” says Herodotus, “hold it unlawful to build temples, erect statues, or consecrate altars, for the celebration of religious wor-

9. See the books of *Kings* and *Chronicles* throughout.

10. Ibid. “As the number of thy cities,” says the prophet Jeremiah, “are thy gods, O Judah!” Jeremiah, chap. ii. ver. 28.

11. See the book of *Daniel*, passim.

12. *Daniel*, chap. vi. ver. 10—23.

13. Justin. lib. i. Plut. *Isid. et Osir.* Eudoxius, ap. Plin. *Nat. Hist.* lib. xxx.

PART I.

“ship”⁴. They even consider it as a mark of insani-
 “ty in others so to do; not believing, like the Greeks
 “(as I conjecture), that the gods have the human
 “nature or form. They sacrifice to the deity,” adds
 he, “on the tops of the highest mountains, and the
 “whole circle of the heavens they call Jove. They
 “sacrifice also to the sun, the moon, the earth; to
 “fire, water, and the winds:—And to these alone
 “they have sacrificed from the beginning”⁵.”

Such was the worship of the ancient Persians, as
 far as it could be understood by an inquisitive and
 intelligent foreigner. But they themselves maintain,
 That they have always worshipped one supreme Be-
 ing (whose glory is displayed in the heavens) before
 the eye of the sun, and under the symbol of fire; as
 the purest emblems of the divine nature, and the most

14. Cicero refines upon this idea. “The Persians think,” says he,
 “that access to the deity ought to be free to every one, and that the
 “whole world is his house and temple.” *Cicer. de Legib. lib. ii.*

15. Herodotus. lib. i. cap. cxxxi. “When the Babylonians had
 “sunk into a more complicated idolatry than that of the first Chal-
 “deans,” says a learned and ingenious writer, “the Persians, who
 “succeeded to the sovereignty of Asia, renewed those rites which
 “had, in a great measure, been forgotten” (Bryant, *Mythol.* vol. ii).
 And from Herodotus we learn, that the Persians soon adopted some
 of the Babylonian superstitions (*Historiar. lib. i. cap. cxxxi.*). He
 afterward describes the Persian worship, as performed in his time.
 “When a Persian resolves to sacrifice,” says this philosophical tra-
 veller, “he builds no altar, kindles no fire, makes no libation; nor
 “uses either flutes, fillets, or consecrated flour: but wearing a tiara,
 “garnished chiefly with myrtle, leads the victim to a clean piece of
 “ground, and invokes the god. He that offers is not permitted to
 “pray for himself alone; but, as he is a member of the nation, is
 “obliged to pray for the prosperity of all the Persians, and for the
 “king in particular. After the victim is slain and prepared for
 “sacrifice, one of the magi standing up, sings an ode, concerning
 “the origin of the gods (or in other words the celestial bodies
 “and four elements); which, they say, has the force of a charm:
 “and without which no sacrifice can lawfully be offered.” Herodot.,
 lib. i. cap. cxxii.

powerful

powerful agents of Omnipotence¹⁶, And that such is the worship of the modern followers of Zoroaster, we have the fullest certainty¹⁷.

LETTER
X.

The theological tenets of the ancient Persians, indeed, immediately led them to such a worship. Their fundamental doctrine was, that there are in nature two principles, or supreme agents; *Ormuzd*, the author of good, and *Ahriman*, of evil¹⁸. The former they represented by light, the latter by darkness, as their proper emblems. But, in regard to these two great beings, they entertained different opinions; some believed that both were eternal, while others maintained, that the *good being* only was eternal, and the *author of evil* created. But they all agree, that there would be a perpetual opposition between those two principles, till the end of the world; when the *good being* would prevail over the *evil one*; and that thenceforth, each would have a world of his own:—the *good being* a world, where all good men would be united to him; and the *evil one* a world, in which he would be attended by all his wicked followers in this world¹⁹.

The reformer of the Persian, or *Magian* religion²⁰, also called Zoroaster (and who is said to have lived under the reign of Cyrus, or his immediate successors²¹), went a step farther. He taught,

16. Hyde, *Relig. Vet. Pers.* cap. v. Prideaux, *Connect.* part. i. book iv.

17. Id. *ibid.*

18. Plut. *Isid. et Osir.* Hyde, *Relig. Vet. Pers.* cap. ix. et seq. Prideaux, *ubi sup.*

19. Id. *ibid.*

20. The Persian priests, as I have formerly had occasion to observe (Lett. VIII.), were called *Magi*, from the occult sciences in which they affected to be skilled. And hence, among ancient writers, the name of the priesthood is often given to the religion of the Persians.

21. Ctesias, ap. Arnob. *Cont. Gent.* Hyde, *Relig. Vet. Pers.* et auct. cit. Prideaux, part. i. book iv.

that

PART I.

that neither Ormuzd nor Ahriman was eternal; but that both were created by *one* supreme being, independent and self-existent, whose most proper symbol was *fire*. He maintained, however, the doctrine of two opposite principles; the one the angel of light, the other of darkness, between whom a perpetual war would continue till the end of the world. Then, he affirmed, there would be an universal *resurrection*, and a *day* of *judgment*, in which every one would receive the just award of his actions; that afterward, the *angel* of *darkness* and his followers would be shut up in a place, where they would suffer the punishment due to their crimes, involved in eternal obscurity; and that the *angel* of *light*, and his followers, would be conveyed to a region, where they would receive the recompense of their good works, 'surrounded with *eternal splendour*; that thenceforth *light* and *darkness*, or good and evil, would no more be blended, as in this world, but remain separate through all eternity²².—These doctrines are still zealously maintained by the remains of the followers of the religion of Zoroaster in India and Persia²³. |

No wonder that Cyrus, who had been instructed in the principles of this pure religion, should hate every species of Idolatry, and shew indulgence to the Jews, who seemed also to worship *God* under the symbol of *fire*; for the holy fire, which came down from heaven, and descended first upon the altar in the tabernacle, at the consecration of Aaron and his sons²⁴, and afterward upon the altar in the temple of Solomon, at the consecration of that sacred edifice²⁵; was constantly fed and maintained.

22. Hyde and Prideaux, ubi sup. et auct. cit.

23. Id. ibid. See also Richardson's *Dissertations on the Language and Manners of the East*.

24. *Levit.* chap. ix. ver. 24.

25. 2. *Chron.* chap. vii. ver. 1.

by the Jewish priests, day and night, and without ever being suffered to go out²⁶.

LETTER
X.

After Cyrus had issued his memorable decree, for rebuilding the temple of Jerusalem, and taken other salutary measures for the ease and comforts of all his subjects, he spent his whole time in regulating the government of that great empire of which he was become the head; passing seven months of the year at Babylon, in the heart of his dominions; three at Susa, on the frontier of Persia; and two at Ecbatana, the capital of Media; as well as for the sake of variety of climate, as to endear himself to the various nations under his sway, and hold them in more perfect obedience²⁷. But as we know not distinctly what regulations were framed by Cyrus, and what by his immediate successors, I shall reserve my account of the government and police of the Persian empire till a subsequent period, when it became better known to the Greeks; to whom we are indebted for our information on these important subjects.

The Persian empire, at the death of Cyrus, extended from the frontiers of India to those of Egypt, and from the Caspian and Euxine seas, to the Persian and Arabian gulfs²⁸. Cambyses, his eldest son, who succeeded him in the government of this immense empire, began his reign with projecting the conquest of Egypt²⁹; a circumstance which incontestibly proves, that Cyrus did not lose his army, and his life, as commonly reported, in an unsuccessful expedition against the Massagetæ, a barbarous nation on the frontiers of Asiatic Scythia³⁰.

Ant. Chr.
529.
Olymp.
lxii. 4.

For,

26. Prideaux, *Connect.* part i., book iii. et. auct. cit.

27. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. viii.

28. Id. *ibid.*

29. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. i.

30. Herodot. lib. i. Justin. lib. i. An extract from Ctesias, preserved

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For, in that event, his successor could not have been in a condition to prosecute conquests of any kind; and would have had too much danger to apprehend from the east, to think of enlarging his empire to the west.

These considerations, my lord, must induce you, to prefer the more consistent, and probable narration of Xenophon, who informs us that Cyrus died in his native kingdom, at an advanced age; in the bosom of his family, and surrounded by his kindred and courtiers; when his empire was in the most prosperous state, and his affairs in the best order³¹. And the judicious Strabo, not only tells us, that no regard is due to what historians have invented, concerning the war of Cyrus with the Massagetæ, but that his tomb was to be seen, as late as the time of Alexander the Great, in a garden at Pasargada, the royal residence of the ancient kings of Persia, with an inscription to the following purport; "I am
" *Cyrus* the founder of the Persian empire, and who
" was lord of Asia. Envy me not this memorial³².

Cambyzes, though a less politic prince than his father, pursued his true interest in undertaking the conquest of Egypt. The experience of ages had evinced, that the humiliation of that kingdom was necessary to the peace and security of the western provinces of the Assyrian empire, which had been subjected to the Persian sway³³. But Egypt was then flourishing in arts and arms, under the wise government of Amasis.

served by Photius, countenances the same tradition, with some variation in regard to the issue of the war. But Ctesias is an author of too little credit to deserve refutation.

31. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. viii.

32. Strabo, *Geog.* lib. xi. p. 507, et lib. xv. p. 730, edit. Lutet. Paris. Typ. Reg. 1620.

33. See Lett. ix. et auct. cit.

This prince, whom we have seen assume the Egyptian sceptre³⁴, after dethroning his tyrannical master, Apries, was worthy of the exalted station to which he had attained. He greatly improved the internal prosperity of Egypt, by facilitating the communication between the country and the Nile, at the same time that he adorned his kingdom with many magnificent buildings³⁵. He maintained the respect due to the throne, while he indulged himself in mirth and jollity with his former companions³⁶; devoting only the morning to public business, or the affairs of the cabinet. He preserved good order among his subjects by salutary laws, and secured his sway by a body of regular troops, which he posted in the neighbourhood of Memphis³⁷. And he pursued the liberal policy of Psammitichus, in encouraging foreign commerce³⁸.

Amasis more especially favoured the Asiatic Greeks, whom he encouraged to settle in his dominions, and indulged with immunities both civil and religious. He permitted as many Grecian emigrants as thought proper to remove into Egypt to inhabit the city of Naucratis, on the western or Canopian branch of the Nile, where they were allowed the exercise of their religion³⁹. And to such Grecian adventurers as did not choose to reside there, or to abandon their native country, but who resorted to Egypt for the purpose of trade, he granted the extraordinary

34. Ibid.

35. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. clxxv.—clxxvii.

36. Id. lib. ii. cap. clxxiii. In apology for this conduct, he replied to his more austere courtiers, who blamed him for it, as unsuitable to the character of a king, "An archer, when he preposes to shoot, "braces his bow; and when he has done, unbends it. For if always "kept bent, it would become unfit for shooting, when he should "have occasion to use it. Such is the condition of mankind. He "that intensely applies to study, without allowing himself any inter- "val of recreation, must gradually break the vigour either of his "body or mind." Id. ibid.

37. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. cliv.

38. Id. lib. ii. cap. clxxviii.

39. Id. ibid.

PART I. privilege of erecting temples, and consecrating altars to their gods, in different parts of his kingdom, where their factories were established⁴⁰. A magnificent repository for the Grecian deities was accordingly raised on the Egyptian shore, at the common expense of the Ionians, Dorians, and Æolians. The people of Ægina built a separate temple to Jupiter, the Samians one to Juno, and the Milesians one to Apollo⁴¹.

But Amasis, notwithstanding his high prosperity, was by no means in a condition to resist the Persian power. He, therefore, seems to have made submissions to Cyrus, when that great warrior appeared on the frontiers of Egypt, after the conquest of Syria⁴². And the withdrawing of this homage or tribute, on the death of the founder of the Persian empire, is the best reason that can be assigned for the hostile purpose of Cambyses, though Herodotus has ascribed it to other causes⁴³, too frivolous to be mentioned.

Be the motives of the Persian monarch, however, what they might, for undertaking the conquest of Egypt, the enterprise was truly political; and the measures which he took, for carrying it into execution, were adequate to the end he had in view. Being absolute master of Asia Minor, he compelled the Ionians and Æolians to attend him in his expedition, with their whole naval and military strength⁴⁴. The Samians, though not under his dominion, supplied him with forty gallies⁴⁵. The Cyprians and Phœnicians, who had voluntarily submitted to his sway, furnished him with a great marine force⁴⁶: he therefore justly boasted, that he was lord of the sea⁴⁷.

40. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. lxxviii.

41. Id. ibid.

42. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. vii. 43. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. i. et seq.

44. Id. ibid.

45. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. xliv.

46. Id. lib. ii. cap. xix.

47. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxxiy.

The army of Cambyses, which consisted of the veteran troops of Cyrus, reinforced with a body of Asiatic Greeks, marched toward Egypt by land. In this march, and in his whole expedition, the Persian monarch was much assisted by the counsel and military skill of Phanes, an Halicarnassean by birth, and lately one of the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the king of Egypt⁴⁸. This experienced officer, disgusted at Amasis, for reasons not known, had made his escape by sea⁴⁹; and arriving in the Persian camp, before Cambyses began his march, offered his service to that prince, and informed him of the state of the kingdom he was preparing to invade⁵⁰. The advances of Phanes were readily accepted: and, through his means, the hostile army was safely conducted to the frontiers of Egypt; being supplied with water by an Arabian chief in passing through the desert⁵¹.

LETTER
X.

Ant. Chr.
526.

Olymp.
lxiii. 3.

Cambyses, on entering the threatened territory, was informed of the death of Amasis, in the forty-fourth year of his reign; and that his son, Psammenitus, had succeeded him in the Egyptian throne⁵². This prince lay encamped with his army near the Pelusian mount of the Nile, expecting the enemy⁵³.

Ant. Chr.
525.
Olymp.
lxiii. 4

48. Herodotus, *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. iv. et seq.

49. Id. *ibid.* It is not a little surprising, that both Mr. Mitford and Dr. Gillies should ascribe the desertion of this Greek to the impolitic-conduct of Psammenitus, the son and successor of Amasis; whereas Herodotus, whom they quote, as their authority for so saying, expressly tells us, that Phanes was disgusted at Amasis, though he owns himself ignorant of the cause (*Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. iv.). And it is evident from chronology, that Amasis could not be dead, when Phanes left Egypt, as his son Psammenitus reigned only six months (*Herodot.* lib. iii. cap. xiv.); a space of time too short for the voyage of Phanes, and the operations of Cambyses, before he accomplished the conquest of Egypt.

50. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

51. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. vii. viii. ix.

52. Id. lib. iii. cap. x.

53. Id. *ibid.*

PART I.

When the Persian forces came within sight, the Grecian mercenaries, in order to shew their detestation of the treachery of Phanes, slaughtered his children before his eyes, and drank their blood⁵⁴. That barbarity, however, availed them nothing. It served only to rouse the courage of the Persians. The two armies joined battle, and fought with obstinate valour. But the Egyptians and their allies, after numbers had fallen on both sides, were finally broken, and totally routed⁵⁵. The surrender of the city of Pelusium, esteemed the key of Egypt, to the arms of the Persian monarch, seems to have been the immediate consequence of this victory.

The king of Egypt took refuge in Memphis, his capital, with the remains of his army. And thither he was followed by Cambyses⁵⁶. Memphis was taken after a short siege, and Psammenitus made prisoner⁵⁷. The unfortunate monarch, who had reigned only about six months, was at first treated with lenity, and furnished with a maintenance suited to his former dignity. But not being able to brook his degraded condition, he attempted to raise a rebellion against the conqueror, and was ordered to drink poison⁵⁸.

Before this fatal event, Cambyses had received the submissions of the neighbouring Africans, and of the Greeks of Cyrenaica⁵⁹. Now undisputed master of Egypt, and of the neighbouring parts of Africa to the west, he projected three grand expeditions; one against the Ethiopians, another against the Ammonians, and a third against the Carthagenians⁶⁰. But the latter he was obliged to lay aside, as the Phœnicians,

54. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xi.

55. Id. ibid.

56. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. xiii. xiv.

57. Id. ibid.

58. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xv.

59. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. xiii.

60. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. xviii.

who formed the chief strength of his navy, refused to act against the Carthagenians, whom they called their children⁶¹. And he did not think it prudent to compel their obedience⁶².

The Persian monarch, therefore, found it necessary to confine his ambition to the conquest of Ethiopia and Ammonia, or the higher part of Lybia. Nor did he, rash and impetuous as he was, and elated with conquest, advance against those unknown regions, without exercising some degree of caution. Before he left Memphis, he sent ambassadors into Ethiopia, in order to discover the state of the country⁶³. But although these ambassadors carried rich presents along with them, according to the custom of the east, and were ordered to make professions of friendship, they were considered as spies by the king of Ethiopia; who, after reproaching Cambyses with an unjust design upon the liberties of a people that had never injured him, dismissed them contemptuously with the present of a *bow*, which he drew, and unbended in their presence, and desired them to deliver to their master⁶⁴. “And tell the king of Persia,” added he, “that the king of Ethiopia gives him this advice:—When the Persians can as easily draw so strong a bow, Cambyses may make war upon the Ethiopians with his victorious forces. In the meantime, let him thank the gods, that have not given the sons of Ethiopia a wish to possess any other country but their own⁶⁵.”

Irritated

61. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xix. Carthage, as I have had occasion to observe (Lett. ix.), was founded by a colony from Tyre.

62. Id. *ibid*.

63. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xx.

64. *Ibid*. cap. xxi, xxii.

65. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. xxi. I have formerly had occasion to remark, that the Ethiopians, notwithstanding their claims to high antiquity, seem always to have remained in a rude or barbarous state (Lett.

PART I.

~ Irritated almost to madness by this insulting message, Cambyses acted, from the moment it was delivered to him, as if he had been deprived of the use of his understanding⁶⁶; already shaken by a convulsive malady, to which he had been subject from his infancy, and occasionally disordered by intemperance⁶⁷; which inflamed the natural violence of his

(Lett. i. note 251). And this insulting message, and their king's treatment of the Persian present, "a purple robe, a chain for the neck, and bracelets of gold, an alabaster box of ointment, and a vessel of palm-wine," prove them to have been little polished in the reign of Cambyses. The barbarian monarch laughed, when the curious workmanship of the necklace and bracelets was explained to him; and said, "that chains of greater strength were to be found in Ethiopia" (Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxii.). He tasted the wine, however, with pleasure; and owned that the Ethiopians had no liquor equal to it. But he set no value on the purple garment; considering the beautiful dye, in changing the native colour of the fleece, as a mark of deceit characteristic of the friendly professions of the Persians (Id. ibid.). Yet do we find in this barbarian pride and haughty contempt of alliance, a degree of dignity that courtly manners cannot bestow; and which had induced men of weak understandings, and narrow minds, to exalt barbarism above refinement; not reflecting, that to the softenings of the human character we are indebted for the most pleasing enjoyments of social life; that barbarian stateliness is less allied to such enjoyments, and consequently less friendly to the happiness of mankind, though it apparently contains less deceit.

It may seem extraordinary, that I should dwell so much on the advantages of refinement, after having given so favourable a picture of the condition of human nature in its first removes from the savage state (Lett. i. passim). But this I do from a feeling of the pleasures of polished life, and from a conviction that the *delicate disguises* of the *passions* are essential to the good order of society; as such habitual restraint only can enable us to subdue them. For, although uncorrupted men associated in small bodies may be safely left to the guidance of their instincts and natural affections, a sense of *honour* and *propriety* is no less necessary than the prohibitions of the magistrate to the well-being of a *large community*; from which it is impossible to exclude the vices that spring from luxury and avarice. Over these it is requisite, that public decency should throw a veil; and manners correct, what laws cannot cure.

66. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. xxv.

67. Id. lib. iii. cap. xxviii—xxxix.

temper, and henceforth often gave to his conduct, both in public and private, the appearance of lunacy⁶⁸. Leaving only the Grecian auxiliaries in Lower Egypt, he put his army instantly in motion, and began his march toward the frontiers of Ethiopia⁶⁹; without having collected a sufficient supply of provisions, or taken other steps necessary to the success of so distant an expedition⁷⁰.

LETTER
X.

Ant. Chr.
524.
Olymp.
lxiv. 1.

When the enraged monarch arrived at Thebes, he detached fifty thousand men to lay waste the country of the Ammonians, and burn the temple of Jupiter, there so famous for its oracular responses⁷¹. The troops that composed this detachment, by the help of guides, reached the city of Oasis in Upper Egypt⁷². But what afterward became of them is not certainly known; as none of them reached the place of their destination, or returned to relate the cause of their failure⁷³. They are said to have been overwhelmed by waves of sand in the deserts of Lybia; in consequence of a violent south wind, while they were seated at dinner, and all to have perished⁷⁴.

Meantime Cambyses had prosecuted his march, and entered Lower Ethiopia. No enemy appeared to obstruct his progress; but famine, the most terrible of all enemies, compelled him to set limits to his ambition. His soldiers having consumed all their provisions, and even the beasts of burden, were driven to the dreadful necessity of feeding upon wild herbs, and even upon each other⁷⁵, casting lots for the wretched victims, to be devoured by hunger⁷⁶.

68. Id. ibid.

69. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxv.

71. Herodot. ubi sup.

73. Id. ibid.

70. Id. ibid.

72. Id. lib. iii. cap. xxvi.

74. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxvi.

75. This is the first time (as far as I remember) that the eating of human flesh is mentioned by any ancient author; and we find, it was by no means from choice.

76. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. xxv.

PART I.

The haughty and obstinate spirit of the Persian monarch, had made him persist in his purpose, to this extremity. But seeing no prospect of attaining the object of his enterprise, the conquest of the kingdom of Ethiopia, and his army in danger of being utterly ruined, he returned to Thebes, and thence to Memphis⁷⁷.

Ant. Chr.
523.
Olymp.
lxiv. 2.

After his return to Memphis, Cambyses was guilty of many extravagances, in his fits of intoxication and phrenzy⁷⁸. But the actions of a madman not being fit subjects of reasoning, as no consequences can be fairly deduced from them, I shall take no notice of any anecdotes of that kind except such as concern the Egyptian superstition.

I have formerly had occasion to speak of the religion of the Egyptians⁷⁹, and to allude to the enormity of the superstition. Yet they, like all other nations, in the first stage of their civil progress⁸⁰, appear to have worshipped one true God, under the wide expanse of heaven; for we are told, that they boasted of being the first people, who built temples, reared altars, and erected statues to the gods⁸¹:—a boast which would not have been made, without reference to some period, when they themselves had none.

Superstition had now attained its height in Egypt. The Egyptians not only worshipped the host of heaven, or the constellations, under symbolical representations, like the Arabians, Syrians, and Chaldeans, but deified in appearance every thing around them⁸². Having given many examples of this in

77. Id. *ibid*.

78. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxvii—xxxix.

79. Lett. i. p. 90—112.

80. See Lett. i. of this work, p. 95, 96.

81. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. iv.

82. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. et Herodot. lib. ii. *passim*.

treating directly of the religion of the Egyptians, one will here suffice. Not satisfied with worshipping Osiris, or the sun, under the shape of a bull, called *Apis*, at Memphis they paid their devotions to a real bullock, bearing certain marks, which were supposed to indicate his divinity⁸³. And when this bestial god died, he was buried with the greatest solemnity, and lamented with the deepest mourning⁸⁴; and the highest joy was expressed, accompanied with the most pompous processions, and universal festivity, when the ingenuity of priestcraft had procured another bullock, bearing the same marks⁸⁵.

Such a god the Egyptians had found, when Cambyses entered Memphis, on his return from his unfortunate expedition against Ethiopia⁸⁶. Conjecturing that their rejoicing was occasioned by his disasters, and considering it as a daring insult on their disappointed conqueror, the irascible monarch sent for the magistrates of the city, and made them acquainted with his displeasure⁸⁷. They declared the cause of the general festivity; but he, not giving credit to what they said, told them they were liars, and ordered them, as such, to be put to death⁸⁸. He next sent for the priests; and having received the same answer from them, replied, that if any god was so condescending as to shew himself to the Egyptians, he would not be unacquainted with him⁸⁹. And, without more words, ordered *Apis* to be brought into his presence. The priests complied, through fear; and Cambyses, frantic at the sight, drew his sword; and, making a thrust at the bullock, wounded him mortally, and fell into an immoderate fit of laughter⁹⁰.

83. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. xxvii. xxviii.

85. Herodot. ubi sup.

87. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxvii.

89. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxviii.

84. Id. ibid.

86. Id. ibid.

88. Id. ibid.

90. Id. lib. iii. cap. xxix.

“ O height

PART I.

“O height of infamy!”—exclaimed he, as soon as he could recover himself;—“do gods exist composed of flesh and blood, and vulnerable by steel?—“Yet this god is worthy of the Egyptians. But I will convince you,” added he, “that I am not to be insulted with impunity.” And he instantly ordered the priests to be severely whipped, and all the deluded votaries of superstition to be killed, that should be found making public demonstrations of joy⁹¹.

Having thus triumphed over the Egyptian god, and overawed the whole nation by the terror of his arms, Cambyses ordered the Asiatic Greeks to return home with their ships, and prepared to follow them with his army. Before he left Memphis, however, he violently entered the temple of Vulcan, and also that of the *dii cabirii* or mighty gods; and after ridiculing their images, committed them to the fire⁹².

But the reign of this tyrannical conqueror, whose theological tenets led him to make a mockery of the religion of the vanquished, and whose unbridled fury added new horrors to despotism, was henceforth to be of short duration. He died, in his march through

91. *Id. ibid.*

92. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxxvii. Diodorus (lib. i.) and Strabo (lib. x. xvii.), have said that Cambyses burned or destroyed the Egyptian temples, not only at Memphis but at Thebes; but as no mention is made of such havoc by Herodotus, who lived soon after the reign of this prince, I have taken no notice of it. They seem to have been imposed on by the Egyptian priests; who, before their era, had invented fabulous accounts (as I have had occasion to observe) of the ancient grandeur of their country. Herodotus beside living nearer to the Persian conquest, being more acute and sceptical, was not to be misled; unless by some marvellous tale (which probably he did not believe), that contained a moral. If the temple of Vulcan had been destroyed by Cambyses, Herodotus could not have so distinctly described its porticoes and statues. *Historiar. lib. ii. passim.*

Syria, of an accidental wound received from his own sword⁹³. And, as he left no issue, his death was followed by a kind of interregnum in the Persian empire. This interregnum was preceded by an usurpation, the causes of which I must now relate.

LETTER

X.

Ant. Chr.

522.

Olymp.

lxiv. 2.

When Cambyses left Susa, in order to conduct his army against Egypt, he had placed the chief administration of affairs, during his absence, in the hands of Patizithes, one of the magi⁹⁴. Smerdis, his only brother, accompanied him. But becoming jealous of this prince, while in Egypt, seemingly on account of his favour with the army, he commanded him to return to Persia; and, in a new fit of jealousy, suspecting that Smerdis might aspire to the crown, the cruel monarch sent after him Prexaspes, a confidential courtier, by whom he was slain near Susa⁹⁵.

The knowledge of this circumstance, and the frantic behaviour of Cambyses, after his return from Ethiopia, which had rendered him the terror of his former subjects, as well as of the Egyptians, inspired Patizithes, the magian minister, with the ambitious thought of placing his own brother upon the imperial throne. He accordingly made him assume the name and character of the murdered prince, whom he greatly resembled in face and person, and sent heralds to all parts of the empire, commanding obedience to be yielded to Smerdis, the son of Cyrus⁹⁶.

One of those heralds met the army of Cambyses, in his return through Syria⁹⁷; and the rage of that monarch, in mounting his horse, in hopes of taking

93. 1d. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxiv—lxvi.

94. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxi.

95. Ibid. cap. xxx.

96. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxi.

97. Id. ibid.

PART I. speedy vengeance upon the usurper, occasioned the wound from his own sword, which proved mortal⁹⁸. Before his death, however, he discovered the intrigue of the two magi; by first examining Prexaspes, and afterward the herald, whom he had ordered to be seized. And finding that his brother, Smerdis, was certainly dead, he lamented his untimely fate; and calling his principal officers around him, made them acquainted with the particulars of the murder, and exhorted them, as they regarded their own happiness, and the honour of the Persian nation, never to suffer a base impostor to sit upon the throne of Cyrus⁹⁹.

This pathetic speech, however, had little effect upon the Persian leaders. Strongly attached to Smerdis, they considered all the dying monarch had said, concerning the assassination of that prince, as suggested by rage and resentment at his brother; for daring to rebel against him, and seize the imperial sceptre¹⁰⁰. And in this opinion they were confirmed by the mysterious behaviour of Prexaspes; who did not dare to own, that he had killed the son of Cyrus¹⁰¹. They, therefore, believed the magian usurper to be the brother of Cambyses; and, after the king's death, paid obedience to him, as the true prince, and rightful heir to the crown¹⁰².

In the meantime Patizithes, who still acted as prime minister, and who appears to have been a profound politician, took the most prudent means for conciliating the affections of all the subjects of the Persian empire. He issued, in the name of the impostor, a proclamation, offering a general remis-

98. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxii.—lxvi.

99. Id. ibid.

100. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxvi.

101. Id. ibid.

102. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxvii.

sion of taxes, and an exemption from military service for three years¹⁰³

LETTER
X.

But this and other popular acts, which endeared the magian usurper to the conquered nations, were not sufficient long to impose upon the Persian nobility, and princes of the blood royal. As the pretended son of Cyrus never shewed himself to the people, or admitted any of the grandees of Persia into his presence, but lived shut up within the walls of his palace, amid eunuchs and women, Otanes, a Persian nobleman of the first rank, grew suspicious of imposture, and found means to detect it¹⁰⁴. He communicated his discovery to Gobryas and Aspathines, two noblemen also of high rank, and approved honour. And these three associated chiefs admitted into a participation of their councils Intaphernes, Megabysus, and Hydarnes, all heads of illustrious families¹⁰⁵.

When those six confederates were concerting measures for degrading the impostor, Darius, the son of Hystaspes (descended in a direct line from Achæmenes, the founder of the royal house of Cyrus), arrived at Susa, and was thought worthy of their confidence. This young prince, whose father had been appointed governor of Persia by Cambyzes, encouraged the associated nobles in their generous purpose; assured them of the death of Smerdis, the son of Cyrus, and was admitted into their confederacy¹⁰⁶.

Meanwhile the magian usurper, and his brother Patizithes, having seemingly gained to their interest the venerable Prexaspes, prevailed upon him to ascend one of the towers of the palace; whence he promised to declare aloud, to the assembled Persi-

103. Id. *ibid*.

104. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxviii. lxix.

105. Id. lib. iii. cap. lxx. et seq.

106. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

PART I.

ans, That to his knowledge, Smerdis, the son of Cyrus, and none other, was the reigning king¹⁰⁷. But he, filled with remorse at the cruel part he had acted; and detesting the office in which he was engaged, began his speech with tracing the genealogy of Cyrus (which he deduced from Achemenes, in the male line), and expatiated on the benefits the Persian nation had derived from that heroic prince¹⁰⁸.

Having finished this part of his oration, Prexaspes disclosed the whole truth. He told the assembled multitude, That the apprehension of the dangers, to which he should be exposed, only had induced him to conceal the secret so long; that now seeing the necessity of revealing it, he thought himself bound to confess, that he, in obedience to the command of Cambyzes, had slain Smerdis, the son of Cyrus; and to declare, that the present possessor of the throne was a magian usurper; then imprecating curses upon the Persians, if they should fail to recover the supreme power, and punish the impostor, he threw himself headlong from the tower, and was killed by the fall¹⁰⁹.

Ant. Chr.
521.
Olymp.
lxiv. 4.

This unexpected declaration, from the mouth of a man of high rank and character, and the fatal catastrophe by which it was sealed, threw the councils of the magi into the utmost confusion, and emboldened the seven confederated chiefs to carry their design into immediate execution. Presuming on the respect inspired by their dignity, as grandees of the Persian empire, they resolved to enter the palace without demanding audience¹¹⁰. The guards, as they had foreseen, obsequiously made way, and allowed them to pass; but the nobles about his person,

107. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxiv.

108. Ibid. cap. lxxv.

109. Idem. ibid.

110. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxvii.

suspecting



suspecting their purpose, attempted to oppose them. This resistance, however, was feeble. The seven compatriots, animating each other, drew their swords; put to death every one that dared to deny them admission; penetrated to the inmost recess of the palace; slew the impostor and his brother Patizithes, whom they found deliberating on the dying testimony of Prexaspes; and cutting off their heads, carried them out, and shewed them to the people¹¹¹. Inflamed with rage and indignation at the affront offered to their sceptre, the Persians flew to arms, and massacred all the magi they found in Susa¹¹².

Nothing now remained for the successful confederates, but to appoint a successor to Cambyses; to divide the government of the Persian empire among them, or resign to the various nations that composed it, those liberties which God and nature had originally given them. The arguments which Herodotus makes the several chiefs use, on this occasion, are highly ingenious, and shew that he was perfectly acquainted with the advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of government, then known¹¹³; but they are better suited to the meridian of Greece, in which he lived, than that of the south of Asia, where absolute monarchy had been hereditary from time immemorial. I shall, therefore, only observe, that it was ultimately resolved to retain the monarchical form of government, and to preserve the empire of Cyrus unbroken¹¹⁴.

Ant. Chr.
521.
Olymp.
lxi. 4.

The grand difficulty, however, still remained to be determined; namely, who should be the head of that empire?—In order to settle this point, without exciting animosity or jealousy among the confede-

111. Id. lib. iii. cap. lxxviii. lxxix

112. Id. ibid.

113. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxx—lxxxiii,

114. Id. ibid.

rates,

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
521.
Olymp.
lxiv. 4.

rates, it was agreed, that they should ride out next morning at the rising of the sun, the great luminary which the Persians revered next to the Supreme Being, and fire his pure symbol; and that he, whose horse first neighed, should fill the vacant throne¹¹⁵.

Darius, who had killed the imposter with his own hand, who stood highest in the right of blood, and whose lofty mind aspired after dominion, communicated the agreement of the confederates to Oebares, his master of horse. And that expert groom assured him of success. In order to make good his promise, Oebares led out the favourite horse of Darius, along with a mare "that the horse loved," (to use the words of the honest historian) and permitted him to cover her on the ground over which he was to pass next morning¹¹⁶.

This artifice had the desired effect. When the Persian chiefs rode out, according to concert, the horse of Darius neighed, as soon as he came to the spot, where he had enjoyed his female the night before. At that sign, and a clap of thunder, which happened at the same time, the competitors of Darius instantly dismounted; and prostrating themselves, saluted him as their king¹¹⁷. And the Persians, and all the nations, who had been subjected the Persian dominion, acknowledged his sway¹¹⁸.

The other competitors for the throne were not, however, left unrewarded. They, and their descendants possessed distinguished honours and privileges, not only during the reign of Darius, but under all his successors. They were considered as the perpetual counsellors of the great king¹¹⁹ (as the Per-

115. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxxiv. 116. Id. lib. iii. cap. lxxxv.

117. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxxvi. 118. Id. lib. iii. cap. lxxxviii.

119. Esther, chap. i. ver. 14.

sian monarch was commonly called by the Greeks), and had access to him, without demanding leave, at all times, unless when he was in private with his women¹²⁰. Their advice was to be asked first, concerning all matters relative to the common interests of the empire; and their dignity was made known by their turbans, which they were permitted to wear in a peculiar form¹²¹. And Otanes, the author of the confederacy, who had declined competition for the throne, was rewarded with yet higher privileges. He enjoyed an exemption from taxes, and was allowed to live as an independent prince, unless in what concerned the general laws of the Persian monarchy¹²². And the same privileges were extended to his posterity¹²³.

LETTER
X.

Darius Hystaspes was worthy of the throne of Cyrus. Equally distinguished as a statesman and a warrior, his long reign of thirty-six years is the most important in the annals of the Persian empire, being better known than that of its founder; and it forms one of the most interesting periods in the history of the ancient world. But the transactions of this period, my lord, must be reserved for another letter.

120. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxxiv.

122. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxxiii.

121. Id. ibid.

123. Id. ibid.

LETTER

LETTER XI.

THE AFFAIRS OF THE GREEKS AND PERSIANS, FROM THE
ACCESSION OF DARIUS HYSTASPES TO THE BATTLE OF
MARATHON.

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
521.
Olympiad
lxiv. 4.

THE reign of Darius is not only memorable on account of the great events by which it was distinguished, but because of its being the æra when the government of the Persian empire was established, on those solid foundations that continued to support it, under his successors, until it was broken in pieces by the irresistible violence of the Macedonian conqueror. This politic prince, in order more firmly to establish his throne, married two daughters of Cyrus the Great; Atossa, and Artystona. He also married, with the same view, Parmys, daughter of the true Smerdis, and Phædmyma, daughter of Otanes, who had detected the magian impostor¹.

The beginning of the reign of Darius, however, was by no means free from troubles. He was under the necessity of putting to death Intaphernes, one of his competitors for the imperial crown, because of his audacity². He also found it necessary to cut off Oroites, satrap of Sardis, and chief governor of Asia Minor; who had been guilty of many cruelties, and was suspected of aspiring at independent sovereignty³. The particulars of the assassination of Oroites,

1. Herodotus, *Histor.* lib. iii. cap. lxxxviii.

2. Id. lib. iii. cap. cxix.

3. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. cxxxvi—cxxviii.

and the circumstances that led to it, deserve to be related, as they will throw light on the state of the Asiatic Greeks under the Persian government.

LETTER
XI.

I have formerly had occasion to mention the planting of the Grecian colonies on the coast of Asia Minor⁴; to speak of their early proficiency in arts and literature⁵; their prosperity under the Lydian monarchy; and their brave, but ineffectual resistance, against the Persian forces under Harpagus, the general of Cyrus⁶. During that struggle for independency, and even after their submission to the Persian power, many of the Grecian inhabitants of Ionia abandoned their settlements, and took refuge with their countrymen in the neighbouring islands of the Ægean sea⁷.

Those islands had never owned the sway of Cræsus; and Cyrus, who confined his ambition to the Asiatic continent, made no attempt to subdue them⁸. The naval force of Cambyzes, as we have seen⁹, was directed against other objects; so that the Greeks in the Asiatic islands, enjoying uninterrupted commerce, and enriched by the very misfortunes of their countrymen on the coast of Asia Minor, had risen, in the course of a century, to an extraordinary height of opulence and naval grandeur. Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Rhodes, were accordingly crowned with superb temples, adorned with the polished beauties of architecture; with splendid palaces, magnificent quays, and fortified cities, furnished with all the luxuries and conveniences of life, while the greater part of the European Greeks, perpetually embroiled in public or private wars, had made few removes from barbarism¹⁰.

4. Lett. iv.

5. Lett. vii.

6. Lett. ix.

7. Herodot. lib. i. passim.

8. Id. ibid.

9. Lett. x.

10. Herodot. et Thucyd. passim.

PART I.

Unfortunately, however, for the inhabitants of those islands, they were not permitted to enjoy their good fortune without alloy. Inequality of wealth, the natural consequence of commercial prosperity, necessarily introduced among them inequality of power. And as that wealth could not be acquired without talents, some opulent and powerful man, in almost every island, usually obtained dominion over his fellow-citizens, and was branded with the odious name, but envied rank of tyrant¹¹.

This tyranny became more general after the conquest of Asia Minor by the captains of Cyrus; who, conformable to his general policy, gave the government of every Grecian city and its territory, on the continent, to some principal citizen, under the controul of the satrap of Sardis¹². Nor was that pernicious example, in conjunction with inequality of fortune, the only cause of the change of government in the Asiatic islands.

Those islands had formerly a close connexion with the free states on the continent, with one or other of which they were in alliance; almost every contiguous island belonging either to the Eolian, Ionian, or Dorian confederacy. But after the Persian conquest of Asiatic Greece, that confederacy was broken. The islanders, therefore, had thenceforth no check upon the ambition of an usurping fellow-citizen, but the virtue of their particular communities; for commercial jealousy prevented the people of one island from interfering in favour of the liberties of those of another¹³. Hence the prevalence of tyranny, or petty despotism, in the principal islands of the Ægean sea.

11. Ibid.

12. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. i. iii. passim.

13. Id. *ibid.*

Of all the despots that reigned in these islands, the most illustrious was Polycrates, tyrant of Samos. This extraordinary man, having usurped the government over his fellow citizens, formed an alliance with Amasis, king of Egypt; who had, like himself, as we have seen¹⁴, risen to the sovereignty from a private station. And, by his attention to naval affairs, Polycrates raised himself to a degree of power unknown to any other Grecian prince of his time¹⁵. He maintained a fleet of one hundred galleys, of fifty oars each, on board of which he embarked a thousand archers¹⁶. With this fleet he acquired the dominion of the Ægean sea; subdued many of the islands; and took and pillaged several cities on the continent¹⁷. Every place he attacked submitted to his arms¹⁸; and no ship could escape his pyratrical cruisers, which were so constructed as to cut the water quicker than any other vessels then in use¹⁹.

Polycrates was no less magnificent and liberal, than opulent and powerful. His superb palace was thought worthy of admiration as late as the Augustine age²⁰. He lived in the utmost splendour; delighted in the conversation of men of learning and genius, who experienced his generosity, and were encouraged by his patronage. Anacreon, the lyric poet, was his constant companion²¹; and the philosopher, Pythagoras, a Samian by birth, was by him recommended to his royal friend Amasis²². And

14. Lett. x.

15. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. xxxix--cxxxv.

16. Id. lib. iii. cap. xxxix.

17. Id. *ibid.* Strabo, lib. xiv. p. 637. Edit. Lutet. Paris.

18. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxxix.

19. Id. *ibid.* et Plut. *Vit. Pericles.*

20. Sueton. *Vit. Caligula.*

21. Strabo, *ubi sup.*

22. Diog. Laert. *Vit. Pythag.* et Rollin, *de la Philosophie.* Art. *Pythag.*

although

PART I. although that philosopher did not choose to reside at the court of Samos after his return from his travels, he was indebted to the recommendation of Polycrates for the favour that was shewn him in Egypt²³; where he was admitted into the arcana of the priests, and is supposed to have acquired the principles of that sublime philosophy, which he afterward taught with so much reputation and success, at Crotona, in Italy²⁴.

The great, and uninterrupted prosperity of Polycrates, alarmed the fears of Amasis, if we may credit tradition, for the future fate of his Grecian friend and ally. He accordingly wrote to him a letter, which is preserved by Herodotus, desiring him to part with some thing that he highly valued; and if his prosperity still continued, to repeat the experiment, in order to arm himself against an awful reverse of fortune, which he had reason to apprehend. "For I know," says Amasis, "the envy of the Gods²⁵."

This opinion, that the gods are envious of human happiness, prevailed very generally in Greece, in early times²⁶; and seems to have arisen from the frequent vicissitudes of fortune, in that unsettled country, connected with a secret consciousness, that opulence and power were too often acquired by such crimes as deserved the vengeance of heaven. A similar sentiment, however, has been common in all ages and countries. "Ah, tremble at the peril of unmixed prosperity!" has ever been the language of men of melancholy dispositions, or desponding tempers; and of men of the firmest minds, during the influence of low spirits, or under the pressure of unexpected misfortune.

23. Id. *ibid.*

p. 263. Diog. Laert. *ubi sup.*

24. Isocrat. *Paneg. Basir.* Strabo, lib. x.

25. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xl.

26. Homer, et Herodot. *passim.*

Whatever might be the thoughts of Polycrates on that subject, he is said to have thrown a favourite signet, or seal-ring, into the sea, in compliance with the advice of the king of Egypt. But that signet, consisting of an emerald curiously sculptured and set in gold, was soon after found in the belly of a fish; which had been presented to him, by the person that caught it, because of its size and beauty²⁷. Proud of his good fortune, the Samian chief communicated the intelligence to Amasis; who instantly sent a herald to Samos, with orders to renounce all friendship and alliance with Polycrates; that he might not be involved in the future calamities of that prince, which he now considered as inevitable²⁸.

Such is the account given, by Herodotus, of this matter. But circumstances make it probable, that the king of Egypt was induced to renounce the friendship of Polycrates, for other reasons than those assigned by the Greek historian; than the fear of having occasion to sympathize with the sufferings of an ally in distress, or even of being obliged to support his desperate cause. Amasis was a great encourager of commerce, and took peculiar pride in patronizing the Greeks, both European and Asiatic, as we have already seen²⁹; and as appears by the magnificent presents, which he made to their temples, in different countries³⁰. He must, therefore, have been offended at the piracy of Polycrates, and alarmed at the growth of his naval power; and consequently would wish to throw off all connexion with a predatory prince, whom it was the common interest of all commercial nations to humble. Viewed in this light, his conduct was wise, political, and

27. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. xli. xlii.

28. Id. lib. iii. cap. xliii.

29. Lett. x.

30. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. clxxx—clxxxii.

honourable;

PART I. honourable; in the other, superstitious, weak and selfish.

Be the motives of Amasis, however, what they might, for renouncing the alliance of the tyrant of Samos, the subtle genius of Polycrates turned that circumstance to his own advantage. When he understood Cambyses was preparing to invade Egypt, he desired him to ask assistance from the Samians; and sent, as we have seen, forty galleys, to augment the Persian naval force³¹. These galleys the artful tyrant manned with such of the Samians as he suspected of seditious designs, and requested the Persian monarch never to suffer them to quit his service³².

The disaffected Samians, however, returned to their native island. But they were not allowed to remain there, being violently expelled by Polycrates³³. In this extremity, they implored the assistance of the Lacedæmonians, who had long considered themselves as the arbiters of Greece. Ever willing to extend their influence, the Lacedæmonians furnished the Samian exiles with an army. That army was embarked on board a Corinthian fleet; and landed, without opposition, in the island of Samos³⁴. Polycrates put himself at the head of his forces; and repulsed the invaders. He was at length, however, obliged to take refuge within the walls of his capital, whence he made frequent sallies. And the Lacedæmonians, after lying before it six weeks, found themselves under the necessity of raising the siege; and returned, with their Corinthian confederates, to Peloponnesus³⁵. The Samian exiles, now abandoned to their fate, commenced pirates;

31. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. xliv.

32. Id. *ibid.*

33. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xlv.

34. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. liv.

35. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lvi.

and after plundering several islands, settled in Crete, where they built the city of Cydonia³⁶.

LETTER
XI.

Thus finally rid of a dangerous body of malecontents, who had sought the subversion of his throne, and having resisted the combined force of the two greatest naval and military powers in European Greece, Polycrates became more formidable than ever. Nor did he fear a reverse of fortune. Laying it down as a maxim, "That he made more friends, " by restoring part of the booty he had unjustly seized, " than he could by abstaining from violence," he set no bounds to his piratical depredations³⁷. King of the ocean, and in a manner lord of all the islands in the Ægean sea, he aspired at the entire conquest of those islands, and also of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast³⁸.

A similar design seems, at the same time, to have been formed by Oroites, satrap of Sardis; who, having under his command all the Persian forces in Asia Minor, could compel the Asiatic Greeks, on the continent, to assist him with their naval force, in the reduction of the islands. The maritime strength of Polycrates was the chief obstacle to the execution of this ambitious project; which would have rendered Oroites the most powerful governor under the great king, or have enabled him to set his master at defiance, and erect an independent sovereignty. In conformity with such views, the crafty Persian insidiously drew Polycrates to Magnesia, in Lydia; and there ordered him to be seized, and ignominiously put to death, by crucifixion³⁹.

36. *Id. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. lix.*

37. *Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxxix. cxxi.*

38. *Id. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. cxxii.—cxxv. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xiii. Strabo, lib. xiv. p. 638.*

39. *Herodot. et Strabo, ubi sup.*

PART I.

The death of Polycrates, however, was not immediately followed by the submission of Samos to the Persian dominion, or with liberty to its citizens. Mæandrus, who had been secretary to the tyrant, retained possession of the sovereignty, and held his fellow-subjects in obedience⁴⁰. Meanwhile Oroites, taking advantage of the weak state of the Persian government under the magian impostor, had put to death every person in authority, within his jurisdiction, that seemed to stand in the way of his ambition, or who gave umbrage to his pride⁴¹. But the restoration of more vigorous councils, supported by legal sway, cut short his life and his tyrannical administration.

Ant. Chr.
521.
Olympiad.
lxiv. 4.

No sooner was Darius seated on the imperial throne, than he saw the ambitious views of Oroites, and the necessity of divesting him of his authority. And his audacity and cruelty, in ordering a messenger, sent to him from the court of Susa, with unwelcome commands, to be assassinated, in his return, made the Persian monarch resolve instantly to accomplish his ruin⁴².

But the government of Darius was not yet so fully established, as to enable him to dispatch an army for that purpose; and without a strong army it could not be openly effected, as Oroites could assemble a great body of troops, drawn from Phrygia, Lydia, Ionia, and other provinces under his jurisdiction⁴³. The new king, therefore, summoned a council of war, and laid his design, and the reasons for carrying it into speedy execution, before the most eminent Persian leaders; then asked, who among them would bring him the body of Oroites dead or alive, without the as-

40. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. cxliii.

41. Id. lib. iii. cap. cxxvi.

42. Id. ibid.

43. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. cxxvii.

istance of an army⁴⁴?—Thirty of those officers declared themselves willing to undertake the dangerous service. And these competitors having drawn lots, the execution of the enterprise fell to Bagæus, the son of Artontes⁴⁵.

This determined soldier having procured official letters of his own framing, to the governor of Asia Minor, sealed with the signet of Darius, set out for Sardis⁴⁶. On his arrival there, he waited upon Oroites, and delivered the letters, one after another, to be read aloud by the king's secretary, according to the established custom. And when he found, that the guards shewed no disaffection, but paid great respect to the contents of the first letter, he ventured to put another into the hands of the secretary, containing these authoritative words :—"Persians, king Darius forbids you to serve any longer as guards to Oroites!"—This order the guards no sooner heard, than they dropped their lances. Thus emboldened, Bagæus delivered his last letter, commanding, in the king's name, the Persians in Sardis to kill Oroites. That command was no sooner announced, than the guards drew their scimitars, and instantly slew the obnoxious satrap⁴⁷.

When Darius was informed of the death of Oroites, he sent the illustrious, and noble-minded Otanes, into Asia Minor, in order to re-establish the government of that important province⁴⁸. And while Otanes resided at Sardis, he undertook an expedition against the island of Samos; which, by the assistance of the Asiatic Greeks, on the continent,

44. Id. *ibid*.

45. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. cxxviii.

46. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

47. Id. *ibid*.

48. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. cxli.

PART I.

he reduced under the Persian dominion, and left under the government of Syloson, brother of Polycrates, who had claims upon the friendship of the great king⁴⁹.

Ant. Chr.
518.
Olympiad.
lxv. 3.

During the interval of peace that followed, or accompanied these events, it appears to have been that Darius issued his memorable decree in favour of the Jews. Though the edict of Cyrus, for rebuilding the temple of Jerusalem, had never been repealed, it had, in a great measure, been rendered ineffectual by the Samaritans, or Cuthians, whom we have seen settled in the kingdom of Israel, and who obstructed the Jews in the prosecution of their pious work⁵⁰. They had even procured an order from the magian usurper, for putting an utter stop to the building of the sacred edifice⁵¹. The decree of Darius not only confirmed that of Cyrus, but furnished the Jews with such assistance and support, for the furthering of their undertaking, that the temple was completely rebuilt within four years after the edict had been issued⁵².

Meanwhile the Babylonians revolted. Unable to brook the subjection into which they were fallen, under the Persian power, and enraged at the removal of the imperial seat to Susa; by which the wealth and grandeur of their proud capital, so long mistress of the east, was diminished, they resolved to retrieve their former consequence, by asserting their independency. They accordingly took advantage of the troubles in the Persian empire, first on the death of Cambyzes, and afterward on the murder of the magian usurper, to prepare themselves for sustaining a siege, by secretly storing their magazines with arms.

49. Id. cap. cxlii—cxlix. et cap. cxxxix—cxl.

50. Ezra, chap. iv. ver. 1—10.

51. Id. chap. iv. ver. 11—23.

52. Ezra, chap. vi. ver 1—15,

and provisions; and finding their purpose still undiscovered, they broke out into open rebellion⁵³.

LETTER
XI.

As soon as Darius was informed of this revolt, he appeared before the city of Babylon at the head of a great army, and invested that ancient metropolis⁵⁴. But the Babylonians, from their lofty walls and towers, derided his efforts for almost two years. In vain had he recourse to the stratagem employed by Cyrus: the Babylonians, aware of their danger, so vigilantly guarded the channel of the Euphrates, that no advantage could be taken of the diversion of its waters⁵⁵. Another stratagem, however, was tried with success.

Ant. Chr.
517.
Olympiad.
lxv. 4.

Zopyrus, the Persian general, having cut off his nose and ears, and otherwise disfigured his person, presented himself in that condition before Darius. Filled with sorrow and surprise at seeing a man of high rank, and who stood high in his esteem, so cruelly mangled, the great king hastily rose from his throne, and asked, with a stern look and loud voice, who had dared to be guilty of such outrage?—"I alone," answered Zopyrus, "am the perpetrator of the deed; for beside thee, O king! no one has power to have treated me thus. My heart swelled with indignation, to see the Persians baffled by the Assyrians⁵⁶."

"Miserable man!"—exclaimed Darius, "can'st thou be so utterly lost to reason as to imagine, that the enemy will surrender the sooner because of thy wounds?"—"If I had made you acquainted with my design," replied Zopyrus, "you would not have agreed to it: I have therefore executed it with-

53. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. cl.

54. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. cli. clii.

55. Id. *ibid.*

56. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. clii. clii.

PART I. “out your knowledge; and, unless the Persians be:
 “have unworthy of themselves, you may now make
 “yourself master of Babylon. For I will go over to
 “the enemy in this lacerated state, and tell them
 “I have suffered these mutilations from you; and
 “when I shall have gained their confidence, I make
 “no doubt of being trusted with the command of part
 “of their forces⁵⁷.”

After some farther explanation, the plan was fully concerted with the king, and Zopyrus affected to desert to the Babylonians. He was received into their city; carried before their great council; and artfully, on his examination, threw the whole blame of the humiliating condition, in which he appeared, upon the Persian monarch, because he had advised him to raise the siege, as he saw no prospect of being able to take the place⁵⁸.

The Babylonians believed every word that was uttered by Zopyrus; and as he assured them, that he longed for nothing so much as to be revenged upon Darius for the injuries he had sustained, and to counteract those councils and designs with which he was well acquainted, they intrusted him with the command of a body of troops. At the head of this chosen band, he repeatedly sallied out upon the besiegers: and every sally was attended with success. In the first attempt he cut off a thousand Persians, who had been thrown in his way by Darius; in the second, two thousand; and in the third, four thousand⁵⁹. Those exploits exalted Zopyrus in the estimation of the Babylonians; who, at length, invested him with the chief command of their forces, and with the military government of their city. And he, in concert with his former

⁵⁷. Id. *ibid*.

⁵⁸. Id. *Historiar. lib. iii. cap. clvi*.

⁵⁹. Herodot. *lib. iii. cap. clvii*.

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master, put the Persians in possession of that metropolis⁶⁰.

Having thus recovered the sovereignty of Babylon, Darius took the most efficacious measures for securing the future obedience of the inhabitants. He ordered three thousand of the most active rebels to be put to death. He removed the brazen gates, and demolished the walls, which had been left entire by Cyrus⁶¹; reducing them, as appears from the description of Strabo, to one-fourth of their former height⁶².

Soon after the recovery of Babylon, the Persian monarch undertook an expedition against European Scythia. His motives for engaging in this enterprise are variously conjectured by historians. The most probable, however, seem to have been, a desire of securing the dominion of Asia Minor, by overawing the European Greeks; and of giving play to the impetuous spirit of his victorious troops, who had now no object for their activity in the south, by leading them against the northern barbarians. Nor is it improbable, that finding himself undisputed master of Asia, his ambition might aspire at the conquest of Europe.

Actuated by these, or similar motives, Darius assembled in the neighbourhood of Susa, an army of seven hundred thousand men, drawn out of every province of his empire⁶³. At the head of this great army, he marched through Asia Minor: passed the Thracian Bosphorus; conquered the Getes, the only people of Thrace that ventured to oppose his progress, or failed to make submission, and arrived on the banks of the Danube; while the Asiatic Greeks,

LETTER
XI.

Ant. Chr.
516.

Olympiad
lxvi. 1.

Ant. Chr.
513.
Olympiad
lxvi. 4.

60. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. clviii.

61. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. clix. 62. Strabo, *Geog.* lib. xvi. init.

63. Herodotus, lib. iv. cap. lxxxvii.

who

PART I.

who formed his maritime force, having advanced into the Euxine sea, attended his motions with a fleet of six hundred sail⁶⁴. By their assistance, he passed the Danube, as he had the Bosphorus, on a bridge of boats, and entered European Scythia⁶⁵; anciently comprehending all the countries between the Ister or Danube, and the Tanais or Don, and extending from the Euxine sea to the Carpathian mountains and the frontiers of European Sar-matia⁶⁶.

The manners of the people in this extensive region, and also in that which stretches from the Tanais to the frontiers of China (of the European and Asiatic Scythians or Tartars), must ever be considered as prime objects of human curiosity; as they are not only marked by strong singularities, but have continued longer in a similar state, than those of any other nation we know. A concise account of the manners and customs of the European Scythians, as given by Herodotus, the first historian who speaks of them, will therefore form a necessary introduction to the invasion of their country by Darius Histaspes.

The Scythians, consisting of various tribes, or hordes, in different degrees of barbarism, “draw not “their *subsistence* from *tillage*,” says the venerable father of history, “but from *cattle*”⁶⁷. This is an important

64. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. lxxxvii—xc.

65. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. xcvi.

66. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iv. cap. xcix. et seq.

67. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. xlvi.—Justin tells us (lib. ii. cap. ii.), that the Scythians, satisfied with the milk of their cattle, made no use of the flesh. But Herodotus makes no such distinction; and although he does not enter particularly into the subject, it appears from his account of their sacrifices, that the Scythians not only ate the flesh of sheep and oxen, but also of horses (*Historiar.* lib. iv. cap. lxi.). He even informs us of the manner in which they prepared it

important fact, and those that follow are no less characteristic. The Scythians, he tells us, having no fixed habitations, used carts or wains instead of houses⁶⁸; that to Mars, their favourite divinity, whose emblem was an old scimitar, they sacrificed, besides horses and other cattle, every hundredth male prisoner taken in war; that after pouring a libation upon the head of the human victim, they cut his throat over a bowl, and washed the sacred scimitar with his blood; then cut off his right-arm, by the shoulder, and threw it into the air; that every Scythian drank the blood of the first prisoner he took; and presented to the king the heads or scalps of the enemies he had slain, without which he was entitled to no share in the booty; that he, who had acquired the greatest number of these barbarous trophies, was accounted the most valiant man; that many Scythians cloathed themselves in the skins of men, as others do in those of wild beasts; that they used the skulls of gallant enemies as drinking cups, covering them with leather; and sometimes inlaying them with gold; that, at their public festivals, distinguished warriors drank out of two of those cups; and every Scythian, who had killed an enemy, out of one; while they, who had performed no such exploit, were not permitted to taste the liquor, but sat at a distance in shame⁶⁹.

These

it (Id. *ibid.*). No martial people, indeed, ever abstained from the use of animal food; and barbarous warriors, like beasts of prey, have generally delighted in it. If not absolutely necessary to inflame their courage, as has commonly been believed, it is at least requisite, in the absence of bread, to enable them to support the toils of war.

68. Id. *ibid.* These moveable dwellings, or covered carriages, which contained all their domestic utensils, were peculiarly suited to defensive war; as they could, when attacked by a superior enemy, retire to a distant district, with not only their herds and flocks, but their wives and children; with all that was dear to them, or necessary for their subsistence. See Gibbon's *Hist. of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, cap. xxvi. et auct. cit.

69. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. lxii.—lxvi. Other ancient authors have delineated

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These particulars enable us to discover, that the Scythians were a warlike and barbarous race of men, with a high sense of military honour; and that, like all northern barbarians, they were addicted to drinking. For this vice, indeed, they were so notorious, that, even among the convivial Greeks, a man who indulged in liquor to violent excess, was said to "play the Scythian"⁷⁰. Drinking and barbarity, in a word, accompanied their most important civil transactions. In ratifying their treaties, they poured wine into a large earthen vessel, and mingled it with blood drawn from the contracting parties; then having dipt into it a scimitar, a quiver of arrows, and other weapons of war, they mutually uttered many imprecations against the violators of the stipulations, and drank off the liquor⁷¹.

But the most remarkable feature in the character of the Scythians, considering their stage in the progress of society, was their superstitious veneration for their king, or great chief. Though they lived in a state so friendly to liberty, and without the restraint of positive laws, they were slaves to the will of a despot⁷². The most solemn oath they could take

delineated the character of the Scythians. But Herodotus, who wrote four hundred and fifty years before the christian æra, and about sixty years after the expedition of Darius, only could describe the manners of the Scythians of those times. He had visited their country, and seen what he relates.

70. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. lxxxiv.

71. Id. *Historiar.* lib. iv. cap. lxx.

72. This mixture of barbarism and despotism, among a people in the hunting and herding state, although singular, is not without example: it has been found in the highlands of Scotland, as well as in the wilds of Scythia. Nor are its causes ^{the} wholly inexplicable. It may be partly accounted for, from the long continuance of the Scythians in that rude state; in consequence of their possessing an extensive champaign country, more fit for pasture than tillage; and partly from their respect, approaching adoration, to the royal race; supposed to be lineally descended from Jupiter, and a daughter of the

take was, to swear by the royal throne; and the king, on an accusation of perjury, which it was the interest of his ministers to prove, could order any obnoxious subject to be put to death; confiscate his property, and extirpate his offspring⁷³. Nor does it appear, that any opposition was ever made against the execution of such mandate.

Such were the people against whom the Persian monarch made war. Conscious of their inability to oppose, in battle, his numerous and disciplined army, the European Scythians, who always fought on horseback, and who had, on this occasion, been abandoned by their Asiatic confederates, retreated before him; wasting the country, and filling up the springs and wells⁷⁴. By that mode of warfare, in which they hazarded only slight skirmishes, they drew him as far as the deserts beyond the Tanais; sending their wives and children, with the greater part of their cattle, into regions still more remote⁷⁵. Thus baffled in his hopes of conquest, and chagrined with disappointment, Darius gave over his fruitless pursuit; and, encamping on the banks of the river Oarus, sent a haughty message to Indathyrus, king of the Scythians, desiring him either to try his strength in the field, or to acknowledge the Persian monarch as his master, by presenting him with earth and water, in testimony of submission⁷⁶.

The Scythian prince, proud of his barbarous independency, returned an answer no less haughty, than

the river Borysthenes, and who had held the throne, about a thousand years, in uninterrupted succession, at the invasion of Scythia, by Darius Histaspes. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. v. vi. vii.

73. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. lxxviii—lxx. In such accusations, the Scythian monarch was assisted by certain prophets or seers; whose spiritual authority was necessary to the exercise of his temporal despotism, and who were rewarded with the confiscations. Id. ibid.

74. Herodotus, lib. iv, cap. cxx.
cap. cxxi—cxxiv.

75. Id. *Historiar.*

76. Herodot. lib. ix. cap. cxxvii.

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the message of the Persian monarch. After telling him, that he never fled from any man out of fear; and that, in declining to give him battle, he was not actuated by that motive, but pursued the mode of war best suited to his circumstances, and the state of his country, "I acknowledge," said he, "no superior, but Jupiter, my progenitor, and Vesta, queen of the Scythians⁷⁷." And, instead of presenting Darius with earth and water, he sent him, by a herald, a bird, a mouse, a frog, and a quiver of arrows⁷⁸. By this present, some of the Persians seemed to think, that the Scythians had made their submission. But Gobrias, one of the seven chiefs who had slain the magian usurper, explained it differently. "By that present," observed he, "the Scythians mean to let us know, that unless we can ascend into the air, like birds, conceal ourselves in the earth, like mice, or plunge into the fens, like frogs, we must perish by those arrows⁷⁹."

Satisfied with the justness of this explication, and seeing the danger of losing his army, already much diminished, in an immense country, intersected with lakes and rivers, Darius took the resolution of returning into Asia Minor, and began his backward march⁸⁰. Meanwhile the Scythians, having collected their forces, pressed upon his rear. In every encounter, the barbarous enemy broke the Persian cavalry; but the Persian foot opposed an impenetrable barrier against their most furious attacks, and obliged them to seek safety in flight⁸¹. At length the Persian monarch approached the Danube. But here a new danger threatened him.

77. Id. *ibid*.

78. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. cxxxi.

79. Id. *Historiar*. lib. iv. cap. cxxxii.

80. Herodotus. lib. iv. cap. cxxviii—cxxxvi.

81. Id. *ibid*.

A body

A body of Scythians had arrived at the Danube, by a different rout, and endeavoured to persuade the Asiatic Greeks to remove the bridge of boats, which they had been left to guard; and by such bold measure, to free themselves and their countrymen from subjection to the Persian power; as Darius and his whole army must, in that event, inevitably perish, either by famine or the weapons of war⁸². This proposal was eagerly embraced by Miltiades, prince or *tyrant* (under the Persian monarch) of Cardia, in the Thracian Chersonesus; and strenuously opposed by Histiaüs, chief of Miletus⁸³.

Histiaüs might have reprobated such treachery to a superior sovereign, upon the purest principles of moral justice. That he was actuated by honourable sentiments, there is reason to believe; notwithstanding what has been advanced to the contrary by Greek and Roman writers, in their enthusiastic zeal for liberty. But he chose to employ political arguments, as of more certain effect, in order to confirm his brother chiefs in their loyalty to Darius. He, therefore, represented to them, that their authority over their fellow-citizens was intimately connected with the dominion of the great king, whose vassals they were; and that, if they should restore liberty and independency to the Asiatic Greeks, the people of every state would choose a democratical form of government, and no longer submit to the will of a master; or the controul of any one man⁸⁴.

Influenced by these arguments, all the other Grecian chiefs, in the service of Darius, agreed to preserve the bridge, and to wait his arrival, except

82. Cornel. Nep. *Vit. Miltiades*, cap. iii. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. cxxxvii.

83. Id. *ibid*.

84. Herodot. et Cornel. Nep. *ubi sup*.

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Miltiades, who adhered to his former opinion⁸⁵; and, finding himself obnoxious on that account, he afterward retired to Athens, his native city, where we shall see him distinguished as a hero and commander, and become the champion of the liberties of Greece⁸⁶. The Persian monarch accordingly repassed the Danube unmolested, with the remains of his army. And having left eighty thousand men in Thrace, under Megabyzus, one of his generals, to secure the conquest of that country, he proceeded with the main body to Asia Minor, and took up his residence at Sardis, which he made the seat of his court⁸⁷. There he spent the winter, and the greater part of the following year; during which time, he accomplished most of the ends he could have proposed to himself by his Scythian expedition, though he had not vanquished the roving enemy in battle.

Ant. Chr.
512.
Olymp.
lxvii. x.

While Darius resided at Sardis, Megabyzus, his general in Europe, subdued all the Thracian tribes that refused to acknowledge the Persian sway, and received the submission of Macedonia⁸⁸. This submission was readily yielded by Amyntas, the Macedonian monarch, who was afraid to resist the arms of the great king. But his son Alexander, a prince of high spirit, ashamed of his father's pusillanimity, and enraged at the licentious behaviour of seven Persian lords (who had been sumptuously entertained on that occasion) to some Macedonian ladies, introduced at their request, and contrary to the custom of Greece, to grace the feast, conspired the destruction of those violators of decency, and the deliverance of Macedonia from foreign dominion. For that purpose, he disguised, in the dress of virgins, a

85. Id. *ibid.*

86. Cornel. Nep. *Vit. Miltiades*, cap. iii. et seq.

87. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. cxliii. et seq.

88. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xiv—xviii.

certain number of gallant youths; who, when the Persian nobles, heated with wine, attempted to take certain liberties, drew their concealed daggers, and put them all to death⁸⁹.

LETTER
XI.


The address of the Macedonian prince, who afterward ascended the throne, in giving a large sum of money, and his sister Gygea in marriage to Bubares, the officer that came to inquire into the cause of the death of the Persian deputies, prevented this assassination from being publicly known⁹⁰. The recal of Megabyzus allowed him no leisure to inquire into the transaction, or to revenge the murder, had he been so disposed. And events of more importance engaged the attention of the Persian monarch.

As the preservation of the sovereignty of Asiatic Greece appears to have been Darius's chief motive for invading Europe, and retaining the conquest of

89. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. xix—xxi. This is one of the most valuable anecdotes preserved by the venerable father of history, and the first philosophical traveller. From it we learn, that the Persian women were usually present at public entertainments (Id. *ibid.*); and that the Macedonian women, who followed the Grecian customs, were confined to their own apartments, on all occasions, and only seen by their husbands and nearest relations (Herodot. *ubi sup.*). Before Alexander introduced the disguised youths, he desired the Macedonian ladies, who had been insulted, to withdraw, in order to bathe before they went to bed, that they might be more agreeable to their Persian paramours. And when the disguised youths entered, in female attire, he presented them to the Persian nobles, and said, "We have treated you with all kind of variety. We have given you not only all we had, but whatever we could procure. And what is yet more, we have not even denied you our wives and daughters, to complete our hospitality; that you may be fully persuaded we have paid you all due honours; and may, at your return, acquaint the king who sent you, that a Grecian prince of Macedonia gave you a good reception, and contributed to your pleasure both at *table* and in *bed*." Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. xx.

90. Id. lib. v. cap. xxi.

Thrace,

PART I.  Thrace, he took the most politic measures for that end; both during his stay at Sardis, and after his return to Susa. He not only confirmed Histæus, to whose fidelity he was indebted for his safe retreat over the Danube, in the government of Miletus, but rewarded him with the territory of Myrcinus on the river Strymon in Thrace; and gave him permission there to build a city⁹¹. He subjected to his sway several of the islands in the Ægean sea, and committed the government of them to such of the natives, as he had reason to think were firmly attached to his interest⁹². He became even jealous of Histæus, the Milesian, because of his great influence in Ionia, and the power which he was likely to acquire, in consequence of his new city and territory in Thrace⁹³. The progress of this jealousy, as related by Herodotus, claims particular notice.

When Megabyzus arrived at Sardis, in order to deliver up his command, after he had completed the conquest of Thrace, and received the submission of Macedonia, he thus addressed Darius:—"What have you done, O king! in permitting a bold and aspiring Grecian chief to found a city in Thrace? —a country abounding in materials for shipbuilding; in men fit for the oar, and in mines of gold; with both Greek and barbarian adventurers, who want only a leader, in order to execute any ambitious enterprise. Put a stop, therefore, to the proceedings of Histæus, if you would avoid the troubles of intestine war⁹⁴."

Convinced of the soundness of this reasoning, and aware of the policy of using gentle means,

91. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xi.

92. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. xxiii—xxvii.

93. Id. *ibid.*

94. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. xxiii.

Darius

Darius sent a messenger to invite Histiaëus to Sardis. On his arrival, the Persian monarch insidiously said, "Histiaëus! ever since my return from Scythia, and thy departure from my presence, my most ardent wish has been to see and converse with thee again; persuaded, that a *wise and affectionate* friend is the most valuable of all acquisitions. And that those qualities are combined in thee, experience has given me sufficient proof. Now, since thy company is so acceptable to me, I will make thee a proposal:—Think no more of Miletus, or of the city which thou art building in Thrace, but go with me to Susa, and take part in all I possess. Be my companion and counselor⁹⁵."

Histiaëus accepted this offer, because he knew his refusal would avail him nothing; appointing Aristagoras, his nephew and son-in-law, governor of Miletus during his absence⁹⁶. And Darius departed for Susa, accompanied with the object of his jealousy; leaving his brother Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis, and chief governor of Asia Minor⁹⁷. Otanes, the son of Sysamnes, one of the royal judges, and who had himself acted in a judicial capacity, succeeded Megabyzus in the command of the Persian forces in Europe, and reduced Byzantium, with several other places, on both sides of the Propontis⁹⁸, which either had not before submitted to the Persian arms, or which had withdrawn their allegiance from the great king.


Meanwhile the ambition of Darius had taken a new direction. It pointed him toward the rich countries, in the extremity of the east, which have in all ages excited the avidity of mankind. In order to make a discovery of those countries, as well as

95. Id. lib. v. cap. xxiv.

96. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. xxv—xxx.

97. Id. ibid.

98. Herodot. ubi sup.

PART I:  to acquire a knowledge of the sea-coast of his extensive dominions in the south, he caused a fleet to be built at Cospatyrus; a city on the river Indus, as high as the frontiers of Asiatic Scythia⁹⁹.

Ant. Chr.
509.
Olympiad
lxvii. 4.

That fleet was built under the direction of Scylax, a Grecian navigator, who was also intrusted with the command of it. Scylax fell down the Indus to the ocean; then, steering westward, passed the Persian gulf; sailed round the Arabian peninsula; entered the Arabian gulf; and arrived, after a voyage of two years and six months, at the harbours, whence the Phœnicians, in the service of the king of Egypt, had set out, as formerly related, to circumnavigate the African continent¹⁰⁰.

Ant. Chr.
506.
Olympiad
lxviii. 3.

Furnished with the information he desired, in consequence of this successful voyage, Darius passed the Indus at the head of a great army, and made himself master of the rich and populous country between that river and the Ganges¹⁰¹. It formed the twentieth, and last acquired province of his vast empire, and paid an annual tribute of three hundred and sixty talents of gold, or about a million sterling annually¹⁰².

Thus, my lord, are we naturally led to consider the government and police of the Persian empire; now at its height; and when its administration was fully established, by the wise policy of Darius Hytaspes.

The sway of the Persian monarch, like that of all great masters of empire, was in some measure absolute; and the reverence, with which he was approached, fell in nothing short of that paid to the

99. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. cii. lib. iv. cap. xliv.

100. Id. ibid.

101. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. xliv.

102. Id. lib. iii. cap. xciv.

Deity, his courtiers prostrating themselves before him¹⁰³. But the *great king*, as he was usually called by the Greeks, and the *king of kings*, as he was styled by his Asiatic subjects, could take no resolution concerning public affairs, but in conjunction with his council of state¹⁰⁴; consisting of seven Persian princes or noblemen (as we have had occasion to observe), conformable to the number of compatriots that slew the magian usurper.

Justice, in the Persian empire, was administered by able judges, whose decisions were regulated by fixed laws, not dictated by arbitrary will, as in other despotic governments. Nor could any sentence be pronounced upon a criminal, before the accused person had been confronted with his accusers¹⁰⁵. And this privilege seems to have been indulged to slaves as well as to free subjects¹⁰⁶.

The same liberal policy was extended to the general government of the Persian empire, and also to the administration of the finances. Not only the satraps, or governors of provinces, who were intrusted with the collection of the royal revenue, but the governors of inferior districts, were appointed by the great king; accountable *ultimately* to him for their conduct, in their particular jurisdictions, not to the satrap under whom they acted; and remova-

103. Plut. *Vit. Themist.* Plato, in *Alcibiad.* We must not, however, assert with Mr. Gibbon, that the absolute and fluctuating will of the Persian monarch was the only rule of moral obligation (*Hist. of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xlii.); though that will was flatteringly allowed by the pliant and intimidated judges of Cambyſes to be the sole rule of his own moral conduct, in regard to what concerned himself only, marrying within the legal degrees of kindred. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxxi.

104. Esther, chap. i. ver. 13, 14.

105. Diod. Sicul. lib. xv. *Cyroped.* lib. i. viii.

106. Id. *ibid.* et Herodot. lib. i. cap. cxxxvii.

PART I. ble solely by him, with the advice of his council of state¹⁰⁷. And on purpose to facilitate intelligence and convey orders, a mode of communication, resembling that of the modern post, was instituted; by which accounts of all transactions were speedily brought to the king at Susa, or mandates carried from that seat of his court¹⁰⁸.

107. Herodot. passim. Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* lib. viii. Plato, de *Leg.* et *Epist.* vii.

108. Esther, cap. iii. ver. 12—15. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xcviii. Though this institution is by Xenophon ascribed to Cyrus, there is reason to believe it owed its origin to the political sagacity of his second successor, Darius Hystaspes; who first regulated the finances of the Persian empire, and imposed a fixed tribute upon each of its twenty provinces, for the support of his civil and military establishment (Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxxix). The account of the division, produce, and revenue of that empire, as given by Herodotus (*Historiar.* lib. iii. cap. xc—cvii.), though too imperfect to merit a circumstantial detail, abounds with much valuable information, and contains many particulars highly worthy of notice. Persia, the birth-place of the monarchy, and the native country of the royal and conquering race, was not included among the tributary provinces; the lands of the Persians being exempted from all taxes (Id. *ibid.*). The neat annual revenue that came into the royal treasury, from all the provinces of the Persian empire, after deducting the expences of government, amounted to fourteen thousand, five hundred and sixty Eubœic talents of silver (Herodot. *ubi sup.*); or about three millions, six hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling; a great sum, considering the value of money in ancient times, and perhaps equivalent to twenty-four millions at present. But the gross revenue, and subsidiary contributions, must have been infinitely greater, for although only a thousand talents, or two hundred and fifty-two thousand pounds entered the treasury from the province of Babylon or Assyria, that province, we find, paid an artabe of silver a day, or about one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling, a year, beside maintaining, during eight months, the household of the great king; eight hundred stallions and sixteen thousand mares; one stallion to twenty mares, for supporting the breed of horses for the king's stables and the royal army (Herodot. lib. i. cap. xcii. et lib. iii. cap. xcii.). And Egypt, and the neighbouring parts of Africa, furnished, beside the fixed tribute, corn for an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xci.

But

But liberal as the spirit of the Persian polity was, and well constituted as the administration appears to have been, the dominion of the great king, like that of all despotic governments, was degrading to the human character, and always borne with impatience by the Asiatic Greeks. Strongly carried toward liberty by original disposition, and by their connexion with their European brethren, licentiously free, they spurned at absolute sway. And certain accidental circumstances conspired to hurry them into revolt, and rouse them to open rebellion against the authority of Darius.

A sedition having happened in the island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades, between the democratical and aristocratical factions, the heads of the latter were driven into exile, and took refuge in the city of Miletus¹⁰⁹. That city was then governed by Aristagoras, as already observed, in the absence of his uncle Histiaëus. To Aristagoras the banished Naxians applied for assistance, in order to restore them to their country, and their former situation of chief citizens¹¹⁰.

Hoping to obtain the sovereignty of Naxos, at that time one of the most populous and wealthy islands in the Ægean sea, if he could reinstate the exiles, Aristagoras assured them he would use his best endeavours to accomplish their wish. He honestly told them, however, that he was not able, as sub-governor of Miletus, to furnish them with the aid they required; for he understood the democratical party, who were in possession of the Naxian government, had eight thousand men, well armed, together with a strong fleet, to support them in their usurped authority. "But," added he, "Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis, and brother to Darius, is my friend. He

Ant. Chr.
502.
Olympiad.
lxix. 3.

109. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xxx.

110. Id. ibid.

"has

PART I.

“ has a numerous army, and a powerful fleet, under his direction; and I have reason to believe, that he will undertake any enterprise I shall suggest¹¹¹. ”

The Naxians agreed to this expedient, and left the conduct of the negociation solely to Aristagoras; authorising him to offer such presents as he should think necessary, and engage, in their names, for the repayment of the expense of the armament¹¹². Aristagoras accordingly went to Sardis, and laid the business before Artaphernes. “ Beside Naxus, which has not yet submitted to the Persian power, you will,” said he, “ by such an expedition, put the great king in possession of Paros, Andros, and the rest of the cluster of islands that go under the name of the Cyclades. And to those may be added Eubœa; a large and wealthy island on the coast of Attica, and easy to be taken. One hundred ships will be sufficient for the reduction of the whole¹¹³. ”

“ You have proposed,” answered Artaphernes, “ an enterprise of great advantage to Darius; and prudently judged in every thing, except the number of ships. For instead of one hundred, which you demand, two hundred shall be ready the ensuing spring, in order to ensure success. In the meantime, the king’s consent must be obtained¹¹⁴. ”

Darius readily agreed to the projected expedition; and Artaphernes having equipped two hundred ships, agreeable to his proposal, and assembled a large body of land-forces, under Megabates, his nephew, sent them to Aristagoras at Miletus¹¹⁵. The armament

111. Herodot. ubi sup.

112. Id. ibid.

113. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xxxi.

114. Id. ibid.

115. Id. lib. v. cap. xxxii. et seq.

accordingly

accordingly sailed. Nor could it have failed of success, if the pride and jealousy of the Grecian and Persian commanders, had not made them quarrel in the voyage.

LETTER
XI.

Ant. Chr.
501.
Olympiad.
lxix. 4.

Megabates having confined the captain of a Grecian ship for neglect of duty, Aristagoras released him, and insisted that the fleet was under his direction¹¹⁶. In consequence of this haughty claim, and the disagreement to which it gave birth, Megabates secretly dispatched a vessel to Naxus, to inform the inhabitants of their danger; so that, when the armament arrived at that island, the Naxians had taken the most effectual measures for the defence of their capital. And the Persians, after a siege of four months, found themselves under the necessity of re-embarking without being able to make themselves masters of the place¹¹⁷.


Aristagoras, on his return to Miletus, sensible that his credit with Artaphernes was now ruined; as well on account of his quarrel with Megabates, as the failure of the expedition against Naxus, be-
thought himself of the only expedient that remained, to save him from utter destruction. He resolved to throw himself upon the protection of his countrymen, the Asiatic Greeks; and to deserve that protection, by encouraging them to throw off the Persian yoke, and attempt the recovery of their liberty and independency¹¹⁸.

When Aristagoras had formed this resolution, but before he had taken any measures for carrying it into effect, he received a message from his uncle Histiaeus, soliciting him to provoke the Milesians

116. Id. *ibid.*

117. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

118. Id. lib. v. cap. xxxv.

PART I.  to revolt from the Persian monarch¹¹⁹. In enjoying the pleasures of the court of Susa, and sharing the councils of a great empire, that Grecian chief found himself of less consequence, than in his own country. He, therefore, longed to return to a situation, where he should see no superior, and be under no constraint; his active and aspiring spirit being ill fitted for the luxurious indolence, and servile condition of a dependent upon an oriental throne. But as all his motions were strictly watched, he saw no means of effecting his escape, or recovering his former station, unless he could awaken such troubles in Ionia, as would make his presence there necessary¹²⁰. Hence the message of Histæus to his newpew and son-in-law, at Miletus.

Thus impelled by circumstances, and prompted by the advice of his uncle, Aristagoras assembled his friends, and made them acquainted with his resolution of resisting the authority of the great king¹²¹. They all applauded his fortitude, and encouraged him in his purpose, except Hecatæus, the historian; who dissuaded him from such an attempt, and endeavoured to deter him, by enumerating the forces of the Persian monarch. But finding his arguments ineffectual, Hecatæus advised, that before such a bold step was taken, the Milesians should make themselves masters of the sea. And as the means of creating this maritime strength, he recommended the seizing of the treasures deposited in the temple of Apollo at Branchidas, within their own territory¹²².

Aristagoras pursued a more immediate, and less obnoxious course, for acquiring naval superiority. He sent Itagoras, one of his associates, to seize by force or fraud, the principal Grecian commanders,

119. Id. *ibid*.

121. Id. lib. v. cap. xxxvi.

120. Herodotus, *ubi sup*.122. Id. *ibid*.

Who had been engaged in the expedition against Naxus, if he could not draw them over by persuasion to his interest. Itagoras succeeded beyond expectation: he seized all the chiefs he could not persuade¹²³. And Aristagoras, rendered confident by his good fortune, determined instantly to set at defiance the power of the Persian monarch. As a prelude to such a measure, he resigned to the Milesians their native liberties, and placed himself on a footing with his fellow-citizens; depending solely upon his personal importance, for the lead which he wished to take in their affairs¹²⁴.

From Miletus Aristagoras went to the other Ionian cities; every where erecting the standard of liberty, and expelling the tyrants, or Grecian governors under Darius. So that all Ionia was soon united in a league of freedom and independency¹²⁵. And the Æolian and Dorian cities afterward acceded to that confederacy.

Ant. Chr.
500.
Olympiad.
lxx. 1.

Meanwhile Aristagoras, aware that the whole body of the Asiatic Greeks were not able to oppose the arms of the Persian monarch, assisted by the naval force of the Phœnicians, their rivals in commerce, resolved to engage the European Greeks in his cause. He accordingly set sail for Greece, and went first to the court of Sparta¹²⁶.


The Lacedæmonians, as I have frequently had occasion to observe, had been considered as the leading people in Greece, ever since the conquest of Messenia. And they had often asserted their superiority with a high hand. They were now governed by Cleomenes and Damaratus; joint kings of Lacedæmon.

123. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xxxvii.

124. Id. ibid.

125. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xxxix.

126. Id. ibid.

PART I.  **daemon or Laconia, agreeable to their constitution.**
But the chief authority was vested in Cleomenes, because of his transcendant military talents¹²⁷.

Aristagoras applied to Cleomenes for assistance. "Wonder not," said he, "at the trouble I have taken to come hither. The business is important. To behold the posterity of the free-born Ionians reduced to the condition of slaves, is extremely grievous and mortifying to their leaders, and must also be to you; for the Lacedæmonians are the arbiters of Greece, and the asserters of liberty. I conjure you, therefore, by the Grecian gods, to rescue the Asiatic Greeks from barbarian servitude!—The enterprise will not be difficult to a prince, and a people, who have attained the summit of military glory¹²⁸."

To these arguments, addressed to the pride and generosity of Cleomenes, Aristagoras added others, calculated to work upon his ambition, and that of the Spartan senate. With this view, he produced a plate of brass, on which was engraved a geographical delineation, or map of the world, as far as then known, with all its seas and rivers. To that plate he pointed, and described the rich province of the Persian empire, from Sardis to Susa. The motives for undertaking the conquest of these, he represented as many, and the dangers to be encountered few; as the barbarians were not only inferior to the Greeks in valour, but in weapons of war; in arms both offensive and defensive. You will not have to "contend," said he, "with a people like the Messenians, Arcadians, or Argives, equal to yourselves in prowess: and the prize will be infinitely greater. For if you should become masters of Susa, and the treasures of the Persian monarch,

¹²⁷. Herodotus, lib. v. passim.

¹²⁸. Id. cap. xlix.

“all Asia will submit to your sway; and you may compete with Jove in wealth and power¹²⁹.”

LETTER
XI.



Cleomenes, having listened with attention to this artful speech, desired three days to deliberate on the proposal of Aristagoras. What resolution he might have formed, during that interval, is not known. But the Ionian ambassador no sooner entered the presence of the Spartan king, to learn the issue of his negociation, than Cleomenes asked, in what time an army could march from the coast of Ionia to Susa. “In three months,” answered Aristagoras unguardedly. “Begone from Sparta, Milesian stranger! “before the setting of the sun,”—said Cleomenes sternly:—“nor farther attempt to engage the Lacedæmonians in so distant an expedition¹³⁰.”

Sensible of the mistake he had committed at his public audience, in mentioning the distance of Susa, Aristagoras clothed himself in the habit of a suppliant, and followed the Spartan prince to his own house. Having gained admittance in this humble character, he attempted to work upon the avarice of Cleomenes; offering him first ten, and afterward fifty talents; or nine thousand, six hundred, and eighty pounds sterling: an immense sum in Greece at that time, if he would persuade the Lacedæmonians to undertake the defence of the Asiatic Greeks. But finding presents as ineffectual as promises, the Ionian chief took his departure from Sparta, according to the former command of the king¹³¹.

Aristagoras went next to Athens, in order to prefer his suit. The Athenians, were then in a temper well adapted to his views. Hippias, whom

129. Id. *ibid*.

130. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. 1.

131. Id. *Historiar*. lib. v. li.

PART I. we have formerly seen expelled Attica, because of his tyrannical administration¹³², after attempting, by various means, to recover his authority over his fellow-citizens, had applied to Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis. And Artaphernes had ordered the Athenians to restore Hippias, if they would avoid the displeasure of the great king¹³³. But fully to understand the state of Athens at this time, it will be necessary to take a retrospective survey of the affairs of that republic, from the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, in the year five hundred and ten before the christian æra, until the arrival of Aristagoras.

The Athenians justly dated the æra of their prosperity, from the recovery of their political freedom. But they had many struggles to encounter, before they could break the machinations of usurping citizens, defeat the designs of the exiled tyrant, and establish that freedom on a firm basis. After the banishment of Hippias, two men of illustrious birth swayed, and divided the Athenian republic; Clisthenes, the chief of the Alcmaeonids, who was archon at that time, and Isagoras, his rival in politics, a man of superior talents, and also of noble blood¹³⁴.

Clisthenes, in order to preserve the ascendant, which his family connexions and political situation gave him, adopted several popular measures. He formed the Athenian citizens into ten, instead of four, tribes¹³⁵; and directed fifty senators to be chosen out of each tribe; so that the great council of the state, which had hitherto been composed of four hundred, henceforth consisted of five hundred members¹³⁶. And on purpose to secure his consequence,

132. Lett. vi.

133. Herodot. lib. v. cap. cxvi.

134. Id. cap. lxvi. et seq.

135. Id. ibid.

136. Aristot. de Civit Athen.

as he possessed the favour of the people, and to guard the state against the danger of tyranny, he instituted the *Ostracism*¹³⁷; a law by which the majority of the Athenians, in the popular assembly, could banish, for ten years, but without the confiscation of his estate, any powerful or ambitious citizen, by writing his name upon tiles or shells; provided the shells, on which his name was inscribed, amounted to six thousand¹³⁸.

Isagoras, thus borne down by his political competitor, and in danger of exile, had recourse to the assistance of Cleomenes, king of Sparta; whose friendship he had gained by acts of hospitality, during the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ¹³⁹. Cleomenes, glad of an opportunity of displaying the power of Sparta at Athens, and of humbling that rival state, which he had formerly been incautiously led to exalt, by a collusive response of the delphic oracle, readily complied with the request of Isagoras. He sent a herald to Athens, and obtained the banishment of Clisthenes and his principal adherents¹⁴⁰. He afterward went thither in person, attended by a military force; expelled seven hundred Athenian families, at the instigation of Isagoras; and attempted to dissolve the council of five hundred, and vest the administration of the state in three hundred partizans of that chief¹⁴¹.

137. *Ælian. Var. Hist. lib. xiii. cap. xxiv.*

138. *Plut. Vit. Themist. et Vit. Aristid.* "The Athenians," says Diodorus Siculus (lib. xi.), "adopted not this institution so much with a view to punishment, as from an idea, that spirits too high and soaring ought to be sent to evaporate in exile." When it was proposed to banish any person by the ostracism, it appears that his friends accused one or more of his reputed enemies, in order to divide the number of shells, and prevent the greatest majority from amounting to six thousand (*Plut. Vit. Aristid.*). Most of the Grecian republics had a similar mode of expelling such of their citizens as excited public jealousy. *Aristot. Plut. lib. iii. cap. xiii.*

139. *Herodot. lib. v. cap. lxx.*

140. *Id. ibid.*

141. *Herodot. lib. v. cap. lxxii.*

PART I.

Roused at this attack upon the freedom of their constitution, the Athenians flew to arms; obliged Isagoras and Cleomenes to take refuge in the acropolis, which was immediately invested; and on the third day of the siege, compelled them to surrender on conditions; the Lacedæmonian king agreeing to evacuate the territory of Attica, and the Athenians to permit him to withdraw his troops without molestation¹⁴². They also permitted Isagoras to accompany him; but all the other Athenian citizens, who had joined in the conspiracy against the liberties of their country, were instantly put to death¹⁴³.

The Athenians no sooner found themselves in quiet possession of their capital, then they recalled Clisthenes, and the seven hundred families that had been driven into exile by Cleomenes¹⁴⁴. And whatever might have been the views of Clisthenes before his banishment, he seems henceforth to have respected, and restored the constitution of his country, as modelled by Solon; with the exception of the division of the tribes into ten, the augmentation of the council of four to five hundred, and the *ostracism*, which he himself had established¹⁴⁵.

But

142. Id. *ibid*.

143. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

144. Id. lib. v. cap. lxxiii.

145. Various have been the opinions of historians, and philosophical politicians, both ancient and modern, concerning the *ostracism*. Like all human institutions, it was certainly liable to abuse. But that abuse could only be occasioned by the mistaken sense of the majority of the Athenian people, in regard to some great public character: Such mistake could seldom continue long; and when the people became sensible of the error they had committed, they could revoke their decree, and repair the injustice before the expiration of ten years, the term ordained by law. That they did so, we are assured by Plutarch (*Vit. Aristid.*). In being thus banished, there was no dishonour; and it was certainly better, that worthy individuals should suffer a temporary hardship, than that the state should be convulsed with jealousy, and distracted with apprehensions of tyranny.

But the Athenians, though now in full possession of those liberties that contributed to their aggrandizement, and which, with the relaxation of public virtue, brought on their declension, found themselves in a perilous situation. They had reason to apprehend the resentment of the Lacedæmonians; and the Lacedæmonians, who still maintained the chief sway, not only in Peloponnesus, but over all Greece, every where attempted to establish an aristocratical form of government, in subordination to their own authority¹⁴⁶. The heads of the Athenian republic, therefore, in this alarming crisis, after looking about in vain for a Grecian ally, able to protect them from the usurping power of Sparta, sent ambassadors to Artaphernes, governor of Sardis, preferring an alliance with the Persian court¹⁴⁷.

The haughty satrap asked who the Athenians were, that they presumed to treat, on a footing, with the great king?—Being informed that they were a free people, struggling for independency with ambitious neighbours, and with the Lacedæmonians, who aspired at the dominion of Greece, he replied, that they must present the Persian monarch with earth and water, in testimony of submission, before they could hope he would interest himself in their affairs¹⁴⁸. The Athenian ambassadors deliberated together on the humiliating proposal; and more zealous for the safety, than the honour of their country, they agreed

tyranny. The Ostracism has accordingly received the approbation of Aristotle (*Polit.* lib. iii. cap. ix.), and of Montesquieu (*L'Esprit des Loix*, liv. xxix. chap. vii.), while it has been reprobated by a herd of declaimers, and decried by all the advocates for despotism. No Athenian citizen could be banished by the ostracism, I here repeat, unless the shells against him amounted to six thousand. Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*

146. Herodot. et Thucydid. passim.

147. Herodot. lib. v. cap. lxxiii.

148. Id. *ibid.*

PART I. to the ignominious condition¹⁴⁹. But, on their return, they were severely blamed by their fellow-citizens, for their compliance¹⁵⁰; and the transaction was disavowed by the state¹⁵¹.

Meanwhile Cleomenes, king of Lacedæmon, ashamed of his disgraceful retreat from Athens, and desirous of humbling that rival republic, had collected forces from all parts of Peloponnesus; but without making known his purpose¹⁵². And having formed an alliance with the Bœotians, and also with the Chalcideans of Eubœa, who engaged to co-operate with him, he marched toward the territory of Attica at the head of a formidable army, in conjunction with his colleague, Demaratus, and accompanied by Isagoras, whom he meant to invest with the supreme power, or at least make the leader of the aristocratical party at Athens. He accordingly entered the district of Eleusis; while the Bœotians, as had been concerted, took Oenoe and Hysia, on the northern frontier of Attica: and the Chalcideans ravaged other parts of the country¹⁵³.

The Athenians, though astonished at the number of their invaders, and distracted by the different directions in which they appeared, were not dismayed. After some deliberation, they boldly resolved to direct their whole strength against the army under the joint kings of Lacedæmon. With this view, they put their troops in motion. But before they reached the hostile camp, a dissention had arisen among the Peloponnesian confederates. And the Corinthians, convinced that the cause, in which they had ignorantly engaged, was unjust, drew off their forces,

149. Herodot. ubi sup.

150. Id. ibid.

151. Valer. Max. lib. vi. cap. iii. 152. Herodot. lib. v. cap. lxxiv.

153. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. lxxv.

when

when the two armies were ready to engage. Demaratus followed their example; and the other Peloponnesian confederates, seeing the Spartan kings divided in opinion, also led off their forces¹⁵⁴. This defection obliged Cleomenes to desist from his ambitious and vindictive enterprise.

Elated at the dissolution of the Peloponnesian army, and the inglorious retreat of the Lacedæmonians, the Athenians resolved to chastise, with exemplary severity, the other invaders of their country. In this spirit, they marched first against the Chalcideans. But finding, when they reached the Euripus, or channel that divides the island of Eubœa from the continent, that the Bœotians were come to the support of their confederates, they gave battle to the succouring army; killed great numbers of the Bœotians, and took seven hundred prisoners; then passing over to Eubœa, they defeated the Chalcideans the same day¹⁵⁵. And so complete was their victory over the latter, that they settled a colony of four thousand Athenians, in the lands that had belonged to the more wealthy Chalcideans¹⁵⁶.

The prisoners, both Chalcidean and Eubœan, were ransomed at two minæ, or about six guineas a head¹⁵⁷; no small sum, considering the value of money in those days. But the fetters, with which the captives had been chained, were carried to Athens in triumph, and hung up in the acropolis; where also was placed a chariot, drawn by four horses, formed of brass, with an inscription to the following purport:

“ Fir’d with just rage, the martial youths
“ Of Athens, broke, by their subduing arm,

154. Id. *ibid*.

155. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. lxxvii.

156. Id. *ibid*.

157. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

“ The

“ The firm Chalcidean and Bœotian bands,
 “ And bound their foes in fetters; hence to thee,
 “ Minerva! they this offering vow’d, the *tenth*
 “ Of ransom paid.”

The ascending star of liberty at Athens was now high, and shone with distinguished brightness; but storms were fast gathering, which threatened to obscure its lustre. The Bœotians, mortified at their late discomfiture, were desirous of taking vengeance upon the Athenians. Finding themselves, however, too weak for that purpose, they had recourse to the assistance of the Æginetes, the rivals of the Athenians in commerce¹⁵⁸.

The island of Ægina is situated in the Saronic gulf, and lies off the coast of Attica, nearly opposite the city of Athens, within sight of the land¹⁵⁹, and at no great distance from Peloponnesus¹⁶⁰. Favoured by their maritime position, the Æginetes had early applied themselves to trade and piracy¹⁶¹, and were at this time equal in naval force to almost any people in European Greece. Become jealous of the rising greatness of the Athenians, against whom they had an old cause of enmity, and afraid of being crushed by the growing navy of the republic, they readily entered into a league with the Bœotians, and invaded Attica¹⁶².

The Athenians met their combined enemies, and defeated them with great slaughter¹⁶³. But while the Athenian forces were employed in expelling the Bœotians, the Æginetes made a second descent, in the

158. Id. lib. v. cap. lxxx.

159. Hence Ægina was emphatically termed “ the eye-sore of the Piræus” (Plut. *Vit. Pericl.*), the principal sea-port of Athens.

160. Strabo, lib. viii.

161. Id. *ibid.*

162. Herodot. lib. v. cap. lxxxi.

163. Id. *ibid.*

neighbourhood of the sea-port of Phaleron, and ravaged the country, to the great distress of the inhabitants¹⁶⁴. Athens had no fleet ready, to take immediate revenge upon the people of Ægina: and more formidable enemies soon engaged her attention. Attica was menaced with a new invasion from Peloponnesus, in the year five hundred and four before the christian æra.

The causes of this hostile design, my lord, will require some explication.

If the pride of Cleomenes, the Spartan king, had been hurt at his first retreat out of Attica, his haughty spirit was inflamed with rage, approaching to madness, at the disgrace of the second. He ascribed the failure of the expedition to the misconduct of his colleague, Demaratus; whose inaction, he affirmed, had occasioned the defection of his allies. And so strongly did he impress this opinion upon the minds of the Lacedæmonians, that they enacted a law, providing, That whereas formerly both their kings had been accustomed to accompany the army, only one of them should march out, in future, on any military enterprise, and the other remain at home¹⁶⁵.

Having thus deprived Demaratus of all share in the command of the army, and eventually of all share in public affairs (as he thenceforth became of small estimation, and was soon after deposed, as we shall have occasion to see, on account of a supposed stain in his birth), Cleomenes awaked the jealousy of his countrymen, by an exaggerated representation of the growing power and aspiring spirit of the Athenians; who had already refused to acknowledge the superi-

164. Herodot. ubi sup.

165. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. lxxv.

PART I.

ority of Sparta, who would soon claim equality, and attempt to wrest from her the arbitration of Greece¹⁶⁶. In order to enforce these obvious causes of alarm, he told the Spartan senate, That while shut up in the acropolis, he had found access to the Athenian archives, and had not only discovered the collusive response of the Delphic oracle, procured by the Alcmeonids, which had induced him to undertake the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, but certain secret oracles, portending the humiliation of Sparta, by that turbulent and ambitious republic¹⁶⁷.

Finding, after this information, the Lacedæmonians sufficiently propitious to his views, Cleomenes assured them, that if the Athenians were permitted to remain in possession of their freedom, they would soon attain to so high a degree of prosperity, that no power in Greece would be able to contend with them. He therefore proposed, That they should send for Hippias from Sigeum on the Hellespont (whither he had retired with his family and friends, on his expulsion from Athens), and reinstate him in the sovereignty of Attica¹⁶⁸. Hippias was accordingly invited to Sparta, and soon arrived in that capital.

But the Lacedæmonians, before they took any step in favour of the exiled chief, assembled the deputies from their Peloponnesian confederates. The Spartan orators, who opened the congress, forcibly represented the iniquitous manner in which their countrymen had been deceived by the oracle; the necessity of humbling Athens; and restoring Hippias, their friend and ally, to the sovereignty of which he had been unjustly deprived¹⁶⁹.

166. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xc. xci.

167. Id. ibid.

168. Herodot. ubi sup.

169. Id. ibid.

These arguments did not seem satisfactory to the deputies of the confederates, who were glad to see a power rising up in the northern parts of Greece, which would balance that of Sparta. No reply, however, was made except by Sosicles, the Corinthian deputy. "Surely," said he, "the heavens will sink beneath the earth, and the earth ascend above the sky; men will live in the sea, and fishes on the land, when ye, O Lacedæmonians! shall attempt to subvert the republics of Greece, and endeavour to establish tyrannies in their stead; tyranny, the most unjust of all forms of government known in human society, and the most debasing to the human character. Yet if it seem to you so excellent, erect such a government in your own country, as a proof of your approbation. But if the Spartans, among whom tyranny is not known, and who have so vigilantly guarded against it, would avoid the experiment, let them beware how they seek to impose it upon other states. And if they had felt its pernicious effects, as severely as we have done, they would think more justly, and act more wisely¹⁷⁰."

After this bold exordium, Sosicles proceeded to recapitulate the history of Corinth, and the miseries it had suffered from tyranny¹⁷¹. That city and its territory, as we have formerly seen, was given by the Heraclidæ, in their division of Peloponnesus, after they had conquered it, to Aletes, their kinsman¹⁷².

This prince and his posterity, commonly known by the name of Bacchidæ, from Bacchis, the fifth Corinthian king of the blood of Hercules, possessed the throne about three hundred and thirty years.

170. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xcii.

171. Id. ibid.

172. See Lett. iv. et auct. cit.

PART I.

After the expiration of that term, and the failure of the royal line, in a direct descent, the Bacchidæ, consisting of four hundred families, governed Corinth ninety years, in the form of an aristocracy; electing annually one of their number, to execute the office of chief magistrate, under the name of Prytanis¹⁷³. At length the Bacchidæ were expelled by Cypselus, son of Etion, a private citizen, who usurped the supreme power, and reigned thirty years¹⁷⁴.

The beginning of the reign of Cypselus was marked with many violences and cruelties. He spared neither the property nor the persons of such citizens as he thought could shake his usurped authority; banishing some, confiscating the estates of others, and putting many to death¹⁷⁵. But when he found himself firmly established in the sovereignty, he seems to have governed with wisdom and moderation; for he enjoyed prosperity to the hour of his death, and was quietly succeeded by his son Periander¹⁷⁶.

Periander has the honour of being numbered among the seven sages of Greece. But, for this honour, he appears to have been more indebted to his love of the company of learned men, his munificence to them, and his encouragement of the elegant arts, than in their infancy in Greece, than to any superiority of talents. The beginning of his reign was milder than that of his father: but the subsequent part was cruel and tyrannical¹⁷⁷. He reigned forty years; and three years after his death, in the third year of the forty-ninth Olympiad, and five hundred and eighty-two years before the christian æra, the citizens of Corinth wrested their free-

173. Diod. Sicul. Frag. de *Corinth. Imper.* ap. Euseb. *Chron.* lib. i.

174. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xcii.

175. Id. *ibid.*

176. Herodot. *ubi sup*

177. Id. *ibid.*

dom from the hands of his nephew, and successor, and established a republican government.

LETTER
XI.

To the happiness which the citizens of Corinth enjoyed under this government, and the remembrance of their former insecure, if not miserable state; when every man's life and property depended on the will of a despot, is to be imputed the zeal with which Sosicles declaimed against tyranny, in the congress of the Peloponnesian delegates assembled at Sparta. After he had recapitulated the sufferings of his country, the Corinthian orator thus concluded his speech;—"These, O Lacedæmonians! these are the certain effects of tyranny. Hence our surprise at finding you had sent for Hippias, and our astonishment at what we now hear. I therefore conjure you, by the gods of Greece! to lay aside the thought of establishing tyrannies in her cities. But if you are obstinate in your purpose, and resolve, in violation of justice, to restore Hippias to the sovereignty of Athens, know that the Corinthians will take no part in the enterprise¹⁷⁸."

This animated speech dictated by the generous spirit of liberty, commanded the approbation of the other Peloponnesian deputies, silenced the Spartan orators, and obliged Cleomenes to desist from urging the execution of his ambitious and tyrannical project¹⁷⁹. Hippias, therefore, found himself under the necessity of returning to Sigeum. But he did not long remain there. The projected revolt of the Asiatic Greeks afforded him the prospect of draw-

178. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xcii. In giving the speeches in this work, the author has, in general, been more attentive to the meaning, than to the words of ancient historians. But where he found peculiar elegance and propriety in the originals, he has endeavoured to render them with all possible truth and force.

179. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. xciii.

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
501.

Olympiad
Lxix. 4.

ing the notice, and engaging in his cause the Persian monarch. He accordingly repaired to Sardis, in the year five hundred and one before the christian æra; and, by his accomplishments and address, soon insinuated himself into the favour of Artaphernes, the brother of Darius¹⁸⁰; already prejudiced, as might be expected, against Athens, for disavowing the submission proffered by her ambassadors.

Ant. Chr.
500.
Olympiad
Lxx. 1.

The Athenians, however, when informed of the kind reception of Hippias at the satrap's court, again sent ambassadors to Sardis; with instructions to say, that they hoped the Persian governor would not give ear to the Athenian exiles¹⁸¹. But Artaphernes, who had by this time taken his resolution, told the ambassadors, as we have had occasion to observe, that their countrymen must restore Hippias to the sovereignty of Athens, if they would be safe¹⁸². The haughty proposal was rejected with disdain; and the Athenians, on the return of their ambassadors, prepared themselves for braving the resentment of the great king¹⁸³.

At this alarming crisis it was, that Aristagoras, after his unsuccessful negociation at Sparta, arrived at Athens, and implored the assistance of that republic; for the support of the Asiatic Greeks, struggling for independency with the Persian power¹⁸⁴. In their present temper of mind, glowing with indignation, yet agitated with terror, much eloquence could not be necessary to persuade the Athenians to engage in the cause of their Ionian descendants; against an enemy by which they themselves were in danger of being subjected to foreign despotism, or domestic tyranny.

180. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xcvi.

181. Id. *ibid*.

182. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

183. Id. *ibid*.

184. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xcvi.

But

But if such eloquence had been wanted, Aristagoras was amply furnished with it. Nor did he fail to make use of it on the present occasion. When introduced to the popular assembly of Athens, he declaimed, as at Sparta, upon the wealth of the Persian monarchy, and the facility with which it might be acquired by a martial people; ascribing to the indolence and effeminacy of the Persians, their inacquaintance with the use of the long spear and large shield¹⁸⁵, the arms upon which the Greeks chiefly depended for success in war. And he claimed the assistance of Athens, as the parent state, in defence of her colony of Miletus¹⁸⁶. In a word, he omitted no argument that his Ionic fancy could suggest, in order to induce the Athenians to enter into his views. And they, disposed by passion as well as policy, to take part in the Ionian rebellion, voted the Milesians an aid of twenty ships¹⁸⁷; but what number of land forces, we are not informed.

The Athenian fleet, equipped with all expedition, and placed under the command of Melanthus, a man of high character, was joined by five ships fitted out by the citizens of Eretria, in the island of Eubœa, as a tribute of gratitude, for former services received from the Milesians¹⁸⁸. Before that combined force, the only succour of European Greece, reached Miletus, Aristagoras had prepared the minds of his countrymen for great and arduous undertakings. And soon after the arrival of the Athenians and Eretrians, having assembled his Ionian confederates, it was resolved in a council of war, to attack Sardis¹⁸⁹, the ancient capital of the Lydian monarchy, and now the seat of the satrap's court.

185. Id. *ibid.*

186. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

187. Id. *ibid.*

188. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xcix.

189. Id. *ibid.*

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The very boldness of this enterprise seemed to insure it success; and the promptitude with which it was executed, did not disgrace the vigour with which it had been planned. The Grecian and Ionian fleets left the harbour of Miletus, and sailed in consort to Ephesus¹⁹⁰. There they disembarked their land forces. The Milesians were commanded by Charopinus, the brother of Aristagoras, and his Ionian confederates by Hermophantus; Aristagoras, as the head of the confederacy, judging it prudent to remain at home, in order to concert new alliances. The Athenians and Eretrians were commanded by their own leaders. The whole composed a formidable army; which marched with such celerity, up the river Cayster, and over mount Tmolus, that Sardis was taken by surprise, before Artaphernes could be said to have any intimation of the design of the enemy¹⁹¹.

The Persian satrap, however, by his courage and conduct, fully compensated for his want of vigilance. Having no suspicion that the Ionians would attempt to penetrate into the country, he was not prepared to receive them. He therefore found it necessary to take refuge in the citadel; and from that fortress, into which he had thrown a strong garrison, he repelled all the assaults of the invaders¹⁹². Nor was their failure in this siege the only disappointment. the Ionians and their European allies met with at Sardis. They were also disappointed in their hopes of booty. A house was accidentally set on fire by a soldier, in the rage of plunder; and the walls of the houses of that city being chiefly built with brick, and the roofs covered with reeds, the flames rapidly spread from house to house, till the whole Lydian capital was in a blaze¹⁹³.

190. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. c.

191. Id. *ibid.*

192. Herodotus, *ubi sup.*

193. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. ci.

The Lydians, and such of the Persians as had not been admitted into the citadel, derived advantage from the confusion produced by this calamitous circumstance. Instead of flying to the fields, in order to avoid the conflagration, which had at first raged most violently in the extremities of the city, they crowded into the public square or market-place¹⁹⁴. Through that square ran the river Pactolus: which, as formerly observed, bisected the Lydian capital: so that the Lydians and Persians were ranged on both sides of the river¹⁹⁵. Thus situated, they saw the necessity of defending themselves, or of supinely perishing with arms by their side; for arms, to use the language of the vain-glorious Greeks, formed part of the dress of a barbarian¹⁹⁶.

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Confidence is inspired by numbers, and courage by despair. The people of Sardis having both to confirm their resolution, disposed themselves in order of battle, and discovered a spirit of resistance suited to the occasion. The victorious invaders, therefore, when obstructed by the flames in the pursuit of pillage, saw with surprise a formidable enemy ready to engage them. Disconcerted by the devouring conflagration, which had blasted their hopes of Lydian treasures, and intimidated at the growing multitude of their opponents, they retired to mount Tmolus; and decamping the following night, began their march toward their ships¹⁹⁷. But they were not suffered to escape with impunity.

194. Id. *ibid*.

195. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

196. Thucyd. *lib. i. cap. vi*. The same respectable author informs us, That the Athenians were the first Grecian people who discontinued the custom of wearing swords, unless during military service; and that the Lacedæmonians (a singular exception from barbarism!) were the first who performed their exercises naked, stripping themselves in public; the custom of wearing scarfs to cover the pudenda, being formerly in use, even at the Olympic games. Id. *ibid*.

197. Herodotus, *lib. v. cap. ci*.

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Intelligence of the taking of Sardis, and the flames with which it was consumed, had spread over Asia Minor the danger of Artaphernes; and the Persian leaders, with their troops, hastened from all quarters to the seat of the satrap¹⁹⁸. Finding, on their arrival, that the Greeks had retired, they pursued them with speed, and came up with them in the neighbourhood of Ephesus¹⁹⁹. Ashamed of their precipitant retreat, and disdaining to shun the combat, the Ionians and their allies drew up their forces beneath the walls of that city, where an obstinate battle was fought.

The Asiatic Greeks, whose liberties were at stake, had every motive for exertion. The native courage of the Athenians and Eretrians shone with distinguished lustre. But the countrymen of Cyrus, accustomed to conquer, and emboldened by superior force, bore down all resistance. The Ionians were defeated with great slaughter; and both they, and the European Greeks, were obliged to seek safety in flight²⁰⁰. And so much were the Athenians disgusted with the unfortunate issue of this enterprise, which they seem to have imputed to the pusillanimity of the Ionians, that they recalled their ships, and could never afterward be prevailed upon to take any part in the confederacy²⁰¹. Nor do the Eretrians appear to have farther interposed in the affairs of Ionia.

But Isagoras was not discouraged by the desertion of his European allies, or the loss he had sustained at Ephesus. The burning of Sardis placed his name high in the estimation of the Asiatic Greeks, who all now took part in the Ionian confederacy; and the flame of liberty spread along the Asiatic coast, from the mouth of the Euxine sea to

198. Id. lib. v. cap. cii.

199. Id. *ibid.*200. Herodot. *ubi sup.*201. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. ciii.
the

the island of Cyprus. An Ionian fleet, sailing northward, reduced Byzantium, with all the Grecian cities on the Propontis, that were under the Persian dominion: then directing its course southward, procured the same deliverance to the Carian and Dorian cities, and steered for Cyprus²⁰².

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That fertile island, situated toward the east end of the Mediterranean sea, and lying at about an equal distance from the coast of Syria and Cylicia, had been early occupied by the Phœnicians²⁰³; who introduced into it the worship of the goddess Venus, for which it continued to be distinguished till the downfall of heathen superstition. But as the Phœnicians valued Cyprus chiefly on account of its copper mines and ship-timber, it being, when first visited by them, almost one entire forest, they paid little attention to the peopling of it, and still less to its cultivation. They, therefore, permitted Grecian colonies to settle in it at different times, from Laconia, Argolis, Attica, and other districts²⁰⁴; until Cyprus, abounding in corn, wine, and oil, came to be considered as a Grecian island, the largest and most populous on the Asiatic coast²⁰⁵. It had been occasionally subject, as we have seen, to the latter Egyptian monarchs, and submitted to the arms of Cambyses, when he became master of the naval force of Phœnicia.

From that time, to the present memorable æra, Cyprus had continued under the Persian dominion. Nor can we suppose the Cyprians had greatly suffered by such subjection; as they had formerly been governed by a number of petty princes or tyrants, each of whom was absolute and independent, in his own city and its district, and who thenceforth held the same regal authority under the controul of the

202. Id. *ibid*.

203. Strabo, lib. iv. sub. fin.

205. Strabo, *ubi sup*.

204. Id. *ibid*.

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great king; whose interest it was to restrain hostilities among them, and to curb oppressions.

Onesilius, king of Salamis, a city which had been founded by a colony from the Grecian island of the same name, was now the most considerable Cyprian prince. He had acquired the sovereignty of Salamis by the expulsion of his brother Gorgas; whose servile submission to the Persian sway had filled him with indignation, from the moment he was informed of the Ionian revolt. And no sooner did he find himself possessed of the supreme power, than he persuaded all the Cyprians, except the inhabitants of Amathus, who were of Phœnician origin, to withdraw their allegiance from Darius²⁰⁶.

Conscious, however, that the Cyprians were not able to resist the arms of the Persian monarch, supported by the naval force of Phœnicia, which he had reason to think would soon be sent to the assistance of the Amathusians, Onesilius dispatched ambassadors to the leader of the Ionian confederacy, demanding succour against the common enemy²⁰⁷. Aristagoras readily complied with the request of the Cyprian prince; and the Ionian fleet, which we have seen break the fetters of slavery, from the Thracian Bosphorus to the Dorian promontory, anchored in the bay of Salamis. But before its arrival, a Persian army, from Cilicia, had been landed in Cyprus, under cover of a Phœnician fleet, which still hovered on the coast²⁰⁸.

Artybius, the Persian general, having raised the siege of Amathus, which had been invested by Onesilius, marched into the plains of Salamis, where the Cyprian army was posted, while the Phœnician

206. Herodot. lib. v. cap. civ.

207. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. cviii.

208. Id. *ibid.*

fleet advanced against that of Ionia. In consequence of these movements, a furious battle was fought on land, and another by sea; and both nearly at the same time, and within sight of each other.

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The Ionians, after an obstinate engagement, defeated the Phœnician fleet. But neither this fortunate circumstance, nor the heroic valour of Onesilius, who slew the Persian general with his own hand, could inspire the Cyprians with courage or unanimity. During the heat of the action; Stesenor, tyrant of Curium, deserted to the enemy; and the chariots of war, belonging to Salamis, followed his example²⁰⁹. Onesilius was slain in attempting to maintain the unequal combat. With him fell Aristocyprus, king of the Solians, an Athenian colony; and the Cyprians were finally broken, and routed with great slaughter²¹⁰. The Ionians, when informed of the issue of the battle, and of the fate of Onesilius, returned home with their fleet, and Cyprus was again reduced under the Persian domination²¹¹.

Meanwhile Darius, having received intelligence of the progress of the Ionian confederacy, took vigorous measures for humbling the Asiatic Greeks, and resolved to prosecute, with unrelenting vengeance, the European abettors of the revolt. When informed of the burning of Sardis, and of the share which the Athenians had in the taking of that city, he is said to have exclaimed, "O Jupiter! grant that I may be avenged of the Athenians!"—then to have ordered one of his domestics, to call *thrice* every time he sat at table, "*King, remember the Athenians*"²¹²!"

209. Herodot. lib. v. cap. cix-cxiii.

210. Id. ibid.

211. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. cxv.

212. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. cv.

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The Persian monarch next sent for Histæus, the Milesian, whom he had detained at Susa, as we have seen, and accused him of having been concerned in the Ionian rebellion; as Isagoras, his lieutenant, had been the prime mover of it. “What advantage, O king!” replied that supple politician, “could I propose to myself by exciting a revolt in Ionia?—I who live in splendour at your court, am honoured with your friendship, and share your councils!—Believe rather, O king! that your affairs in those parts have suffered by my absence from my native country. The Ionians seem only to have waited for my departure, in order to put in execution a design, which they had before formed, against your authority; for if I had continued among them, be assured, that not one of their cities would have dared to revolt from the great king. Dismiss me therefore speedily, and send me back to Miletus, that I may remedy the disorders, and restore the obedience of Ionia²¹³. When I have performed this service,” added he, “and put into your hands the Milesian deputy, who alone has been the author of the confederacy, I swear, by the gods of the king, that I will not change the garments I wear, in my journey to Ionia, until I have rendered all the islands that crown the Ægean sea tributary to Darius²¹⁴.”

Deceived by this artful speech, the Persian monarch complied with the desire of Histæus²¹⁵. But he did not rest the recovery of Asiatic Greece upon the professions, or the promises, of that suspected chief. He had already sent into Asia Minor, for the support of his brother Artaphernes, a powerful army, under the command of Hymeas, Daurises, and Otanes,

213. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. cvi.

214. Id. *ibid.*

215. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

three of his sons-in-law. And these generals having over-run Ionia, and obliged the Milesians to confine themselves to the sea-coast, where they were protected by their naval strength, divided their forces into three bodies, destined to act in different directions, and attempt the reduction of the maritime cities²¹⁶.

Hymeas, with one of those bodies, directed his march to the Propontis; while Daurises, with another, acted on the coast of the Hellespont. Daurises, in a few days, made himself master of Precote, Abydos, Lampsacus, and other towns in his district²¹⁷. But he was soon recalled, and employed in an opposite quarter. He was sent against the Carians and Dorians; who having joined in the Ionian confederacy, as already observed, were become formidable to the southward. He accordingly passed the Meander; whose winding course, and fertile vales, have so long been adorned by poetic fancy, and gave battle to the enemy on the banks of the Marsya. The dispute was obstinate and bloody; but, at length, the Carians and Dorians, oppressed by numbers, were totally defeated²¹⁸. In this action, twelve thousand men are said to have fallen on both sides²¹⁹.

Such of the Carians and Dorians, as escaped the Persian sword, took refuge in a grove sacred to the military Jupiter; the only place, says Herodotus, where that deity was worshipped under the name of the god of armies²²⁰. Here, while the Carian fugitives deliberated, whether they should utterly abandon their country, or surrender themselves to the conquerors, they were joined by a body of Ionians. Encouraged by this reinforcement, they hazarded a

216. Id. lib. v. cap. cxvi. cxvii.

218. Herodot. lib. v. cap. cxxiii. cxxix.

220. Herodot. ubi sup.

217. Id. ibid.

219. Id. ibid.

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The Asiatic Greeks²²² in that quarter, however, did not yet abandon themselves to despair. Heavy as the second blow was, they still continued to keep the field; and the superior military genius of Heraclides, the Carian general, formed to rise above misfortune, and take advantage of circumstances, furnished them with great revenge. Understanding that the Persians, tired of a desultory war, intended to fall down to the sea-coast, and reduce the maritime towns, he placed an ambuscade in certain defiles, which they had to pass. Marching in all the security of conquest, Daurises was slain, and his whole army cut off, by the Carians and their allies²²³,

But this disaster had no serious influence upon the general progress of the Persian arms. It only served to protract, for a time, the final reduction of Caria and Doria. When Daurises led his army toward those countries, Hymeas had left the Propontis; and, marching along the coast of the Hellespont, completed the conquest of the northern part of Æolia; while Otanes, assisted by the experienced counsels, and the presence of Artaphernes, took Cumé, on the southern frontier of Æolia, after having

221. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. cxx.

222. The Carians were not, properly speaking, Greeks; but they were by this time so much blended with their Grecian neighbours, that they seem often to be confounded with the Dorians by Herodotus (Vid. lib. v. passim.). Their country, which they had inhabited from the most remote antiquity (Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxxi.), was originally of considerable extent, but now contracted to a small district between Ionia and Doria (Id. *ibid.*). To this narrow situation they had been reduced by the Ionian and Dorian emigrants from Greece, with whom they became partly incorporated. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

223. Herodot. lib. v. cap. cxxi.

reduced Clazomenæ, and almost every other town in Ionia, except Miletus²²⁴. And that famous city, the head of the confederacy, and the pride of Asiatic Greece, was now threatened by the whole body of the Persian forces in Asia Minor.

At a crisis so alarming, it might have been expected that Aristagoras, the author of the Ionian revolt, and who had hitherto acted so distinguished a part, would have displayed his vigour and patriotism, in providing for the defence of Miletus. But that aspiring chief disappointed the hopes of his countrymen and confederates; who, in protracting the unequal struggle for freedom, were less governed by policy than passion. Finding he could no longer oppose, with any prospect of success, the combined armies of a great empire, furnished with all the engines of war that could facilitate the operations of a siege, he advised the Milesians to make preparations for retiring on board their fleet, and to seek a settlement on some European shore, rather than run the hazard of again falling under the Persian dominion²²⁵.

In recommending this project, Aristagoras proposed Thrace, or the island of Sardinia, as the place of the new establishment²²⁶. Hecataeus the historian, who seems always to have had great sway in the councils of his countrymen, declared for a temporary settlement in the island of Lerus; whence the Milesians might return to their former city, after the storm with which it was threatened had spent its force²²⁷. But none of these proposals being embraced, Aristagoras delivered the government of Miletus into the hands of Pythagoras, an eminent citizen; and embarked with as many adventurers,

224. Id. *Historiar.* lib. v. cap. cxxii. cxxiii.

225. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. cxxiv.

226. Id. *ibid.*

227. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. cxxv. cxxvi.

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as were willing to accompany him, for that territory on the river Strymon in Thrace, which had, as we have seen, been granted to his uncle Histæus, and where had been founded the city that excited the jealousy of the great king²²⁸.

We are not informed in what state Aristagoras found this settlement, or in what manner it had been governed during the absence of Histæus. But it appears that he took possession of it without opposition, and instantly began to form ambitious views; for he was soon after treacherously slain, with all his followers, beyond the limits of the bequeathed territory, by the inhabitants of a Thracian town, which had agreed to surrender on terms²²⁹. Thus fell Aristagoras, who seems to have been better calculated to plan than to execute great designs, and of whose character it is very difficult to form a decided opinion. He certainly possessed no common share of political talents and address. Nor is there any reason to accuse him of want of valour, prudence, or even of patriotism; for Herodotus positively declares, that he did not quit Miletus, until he saw that his most vigorous efforts to defend it, by land, would prove ineffectual²³⁰. He might, however, have gone on board the fleet, and animated his countrymen and confederates, by sea, as he found the Milesians resolved to sustain a siege, rather than abandon their city.

But persevering fortitude was none of the virtues of Aristagoras. His bold, but irresolute heart, shrunk from the difficulties with which he was surrounded; from the prospect of misfortune, and the possibility of being delivered up to the Persian monarch, from whom he could hope for no mercy: while

228. *Id. ibid.*

229. *Herodot. ubi sup.*

230. *Id. Historiar. lib. v. cap. cxxiv*

his versatile genius, fruitful in resources, discovered new situations, with new theatres of glory and ambition. Yet, if he had been properly supported by the European Greeks, he would surely have delivered those of Asia from the Persian dominion. What part he would have then taken in the government, must have been determined by events, brought forward by circumstances, to which time never gave birth,

Before Miletus was invested, Histiaëus arrived at Sardis from Susa. The high rank he had held in the court of the great king, and the *pretended* purpose for which he was permitted to return into Asia Minor, gave him reason to expect that he would be employed by Artaphernes, in extinguishing the Ionian rebellion; though his *real* intention was to inflame it. But that experienced governor, who was better acquainted with his true character than Darius, not only declined entrusting him, with any command, but made him sensible, that he was acquainted with his former intrigues²³¹. And Histiaëus, after having sown at Sardis, among the Persian officers, the seeds of a conspiracy against the satrap's authority, secretly retired toward the sea-coast, and passed over to the island of Chios²³².

There being taken into custody by the Chians, as an emissary of Darius, the Milesian chief declared his purpose of heading the Ionian confederacy²³³. And he assigned, as his reason for promoting the revolt, his knowledge that a resolution had been taken in the cabinet of the great king, for planting the Phœnicians in Ionia, and removing the Ionians to Phœnicia²³⁴; a piece of secret history which, although discredited by Herodotus, is perfectly consistent with the line of Persian policy (such removal

231. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. i.

232. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. ii.

234. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. iii.

233. Id. *ibid.*

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of inhabitants being by no means uncommon in that monarchy), and highly favourable to the interests of Darius. For he would, by such a measure, have effectually disjoined the most powerful body of the Asiatic Greeks from their European brethren, and have substituted, in their room, a numerous colony of faithful subjects, equally industrious and expert, as mariners and manufacturers.

But whatever truth there might be in this information, it was readily believed by the Asiatic Greeks, and increased their terror at the progress of the Persian arms²³⁵. Histiaeus, however, with all his address, could never acquire their confidence. The Milesians, having tasted the sweets of liberty, and remembering his former tyranny, obstinately refused to admit him into their city²³⁶. And the Chians, though they afforded him protection, would not entrust him with the command of their fleet²³⁷. In the midst of these disappointments, he received intelligence that the conspiracy at Sardis had been discovered, by means of his letters, and all the Persians concerned in it put to death²³⁸.

This was a severe blast to the hopes of Histiaeus; especially as he understood that the government of Artaphernes, which he wished to overthrow, had only suffered a momentary shake, and was again firmly established. Still, however, undismayed by his adverse fortune, he passed to Mitylene, the capital of the island of Lesbos; and the Lesbians furnished him with eight ships, fitted out at their own expense, and manned with their own people²³⁹. With this small fleet he sailed to Byzantium; and

235. Id. *ibid*.

236. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. iv. v.

237. Id. *ibid*.

238. Herodotus, *ubi sup*.

239. Id. *Historiar*. lib. vi. cap. v.

cruising off that port, took all the ships that came out of the Euxine sea, except such as were commanded by Grecian masters, willing to enter into his views²⁴⁰.

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Meantime Artaphernes having completed his military preparations, the Persian generals, within his government, advanced with their united forces to the seige of Miletus; while an Egyptian and Phœnician fleet, assisted by some ships from Cyprus and Cilicia, blocked up the harbour, and favoured the operations of the army²⁴¹. This enterprise, which struck at the head of the confederacy, occasioned great alarm in Asiatic Greece. All the confederates sent deputies to the Panionian council, or general assembly of Ionia, held in a temple on the promontory of Mycale, where it was resolved, after mature deliberation, that no attempt should be made to relieve Miletus by land, as none could be made with any prospect of success; but that the whole naval force of Asiatic Greece, both in the islands and sea-ports of the continent, should be speedily manned and equipped, in order to give battle to that of the enemy²⁴².

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In consequence of this resolution (which was communicated to the Milesians, for their encouragement in the defence of their walls), the ships from the several allied states assembled at the island of Ladé, within sight of the port of Miletus²⁴³; and formed a fleet of three hundred and fifty-three sail of triremes²⁴⁴, or gallies with three banks of oars²⁴⁵, the largest ships of war then in use; carrying each,

by

240. Id. *ibid*.

241. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. vi.

242. Id. *Historiar*. lib. vi. cap. vii.

243. Id. *ibid*.

244. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. viii.

245. The manner in which these banks or tiers of oars could be placed, so as to prevent the rowers from obstructing each other, was long a matter of doubt among modern antiquarians. But the difficulty seems,

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by computation, about two hundred men. The enemy's fleet, composed of ships of the same size, was far more numerous: it consisted of six hundred sail²⁴⁶.

The Persian commanders, however, were afraid to hazard a naval engagement; and, therefore, endeavoured to disunite the confederated Greeks. For that purpose, they applied to the Ionian and Æolian tyrants, who had been expelled by Aristagoras; and who, having found refuge in the satrap's court, were now in the Persian army or on board the fleet²⁴⁷. To these banished chiefs they offered, in the name of Darius, the full restitution of their authority, provided they could prevail upon their former subjects to desert the general confederacy. And they impowered them to promise, that the people of such states as should embrace the gracious proposal, would be again received into favour, and suffer nothing on account of their rebellion; their lives, their property, their houses, and temples would be safe. But if they obstinately persisted in their resolution of determining the dispute by the sword, that the most frightful calamities awaited them; that after

seems, at last, to have been removed by the ingenuity of general Melville. He conjectured, that the waste part of the ancient gallees rose obliquely above the water's edge; and that upon the inner sides of this waste part, the seats of the rowers were fixed horizontally, in rows. In that conjecture (according to which he constructed a model) he was confirmed by some remains of ancient sculpture and painting in Italy; on one of which was found the figure of a triremis, with three tiers of oars, issuing chequerwise from an oblique side; and, on another, the oars issuing, in the same manner, from the oblique side of such a vessel, and all, without interference, reaching the water (See Pownall's *Treatise on the Study of Antiquities*, as the *Commentary of Historical Learning*, Append. and Gillies's *Hist. of Greece*, chap. v. note 4.). The quadriremes and quinquiremes, of the ancient ships of war, of the first and second rate, were constructed in the same manner. Id. *ibid.*

246. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

247. Id. lib. vi. cap. ix.

being

being conquered, they would be reduced to the condition of slaves; their youths would be made eunuchs; their virgins be carried captive to Bactria (a province on the north-east frontier of the Persian empire), to satiate the lust of barbarians; and their country, so dear to them, be given to another people, more deserving the clemency of the great king²⁴⁸.

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The exiled chiefs, as might be expected, dispatched messengers, and used all their interest with the citizens of the several states over which they had presided. But neither the threats, nor the promises of the Persians, were attended with any *immediate* effect upon any of those states. The people of each particular state, thinking they alone were solicited to betray the common cause, rejected with indignation the proffered rewards for such treachery²⁴⁹. And thus the whole confederacy was preserved entire.

But other causes produced dissensions in the Grecian fleet, and slackened the bands of union among the confederates. Nor can it be supposed but the offers of the Persian monarch, as soon as they were known to have been general, made a secret impression upon the minds of many.—When the whole naval armament assembled off the island of Ladé, a council of war was held; in which, after various opinions had been given, in regard to the conduct to be pursued, Dionysius, the Phocæan leader, spoke to the following purport:

“ Our fate, O Ionians!” said he, “ stands upon a needle’s point: it is now to be determined, whether we shall be freemen, slaves, or fugitives. If you will submit to rigid discipline, you must suffer fatigue, and endure hardships; but these will enable

248. Id. *ibid.*

249. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. ix.

“ you

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“ you to vanquish your enemies, and preserve your
 “ freedom. Whereas, if you shrink from toil, and
 “ neglect discipline, I see no hope of your escaping
 “ the punishment of rebels. If, however, you will
 “ take my counsel, and conform to my directions, I
 “ pledge myself, the gods aiding our just cause!
 “ that we shall wear such a formidable counte-
 “ nance, that the enemy will not dare to give us
 “ battle; or if they should, that they will rue the
 “ encounter, nor ever afterward venture to face us
 “ at sea²⁵⁰.”

This speech was heard with such general approbation, that not only the Ionians, but all their confederates, agreed to put themselves under the discipline of the Phocæan commander; who acquitted himself in a manner worthy of an experienced naval officer. He ranged the whole fleet, every day, in order of battle; directed the squadrons frequently to change their stations, that they might habituate the seamen to the labour of the oar; which only was made use of by the ancients in time of action: and he made the soldiers, on board, do duty in their armour²⁵¹. After these evolutions were performed, the fleet lay at anchor during the remainder of the day²⁵².

Seven days did the confederates patiently submit to this discipline; so necessary to inure them to the toils, and render them expert in the practice of war. And so long did the hostile fleet remain quiet in harbour. But at length the Ionians, the most effeminate of all the Asiatic Greeks, began to murmur at the hardships to which they were exposed. From murmurs they proceeded to complaints, and from complaints to mutiny. They exclaimed against the exhausting

250. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xi.

251. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xii.

252. Id. *ibid.*

fatigues,

fatigues, which they were daily obliged to sustain, under the burning heat of the sun; fatigues, they said, which had already destroyed many of them, and would soon prove fatal to more; fatigues less tolerable than the worst servitude. “And all these,” cried they, “are imposed upon us by an insolent Phocæan, who brings no more than three ships, for the support of the common cause²⁵³!” They accordingly refused any longer to obey the orders of Dionysius; and having formed a camp in the island of Ladé, sat down under the shade of their tents, and utterly neglected their naval exercise²⁵⁴.

During this season of inaction, the Samians, disgusted at the indolence and disorderly behaviour of the continental Ionians, whom they had reason to believe would not acquit themselves like men, privately complied with a message from Æaces, the son of Syloson, their former chief; exhorting them to abandon the Ionian confederacy, and accept the offers of the great king²⁵⁵.

No sooner was that transaction made known to the Persian commanders, than their fleet quitted the harbour of Miletus, and advanced, in order of battle, toward that of the enemy, the Phœnicians leading the van²⁵⁶. The Asiatic Greeks, dividing their fleet into squadrons, also formed a line of battle: though we have reason to believe they observed little concert in action, as they mutually accused each other of neglect of duty²⁵⁷.

Ant. Chr.
494.
Olympiad
lxxi. 3.

The Grecian fleet was thus disposed. The Ionians, with eighty ships, were ranged at the head of

253. Herodot. ubi sup.

254. Id. ibid.

255. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xiii.

256. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xiv.

257. Id. ibid.

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494.

Olympiad
lxxi. 3.

the line, stretching eastward. Next were stationed the Prienians, with twelve ships; and the Myusians, with three; supported by the Teians, with seventeen; and the Chians, with an hundred sail. The centre was composed of the Erythræans, with eight; the Phocæans, with three, and the Lesbians with seventy sail. The Samians, with sixty sail, formed the rear²⁵⁸.

We are not particularly informed, in what manner the battle that ensued was conducted, on either side. We only know, that the Samians early hoisted sail, and went out of the line²⁵⁹; a certain signal of their defection, which was understood by the Greeks, as well as by the Persians. The Lesbians, who were stationed next to them, followed their example, as did the greater part of the Ionians²⁶⁰. The Chians, however, disdaining such treachery and pusillanimity, bravely maintained their station: they even advanced against the enemy, and long sustained the whole weight of the battle. Nor did they retire until they had taken and destroyed many ships of the hostile fleet, and lost a large proportion of their own²⁶¹.

In that awful conflict with superior force, the Chians were vigorously supported by the captains of eleven Samian ships; who, ashamed of the baseness of their countrymen, and their commander in chief, heroically returned to the charge, fought in defiance of orders, and rendered their names immortal²⁶².

Nor

258. Herodot. ubi sup.

259. Id. ibid.

260. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xiv. By Ionians must here be understood the Greeks of Ionia, properly so called; for the Samians, Chians, and Phocæans, also were of Ionian origin, and their deputies had a seat in the Panionian council, or general assembly of Ionia. Herodot. lib. i. cap. xli—xliii.

261. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xiv. xv.

262. Id. ibid. The community of Samos, in order to transmit the memory

Nor ought, on this memorable day, to be forgot the valour and conduct of Dionysius, the Phocæan leader. With his three ships, he captured three of the enemy's fleet, and gallantly maintained the combat, until he saw the Grecian fleet totally defeated²⁶³. Then, chusing the condition of an exile, rather than a precarious asylum in his native country, which he foresaw must soon be subjected to the Persian dominion, he sailed for the coast of Phœnicia; there took many rich prizes, and carried them to the island of Sicily, whence he carried on a piratical war against the enemies of Asiatic Greece²⁶⁴.

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lxxi. 3.

The Persians, now victorious on the watery element, pressed the siege of Miletus both by sea and land; and, after having employed against it all sorts of warlike engines, and undermined the walls, they made themselves masters of the place, in the sixth year after the revolt of Aristagoras²⁶⁵. As the city was taken by storm, it was pillaged, and the greater part of the men were put to the sword²⁶⁶. The women and children were made captives; and together with such of the citizens as had escaped the general slaughter, were carried to Susa, and afterward settled in the district of Ampæ on the Tygris²⁶⁷. The level, and most fertile part of the Milesian territory was divided among the Persian conquerors, and the mountainous tracts were given to the Carians of Pedasis²⁶⁸.

On the reduction of Miletus, Histiaëus, its former chief, and the author of many calamities, both to

memory of these brave men to posterity with honour, erected a column on which was inscribed their names and families. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xv.

263. Id. lib. vi. cap. xvii.

264. Id. ibid.

265. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. xviii.

266. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xix.

267. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xx.

268. Id. ibid.

himself

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himself and his country, left Byzantium, and sailed to Chios. There meeting with opposition, he made himself master of the island, through the assistance of the Lesbians, who continued to adhere to his interest²⁶⁹. This success, originating in the misfortunes of the bravest of the Asiatic Greeks, who were still weak from the loss they had sustained in combating the Persians at sea, rekindled the ambition of Histiaëus, and inspired him with the hope of yet setting bounds to the power of Darius. He accordingly assembled a number of Ionian and Æolian adventurers, and reigned, for a while, tyrant of the Ægean sea; but imprudently venturing to land on the coast of Asia Minor, at the head of a small body of forces, a period was suddenly put to his new career. He was surprised, routed, and made prisoner by one of the Persian generals; and being carried to Sardis, he was there crucified, by order of Artaphernes²⁷⁰.

Such was the fate of Histiaëus, the Milesian, one of the most extraordinary men that Asiatic Greece ever produced; and who, if he had not been deluded into splendid captivity, by the insidious caresses of a jealous monarch, whom he had essentially served, would have acted a great part upon the theatre of human affairs. Ambition was his ruling passion, and his radical vice; but that ambition had for its primary objects the exaltation of his native country, and the limitation of the Persian power. If he failed to accomplish these ends, his miscarriage will be imputed, by your lordship, to the difficulties with which he had to struggle, not to any want of political or military talents.

Ant. Chr.
493.
Olympiad
lxxi. 4.

The Persian fleet having wintered at Miletus, easily reduced, in the spring, the islands of Chios,

269. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xxvi. xxvii.

270. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xxviii.—xxx.

Tenedos,

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Ant. Chr.
493.
Olympiad
lxxi. 4.

Tenedos, and Lesbos; while the army, in conjunction with a division of the same fleet, took all the Ionian cities on the continent. And the commanders, both by sea and land, executed the full vengeance that had been denounced against the inhabitants, when they obstinately rejected the proffered terms of submission. Such of the men and women as had not escaped by flight, were subjected to the condition of slaves; the handsomest boys were made eunuchs; and sent, with the most beautiful virgins, to Susa: the houses, and even the temples, were consumed with fire²⁷¹.


From the Ægean sea, the hostile fleet sailed to the Propontis; where all the towns on the Asiatic coast being already brought under the Persian dominion, the incensed conquerors turned their arms against those on the European shore, which they cruelly desolated with fire and sword²⁷². The citizens of Byzantium, however, escaped the general slavery imposed upon their neighbours, with many of its attendant calamities. Having retired with their most valuable effects, on the approach of the enemy, they took possession of a territory on the coast of the Euxine sea, and there built the city of Mesambria²⁷³.

No sooner was Darius informed of the recovery of Asiatic Greece, than he resolved to prosecute that revenge, which he had meditated, upon the Athenians and Eretrians, for taking part with his rebel subjects; but more especially for having been concerned in the burning of Sardis, an insult which his pride could not brook. As a prelude to the execution of this vindictive enterprise, he recalled his generals, who had completed the reduction of

271. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xxxi. xxxii.

272. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xxxiii.

273. Id. *ibid.*

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Ant. Chr.
492.
Olympiad
lxxii. 1.

Mardonius, in going to take possession of his command, and chastise the European Greeks, led a great army to the coast of Cilicia. There embarking on board a fleet, which was ready to receive him, he sailed to Ionia; and went, as may be conjectured, to Sardis, in order to confer with Artaphernes; while the land forces, under his generals, marched to the Hellespont²⁷⁶. During his residence in Ionia, he carried into execution a measure that discovers great liberality of mind, as well as enlarged views of policy, and for which he must have had the sanction of the venerable satrap: he deposed all the tyrants who had been restored to their authority, and established a democratical form of government in every Grecian city²⁷⁷.

Having,

274. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xliii.

275. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xlii.

276. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xliii.

277. Id. *ibid.* It is more reasonable to suppose (for Herodotus is silent on the subject) that this measure was adopted in concert with Artaphernes, than that so young a man as Mardonius was appointed
satrap

Having, by this popular act, secured the fidelity and attachment of the Asiatic Greeks, Mardonius proceeded to the Hellespont, and passed over with his army into Europe. Marching through Thrace, he entered Macedonia, and added that ancient kingdom to the Persian empire; while the Persian fleet, having received the submission of the island of Thasus, famous for its gold mines, steered for the coast of Attica, in order to co-operate with the army. But, in attempting to double the promontory of mount Athos, now called Capo Santo; it was attacked by a violent storm from the north-east; and three hundred ships were dashed in pieces against the rocks, and twenty thousand men perished in the waves²⁷⁸.

This shock was sufficient to have defeated the expedition of Mardonius, as the fleet must have been necessary to the success of the army, in its destined attack upon Athens. But it did not come alone. The camp of Mardonius was forced by night, by the Brygians, a Thracian people: many of his men were killed, and he himself was wounded²⁷⁹. He sought revenge, however, upon the barbarous enemy, before he prosecuted his march, and severely chastised them²⁸⁰; but having, in the meantime, received information of the destruction of his fleet, and the season being too far advanced for him to think of repairing the loss that year, he led back his army to winter in Asia Minor²⁸¹.

Though the success of Mardonius was not adequate to the hopes of Darius, his expedition had

satrap of Sardis, in the room of that experienced governor, and invested with the civil, as well as the military command, of the maritime parts of Asia Minor. Yet most modern historians have favoured the latter opinion.

278. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xliv.

279. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xlv.

281. Herodot. ubi sup.

280. Id. *ibid.*

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been productive of an event not a little flattering to the pride of the Persian monarch. The conquest of Macedonia, a kingdom which was one day to give law to Greece, could not be considered as a small acquisition. The failure of the enterprise, in its ultimate object, might be imputed to the loss of the fleet, and the inexperience of Mardonius. The great king, therefore, persevered in his resolution of chastising the European Greeks, unless they would acknowledge his sway; and ordered ships to be built, next summer, in all the ports of Asia Minor, for carrying his ambitious design into execution²⁸².

Ant. Chr.
491.
Olympiad
lxxii. 2.

In the meantime, Persian heralds were sent to all the Grecian states, demanding earth and water, in testimony of their submission²⁸³. Many of the states on the continent, and also of the islands, overawed by the power of Darius, complied with this demand²⁸⁴. But the citizens of Athens and Sparta, inflamed with rage and resentment at the insolence of the barbarian (as the Persian monarch was disdainfully called by the more enlightened Greeks), threw some of his heralds into a ditch, and others into a well, and desired them thence to take earth and water for the king²⁸⁵.

No sooner, however, did the people of those states recover their temper, than they became ashamed of their conduct, and endeavoured to make every reparation in their power, for so flagrant a violation of the laws of nations²⁸⁶. But their resentment against the people of such states, as had submitted to the Persian dominion, remained implacable. This resentment fell with peculiar seve-

282. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xlviiii.

283. Id. *ibid.*

284. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xlix.

285. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. exxxiii.

286. Id. *ibid.* et seq.



city upon the Æginetes, whom the Athenians suspected of a design against their republic, in conjunction with the common enemy, and accused in the senate of Sparta, as betrayers of the liberties of Greece²⁸⁷.

The Spartans, laying aside their jealousy of Athens, eagerly listened to the accusation; and Cleomenes, their warlike king, as the head of the governing state in Greece, went in person to Ægina, and attempted to seize the leaders, who had advised the obnoxious submission to the Persian monarch²⁸⁸. The Æginetes admitted the supremacy of the Spartan state, but refused to comply with the demand of Cleomenes; under pretence, that he did not act by public authority, as he was not accompanied by his colleague Demaratus²⁸⁹.

Cleomenes, not choosing to employ force, returned to Sparta without accomplishing his design. And understanding that it had been defeated, by the intrigues of Demaratus, in his absence, he got that prince deposed, on account of his real or pretended illegitimacy; and Leotychides, the next heir, was advanced to the sovereignty²⁹⁰. Demaratus, on being degraded, quitted the dominions of Sparta, and afterward retired to the court of Susa, where Hippias and his adherents were now in high favour²⁹¹.

Meantime Cleomenes, accompanied with his new colleague, went again to Ægina, and repeated his demand. And ten of the chief citizens being delivered up to him, he sent them to Athens, as pledges

287. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xlix.

288. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. l.

289. Id. *ibid.* et seq.

290. Herodotus, *ubi sup.*

291. Id. lib. vi. cap. lxx. et lib. vii. cap. iiii.

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Ant. Chr.
490.
Olympiad
lxx. 1.

Darius having completed his naval and military preparations, removed Mardonius from the command of his forces in the maritime parts of Asia Minor, and appointed in his stead Datis and Artaphernes; the former a Mede, and an officer of experience; the latter son to his brother Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis²⁹⁵. These commanders, as soon as they had received their instructions, and taken leave of the king, advanced with a numerous, and well appointed army, into the plains of Cilicia²⁹⁶. There they encamped, until the vessels ordered to be built in the ports of Asiatic Greece, for the transportation of horse as well as foot, arrived; it being resolved to avoid the circuitous march into Greece, through Thrace and Macedonia, by landing the forces at once in the threatened territories²⁹⁷.

When the troops were embarked, the whole Persian fleet, consisting of six hundred sail, steered for the island of Samos, the place of rendezvous²⁹⁸. Here having received the Æolian and Ionian levies, this mighty armament, which had for its object, as

292. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. lxxlii.

293. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. lxxv.—lxxxiv.

294. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. lxxxvii.—xciv. et lib. vii. cap. cxliv. cxlv.

295. Id. lib. vi. cap. xciv.

296. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xcv.

297. Id. *ibid.*

298. Herodotus, *ubi sup.*

already

as already observed, the conquest of European Greece, but whose declared purpose was the chastisement of Eretria and Athens, began its operations with reducing under the dominion of the great king, the European islands in the lower part of the Ægean sea, known by the name of the *Cyclades*.

Most of those islands had acknowledged the sovereignty of Darius, by the delivery of earth and water. But that was not thought enough: it was resolved to bring them under more absolute subjection, and to secure their obedience by hostages. The storm fell first upon Naxos. Knowing themselves obnoxious to the Persian monarch, on account of their former resistance, and sensible of their inability to withstand the force that surrounded their shores, the Naxians abandoned their habitations, and took refuge in their mountains²⁹⁹. The haughty invaders, enraged at such desertion, reduced the Naxian capital to ashes, and carried off all the prisoners they could seize³⁰⁰. But Delos, the favourite seat of Apollo, and the contiguous islands, were treated with more lenity. The inhabitants were invited to submission. That they readily yielded, in the manner desired. And the victorious fleet, leaving behind it the Cyclades, steered for Eretria, on the western coast of the island of Eubœa³⁰¹.

The Eretrians, who had been marked out as the objects of exemplary vengeance, could hope for no indulgence from the Persian commanders, should they even seek to purchase it by voluntary submission. Yet an attempt to resist such a formidable enemy, afforded so little prospect of success, that it could only be considered as a desperate effort, which

299. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xcvi.

300. Id. *ibid.*

301. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xcvi. xcvi.

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might aggravate the calamities of their future condition. We cannot, therefore, wonder, if, in those circumstances, their councils were divided; or that some citizens, who had no concern in the public offence, thought of making their peace with the incensed monarch, at the expense of the interests of the state³⁰². Resistance, however, was at last resolved upon, by the majority of votes³⁰³.

In consequence of this resolution, which made a siege necessary, as the Eretrians could not think of meeting the enemy in the field, the Persian commanders, who had landed their forces in the neighbourhood, advanced toward Eretria, and invested that city. For six days did the Eretrians, who had taken refuge within their walls, sustain the assaults of the powerful invaders of their country. Nor can it be said, how long they might have held out, had they not been betrayed by Euphorbus and Philargus; two of their chief citizens, who put the besiegers in possession of the city³⁰⁴. The town thus entered, was delivered up to pillage by the Persian generals: the houses and temples were burnt; and the brave Eretrians, whom policy, not humanity, saved from the sword, were loaded with fetters, in order to be sent in that condition to Susa, there to receive their final sentence from Darius³⁰⁵.

A few days after the taking of Eretria, the Persian forces were reembarked, and landed on the coast of Attica; with Hippias, its former king, at their head³⁰⁶. By the advice of Hippias, the Persian generals conducted their army into the plain of Marathon³⁰⁷. This camp was judiciously chosen. Here

302. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. c. ci.

303. Id. *ibid.*

304. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

305. Id. *ibid.*

306. Herodotus lib. vi. cap. cii.

307. Id. *ibid.*

their

their numerous infantry might be drawn up, without being greatly impeded; and here their cavalry could act to advantage, if the enemy should think proper to give them battle. The road to Athens was open; and they could be supplied with provisions from the fleet, while they remained in that station, whence they could ravage and desolate the country. The inhabitants of Attica, hunted down by the Persian cavalry, might be utterly extirpated; or compelled to take shelter within the walls of their capital, which could be blocked up by sea and land.

The Athenians were aware of their perilous situation; and their apprehension of danger was aggravated by self-reproach. They now saw, with sorrow and shame, their unwise and ungenerous conduct, in abandoning the cause of the Asiatic Greeks; but especially in suffering the naval force of Ionia, which might have protected them, to be broken by that of Phœnicia, and turned against them. The unconquerable spirit of liberty, however, preserved them from despair; and the dread of tyranny made them resolve to die free, rather than submit to the will of a despot.

The presence of Hippias increased the horror of his countrymen against the Persian power. But how to resist that power, or to prevent the restoration of the tyrant, was a question not easy to be answered. Thrace and Macedonia had already submitted to the arms of Darius. The Thebans had acknowledged his sway, by the delivery of earth and water. No people, in a word, remained, to whom the Athenians could, in this extremity, apply for aid, except the Lacedæmonians. And the unfeeling disciples of Lycurgus cruelly evaded their request.

As

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As soon as informed of the taking of Eretria, the Athenian senate had sent a messenger to Sparta, craving the assistance of the Lacedæmonians; and expressing a hope, that they would not suffer the most ancient of the Grecian cities to be enslaved by the Barbarians³⁰⁸. The Spartan senate and popular assembly readily agreed to succour the Athenians; but they could not, they declared, do it immediately. By an ancient, and seemingly obsolete law (for we do not find that on any other occasion it ever obstructed their operations), their army was forbid, they said, to march beyond the territories of the state before the full moon; and it yet wanted five days of that time³⁰⁹.

When this answer was received at Athens, her bravest citizens were filled with consternation, and doubtful what course to pursue. The Plataeans, in gratitude for former service and support, had promised them a thousand chosen warriors³¹⁰. But these, and all the men they could muster, appeared so inadequate to the force of the enemy, that the Athenians found it difficult to determine, whether they ought to meet the Persian army in the field, or rest their safety on the defence of the capital?

That momentous question, which seems to have divided the assembly of the people, as well as the council of state, was ultimately decided by the arguments of Miltiades, one of the ten generals appointed by the republic, to command the levies of the ten tribes, into which the Athenians were divided, and whose zeal for the independency of Greece we have already had occasion to notice. “Depend

308. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cvi.

309. Id. ibid.

310. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cviii. et Cornel. Nep. *Vid. Miltiad.*

“not upon your walls,” said he, “for freedom or safety. Many are the hardships of a siege, and many the accidents to which it is liable. The temptations to treachery are strong, and the slightest neglect of duty may occasion surprise. But should you escape these, other dangers await you. The spirits of men sink, under the pressure of famine; and their courage slackens, when they are confined to particular posts. Imbody, therefore, your citizens; boldly lead them forth against the barbarian host; and patriotism and emulation, animating valour, will convince you, that victory does not depend upon numbers³¹¹.”

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The opinion of Miltiades was adopted as the resolution of the state. And he and his colleagues, conducted to the heights of Marathon, nine thousand free Athenians³¹², and probably an equal number of armed slaves; and fortified their camp with branches of trees, as a security against the enemy's cavalry. There they were joined by the brave and faithful Plataeans³¹³; the whole composing an army of about twenty thousand men³¹⁴. The Persian army, according to the most moderate computation, consisted of one hundred thousand infantry, and ten thousand cavalry³¹⁵. The appearance of so great a body of men accustomed to conquer, and whose name had every where spread terror, renewed the apprehensions of the Athenian generals, and made them hesitate in regard to the propriety of giving battle³¹⁶,

311. Compare Cornel. Nep. *Vit. Miltiad.* cap. iv. with Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxi.

312. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cviii. Cornel. Nep. *Vit. Miltiad.* cap. v.

313. Id. *ibid.*

314. See, on this subject, the conjectures of Mr. Mitford (*Hist. Greece*, chap. viii. sect. iv.) and Dr. Gillies (chap. ix.)

315. Cornel. Nep. *Vit. Miltiad.* cap. v.

316. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cix.

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In a council of war, assembled on the occasion, five of those generals declared in favour of an immediate action, and an equal number against hazarding it. Among the former, was the resolute and stout-hearted, Miltiades, who thus addressed himself to Calimachus, the Polemarch, or archon for military affairs; a magistrate that always attended the army, and who had, in such cases, the privilege of a casting vote³¹⁷. “You, O Calimachus,” said he, “have now the choice, whether you will reduce Athens to the condition of servitude, or preserve her freedom, and render your name immortal; for never were her liberties in so much danger, since the Athenians were a people. If we decline an engagement, the courage of our troops will sink, and desertion will be the consequence. But if we face the enemy, with undaunted countenance, the just gods will behold our triumph. Your voice must determine, what step we shall take³¹⁸.” He gave it for coming to action.

But after this difficulty was removed, another still remained, to obstruct the views of Miltiades. The ten Athenian generals held, each, in turn, the chief command of the army for one day³¹⁹; so that any of those generals might, on such day, decline the combat on any pretence whatever. As a temporary remedy for this defect in the military system of the Athenians, (which had arisen from their dread of tyranny, the too common consequence of undivided authority, and which was subversive of that unity of design, so necessary to success in the operations of war) all the generals, who had voted for giving battle, resigned their right of command to the experienced valour of Miltiades³²⁰.

317. Id. *ibid*.318. Herodot. *ubi sup*.319. Id. *Historiar*. lib. vi. cap. cx.320. Id. *ibid*.

Miltiades accepted the power; but, in order to obviate the fatal effects of envy or jealousy, among the other generals, he would not hazard an engagement until his own day came³²¹. He had made, however, in the meantime, the proper movements, and dispositions for insuring success; and no sooner did he find himself legally invested with the chief command, than he acquainted his countrymen with his resolution of giving battle to the enemy, and prescribed the order in which they should act. All impatience for the combat, the Athenians and Plataeans intrepidly quitted the heights of Marathon, on which they had been encamped, and fearlessly marched down, under the conduct of a leader whom they believed destined by heaven to save Greece from barbarian slavery. Nor did they halt, when they reached the plain; but ran to meet the haughty invaders, with the ardour of men determined to conquer or perish. The body of the Athenian citizens, headed by the polymarch, occupied the right wing of the army; the Plataeans, the left; and the armed slaves, supported by the levies of two Athenian tribes, under Themistocles and Aristides, formed the centre³²². Miltiades was every where present.

The Persian generals, when they saw the Greeks advancing with such impetuous speed, against a great army disposed in order of battle, considered them as men ignorant of military discipline; and who, in a fit of despair, were rushing upon certain destruction; especially as they had neither cavalry nor archers³²³. But they soon had occasion to discover their mistake. Miltiades, who was acquainted with the arms, and the manner of fighting, both of the Greeks and

Ant. Chr.
490.
Olympiad
lxxii. 3.

321. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cx.

322. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. cxi. cxii. Plutarch, *Vit. Aristid.*

323. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxii.

PART I. barbarians, had desired the Athenians to advance with rapidity; in order to awaken that enthusiasm of valour, which, spreading from rank to rank, and growing in its progress, as fire is inflamed by the wind, becomes irresistible; as well as to avoid the missile weapons of the enemy³²⁴.

The numerous nations, of which the Persian armies were composed, relied chiefly for their security, and the power of annoying their enemies, upon the use of darts and arrows³²⁵. The proper Persian foot alone had any reputation for close fight; and the success of every engagement depended much upon the cavalry, formed of the bravest warriors of each nation³²⁶. The long and weighty Grecian spear was greatly superior to the Asiatic, which was short and light; and that spear, when directed by the phalanx (which I shall afterward have occasion to describe), could break any troop of horse; while this firm body could resist the most impetuous shock of cavalry³²⁷. The strong corslets, the greaves of brass, the massy buckler of the Greeks, were also far superior to the defensive armour of the Persians³²⁸.

But the greatest superiority of the troops under Miltiades consisted in their personal prowess. Accustomed, like all the Greeks, from their infancy to the use of arms, they were expert in every military evolution; and their bodies, toned by gymnastic exercise, had acquired a degree of strength and agility, which made up in force what they wanted in numbers. The battle of Marathon was accordingly fierce and

324. Justin. lib. ii. cap. ix. Cornel. Nep. *Vit. Miltiad.* cap. v.

325. Herodot. et Xenoph. *passim*.

326. Id. *ibid.*

327. Potter, *Archæolog. Græc.* book. iii. chap. iv. vi. et auct. cit.

328. Id. *ibid.*

obstinate.

obstinate. The Athenian general, in extending his two wings, so as to present a front equal to that of the enemy, had been under the necessity of weakening his centre³²⁹; which, after a violent struggle, was broken by the enemy's main body, composed chiefly of Persian infantry³³⁰. But his two wings defeated those of the Persian army; and, judiciously avoiding pursuit, closed upon the victorious main body, which they also defeated, and pursued with great slaughter to the fleet on the coast³³¹.

Six thousand three hundred of the barbarians were slain, and seven of their ships were taken. Of the Athenians fell one hundred and ninety-two; among whom were numbered Calimachus, the polymarch, Stesileos, one of the generals, and many other persons of distinction³³². Among the persons of rank killed, on the side of the Persians, is said to have been included Hippias, the author of the invasion³³³; who here sought the restoration of his authority, at the expense of the liberties and independency of Greece, twenty years after his expulsion from Attica³³⁴.

This battle, however, though decisive, and highly honourable to the victors, did not utterly defeat the designs of the vanquished enemy. The Persian armament was still strong; and no sooner did the fleet put to sea, than the commanders attempted to surprise Athens, by doubling the promontory of Sunium, before the return of the army³³⁵. But the vigilance of Miltiades was equal to his conduct and

329 Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. cxi.

330. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. cxiii.

331. Id. *ibid.*

332. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xiv—xvii.

333. Justin. lib. ii. cap. ix.

334. Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. lix.

335. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. cxv. cxvi.

PART I.

valour. Suspecting the design of the enemy, he decamped from the plain of Marathon, with the flower of his victorious troops; and by a rapid march of thirty miles, displayed his triumphant banners on the heights of Cynosarges, which overlook the Athenian capital, when the hostile fleet was preparing to enter port Phaleron³³⁶. The Persian commanders, seeing their views frustrated, again put to sea, and steered for the coast of Asia³³⁷.

Thus, my lord, was finally rendered abortive, in consequence of the victory gained at Marathon, the second great effort made by Darius, for enslaving the Athenians, and acquiring the dominion of European Greece. But this was not the only consequence of that victory. The Lacædæmonians, who arrived on the frontiers of Attica the day after it had been obtained, with two thousand men, reluctantly congratulated their rivals on an event, which they foresaw would give Athens an ascendant among the Grecian states she had not hitherto maintained; but they desired to be conducted to the field of battle, that they might see the Median habit, the arms, and the bodies of the slain³³⁸. This was a curiosity worthy of the disciples of Lycurgus; for the Median habit, which was worn by the Persians as well as the Medes, had hitherto been an object of terror to the Greeks³³⁹. The victory at Marathon dispelled that terror, and made the Greeks sensible of their superiority in weapons, in armour, in valour, and in personal prowess; that, although

336. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. cxvi.

337. Id. *ibid.*

338. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxx.

339. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. cxii. Nor need we be surprised at such terror; "for so many, so powerful, and so warlike," says Plato, "were the nations that had bowed to the Persian yoke, that Darius seemed to have subdued the very opinions of all mankind." *Dialog. Menexen.*

comparatively few in number, yet while united among themselves, and animated by the generous spirit of liberty, they were unconquerable, and might set at defiance the myriads of the great king³⁴⁰.

LETTER
XI.

340. Plato, in *Menexen.* et de *Legib.* lib. iii.

Liberty for ever!
no downbearing autocrats

LETTER

LETTER XII.

THE AFFAIRS OF THE GREEKS AND PERSIANS CONTINUED, FROM THE VICTORY GAINED BY MILTIADES AT MARATHON TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, AND THE RETREAT OF XERXES IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS DEFEAT.

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
490.
Olympiad
lxxii. 3.

THE lofty mind of Darius, reposing upon the summit of power, affected to look down with indifference upon the defeat of his army at Marathon. Instead of being discouraged by his loss, he regarded it only as a new motive for taking vengeance upon the Athenians, and humbling the whole body of the Grecian states¹. His desire of vengeance, however, was altogether political. It was inconsistent with the dignity of the Persian monarch, and even with the safety of his empire, to let Athens enjoy her triumph, or European Greece glory in his disaster with impunity. But his humanity was, on all occasions, conspicuous toward those unhappy individuals, whom fortune had put in his power. When the Eretrian captives were sent to him by Datis and Artaphernes, in proof that they had not altogether failed in their enterprise, he discovered to those obnoxious enemies the same magnanimous lenity, which he had formerly manifested to the Milesian prisoners. They were not only exempted from punishment, but settled in the fertile district of Ardarica, about forty miles distant from Susa, where they long preserved the Greek language and manners².

1. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. i.

2. Id. lib. vi. cap. cxix.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile Darius having resolved upon another invasion of Greece, ordered preparations to be made, throughout all his extensive dominions, for assembling a great naval and military force³. This armament he proposed to have conducted in person; but before his preparations were completed, he was informed of the revolt of Egypt⁴. And that disagreeable event was followed by a dispute among his sons, in regard to the succession to the crown; which it was necessary, according to the laws of the empire, that he should settle before he left Susa⁵. Artabazenes, his eldest son by the daughter of Gobryas, pleaded his primogeniture; while Xerxes, his eldest son by Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, urged his right to the throne, as the lineal descendant of the founder of the Persian empire; and also as the first born son of Darius, after he was invested with the imperial ensigns⁶.

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XII.

Ant. Chr.
489.
Olympiad
lxxii. 4.

The claim of Xerxes was sustained⁷. But Darius died before he could take any steps for the recovery of Egypt, or the invasion of Greece⁸. Considered in his civil capacity, Darius appears to have been one of the greatest and wisest monarchs that ever reigned in the east. Nor was he destitute of military talents, though, on most occasions, he prudently chose to preside over the administration of government, rather than appear at the head of his armies; conscious that the failure of an enterprise, or even the loss of an army, was of small consequence to him, compared with any derangement in the political machine.

Ant. Chr.
485.
Olympiad
lxxiii. 4.

Xerxes, the son and successor of Darius, inherited the ambition, the power, and the resentments of his

3. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. i.

4. Id. *ibid.*

5. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. ii.

6. Id. lib. vii. cap. ii. iii.

7. Herodotus, *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. iii.

8. Id. lib. vii. cap. iv.

father,

PART I.

father, without being heir to his abilities. He was not, however, destitute of talents for sway. He was magnificent, generous, brave; and consequently popular, as far as popularity is consistent with absolute monarchy. The two first years of his reign were chiefly employed in settling his affairs, and in accomplishing the recovery of Egypt; which he reduced to a state of more abject servility, and committed to the government of his brother Achæmenes⁹. He next proposed, in conformity with the views of his father, to undertake the conquest of Greece. But before I describe his preparations for that enterprise, we must, my lord, take a view of the state of the celebrated country against which it was directed.

The Athenians, as I have had occasion to observe, had been rapidly increasing in power, since the recovery of their political freedom, in consequence of the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ. The victory at Marathon gave them an ascendant in the affairs of Greece, which they had never before possessed; and they soon aspired, with their new created navy, at the same dominion by sea, which the Lacedæmonians exercised on land. Miltiades, to whom they were chiefly indebted for that victory, was deservedly the man of most authority¹⁰. He proposed to reduce under the Athenian sway, and levy fines upon such of the European islands in the Ægean sea, as had favoured the Persian monarch¹¹. For these purposes, he was furnished with a fleet of seventy sail, and directed his course to the Cyclades¹². But instead of conducting himself with moderation, or studying the general good of the

9. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. vii.

10. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. cxxxii.

11. Cornel. Nepot. *Vit. Miltiad.* cap. vii.

12. Id. *ibid.* et Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxxxiii.

republic,

republic, he gave way to the violent disposition of his naturally haughty and tyrannical heart¹³. Actuated by personal resentment¹⁴, he instantly appeared off the island of Paros, famous for its marble, and demanded from the inhabitants a fine of one hundred talents of silver¹⁵, or about twenty thousand pounds sterling. The Parians, neither able nor willing to pay so large a sum, denied his request without hesitation; prepared themselves for resistance, and diligently repaired the walls of their capital¹⁶. Miltiades disembarked his troops, and invested the place both by sea and land. But after carrying on his operations for twenty-six days, during which he had ravaged the country, and employed in vain every effort to take the obstinate city, he raised the siege, and returned with his unsuccessful armament to Athens¹⁷.

In a republic, no distinguished man is without enemies; who are, at all times, ready to take advantage of his miscarriages. Xanthippus, an eminent Athenian citizen, and father to the famous Pericles, envious of the high reputation of Miltiades, or jealous of his power, accused him, in the popular

13. That such was the true character of Miltiades, we have the fullest testimony in Herodotus (*Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. xxxix.). He had violently seized the government of the Thracian Chersonesus (*Id.* *ibid.*). In order to support his usurped authority, and give dignity to the regal office, he maintained five hundred guards (*Herodot.* *ubi sup.*); and, as a farther support to his power, he married the daughter of Olerus, king of the neighbouring part of Thrace. *Id.* *ibid.*

14. *Herodot.* lib. vi. cap. cxxxiii.

15. *Id.* *ibid.*

16. *Herodot.* *ubi sup.*

17. *Id.* *Historiar.* lib. vi. cap. cxxxiv. cxxxv. Cornelius Nepos assigns as a reason for Miltiades raising the siege of Paros, the accidental burning of a grove on the Asiatic coast, which he considered as a signal to the inhabitants of the approach of a Persian fleet, to their assistance (*Cornel. Nep. Vit. Miltiad.* cap. vii.): But no notice is taken of this circumstance by Herodotus.

PART I.

assembly, of having betrayed the interests of the state¹⁸. Confined to his bed by a wound, which he had received at Paros, and which may be considered as the true cause of his relinquishing the siege of that place, Miltiades was not able to appear in his own defence¹⁹. His friends undertook it for him; and urged his former services, in extenuation of his late unaccountable failure²⁰.

The Athenians, in consideration of these services, exempted their unfortunate commander from the punishment of death, which his accuser urged was due to his crime, by the laws of the republic; but they condemned him to pay a fine of fifty talents of silver, in order to defray the expense of the armament, which had been fitted out at his request²¹. Not being able to raise the sum, he was thrown into prison; where he died, soon after, of a mortification in his thigh, in consequence of his wound²². Cimon, the worthy son of Miltiades, engaged to pay his father's fine, that he might be permitted to perform his funeral honours²³:—and his countrymen, in succeeding times, did justice to his military character²⁴.

The

18. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. cxxxvi. "For a Persian bribe," says Nepos (*Vit. Miltiad.* cap. vii.). Herodotus does not carry the accusation so far.

19. *Id.* *ibid.*

20. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxxxvi. Considering the high reputation of Miltiades for courage and conduct, and the formidable armament with which he was entrusted, we cannot wonder that the Athenians were astonished, and enraged at his returning without either wealth or honour (Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxxxv.); or that, under such aggravating and suspicious circumstances, his friends did not dare to plead his innocence.

21. Cornel. Nepot. *Vit. Miltiad.* cap. vii. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

22. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. cxxxvi.

23. Plat. et Cornel. Nepot. *Vit. Cimon*, init.

24. A monument was raised to his memory in the plain of Marathon (Pausanias, lib. i.); his statue, executed by Phidias, was placed in the temple of Apollo at Delphos (Pausan. lib. x.); and when the

battle

The Athenians have been accused of cruelty and ingratitude to Miltiades. But it is impossible, that the collective body of any free people can ever forget the services, or treat with severity a citizen, who has distinguished himself in the cause of his country, unless they have reason to believe he has afterward injured the state, or to apprehend that he is disposed so to do. Miltiades had commanded in chief at the battle of Marathon, which delivered Athens from the danger of Persian slavery, and the dread of the restoration of her former tyrant. But he was only one of ten generals, who had, on that occasion, headed the levies of the ten tribes of the republic: many Athenian citizens accounted themselves equally worthy of command; all had discovered equal courage in action. And it was universally understood, that after a citizen had performed the most gallant exploits, in defence of his country, he had done no more than was his duty. If he aspired at envied honours, or perpetual command, he became an object of jealousy. If he employed the forces of the state for the purpose of personal vengeance, or self-aggrandisement, he was justly held obnoxious.

Greece, perhaps, never produced a more able general, nor Athens a more dangerous citizen than Miltiades. The Athenians seem, therefore, to have wisely judged, that it was better a suspected leader, though innocent, should suffer, than his fellow-citizens remain in a state of fear²⁵. They were sensible that, considering the influence of habit upon ambitious minds, he had been too long accustomed to

battle of Marathon was painted by Polygnotus, at the desire of the Athenian state, and placed in the public gallery called *Pæcile*, the portrait of Miltiades was drawn in the fore-ground, animating the troops by his presence and example. *Cornel. Nepot. Vit. Miltiad. cap. vi. Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. xxxv. cap. ix.*

25. *Cornel. Nepot. Vit. Miltiad. cap. viii.*

command,

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command, ever to learn to obey; and that he had too long enjoyed the highest offices, quietly to descend to a private station²⁶. His degradation was become necessary to the safety of the constitution²⁷; and, in order to accomplish that end, without convulsing the state, it was expedient to connect misfortune with disgrace, and to construe misapplication of the strength of the republic into treachery or treason. *A very poor defence for the Athenians*

But Xanthippus did not obtain his aim, in turning the resentment of the people against Miltiades. The favour of the Athenians, after the death of that illustrious captain, was divided between Aristides and Themistocles, two younger men, who had distinguished themselves in the field of Marathon, by their valour and conduct, and who both possessed great talents, for civil as well as military affairs. These two candidates, for the lead in the government of Athens, were however persons of very different characters. Aristides was a man of austere manners, inflexible justice, and uncorruptible integrity; studious of deserving, but above courting popularity²⁸. Though only a citizen of small fortune, he leaned toward the aristocratical part of the constitution²⁹; not from any desire of lording it over his fellow-citizens, but from a conviction, founded on the most perfect knowledge of the administration of the republic, that the popular assembly, was now more than a balance for the

26. Id. *ibid.*

27. If Miltiades had continued to retain the chief command, the Athenian constitution, according to the ideas of the Greeks, would have been subverted; for, as Cornelius Nepos well observes, "all were accounted, and called tyrants, whose power was perpetual in a free state" (*Vit. Miltiad*, *ubi sup.*). The courteous affability, and condescending humanity of Miltiades, served only to confirm the Athenians in their jealousy of his ambitious views; he reminded them of Pisistratus. Id. *ibid.* c. Suidas, *voc. Miltiad*.

28. Plut. et Cornel. Nepot. *Vit. Aristid.* *init.*

29. Plut. *ubi sup.*

senate and areopagus, the two higher branches of the political system.

LETTER
XII.

Themistocles was a man of less rigid morals, and less sincere patriotism, than Aristides. He was more ambitious of public favour, than zealous for the public good; and, in order to acquire popularity, and procure the employments of the state, he did not scruple to pervert justice, and make use of bribes³⁰. But if inferior to his rival in virtue, he was superior in abilities. He was an eloquent orator, an expert general, a consummate politician; and the better to carry his measures in the popular assembly, he affected to foster the democratical spirit of the people³¹. His memory was tenacious, his judgment clear, and his genius penetrating. Hence he surpassed all his contemporaries, if not all mankind, in ready recollection, decision, and foresight: in the faculty of taking advantage of present circumstances, whether as a statesman or a commander, and in conjecturing justly concerning future events³². Nor was he less distinguished by his singular acuteness, in discerning the strength or the weakness of arguments on the most intricate subjects, how little soever such debates might have hitherto engaged his attention³³; and of giving the ascendant to which ever side he inclined, while he seemed only to abet what was incontrovertibly right.

The opposite characters of these two extraordinary men, and their opposite lines in politics, made them divide upon all public questions³⁴. The elo-

30. Plut. *Vit. Aristid. et Themist.* "May I never sit on a tribunal," said Themistocles, when accused of partiality in the distribution of justice, "where my friends shall not find more favour than strangers." Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*

31. Id. *ibid.*

32. Thucid. lib. i. cap. cxxxviii.

34. Plut. *Vit. Aristid. et Themist.*

33. Id. *ibid.*

quence,

PART I.

quence, the address, and popular arguments of Themistocles generally swayed the assembly of the people. He accordingly obtained the chief command of the naval force of Athens, and was invested with very extensive powers³⁵. But the sound understanding, the blameless manners, the benevolent disposition, and unbending probity of Aristides, gave a standard weight to his character, which balanced all the splendid qualities of his rival, in the estimation of the more respectable citizens³⁶.

This upright senator had been chosen archon the year after the battle of Marathon; in consequence, as may be conjectured, of his gallant behaviour in that battle, and his approved honesty in the care of the spoil, which he had been appointed to guard³⁷. Aristides discharged the office of archon, the highest magistracy in the state, and every other civil employment he had filled, with such wisdom and integrity, that he obtained the surname of *Just*³⁸; the most honourable appellation that can be given to any human being, and to which no man seems ever to have been better entitled.

But the reputation of Aristides for the godlike virtue of justice proved his misfortune. The people of Athens had such confidence in his solid judgment, and impartial decrees, from his admirable conduct while in office, that they resorted to him for arbitration, in private life; and in such numbers, that the courts of law were overawed by his equitable decisions, and in a manner deserted³⁹. The pride of the Athenian magistrates was hurt, and their choler roused, at such preponderating personal

35. Cornel. Nepot. *Vit. Themist.*36. Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*37. Id. *ibid.*38. Plut. *ubi sup.*39. Id. *ibid.*

influence.

influence. And Themistocles blew these discontents into a flame, that destroyed the credit of his rival.

LETTER
XII.

After returning from a naval expedition, in the course of which he had humbled the Corcyreans, and acquired for the Athenians the undisputed empire of the Ægean sea, that successful commander amused his friends and the populace with theatrical entertainments, and other public spectacles⁴⁰. Meanwhile he made it be secretly whispered among them, that Aristides, by drawing to his own arbitration, the decision of all causes, had established, though without the assistance of guards, a tyranny over the minds of his fellow citizens⁴¹. The alarm spread from the capital to the country; and the people, crowding from all quarters to Athens, banished Aristides by the ostracism⁴².

Ant. Chr.
485.
Olympiad
lxxiii. 4.

The firm behaviour of Aristides, on this trying occasion, was worthy of his virtuous and steady character. When the people were inscribing the names on the shells, which were to determine his

40. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

41. Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*

42. Id. *ibid.* The nature of this judicature I have formerly had occasion to explain. I shall, therefore, only here observe, that the popularity of Themistocles must have been very great, and his insidious arts many, before he could induce the people to drive into exile "the best and justest man in Athens," to use the words of the honest and candid Herodotus (lib. viii. cap. lxxix.): And I may venture to add, without incurring the imputation of scepticism, that Aristides must have set too high a value upon his moral character, and have arrogated more personal authority, than was consistent with the equal freedom of republican government at Athens. before six thousand citizens could be procured, by any means, to demand his banishment. For that number, we have seen (Lett. xi.), was required to effect an expulsion by the ostracism; and more might be necessary, to produce a majority, though fewer could not obtain a decree of exile (Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*). Aristides was banished in the sixth year before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Cornel. Nepot. *Vit. Aristid.* init.

exile,

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exile, an illiterate countryman came to the envied senator, and giving him a shell, desired him to write *Aristides* upon it. Surprised at the request, he asked the fellow, if *Arstides* had ever injured him?—"No," answered he, "nor do I so much as know his person; but it grieves me to hear him every where called *the Just*⁴³." *Aristides* coolly wrote his own name upon the shell, and returned it, without making any reply⁴⁴. And when he quitted Athens, in submission to his sentence of exile, he lifted up his hands toward heaven, and patriotically prayed, that the Athenians might never see the day, which should make them remember *Aristides*⁴⁵.

The expulsion of this truly good, and great man, left full scope for the ambition, and enterprising spirit of Themistocles. And, fortunately for Athens, that ambition was directed in a line, which, in her then circumstances, was equally consistent with her glory and safety. Themistocles had early turned his mind to maritime affairs⁴⁶; and as no man understood the interests of his country better, or pursued its prosperity with more undeviating aim, he constantly recommended to the Athenians the augmentation of their navy⁴⁷. With that view, he had begun, while archon, three years before the battle of Marathon, the enlarging and fortifying of the harbour *Peiræus*⁴⁸. Now, in a manner, absolute disposer of the resources of the state, he determined to raise Athens to the uncontrouled sovereignty of the sea; as her proper road to wealth and grandeur, as well as her best security against enemies, both Greek and barbarian⁴⁹.

43. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*

44. Id. *ibid.*

45. Plut. *ubi sup.*

46. Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

47. Id. *ibid.*

48. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xciii.

49. Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

In the prosecution of this project, recommended by his late naval success, he met with few obstacles. The Athenian treasury was already so full, that it had been proposed to divide among the citizens, at ten drachms a head, the annual produce, or revenue arising from the silver mines of Laurium⁵⁰; a mountain between the Piræus and the promontory of Laurium, which was public property. Themistocles remonstrated against that measure; and obtained, by his eloquence and influence, a decree of the state, that no such distribution should be made, until two hundred trireme gallies were built⁵¹.

The pretext for building these gallies was the final humiliation of the Æginetes, the ancient naval enemies of Athens, who were again become powerful and insolent⁵². But Themistocles had farther views. He had long foreseen, and foretold, that the victory at Marathon, instead of being considered as the termination of the Persian war, ought only to be regarded as its beginning; as the source of new invasions, and of greater battles both by land and sea⁵³. He was, by this time, informed of the preparations of Xerxes: and the gallies, which he had ordered to be built, were fit for service, before the impending danger approached the Grecian shores⁵⁴.

The first intimation of this danger, is said to have been conveyed to Sparta by Demaratus, the degraded king of Lacedæmon⁵⁵; who, though entertained at

50. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxliv.

51. Id. *ibid.* These gallies, we are told, were of superior size and construction to any armed vessels hitherto seen in Græce. Plato, *de Legib.* lib. iii. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xiv.

52. Herodot. *ubi sup.* Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

53. Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

54. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxliv.

55. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ccxxxix.

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the court of Susa, in a manner suitable to his rank, and considered as a counsellor of the Persian monarch, seems still to have retained a secret affection for the cause of Greece. Leonidas, who had (as we have seen), succeeded his brother Cleomenes in the Spartan throne, as the colleague of Leotychides, and who seems to have taken the lead in military affairs, conveyed the alarming intelligence to the several Grecian states⁵⁶; and it was resolved in the Amphictyonic council, or general assembly of those states, convened at the isthmus of Corinth, that all private hostilities should cease, and measures be taken for opposing the public enemy⁵⁷.

Little dependence was, however, to be placed upon any of the confederate states, except Athens and Sparta. The Thebans, jealous of the Athenian power, were secretly disposed to favour the operations of the Persian monarch; as were the Argives, who had long been cruelly harrassed by the inroads and arrogance of the Lacedæmonians⁵⁸. The Thes-
salians were exposed to invasion from Thrace and Macedonia, already subjected to the dominion of the great king; and the people of the smaller states, it was to be apprehended, would be awed into submission by the terror of his arms.

The preparations of Xerxes were, indeed, such as might have excused, upon prudential considerations, the submission of the whole body of the European Greeks, to the east of the Ionian sea, and even have exempted them from the imputation of cowardice, whether we consider their population, or the extent of their territory. But the political and military institutions of the Greeks, which made every citizen a sol-

56. Id. *ibid*.

57. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxlv.

58. Id. *Historiar*. lib. vi. vii. *passim*.

Ancient
Mon Ancient
Antaxerxes
Pythagoras 203
ANCIENT EUROPE.

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XII.

dier and a statesman, with the impracticable nature of their country; intersected by gulfs and stupendous ridges of mountains, and excavated by deep bays; made the conquest of Greece appear so arduous an enterprise, that deliberations on the subject are said to have deeply engaged, and divided the grand council of the Persian monarch, after the third invasion of that illustrious country was projected. These deliberations, as given by Herodotus, throws so much light on the national character of the Persians, on the state of their immense empire, extending from the Nile almost to the Ganges, and on the views of the great king, that the substance of them deserves to be related; especially when we consider, that the invasion of Greece by Xerxes is the most memorable expedition in the history of Ancient Europe.

What time this mighty monarch had recovered possession of Egypt, he assembled at Susa an extraordinary council of state; and having desired the princes, noblemen, and chief governors, that composed it, to deliver their sentiments with freedom, he spoke to the following purport: "From the æra, "O Persians! that we were freed from the domination of the Medes, and taught to conquer by "Cyrus, we have never led an inglorious or inactive "life; but, following the guiding hand of God, have "risen, by hardy deeds, to the summit of human "grandeur. I need not enumerate to you the achievements of Cyrus, of Cambyses, or of my father, "Darius; the nations they conquered, or the extent "of empire they acquired: with those matters you "are well acquainted. And since I ascended the "imperial throne, it has been my study to act in a "manner worthy of my illustrious ancestors, and to "seek the farther exaltation of the Persian power.

Ant. Chr.
484.
Olympiad
lxxiv. 1.

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“ In thus directing my views, I find we may still
“ earn an accession of glory, with the conquest of a
“ country not inferior in any respect to those we
“ now possess, and more abounding in many things,
“ while we avenge ourselves of our enemies. Hence
“ I have convoked this general council, that I may
“ unfold my purpose to the Persian princes, nobles,
“ and rulers.

“ I propose to lay a bridge over the Hellespont,”
said he, “ and to lead an army into Greece, through
“ those countries we have conquered in Europe; in
“ order to punish the Athenians for the injuries they
“ have done the Persians in general, and for their
“ insults to my father, in particular. Darius, you
“ know, had determined to make war against that
“ people; but death prevented the execution of his
“ vengeance. I therefore think it my duty to right
“ the Persians, and revenge my father’s wrongs, by
“ sacking and burning Athens; whose citizens auda-
“ ciously took up arms, at the instigation of Arista-
“ goras, the Milesian, our servant; assailed Sardis,
“ without the shadow of injury, and consumed with
“ fire not only the city, but the altars and sacred
“ groves. Their treatment of the Persians, who
“ entered their territory under Datis and Artas-
“ phernes, demanding justice, is too recent to be
“ forgot.

“ These hostile provocations,” continued Xerxes,
“ and the cruel indignities offered to my father’s
“ heralds, have inflamed me with a violent desire
“ of making war upon the Athenians. And if we
“ can subdue them, with their warlike neighbours,
“ who inhabit Peloponnesus, the Persian empire,
“ unless political reasonings deceive me, will know
“ no limits but the heavens; nor shall the sun survey,
“ in his course, any country exempted from our sway.
“ For

“ For I intend to penetrate, with your concurrence,
“ to the extremity of Europe, and to combine the
“ whole world into one empire; being well assured,
“ that when we shall have achieved the conquest of
“ Greece, no city or nation upon the face of the
“ earth will be able to withstand our armies⁶⁰. ”

Mardonius, who had first awakened the youthful ambition of Xerxes, spoke next, and warmly in favour of the projected enterprise. “ You have
“ wisely resolved, O king!” said he, “ to take ven-
“ geance upon the European Greeks; for, after
“ we have conquered so many great nations, it
“ would be the utmost indignity to the Persian
“ name, to suffer the unprovoked injuries of this
“ people to go unpunished. Of what can we be
“ afraid?—What forces, what resources have they?
“ —Have we not already subdued their descend-
“ ants, the Ionians, Æolians, and Dorians, who in-
“ habit the Asiatic coast?—And when your father,
“ Darius, commanded me to make war upon the
“ Athenians, I marched into Macedonia, and ad-
“ vanced almost to Athens; yet no Grecian people
“ had the courage to oppose my progress. How
“ then shall they dare to resist the great king, going
“ to war with all the forces and ships of Asia?—
“ From what I know of the Greeks,” added he, “ I
“ cannot think they will proceed to such audacity.
“ But should I happen to be mistaken, and they,
“ vainly elated, venture to give us battle, they will
“ learn, by fatal experience, that we surpass all man-
“ kind in feats of arms. Let us, therefore, prepare
“ to put in motion the armament: for, without ex-
“ ertion, nothing can be performed; but all things,
“ possible to men, may be accomplished by valour
“ and fortitude⁶¹. ”

60. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. viii.

61. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ix.

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When Mardonius had finished this ardent speech, in support of the expedition proposed by the king, all the other Persian chiefs remained silent, except Artabanus, the paternal uncle of Xerxes. “As the purest gold,” said he, “is best distinguished by comparison from baser ore, in like manner, O king! princes are enabled, by hearing different opinions, to adopt sound counsels. When Darius, your father, and my brother, had formed the design of invading Scythia, a country utterly destitute of cities, I endeavoured to dissuade him from it. But he, hoping to subdue the Scythian Nomades, rejected my advice, and undertook that pompous expedition against them, in which he lost the flower of his army. You, O king! propose to carry war into the territories of a more gallant people than the Scythians; a people who are highly renowned for their exploits, both by land and sea. I therefore think myself bound,” continued he, “to mention the difficulties you must expect to encounter.”

“When you shall have joined the shores of the Hellespont by a bridge, and led your forces, let us say unbroken, into Greece, you will then be under the necessity of vanquishing the valiant enemy, and perhaps on both elements, or of suffering the greatest hardships. And that no feeble effort will be required, to gain a victory over them on either element, former experience seems to attest. If the Athenians alone defeated the vast army thrown into their country by Datis and Artaphernes, what may not be expected from the collective body of the Greeks?—And should they prove victorious at sea, as well as on land; and, sailing to the Hellespont, break down your bridge, how dreadful will be the event!—Tremble, O king! to think of the consequences. Hearken, therefore,

“ fore to my words: deliberate no more upon this
 “ matter; nor farther think of exposing yourself to
 “ so many dangers, without necessity.

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“ You are, indeed, mightier than all other poten-
 “ tates, king of kings!”—added Artabanus;—“ but
 “ God takes pleasure in pulling down human gran-
 “ deur, and in frustrating ambitious designs. Hence
 “ we often see an immense army, struck with sud-
 “ den terror by the jealous Power; and, deprived
 “ of its wonted courage, routed by a small body
 “ of men. For the Deity permits transcendant
 “ greatness to be permanently enjoyed by himself
 “ alone⁶².”

Transported with rage, and stung with indigna-
 tion, at the discouraging speech of Artabanus, Xerxes,
 after reproaching him with cowardice, replied thus:
 “ Without thee, I shall be able to execute my enter-
 “ prise. Nor should I be the son of Darius, who
 “ derived his blood from Hystaspes, through a long
 “ line of royal ancestors, unless I thirsted for ven-
 “ geance upon the Athenians; well knowing, that if
 “ we remain quiet, they will not be inactive, but, fol-
 “ lowing the dictates of their restless disposition, will
 “ enter our territories with an army. We may judge
 “ of their future intentions by their past hostilities.
 “ Have they not dared to invade Asia, and burn
 “ Sardis? Both we and they have advanced too far
 “ to recede, and must either resolve to conquer or
 “ serve. All our dominions must fall under the power
 “ of the Greeks, or their country must become an
 “ accession to the Persian empire. No other alterna-
 “ tive remains, for terminating our mutual enmity.
 “ They were the aggressors; and we must seek
 “ revenge, or sacrifice our national honour⁶³.”

62. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. x.

63. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. xi.

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The invasion of Greece was accordingly resolved upon by the august body of the Persian chiefs, solemnly assembled in council: even Artabanus, at last, gave it his sanction⁶⁴. In consequence of this resolution, Xerxes issued orders for levying troops in all the provinces of his extensive empire, and for building ships in all the sea-ports of his dominions, in Europe, Asia, and Africa, from the Thracian Bosphorus to the frontiers of Libya⁶⁵. These formidable preparations were vigorously prosecuted for three years; at the expiration of which term, the Persian monarch found himself master of the greatest naval and military force that ever was equipped by any prince, in ancient or modern times, and amply furnished with provisions and stores⁶⁶. Nor had any measure been omitted, that could facilitate the success of this prodigious armament. A navigable canal had been cut through the neck of the stormy promontory of mount Athos, in order to avoid the danger of doubling it with a fleet⁶⁷; magazines were formed in Thrace and Macedonia⁶⁸; and a bridge was thrown over the Hellespont from Sestos, on the Asiatic coast, to Abydos on the European shore⁶⁹.

When all things were ready for the execution of this grand enterprise, Xerxes joined his oriental forces

64. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xii—xviii.

65. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. xx. et seq. 66. Id. *ibid.*

67. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xxi—xxiv. The disaster, which the Persian fleet had formerly suffered off that promontory, suggested the idea of this canal (Id. *ibid.*). It was so capacious as to admit two trireme galleys to pass abreast (Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xxiv.). The cavils of some modern writers, in regard to the *reality* of such a work, have been so fully refuted by Mr. Mitford and Dr. Gillies, that I have no occasion to touch upon the subject. The authority of Thucydides (lib. iv. cap. cix.) added to that of Herodotus, is indeed sufficient to silence the most obstinate incredulity.

68. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. xxv. cap. xxxiii. et seq.

69 Herodotus, lib. vii.

at Cratile in Cappadocia; and having crossed the river Halys, and marched through Phrygia, near the sources of the Meander, he proceeded to Sardis with his immense army⁷⁰. There, the troops levied in the western provinces of the empire, had been ordered to rendezvous, while the fleet assembled near the mouth of the Hellespont; and there the Persian monarch passed the winter⁷¹.

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Ant. Chr.
481.
Olympiad
lxxiv. 4.

Soon after his arrival at Sardis, Xerxes sent heralds to all the states of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, demanding earth and water, in testimony of their submission⁷². For this honourable distinction, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were indebted to their former barbarous treatment of the Persian heralds, not to any lenity on the part of the great king⁷³; who considered them, as we have seen, as his most formidable and inveterate enemies; and, therefore, was unwilling to hazard a new insult. But the people of the other states, he flattered himself, would readily deliver the symbols of obedience; when informed of the immensity of his armament, and its destination. Nor was he altogether deceived; for many of those states either yielded the submission required, or secretly treated with him⁷⁴; though they pretended, at the same time, to adhere to the general confederacy, and sent deputies to the isthmus of Corinth (as we shall have occasion to observe), where the Grecian delegates were assembled.

Meanwhile the Persian monarch was employed in embodying his troops, and making preparations for

⁷⁰. Id. *Historiar.* lib. xxvi—xxvii. ⁷¹. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xxxiii. xxxvii. ⁷². Id. lib. vii. cap. xxxii. ⁷³. Id. *ibid.*

⁷⁴. Herodotus, lib. vii. *passim*. The people, who prudently provided for their safety by presenting earth and water to Xerxes, were the Thessalians, Dolopians, Enienses, Perrhæbians, Locrians, Magnetes, Melians, Achæans, Phthiotians, and the Thebans, with all the other Bœotians, except the Thespians and Platæans. Id. lib. vii. cap. cxxxii.

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crossing the Hellespont. The first bridge thrown over that strait, which is near a mile in breadth, having been broken in pieces by a violent storm, he ordered another to be built by more able artificers⁷⁵. These naval architects, instead of one, formed two bridges; so contrived, as mutually to defend each other against storms in opposite directions; and constructed in the following manner. They bound together, with strong cordage, side by side, a row of gallies, with their prows to the Propontis: securing each galley by its great anchor, to resist the winds from the Euxine sea; and they made fast the whole row of gallies with thick cables, tightened by the force of engines, to moorings on shore⁷⁶. In the same manner, they bound together, and moored, a second row of gallies, with their prows to the Ægean sea; and secured by anchors, like the former, against the winds from that sea⁷⁷. Over the surface of each of those rows of gallies, they laid trunks of trees, cut exactly to the breadth of the bridges, and strongly compacted together. Upon these cross beams, they fixed planks, covered with earth; and both bridges were furnished, on each side, with a close ledge of timber, that the horses and other cattle might not tumble over, or be frightened at the sight of the sea⁷⁸.

As soon as Xerxes was informed, that the bridges over the Hellespont were finished, and the navigable canal, through the isthmus of mount Athos, secured at each end by a bank of earth, to prevent the flow of the tides from choaking it with sand, he quitted Sardis, and marched with the great body of his forces to Abydos⁷⁹. Here, being desirous to

75. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xxiii—xxxvi.

76. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. xxxvii.

77. Id. *ibid.*

78. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

79. Id. *Hist.* lib. vii. cap. xxxvii. et seq.

survey his mighty armament, on both elements, he ascended a lofty tower, which he had ordered to be built for the purpose, in the form of an observatory, whence he could at once view both his fleet and army⁸⁰; the sea covered with his ships, and the land with his troops, as far as the eye could reach. He seemed at first highly elated with this magnificent spectacle, and beheld with peculiar pleasure a bloodless naval engagement, exhibited for his amusement, in which he adjudged the honour of victory to the Sidonians⁸¹; but afterward reflecting on the shortness and fragility of human life, with the perils to which so many myriads of men must be exposed, in order to gratify his ambition, the triumph of pride gave way to softer emotions, and he could not refrain from shedding tears⁸².

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lxxiv. 4.

Artabanus, the king's uncle, who had observed the change in his countenance, and learned its cause, endeavoured to console him, by remarking, that mankind, during life, inevitably suffer miseries more to be bewailed, than its loss. "Hence," said he, "short as our mortal period is, there breathes no man among the myriads in your service, or in any other human condition, who enjoys such a share of happiness, as not often to be willing to die, rather than live. For the calamities and diseases, incident to humanity, are so grievous, that this short existence seems tediously long; and death is found the safest shelter from the ills of life⁸³."

"Since human life, Artabanus, is so miserable as you represent it," said Xerxes, "let us cease to regard it; nor weakly give way to unavailing lamentations, when we ought to cherish the de-

80. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xliv.

81. Id. *ibid*.

82. Id. *Historiar*. lib. vii. cap. xlv. xlv.

83. Id. *ibid*.

"lightful

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“lightful hopes of a prosperous issue to our undertaking⁸⁴.” Artabanus, however, endeavoured to moderate those hopes, and even ventured to predict the probability of failure, from the very magnitude of the king’s naval and military force; the difficulty of supplying with provisions such an immense army in an enemy’s country, and the dangers to which so enormous a fleet must be exposed upon stormy and hostile shores⁸⁵.

Xerxes replied in a manner worthy of his exalted station and illustrious descent. “All that you have said, Artabanus,” observed he, “appears to be just. We must not, however, anticipate misfortunes; nor minutely inquire into the possible circumstances, that may frustrate our designs; otherwise we shall never engage in any arduous enterprise, but remain in a state of inaction more to be shunned than the disasters we fear. Had my predecessors listened to such timid counsels, as those you offer, our dominion would still have been confined to the mountains of Persia; but they, by greatly daring, and despising dangers and difficulties, raised this empire to its present height of power. I am, therefore, determined to emulate the exploits of my ancestors; and having provided every thing that can render my undertaking successful, and entered upon the execution of it at the most favourable season of the year, will prosecute it with vigour; assured, that no mortal can certainly foretel the event of human pursuits⁸⁶.”

Immediately after this conversation was ended, Artabanus returned to Susa; in order to superintend the royal household, and conduct the administration of government during the king’s absence⁸⁷.

84. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xlvii.
cap. xlviii. xlix.

85. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii.

86. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. l.

87. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. liii.

And Xerxes, having again assembled the Persian princes and nobles (to whom chiefly was committed the command of his naval and military forces), he spoke to the following effect: “ I have called you together, O Persians! on this occasion, that I may exhort you to acquit yourselves like brave men; nor bring, by a contrary conduct, disgrace upon the great and glorious achievements of your renowned ancestors; but one and all display intrepidity, in the common cause in which we are engaged. For such conduct only can insure success. Beside these reasons for exertion,” added he, “ I am peculiarly desirous of awakening your courage in the present war; because, I am told we have to contend with a gallant enemy; and that, if we can vanquish the Greeks, we shall meet with no opposition from any other people. Let us then boldly begin our march, after we have implored the protection of the guardian powers, who preside over the Persian empire⁸⁸.

The same day preparations were made for passing the Hellespont; and next morning, before sun-rise, an oblation of all kinds of perfumes was burnt upon the bridges, which were afterward strewed with myrtles⁸⁹. As soon as the *sun* rose, Xerxes poured a libation into the sea, from a golden phial, and addressed a prayer to that adored luminary, “ That he might meet with no obstruction in his progress, until he had carried his arms to the extremity of Europe, which it was his purpose to subdue;” then threw the phial into the Hellespont, together with a golden goblet, and a Persian scymitar⁹⁰.

When these sacred rites had been performed, the Persian army began to pass the bridges; the troops,

88. Id. *ibid*.

89. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. liv.

90. Id. *ibid*.

PART I. both horse and foot, over that which lay next the Euxine; and the numerous attendants, with the baggage-carriages and beasts of draught, over that which was nearest the Ægean sea; while the fleet weighed anchor, and sailed toward the European coast⁹¹.

After all the forces of Xerxes had completed the passage of the Hellespont, which is said to have employed seven days and nights, they marched through the Chersonesus; and, bending their route westward, encamped in the extensive plains of Doriscus, near the mouth of the Hebrus, the largest river in Thrace⁹². Here the Persian monarch reviewed his army, and found it amount to the amazing number of seventeen hundred thousand infantry, and eighty thousand cavalry; beside camel-drivers and charioteers, computed at twenty thousand⁹³.

The description of the arms and accoutrements of the troops of the various nations, which composed this immense body, as given by Herodotus, forms the most valuable article in the works of that venerable historian; whose writings afford more important information in regard to matters of remote antiquity, and furnish a more just view of the civil and military state of the world in early times (I shall not even except Homer), than those of all other authors extant. This article is too curious to be altogether omitted, and too copious to be here inserted at full length: I shall, therefore, select such particulars as will most contribute to the advance-

91. *Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. liv.*

92. *Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lvi—lix.*

93. Compare *Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lx—lxxxvii. with cap. clxxxiv.* I forbear to quote any other authority; considering the testimony of the original, and in some measure contemporary historian, as of greater weight than that of any subsequent writer.

ment of your lordship's historical studies, by drawing your attention upon the weapons, and martial attire, of the great nations of Asia and Africa, best known to the Greeks in the reign of Xerxes; when the Romans were yet an obscure people, unnoticed by their Grecian neighbours⁹⁴, and when our German, and British ancestors, wandered wild in their native forests.

The Persians commanded by Otanes, father of Amestris, the *favourite wife of Xerxes*, were equipped in the following manner. They wore on the head a tiara or light turban: their body was covered with an iron coat of mail, jointed in the form of fishes scales, with sleeves of various colours; and their legs and thighs were secured by a kind of trowsers, instead of greaves. They were armed with a wicker shield, a short spear, a large bow, and arrows of cane; with a dagger, or scymitar, on the right thigh, depending from a belt about the waist⁹⁵.

The Medes, commanded by Tygranes, of the ancient royal house of Persia, were armed and accoutred in the same manner with the Persians; "for these weapons and habiliments," observes the discriminating historian, "originally belonged to the Medes, and not to the Persians⁹⁶." The Saranges, Cissians or levies of Susiana, and the Hyrcanians, were also armed nearly in the Persian or Median manner⁹⁷; and were commanded, as were the troops of all the other nations, by Persian leaders.

The Sacæ, or Asiatic Scythians under the Persian dominion, wore a strong high-crowned cap, by way

94. No mention is made of the Romans, in any Greek author extant, before the reign of Alexander the Great.

95. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lxi.

96. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. lxii.

97. Id. *ibid.* et seq.

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The Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, and Dadicians, were armed like the Bactrians¹⁰¹. But the Caspians, cloathed in shaggy skins; carried a bow and a scymitar¹⁰². The Colchians, wore wooden helmets, and carried a shield of raw hides, with a spear and cutting sword¹⁰³. And the Saspirians and Allerodians were accoutred, at all points, like the Colchians.

The Assyrians and Chaldæans wore a helmet of brass in a barbarous fashion, not easy to be described, and a corslet of flax. They were armed with a shield, a spear, a stout sword, and a tremendous truncheon, as hard as iron¹⁰⁴. The Arabians were girt in a cloak called *Zira*, and carried long and strong cross-bows¹⁰⁵. The Ethiopians, clad in the skins of lions and leopards were armed with bows not less than four cubits in length, and short arrows, barbed with flint instead of steel. They also carried a spear pointed with goat's-horn, and a hard club, with a ponderous head¹⁰⁶; while the Lybi-

98. Herodot. ubi sup.

99. Id. ibid.

100. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lxiv.

101. Id. *Historiar.* lib vii.

ap. lxvi.

102. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lxvii.

103. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. lxxxiv.

104. Herodotus,

lib. vii. cap. lxiii.

105. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. lxix.

106. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lxix. As the ancients called all *Blacks*, and consequently all the inhabitants of the torrid zone, *Ethiopians*, the discriminating historian gives us to understand, that these were "the Ethiopians who inhabited the country *above Egypt*." Id. ibid.

ans, cased in leather, were armed with a wooden lance, hardened at the point by fire¹⁰⁷.

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The Paphlagonians wore a helmet composed of several pieces, laced together, and a kind of half-boots. They were armed with a shield, a spear of a moderate size, and also with a javelin and dagger¹⁰⁸. The Ligyians, Cappadocians, and some other nations of Asia Minor, were armed in the same manner¹⁰⁹. The Phrygians carried arms little differing from those of the Paphlagonians¹¹⁰; and the Armenians, a Phrygian colony, were accoutred like the Phrygians¹¹¹.

The Bithynians, a colony from Thrace, wore a cap of the skins of foxes; a vest, and a coat of various colours, with buskins tied with thongs above the ankle. They were armed with a buckler in the form of an half-moon, and with a javelin and short sword¹¹². The Lydians were armed nearly in the Grecian manner¹¹³.

The cavalry in the army of Xerxes, were accoutred in all respects like the infantry; unless that some of the Persian horsemen wore a helmet of brass or iron, instead of a turban¹¹⁴. And the whole immense body of infantry, with the exception of ten thousand Persian foot, called the immortal band (because on the death of any of them, the number was instantly filled up, by a draught from other Persian corps), was under the conduct of six superior generals, namely, Mardonius, the son of Gobryas; Trintataëchmes, the son of Artabanus; Smerdomenes, the son of Otanes; Masistes, the son of Darius, by Atossa; Gergis, the son of Arizus; and

107. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. lxxi. 108. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lxxii. 109. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. lxxiii. et seq. 110. Id. *ibid.* 111. Herodotus, ubi sup. 112. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lxxvi. lxxv. 113. Id. *ibid.* 114. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lxxxiv.

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Megabyzus, the son of Zopyrus¹¹⁵. The immortal band, consisting of the flower of the Persian infantry, and magnificently decorated with ornaments of gold, was commanded in chief by Hydarnes, son of Hydarnes, governor of the maritime parts of Asia Minor¹¹⁶. The generals of horse were Harmamithres and Tithæus, sons of Datis, who commanded in the battle of Marathon.

After the Persian monarch had reviewed his land-forces, and divided them into national bodies, he ordered his fleet to be numbered; and found it to consist of one thousand two hundred and seven triremes, or ships of war of the largest size then in use, equipped in the following proportions, by the several maritime nations, who seem to have been exempted from all military service. The Phœnicians, with the Syrians of Palestine¹¹⁷, furnished three hundred ships; the Egyptians, two hundred; the Cyprians, an hundred and fifty; the Cilicians, one hundred; the Pamphylians, thirty; the Lycians, fifty; the Asiatic Dorians, thirty; the Carians seventy; the Ionians on the Asiatic continent, one hundred; the Ionian islanders, seventeen; the Æolians, sixty; and the Hellespontine Greeks of Dorian and Æolian origin, one hundred¹¹⁸. Each of these ships carried two hundred native seamen, and thirty Persian, Median, or Sacæan soldiers¹¹⁹; so that the whole number of men, on board the hostile fleet, amounted to two hundred and twenty-seven thousand six hundred and ten.

115. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. lxxxii.

116. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lxxxiii. et cap. cxxxv.

117. These people, observes Herodotus (lib. vii. cap. lxxxix.), were formerly seated, according to their own account, on the Red Sea. But afterward, quitting their country, they took possession of that maritime tract in Syria, which borders on Egypt, and now bears the name of Palestine. Id. *ibid.*

118. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lxxxix.—xcv.

119. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. xcvi. et cap. clxxxiv.

As the army of Xerxes was wholly commanded by Persian leaders, so also was the navy. The Ionian and Carian fleet was under the conduct of Ariabignes, the son of Darius by the daughter of Gobryas; the Egyptian, under that of Achæmenes, the brother of Xerxes¹²⁰. And the ships of all the other nations were ranged under the command of Prexaspes, the son of Aspathines, and Magabazus, the son of Megabates¹²¹. Subordinate to these, acted many experienced naval commanders; the most distinguished of whom were, Tetramnestus of Sidon, Marten of Tyre, Syennesis of Cilicia, Chiberniscus of Lycia, Gortus and Timonax of Cyprus, and the famous maritime heroine, Artemisia, of Halicarnassus¹²²; who reinforced the armada of Xerxes with five ships, superior in size, and construction, to those of any other people, except the Sidonians¹²³.

When the Persian monarch had numbered, and mareschalled his whole forces, by dividing the army, as above related, into distinct bodies, and the fleet into squadrons, he resolved to take a particular survey of the troops, and the ships of each nation. With that view, he mounted a chariot, and was carried to the head of each division of his army; and having asked such questions, as he thought most pertinent, he commanded his secretaries to put in writing the answer he received¹²⁴; then going on board a Sidonian galley, he seated himself under a canopy of gold, and passing by the fleet, which was disposed in order of battle, he made the like inquiries, and directed them to be noted by his secretaries, in the same manner¹²⁵. On purpose to afford

120. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xcvi.

121. Id. ibid.

122. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xcvi. xcix.

123. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cxiv.

124. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. c.

125. Id. ibid.

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him pleasure, in this maritime review, the commanders had put to sea, before Xerxes went on board his galley; and having drawn their ships into a line abreast, at a moderate distance from the land, with their heads pointing in that direction, they armed their men as for fight; so that the king, sailing between the fleet and the shore, saw the whole naval armament distinctly¹²⁶.

Xerxes having thus satisfied himself in regard to the number, and the state of his forces, called into his presence Demaratus, the degraded Spartan king, who accompanied him in his expedition, and asked, in a tone of exultation, "If he thought the Greeks would venture to resist so formidable an armament?"—Demaratus hesitated in his answer, until the Persian monarch desired him to declare the truth without reserve. "Hear then, great king!" said he, "the truth from my lips."

"Greece, who had for her nurse Poverty, the guest of Virtue, was by them, in old times, taught wisdom, and inured to discipline; which have enabled her to conquer Want, and expel Tyranny. Hence all the Greeks," observed Demaratus, "are brave, and bold in the cause of freedom. But dauntless courage is more peculiar to those of Dorian origin; and among the Dorian race, the Lacedæmonians are eminently distinguished. Of this people, therefore," continued he, with pious predilection, "it will be sufficient to speak; as they will never tamely suffer you to subject Greece to the yoke of servitude, but intrepidly meet you in the field, should all the other Greeks acknowledge your sway. I need not mention their number; for if they amount only to a thousand, or even consist of a still

126. Herodot. ubi sup.

" smaller

“ smaller body of men they will not hesitate to give
 “ battle to your immense army¹²⁷. LETTER
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The Persian monarch affected to laugh at the folly of Demaratus, in supposing that a free people would voluntarily expose themselves to certain destruction. “ The Lacedæmonians,” replied the Spartan prince, “ are politically free, but the law is their master; “ and that sovereign they honour with more implicit “ obedience, than your subjects do the lord of Asia. “ They cheerfully submit to whatever it enjoins: “ and it rigorously commands them to stand firm “ in battle, nor to fly from an enemy how superior “ soever in force; but to keep their ranks, and to “ conquer or fall¹²⁸.

Neither offended at the freedom, nor discouraged by the information of Demaratus, Xerxes ordered his troops to be put in motion, and throwing the Hebrus behind him, began his march from Doriscus to Acanthus¹²⁹; a sea-port town in Lower Macedonia, toward which the fleet was directed to sail. In the prosecution of this march, the Persian army, by the advice of the king, was divided into three great bodies; which, according to their instructions, took different routes. One division, under Mar- donius and Masistes, proceeded along the sea-coast, and in a manner kept company with the fleet; another, under Trintatæchines and Gergis, advanced by the upper countries; and the third, commanded by Xerxes in person, attended by Smerdomenes and Megabyzus, held a midland route between the other two bodies¹³⁰.

127. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cii.

128. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ciii. civ.

129. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cviii.

130. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxxi.

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When Xerxes had reached Acanthus, where, and in the neighbouring towns, he and his officers were sumptuously entertained, at the expense of the inhabitants, he called a council of his naval commanders, and instructed them to pass through the canal of mount Athos; and, holding their course westward, to assemble the fleet in the gulf of Therma, now called *Gulfo di Salonichi*; while he marched with his land forces to the city of Therma, afterward known by the name of Thessalonica, toward the bottom of that gulf¹³¹. At Therma both the fleet and army arrived safe. And there Xerxes halted, and encamped his troops along the whole sweep of the Macedonian shore, from Therma and the territory of Mygdonia, to the river Haliacmon, on the frontiers of Thessaly¹³².

The Persian monarch, who had attentively examined in his march, every curious work of nature or art, as well as the manners of several nations he had seen, having from Therma a prospect of the lofty and celebrated Thessalian mountains, Olympus, Ossa, Pelion, and Pindus, was desirous to view the mouth of the river Peneus, and the famous valley of Tempe, between Ossa and Olympus, through which the Peneus enters the sea¹³³. He accordingly left his camp, and went on board a Sidonian galley, which he always used on such occasions. And having gratified his curiosity, and expressed his surprise at the singular boldness of the channel of that river considered by the Greeks as the work of Neptune¹³⁴: (or, in other words, as the effect of an earthquake; and which, if shut up by a dyke, as the king sagaciously remarked, would lay all Thessaly, except the tops of the mountains, under water); he

131. Id. *ibid.* et seq.

132. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxxxvii.

133. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cxxviii.

134. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxxix.

returned by sea to Therma¹³⁵. Thence Xerxes went to Piera, where he spent some days; part of his troops being employed in opening a passage for the whole army through Upper Macedonia, which had been recommended to him as the safest route into Greece¹³⁶.

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Meantime the Persian heralds, who had been sent to the Grecian states, returned to the royal pavilion, with an account of their success¹³⁷. The people of several of those states, made the required submission, by the delivery of earth and water. Among these were included (as I have already had occasion to remark) the Thessalians, the Locrians, and the Thebans, with all the other Bæotians, except the Thespians and Plataeans¹³⁸. For the honour of the Thessalians, however, it must be observed, that they did not offer to make their peace with the Persian monarch, until the defence of their country was abandoned by the Grecian confederacy¹³⁹.

This reflection naturally leads us to take a view of the interior state of Greece, when the Persian forces approached its frontiers; and also to consider the measures taken by the confederated Greeks, for their common defence, from the time that Xerxes left Susa, and began his march toward Sardis.

On the first intimation of the danger, with which Greece was threatened, the Amphictyonic council, as we have seen, assembled at the Corinthian isthmus; instead of Thermopylæ or Delphos, its usual places of meeting. And there it was resolved, that all hostilities between the citizens of the Grecian states

135. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. xxx.

136. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xxxi.

137. Id. *ibid.*

138. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxxxii.

139. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. clxxiv.

should

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should cease, and vigorous exertions be made for opposing the barbarian enemy; that spies should be sent to Sardis, to view the strength of the Persian army; while envoys were dispatched to the Grecian colony of Syracuse, already formidable both by sea and land, and to the islands of Crete and Corcyra, requesting assistance; and representing, that as they all bore the name of Greeks, they all ought to embrace one common cause with the confederates, and act as if the dangers hanging over Greece were common to all the Grecian people¹⁴⁰. Messengers were, at the same time, dispatched to Argos (which seems, on this occasion, to have sent no delegate to the diet of Greece); soliciting that ancient state to take part in the general war¹⁴¹.

Before the return of those envoys, and when the issue of their negociation was unknown, the Thessalians, having received information that Xerxes was preparing to pass the Hellespont, deputed an embassy to the Amphictyonic council, still assembled at the Corinthian isthmus; in order to represent, that as their country lay on the Grecian frontier, they would be under the necessity of providing for their own safety, by submitting to the Persian monarch, unless an army was sent by the confederates, to enable them to defend the entrance into Greece¹⁴².

In consequence of this remonstrance, a detachment of Athenian and Lacedæmonian infantry was embarked for the support of the Thessalians; under the conduct of the renowned Themistocles, and Evenetus, a Spartan general¹⁴³. These commanders sailed through the Euripus, or strait between the

140. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxlv.

141. Id. *ibid*.

142. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. clxxii

143. Id. *Historiar*. lib. vii. cap. clxxiii.

island of Eubœa and the continent; and landing their troops in lower Thessaly, marched across the country to the river Peneus, and occupied the pass of Tempe, between Ossa and Olympus¹⁴⁴. When they reached that pass, their forces consisted of ten thousand heavy armed foot, and a strong body of Thessalian horse¹⁴⁵; an army sufficient to have long defended a defile not five hundred feet wide, and intersected by the navigable chanel of the Peneus, against the myriads of the great king.

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The Greeks, however, were induced to abandon their post a few days after they had taken possession of it. Alexander I. king of Macedonia, whom they believed to be their friend, as he was descended from Grecian ancestors, and had shewn, during the life of his father Amyntas, his detestation of Asiatic despotism, by the assassination of the Persian nobles, but who had now learned to temporize—Alexander sent the Greeks intelligence of the immensity of the naval and military forces of Xerxes; and advised them to retire, if they would avoid being trodden under foot by the invading army¹⁴⁶.

During the apprehensions excited by this alarming message, the Grecian commanders learned, that there was another passage for the barbarian forces into Thessaly; through the territory of the Perrhæbians, and by the city of Gonnus in Upper Macedonia¹⁴⁷. They, therefore, decamped with their troops; and marching back to their ships, returned by sea to the isthmus of Corinth, in order to concert new

144. Id. ibid.

145. Herodot. ubi sup.

146. Id. ibid.

147. Herodotus, lib. xii. cap. clxxiii.

PART I. measures for the defence of a less distant post¹⁴⁸.
 And the Thessalians, finding themselves thus deserted by their allies, no longer hesitated to make their submission to the Persian monarch¹⁴⁹.

Meantime the affairs of the confederated Greeks wore a very unfavourable aspect. The persons sent to Sardis, in order to reconnoitre the Persian army, had been seized by the generals, and put ~~to~~ the torture, as a prelude to their execution. But Xerxes, with a magnanimity worthy of the grandson of Cyrus, rescued them from their impending doom. He commanded his guards to bring the Grecian spies into his presence; when, instead of inflicting upon them the violent death authorised by the laws of nations, he desired they might be gratified with a full view of all his land forces, and dismissed them with impunity¹⁵⁰; well considering, says Herodotus, that if the spies were put to death, the Greeks would not be informed, that his armament was greater than even fame had reported it; and, that their strength could not be much weakened by the loss of three men¹⁵¹. And he discovered the same magnanimity, while he remained at Abydos; where, when acquainted by his naval officers, that certain ships, laden with corn for his enemies, were passing through the Hellespont, from the Euxine sea, and ought to be seized, he asked "Whither they were bound;" and being told, "for the ports of Greece," he desired they might be permitted to proceed on their voyage. "For are not we," observed he, "going thither also?—and do not we carry with us corn and other necessaries?—

148. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. clxxiii. clxxv.

149. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. clxxiv.

150. Id. *Histor.* lib. vii. cap. cxlvi. cxlvii.

151. Id. *ibid.*

"Why,

“ Why, therefore, prevent them from carrying pro-
visions before us¹⁵²?”

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XII.

To these instances of contempt from the avowed and formidable enemy of Greece, was added disappointment from her reputed friends. The Argives obstinately refused to take any share in the confederacy, so long as the Lacedæmonians acted as its head. “ They would rather,” they said, “ submit to the sway of the barbarian, than continue to suffer the domination of Sparta¹⁵³.” The Corcyrians promised assistance by sea; but in such a vague manner as made it evident, that no dependence could be placed on the co-operation of their fleet¹⁵⁴. The Cretans, more honest, openly declined taking part in the war¹⁵⁵; while Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, imperiously insisted on such high command, if he should interpose, as the Grecian ambassadors had not power to grant¹⁵⁶. And before they could receive new instructions, he was threatened with an invasion from Carthage, which made all his forces necessary at home¹⁵⁷.

The Grecian confederates were even denied the usual consolations of superstition. All the responses of the Delphic oracle, to its numerous supplicants, were dark and discouraging. Those delivered to the Athenians were peculiarly so. They were, by one response, threatened with the destruction of their capital, and the subversion of their state. “ O wretched men!”—exclaimed the prophetess, “ why linger here? Begone! desert your houses, and the swelling bulwarks of your city, and seek refuge in

152. Herodot. ubi sup. et Plut. *Apoptb.*

153. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. clxix.

154. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cxlviii.

155. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxix.

156. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. clviii.—clxiii.

157. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxv. et seq.

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“ the uttermost parts of the earth; for all these
 “ shall be broken down. Fire, and furious Mars,
 “ in the Assyrian chariot, waging horrid war, shall
 “ burn and overthrow not only yours, but many
 “ other cities, with their stately towers, and the
 “ temples of the gods; which now I see dropping
 “ sweat, and shaking with fear!—their lofty domes,
 “ in anguish, weeping blood! at the prospect of their
 “ tremendous fate. Begone! and nurture your
 “ minds for the sorrows that await you¹⁵⁸.”

The sacred ministers of Attica, quitted the temple of the soothsaying god, but delayed their return; and through the interposition of one of the chief citizens of Delphos, named Timon, they obtained, before their departure, a second response from the pythia, to the following purport: “ Pallas in vain
 “ has strove, by arguments and intercessions, to
 “ soothe the god who reigns upon Olympus. I,
 “ therefore emit again this adamantine truth: All
 “ that is comprehended within the confines of Cecropia, to the hallowed recesses of Cithæron,
 “ shall be ravaged with fire and sword. Jupiter
 “ only grants, to the prayer of Minerva, the wooden
 “ wall, which shall remain impregnable, and afford
 “ refuge to you and your offspring¹⁵⁹.”

When this final answer was carried to Athens, her sages and citizens were much divided concerning its meaning; whether it pointed them to some defence on land, or at sea?—But Themistocles, prompt in all his decisions, and by whom the response had probably been suggested, declared that by the wooden wall nothing could be meant but the Athenian fleet¹⁶⁰. That interpretation was generally adopted. And it was resolved in the popular assembly, That all

158. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxl.

159. Id. *Historiar*, lib. vii. cap. cxli.

160. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxlii.

the Athenians, who were fit to bear arms, should go on board those ships which had been built, as we have seen, at the desire of Themistocles, for the security of the republic; and wait the approach of the enemy by sea, in conjunction with the naval forces of such of the other states as should be disposed to join them¹⁶¹.

Conformable to the order of events, in the narration of Herodotus, this resolution, my lord, appears to have been taken before the Grecian delegates assembled at the Corinthian isthmus. But if we judge by circumstances, it must have been embraced after the return of Themistocles from Tempe. For if the Athenians had before resolved to place their safety solely in their maritime force, and to send every able-bodied man on board the fleet, they would not have found soldiers to detach to the defence of a distant post, or have been induced to spare, for such service, their distinguished naval commander. We accordingly find, that thenceforth they took no concern in military affairs, till after the battle of Salamis.

Be this, however, as it might, Athens had the honour by that bold resolution, to which she firmly adhered, of setting the other Grecian states an example of intrepidity, in defence of their independency and common liberties. And a similar resolution was now adopted by the Amphictyonic council, for opposing the enemy by land. It was determined to send a body of troops to occupy the pass of Thermopylæ, on the south-west frontier of Phthiotis¹⁶²; and the only opening through which an army could enter Southern Greece.

That pass, formed by the branches of mount Oeta, on the west, and by an impracticable morass and the

161. *Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. cxliv.*

162. *Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxxv.*

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sea, on the east; was only fifty feet broad at the widest part; and at the narrowest, so strait as scarcely to afford room for a carriage to drive¹⁶³. This narrow pass the Phocæans had formerly fortified with a wall, then in ruins, in order to defend their country from the inroads of the Thessalians¹⁶⁴. That wall the confederated Greeks rebuilt, as soon as they had resolved to make a stand at Thermopylæ against the army of Xerxes¹⁶⁵.

The Grecian fleet was, at the same time, ordered to take its station at the promontory of Artemisium, on the north-east side of the island of Eubœa, and almost opposite Thermopylæ¹⁶⁶. It consisted, when first assembled, of two hundred and twenty-one triremes, and nine vessels of inferior size¹⁶⁷. Of the triremes, Athens furnished one hundred and forty-seven; though the Athenians, with the assistance of the Platæans (who, although utterly unacquainted with naval affairs, went cheerfully on board the fleet), were only able to man an hundred and twenty-seven¹⁶⁸. The remaining twenty were lent to Chalcis, and manned by the Chalcidians¹⁶⁹. The Corinthians equipped, and sent to the common rendezvous, forty triremes; the Megareans, twenty; the Æginetes, eighteen; the Sicyonians, twelve; the Lacedæmonians, ten; the Epidaurians, eight; the Eretrians, seven; the Troezenians, five; the Styrians,

163. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. clxxvi.

164. Herodot. ubi sup.

165. Id. *ibid.*

166. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxxv. clxxvi.

167. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. ii.

168. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. i. As a triremis usually carried two hundred seamen and soldiers, the whole number on board the Athenian squadron would amount to about twenty-five thousand four hundred men.

169. Id. *ibid.*

two; the Ceans, two, with two gallees of fifty oars; and the Opuntian Locrians, seven gallees of fifty oars each¹⁷⁰.

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XII.

The land-forces sent from the isthmus of Corinth, to take post at Thermopylæ, consisted only of four thousand two hundred heavy-armed men; under the conduct of Leonidas, one of the kings of Sparta¹⁷¹. The small number of these forces may be accounted for from two causes: the narrowness of the pass to be defended, and the selfish policy of the Lacedæmonians¹⁷²; the natural consequence of their illiberal institutions, which confined patriotism solely to their own state. They pleaded for delay, on the present momentous occasion, as before the battle of Marathon, the excuse of religion: and the same excuse was pleaded by the citizens of some other states of Peloponnesus¹⁷³. Although the Lacedæmonians; still considered themselves as the governing people in Greece, were acknowledged to be such by the con-

170. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. i.

171. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccii.—cciv. It afterward appears, that there were also many helots or slaves, who acted as light troops (Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. xxv.), but what proportion they bore to the number of freemen we are not told.

172. This policy is severely reprobated by Herodotus (*Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cxxxix.); who, at the same time, bears honourable testimony in favour of the more benevolent system, and generous spirit of the Athenians (Id. *ibid.*). If Athens, says he, had shrunk from the impending danger, instead of adventuring, with the whole strength of the state, to oppose the barbarian fleet, all Greece would inevitably have sunk under the Persian yoke. For admitting Sparta, and her Peloponnesian confederates, to have been equal to the defence of the fortifications at the Corinthian isthmus, on which she seemed inclined to rest her safety, the several states within that isthmus, being open to invasion by sea, would have been subdued one after another, by the forces of Xerxes; and the Lacedæmonians, confined to their own territory, must ultimately have fallen in the field; or been compelled to submit to a power, which they were not able alone to resist. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxxxix.

173. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. ccvi.

federates,

PART I. federates, and honoured with the chief command both by land and sea, they detached, therefore, no more than three hundred free men, for the support of the common cause¹⁷⁴. But these were all tried soldiers, and fathers of families, clad in heavy armour, and prepared to die with their leader¹⁷⁵.

The mass of the Grecian army was composed of two thousand, one hundred, and twenty Arcadians; furnished by Tegea, Mantneia, and other mountainous districts; four hundred Corinthians, and an equal number of Thebans; seven hundred Thespians, with one hundred men from Philus, and eighty from the ancient city of Mycenæ¹⁷⁶. And, in order to rouse the northern Greeks to exertion; to prevent their submission to the Persian monarch, and augment this slender force, rendered respectable by the presence of Leonidas, and formidable by his chosen band, political address was employed. Messengers were dispatched, by the Amphictyonic council, to the several states on the Thessalian frontier, representing the advanced body, under the Spartan king, as only part of the troops destined by the confederates to oppose the invader, and secure the entrance into Greece; so that the army of Leonidas was reinforced with a thousand Phocæans, beside the whole strength of the Opuntian Locrians¹⁷⁷.

Meantime the Persian monarch, having prosecuted his march through Upper Macedonia, and crossed Thessaly with his army, had reached the city of Anticyra on the river Sperchios, not far distant from Thermopylæ; while his fleet, which had continued its course from the gulf of Therma, ren-

174. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ccii.

175. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccv.

176. Id. *Histor.* lib. vii. cap. ccii.

177. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cciii.

devoured in the bay of Casthanæa, to the north of cape Sepias, on the coast of Magnesia¹⁷⁸.

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XII.

At both these stations, the sea and land-forces of Xerxes arrived, not only without loss, but with great accession of strength. The Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace, and in the adjacent islands, had augmented his naval armament, according to the computation of Herodotus, with one hundred and twenty ships of war, which carried twenty-four thousand sailors and soldiers¹⁷⁹; and the various tribes of Thracians, Macedonians, and Thessalians, did not furnish the invader with fewer, he calculates, than three hundred thousand infantry and cavalry, equipped for military service¹⁸⁰.

The venerable historian, therefore, estimates the whole forces, by sea and land, which Xerxes brought against Greece, at two millions, six hundred and forty-one thousand, six hundred and ten¹⁸¹. And amid that vast multitude, he tells us, none appeared more worthy of being invested with supreme command, than the monarch himself¹⁸²; who was eminently distinguished by his majestic mien, the superior size of his body, and the symmetry of his form¹⁸³.

But the fighting men, according to the calculation of the same original historian, composed not above half the myriads that accompanied Xerxes in his Grecian expedition¹⁸⁴; the fleet, consisting of one thousand, three hundred, and twenty-seven triremes, carrying two hundred and thirty men each,

178. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. clxxxiii. clxxxiv.

179. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxxxv.

180. Id. *ibid.*

181. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

182. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. clxxxvii.

183. Id. *ibid.*

184. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. clxxxvi.

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being attended by an incredible number of store-ships, transports, and smaller vessels of different constructions, and for various uses¹⁸⁵; and the army, computed at two millions of soldiers, beside camp-equipage and its necessary appendages, forage-masters, purveyors, butchers, bakers, conductors and drivers of cattle and carriages, was encumbered with women of pleasure, eunuchs, Indian dogs, and every species of Asiatic pomp and luxury¹⁸⁶.

Little wonder, my lord, that at the sight of so prodigious a land-force, headed by a prince of such an august presence, a Thracian Greek exclaimed, “O Jupiter! why art thou come in the Persian habit, and under the name of Xerxes, with all mankind waiting thy nod, to tear the Greeks from their ancient seats, when thou couldest have accomplished their extirpation by thy own immortal arm¹⁸⁷?” —Or, that the commanders of the Grecian fleet, on the approach of such an immense naval armament, despairing of success in the open sea, quitted their station at Artemisium, and retired to Chalcis, in order to defend the passage of the Eripus¹⁸⁸.

But the vast army of Xerxes (apparently the greatest that ever was assembled in the ancient or modern world, and to supply which with water, some rivers, both in Europe and Asia, were not equal), was soon to suffer a check; and his enormous fleet, beneath the weight of which the sea seemed to groan, to sustain a loss, that encouraged the Grecian navy to resume its former station, on the north-east side of the island of Eubœa.

The road or bay, between the city of Casthanæa and cape Sepias, not being sufficiently capacious to

185. Id. *ibid.*186. Herodot. *ubi sup.*187. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. lvi.

188. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxxxii.

admit the whole barbarian fleet to moor on land, according to ancient custom, the ships which first reached that rendezvous only could be moored in a line along the shore¹⁸⁹. The greater number, both of ships of war and burden, were therefore obliged to ride at anchor, formed into seven divisions, one behind another, with their heads toward the sea¹⁹⁰. In this arrangement, they passed the night of their arrival free from danger, as the sea was calm.

Next morning, however, about day-break, the waves began to roll; the clear and serene sky, which brightened the heavens, was suddenly darkened, and a furious wind blew from the north-east into the bay¹⁹¹. The ships that early perceived the gathering storm, and were not prevented, by their station, from eschewing it, took refuge under the land, and there remained safe. But such as were assailed by the tempest at sea, shared a very different fate; for so excessive was its violence, that some were dashed against the cliffs of Pelion, some wrecked upon the promontory of Sepias; others were stranded on the neighbouring shore; while many were driven upon the shallows of Melibœa, and toward the city of Casthanæa, where they bulged¹⁹².

The storm raged for three days and nights, during which four hundred ships of war are said to have been lost¹⁹³; with so many store-ships and other vessels, that the barbarians, who escaped from the waves, fortified themselves with the wreck, lest they should be attacked, in their distress, by the Thessalians, their new friends, not yet confirmed in allegiance to the great king¹⁹⁴. But, on the fourth day,

189. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. clxxxviii.

190. Id. *ibid.*

191. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. clxxxviii.

192. Id. *ibid.*

193. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxc.

194. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cxci.

THE HISTORY OF

the tempest ceased, when the Persian naval commanders, observing the sea again calm, weighed anchor; and sailing along the shore, passed cape Sepias and the promontory of Magnesia, and entered the Pegasæan or Pelasgic gulf, which is in a manner land-locked, and took their station, with the bulk of the fleet, between the ports of Pegasæa and Aphitè¹⁹⁵.

Meanwhile the Grecian admirals, having been informed of the blow which the barbarian fleet had received from the storm, had poured a libation to Neptune the Deliverer, and returned with fresh courage to Artemisium¹⁹⁶. This was a movement of the utmost importance; for, if it had not been made, the Grecian army, encamped at Thermopylæ, would not only have been deprived of provisions, but exposed to the attacks of the enemy, both by land and from the sea.

Nor was the communication with the army the sole advantage, which the Greeks derived from the return of their fleet to its original station. Fifteen of the enemy's ships, under the conduct of Sandoces, governor of Cumè, who had lost company with the main body of the armada, overshot the mouth of the Pegasæan gulf, and were captured by the Grecian navy near Artemisium¹⁹⁷. On board that division of the barbarian fleet were found several persons of distinction, beside Sandoces, the admiral; and among those Andolis, tyrant of Alabandæ, in Caria, and Penthylus, commander of the Paphian squadron, who had lost all his ships in the storm but one¹⁹⁸. When the Grecian admirals had

195. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxiii.

196. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cxiii.

197. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxiv.

198. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cxv.

examined the prisoners, they sent them, under a guard, to the isthmus of Corinth, where the Amphictyonic council continued assembled¹⁹⁹.

The prospect of Grecian affairs now began to brighten at sea. The sailors were heartened by the interposition of Neptune and Boreas²⁰⁰; and the commanders, along with the acquisition of fifteen triremes, had received information by which they could not fail to profit. But the hostile fleet, now safe in the Pegasæan gulf, was still awfully great: nor were ensigns of the various nations that composed it, streaming in the road of Aphité, beheld with indifference at Artemisium²⁰¹. By land the storm of war rolled toward the centre of Greece; and the only hope of security which remained was, that its force might be broken at the pass of Thermopylæ, and other strong posts among the ridges of mount Oeta.

About the time the barbarian fleet rendezvoused in the Pegasæan gulf, Xerxes passed the river Sperchios, and the Trachinian rocks, which embosom the Melian bay; and entered the plain of Trachis with his army²⁰². Near the middle of that plain, which is between forty and fifty miles in circumference, stood the city of Trachis. There the Persian monarch fixed his head-quarters, and encamped his troops in the surrounding level²⁰³.

The city of Trachis was situated between the rivers Dyrras and Melas; which, descending from the neighbouring mountains, intersect the Trachinian plain, and fall into the Melian bay²⁰⁴. To the south of the

199. Id. *ibid*.

200. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. clxxxix—cxcii.

201. Id. *Historiar*. lib. viii. cap. iv.

202. Herodotus,

lib. vii. cap. cxcviii—cc.

203. Id. *ibid*.

204. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxcviii. cxcix.

Melas,

PART I. Melas, and close by one of the ridges of mount Oeta, ran the river Asopus; into which fell the Phœnix, from the same mountain, in a northern direction; and below the junction of these two rivers, stood the town of Anthela, in a narrow plain near the sea, and difficult of access from Trachis²⁰⁵.

In that small plain stood a temple dedicated to the Amphictyonic Ceres; and the chapel or hall of Amphictyon, where the Grecian delegates originally held their deliberations²⁰⁶. A little below this place, and about a mile and an half south of the Asopus, lay the pass of Thermopylæ, defended by the Greeks under Leonidas²⁰⁷.

Xerxes was master of all the European continent to the north and east of this pass, as far as the Danube and the Euxine sea. He could not, therefore, but be mortified at finding his progress so strongly opposed by the barriers of nature, as to be obstructed by a small body of men. Though not discouraged, he was disconcerted by the singularity of his situation: nor were the Greeks free from alarm at his approach²⁰⁸. He sent one of his officers, on horseback, to reconnoitre their post, before he attempted to force it²⁰⁹. But the information gained by that officer was by no means satisfactory, in regard to the number of the army under Leonidas; the Grecian forces being all behind the Phocæan wall except the three hundred Spartans, whose turn it was to keep guard without, and who were carelessly employed in performing their gymnastic exercise, or in adorning their persons²¹⁰.

205. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cxcix. cc.

206. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cc.

207. Id. *ibid.*

208. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccvii. In a council of war, held on the occasion, Leonidas found it difficult to prevent the Peloponnesian confederates from retiring. Id. *ibid.*

209. Id. *Historiar.*

lib. vii. cap. ccviii.

210. Id. *ibid.*

The Persian monarch, on receiving this report, could not believe that men, who seemed to be so much at their ease, had come with a resolution to die rather than quit their ground, as he had been told by Demaratus. He therefore, sent for that prince, who was still in the camp, and questioned him on the subject. "Nothing," replied Demaratus, "is more certain, than that such is their purpose²¹¹." Xerxes, however, waited four days; in hopes they would retire, and save him the trouble of so singular a combat²¹²; he being still ignorant of the number of the Greeks, and supposing the army under Leonidas consisted only of three hundred men. But, on the fifth morning, finding they had not withdrawn, he imputed their stay to audacious temerity²¹³; and bursting into rage at their foolish obstinacy (for such it appeared to him) he ordered the Medes and Cissians to march to Thermopylæ; haughtily commanding them to seize the Lacedæmonians, and bring them alive into his presence²¹⁴.

The leaders of the forces of these nations, seeing the army of Leonidas ready to receive them, made a furious attack upon the Greeks; but although fresh troops constantly supplied the place of those that fell, they could gain no ground. Hence, says Herodotus, it was evident to every one, as well as Xerxes, "that he had many men, but few soldiers²¹⁵."

This action happened in the early part of the day, and about the summer solstice²¹⁶, when the days are long. Therefore, after the Medes, who seem to have

Ant. Chr.
480.
Olympiad
lxxiv. 4.

211. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccix. ccx.

212. Id. Histor. lib. vii. cap. ccx.

213. Id. ibid.

214. Herodotus, ubi sup.

215. Histor. lib. vii. cap. ccx.

216. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccx. et lib. viii. cap. xii.

distinguished

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distinguished themselves most, could maintain the battle no longer, they were withdrawn, and the king ordered the immortal band of ten thousand Persians, led by Hydarnes, to advance to the charge²¹⁷; not doubting but that chosen body would bear down all resistance. The Persians, however, when they came to close fight with the Greeks, made no greater impression on the army of Leonidas than the Medes²¹⁸. And the cause of their failure is substantially assigned by the enlightened contemporary historian, who alone is to be trusted in regard to the events of this war. As the Persians fought in a narrow pass, they could not, observes he, avail themselves of their numbers; and their spears being shorter than those of the Greeks, and their armour less complete, they were necessarily exposed to the thrusts of their antagonists²¹⁹.

Nor were these the only disadvantages under which the barbarians laboured. The Greeks, but especially the Spartans, discovered great superiority in discipline and military address. When hard pushed, they gave way, but made their retreat in the firm bands; and while the Persians, in the ardour of pursuit, rushed on with noise and tumult, as to certain victory, they quickly wheeled about upon their exulting enemies, and dexterously wounded them in the unguarded breast, during the surprise occasioned by that unexpected evolution²²⁰. By frequently repeating this stratagem, which the blind fury of the enemy enabled them to do successfully, the Spartans slew a great number of the Persian forces, while the Grecian army sustained little loss. Hydarnes was, therefore, obliged to draw off his troops; after he had attempted in vain to open the pass, both with larger and smaller divisions²²¹.

217. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ccxi.218. Id. *ibid.*219. Herodotus, *ubi sup.*220. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ccxi.221. Id. *ibid.*

It is said that Xerxes, who beheld these encounters from a neighbouring eminence, started thrice from his throne in wild emotion, lest he should lose the flower of his army²²²; so hot was the conflict. Next day, however, it was resolved, in a council of war, to make a new effort to dislodge the Greeks; as it was supposed so many of them must now be wounded that they would not be able to maintain another battle²²³. But Leonidas having drawn up his troops in national bodies, in order to inspire them with emulation, and in close array, they received the shock of the enemy with firmness; and repelled the reiterated attacks of the barbarians with such vigour, that the whole army of Xerxes was foiled, in endeavouring to force the Grecian post at Thermopylæ²²⁴.

While the Persian monarch, in this desperate crisis of his affairs, remained doubtful what measures he should adopt, Ephialtes, a native of the territory of Melis, tempted by the hope of a great reward, had resolved to betray the cause of Greece²²⁵. With that view he demanded audience of Xerxes, and acquainted him with a practicable defile in the higher part of the mountains that environed the Grecian post; through which a body of men might march, and attack Leonidas in the rear²²⁶. This narrow pass which had been discovered by the Thesalians, after the wall was built at Thermopylæ, in order to prevent their inroads upon Phoces, though now unfrequented and little known, was not concealed from the Grecian commander. Leonidas had been informed of it on his arrival at Thermopylæ; and he had appointed the thousand Phocæans, who there joined him, to guard it²²⁷.

222. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxii.

223. Id. ibid.

224. Herodot. ubi sup.

225. Id. lib. vii. cap. ccxiii.

226. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxiv. ccxv.

227. Id. Histor. lib. vii. cap. ccxvi. ccxvii.

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Xerxes, ignorant of this circumstance, listened with the highest pleasure and satisfaction to the intelligence of Ephialtes: and dispatched Hydarnes, with the chosen body of Persian foot under his command, to follow the directions of his guide²²⁸. That general, who alone seems to have been entrusted by his sovereign with the important secret, which was to open him a passage into Greece, began his march toward evening²²⁹; and crossing the Asopus, near its junction with the Phœnix, reached before morning, the summit of the mountains that divide Phocis and Locris from the Trachinian plain, and overlook the city of Alpini; where the winding and difficult passage terminated²³⁰.

On this stupendous ridge was the post the Phocæans had undertaken to defend. But their centinels appear to have been wanting in vigilance, as they had not hitherto discovered the approach of the enemy; concealed though they were from view, by the oaks which grew thick on the sides of the mountains²³¹. At last taking alarm from the rustling of the leaves, the air being still, the Phocæans flew to arms; and the first object that met their sight was the Persian detachment, under Hydarnes²³².

The astonishment of both parties, on that trying occasion, was almost equal, as were their apprehensions of danger. The Phocæans saw their post ready to be stormed, by an unexpected and formidable body of enemies; while the Persians beheld with surprise a party of Greeks stationed, where the obstacles of nature were awfully strong, and where they had never supposed they should meet with a single antagonist.

228. Id. *ibid*.229. Herodot. *ubi sup*.230. Id. *Historiar. lib. vii. cap. ccxvii. ccxviii.*231. Herodot. *lib. vii. cap. ccxviii.*232. Id. *ibid*.

The Phocæans behaved in a manner unworthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and of the confederates with whom they acted. Galled by the missile weapons of the Persians, they precipitantly quitted their post, and retired to a neighbouring eminence²³³. There they resolved to make a stand; but Hydarnes was too consummate a general to give them any farther annoyance. Aware of the importance of his commission, he judiciously prosecuted his march²³⁴. And the Phocæans permitted him to proceed, without attempting to harass his rear, or otherwise impede his progress.

The march of the Persian detachment, by the higher pass in the mountains, was not long unknown to Leonidas. The auger Megistias, who probably had the first intimation of it, had foretold, during the night, that the Greeks, whom Aurora should behold at Thermopylæ, were destined to inevitable destruction²³⁵. Certain deserters, soon after, brought the Spartan king intelligence of his danger²³⁶; and his own scouts, by day-break, informed him, that the enemy had forced the Phocæan post²³⁷.

A council of war was instantly held, at which the Grecian leaders were divided in their opinions; some being for maintaining their post, others for abandoning it²³⁸. In consequence of this diversity of sentiments, all the Peloponnesian confederates returned to the defence of their several states, with the consent, if not by the order of Leonidas, except the Spartans immediately under his command²³⁹.

233. Herodot. ubi sup.

234. Id. ibid.

235. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxix.

236. Id. ibid.

237. Herodot. ubi sup.

238. Id. ibid.

239. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxx. ccxxi.

PART I. The Thespians heroically refused to leave him; and the Thebans he compelled to stay, because he knew they were disposed to join the common enemy²⁴⁰.

Meanwhile Xerxes having poured a libation to the *sun*, as soon as that glorious luminary appeared above the horizon, assembled the main body of his forces; and marched, according to concert, with Hydarnes and Ephialtes, toward Thermopylæ, about three hours before noon²⁴¹. On the approach of the barbarian host, Leonidas left part of his forces to guard the wall, near which the Greeks had fought the two former days, and advanced to the widest part of the pass with his chosen band of Spartans, and the flower of the Thespians; under their leader Demophilus, and his gallant associate Dithyrambus; all men of resolute courage, and determined, if they could not conquer (of which small probability now remained), to fall in defence of the liberties of Greece²⁴². Leonidas had farther motives for perseverance. He acted in obedience to the laws of his country, which forbade him to quit his ground; and conformable to a response of the Delphic oracle, that foretold the desolation of Sparta by the Persians, unless a king of the Herculean race should die to save the state²⁴³.

Such being the resolution of every Spartan, in the little army of Leonidas, henceforth the concern of the whole was rather to kill as many of the enemy as possible, than attend to their own personal safety. They accordingly exposed themselves freely to danger, at the widest part of the pass, and made dreadful havoc of the barbarians²⁴⁴. But

240. Id. lib. vii. cap. ccxxii.

241. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxxiii.

242. Id. ibid.

243. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxx.

244. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. ccxxiii.

the Persian officers, forcing on their men by blows and menaces, without any regard to the dying, the wounded, or those that were pushed into the sea, gradually gained ground; especially after the Grecian spears, blunted and broken by action, became unfit for service²⁴⁵. Then considering the struggle as desperate, the Greeks drew their swords; and furiously closing with the Persians, seemed for a time to turn the tide of battle, by the mortal wounds they inflicted, and the multitude of barbarians that fell around them²⁴⁶. In that conflict Leonidas was slain²⁴⁷; and his body was recovered by the Greeks, after it had been four times disputed by the Persians²⁴⁸; who were finally obliged to yield the contest to disciplined valour, animated by patriotism.

In this moment of glorious triumph, victory shifted sides. The Greeks being informed of the approach of the Persian troops, under Hydarnes and Ephialtes, returned to the narrowest part of the strait²⁴⁹; retiring behind the wall, which secured the pass, all except the Thebans, threw themselves into a compact body, and took post upon a spot of rising ground, on the side next Alpini²⁵⁰; where a lion of stone was afterward erected in honour of Leonidas, their fallen leader²⁵¹, whose venerated corps seems still to have formed the centre of union among them. Demophilus, the Thespian general, appears also, by this time, to have been slain. But the remainder of the Lacedæmonians, under Dieneces, and the Thespians, under Dithyrambus, intrepidly defended themselves against the combined forces of Xerxes. These forces, under their various leaders, now rushed upon the Greeks on all sides; with triumphant shouts, and bar-

245. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. ccxxiii. ccxxiv.

246. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ccxxiv.

247. Id. *ibid.*

248. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxxv.

250. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

249. Id. *ibid.*

251. Id. *ibid.*

PART I. barous yells of exultation; some breaking down the wall at Thermopylæ, and others entering by the breaches²⁵²; while Hydarnes charged in the opposite direction, with his chosen battalions of Persian foot²⁵³.

Although the Thebans, resolved to surrender to the victorious enemy, had formed themselves into a distinct body, under their leader Leontiades, they did not escape the fury of the enraged barbarians. Many of them were slain, while with extended hands they were imploring mercy; and declaring they had always been friends to the Persians, and were among the first of the Greeks that had presented the great king with earth and water²⁵⁴. And Xerxes, in receiving the submission of those that were spared, is said to have branded them with a mark of infamy; beginning with Leontiades, their commander²⁵⁵.

Very different must have been the sentiments of the Persian monarch, in regard to the patriotic band of Lacedæmonians and Thespians; who fought sword in hand with mutilated weapons, upon the eminence they had seized, to the last man²⁵⁶; and with such firmness, that their dead bodies covered nearly the same ground, which they had occupied while embattled. Among the Spartans, Dieneces peculiarly distinguished himself by acts of valour and prowess; and, among the Thespians, Dithyrambus²⁵⁷. Dieneces, when told by a Trachinian, before the attack began, that the Persians would discharge such a flight of arrows as would cloud the face of the sun,

252. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxxvi.

253. Id. *ibid*.

254. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ccxxxiii.

255. Id. *ibid*.

256. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxxxiii—ccxxxviii.

257. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ccxxxvi.

gallantly

gallantly replied, "Then we shall have the benefit of fighting in the shade²⁵⁸." His exploits justified that bold expression.

LETTER
XII.

Such were the efforts of the Lacedæmonians and Thespians at Thermopylæ, or Pylæ, as it was simply called by the inhabitants of the neighbouring country²⁵⁹; where Xerxes lost two brothers, and twenty thousand of his best troops, besides many other persons of high rank, in opening a passage, by land, into Greece²⁶⁰. Nor were the Athenians and their allies, in the meantime, inactive at sea, or the Persian naval commanders remiss in their duty.

During the three days that Leonidas and his little army strove to defend the pass at Thermopylæ, against the myriads of the great king, Themistocles and his maritime associates at Artemisium contended, with no less ardour, to prevent the barbarian fleet from entering the Euripus, and ravaging the coasts of Greece²⁶¹. The struggle, at both places, as Herodotus judiciously observes, was of the same nature, and the object of both parties the same: the Greeks fought for liberty and independency, the barbarians for victory and conquest; which only could be obtained by forcing those straits²⁶². The Athenian admiral peculiarly distinguished himself in this struggle.

The great superiority of Athens by sea, above the other states of Greece, and his own eminent and approved abilities in naval affairs, it might have been supposed would have elevated Themistocles to the command of the whole Grecian navy; yet had he found difficulty, in quietly obtaining the conduct of

258. Id. *ibid.*

259. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cci.

260. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. ccxxiv. et lib. viii. cap. xxiv.

261. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xv.

262. Id. *ibid.*

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the Athenian fleet. His just pretensions to the rank of admiral having been opposed by a demagogue, named Epicydes, whose eloquence gave him much sway in the popular assembly, he politically silenced his competitor with a bribe²⁶³; in order to secure the object of his ambition, and with it the interests of his country, without distracting the state by the spirit of party.

Themistocles discovered the same prudence and political address, with a superior degree of seeming moderation and self-government, when the commanders of the confederate fleet refused to act under an Athenian admiral, and insisted on having a Lacedæmonian commander in chief²⁶⁴. He persuaded the Athenians to wave their claim to the sovereignty of the Grecian seas, at that alarming crisis, as he did his own to supreme authority, and cheerfully served under Eurybiades, the naval commander nominated by the senate of Sparta²⁶⁵. “Well considering,” says Herodotus, “that dissention among confederates, engaged in common hostilities, are as much more pernicious than war, as war is less favourable to public happiness than peace²⁶⁶.”

The transcendant genius of Themistocles, however, procured him the actual command of the confederate fleet, without making him accountable for the success of the measures which he prompted. For these the Spartan admiral alone was responsible.

When the Grecian naval commanders, alarmed at the formidable appearance of the vast armada of Xerxes, in the road of Aphité, proposed to abandon

263. Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

264. Id. *ibid.* et Herodot. lib. viii. cap. ii.

265. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. iii. et Plut. *ubi sup.*

266. Herodot. *Historiar.* *ubi sup.*

their station a second time, and even to give up the defence of the Euripus, the inhabitants of Eubœa, after they had in vain entreated Eurybiades to delay his departure, until they could carry off their wives and children, and property, secretly applied to the Athenian admiral²⁶⁷. Themistocles, who had ineffectually opposed a retreat, and who wished for nothing so much as the means of retarding or preventing it, demanded a present of thirty talents, as the price of the requested delay²⁶⁸. The money was readily paid²⁶⁹; and, if it did not fully answer the end for which it was delivered, it proved of infinite service to the cause of Greece.

Themistocles gave five talents of this money to Eurybiades, as from his own fund; and by that bribe engaged the consent of the commander in chief, to stay and give battle to the enemy at Artemisium²⁷⁰. All the other Grecian commanders were induced to accede to the resolution of Eurybiades, except Adimantus, the Corinthian admiral; who still contended for a retreat, and declared he would draw off his squadron²⁷¹. To him, therefore, Themistocles boldly applied his never failing argument. “By the gods of Greece!” exclaimed he, “Adimantus, thou shalt not leave us; for I will give thee a richer present for remaining here, than the Persian monarch would send thee, for deserting thy associates²⁷².” He accordingly ordered three talents of silver to be instantly conveyed on board the ship of Adimantus²⁷³. And thus, by these well-timed presents, he at once discharged his promise to the Eubœans, and prevented the departure or division of the Grecian fleet, while he pocketed a large sum²⁷⁴.

267. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. iv. et Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

268. Id. *ibid.*

269. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

270. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. v.

271. Id. *ibid.*

272. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

273. Id. *ibid.*

274. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. v.

PART I. For those, who received the money, knew nothing of the manner in which it had been obtained²⁷⁵; and those who paid it, seem never to have inquired, how it was dispensed.

The address of Themistocles, in conjunction with other circumstances, brought on an engagement with the barbarians, the same day that the resolution was taken by the Greeks to remain at Artemisium. The Persian commanders, who had assembled in the road of Aphité, about break of day, that enormous fleet which struck such terror into the Peloponnesian admirals, thought of nothing but capturing the whole Grecian navy, from the moment they observed it did not quit its station²⁷⁶. With this view, they sent two hundred of their best ships, to circumnavigate the south-east side of the island of Eubœa, and take possession of the higher part of the strait between that island and the continent²⁷⁷. The voyage they expected would be performed by next morning; when a signal was to be given by the division under sail, for the main body of the armada to advance, and surround the Grecian fleet²⁷⁸.

Meanwhile the Persian admirals employed themselves in taking a review of their naval force remaining at Aphité²⁷⁹. During the bustle and parade, occasioned by that pompous spectacle, Scyllias, a Thracian Greek, and a most expert diver, deserted to the confederates at Artemisium²⁸⁰. He had been peculiarly serviceable to the Persians in recovering part of the treasure sunk in the wreck of their ships, between mount Pelion and cape Sepias, and had converted a considerable sum to his own use²⁸¹.

275. Id. *ibid.*

276. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. vi.

277. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. vii.

279. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. vii.

280. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. viii.

278. Id. *ibid.*

281. Id. *ibid.*

This speculation seemingly, more than attachment to the cause of Greece, had made him anxiously seek an opportunity of escape²⁸². In what manner he effected it is not certain²⁸³; but probably in a boat, which he had seized in the road of Aphité, and turned adrift before he arrived at Artemisium; in order to give the air of miracle to his adventure, in the eye of the confederates, or the better to elude the pursuit of the barbarians. For the Greeks afterward affirmed, that he plunged beneath the water at Aphité, and never rose to the surface till he reached Artemisium²⁸⁴. It therefore appears, that he must have made his escape partly by his dexterity in swimming and diving, and that he brought no boat with him to the confederate fleet. The distance between Aphité and Artemisium was about twenty miles²⁸⁵.

By Scyllias the Grecian commanders were informed of the state of the barbarian navy, and of the sailing of the division that was sent to circumnavigate Eubœa²⁸⁶; and which, on purpose to elude the vigilance of the Greeks, had steered a north-east course round the island of Scyathus, before it took a southern direction²⁸⁷.

In consequence of this intelligence, the confederates called a council of war: where it was resolved, after various opinions had been offered, that they should remain in their station all that day; and, weighing anchor about midnight, attack the fleet, which was intended to obstruct their retreat²⁸⁸. Conformable to that resolution, they lay at Artemisium till about sun-set. Then, as their cruisers had

282. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. viii.

283. Id. *ibid.*

284. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. viii.

285. Id. *ibid.*

286. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

287. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. vii.

288. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. ix.

brought

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brought no notice of the approach of the Persian division they determined to make trial of the courage of the barbarians in fight, and of their skill in seamanship, by giving battle to the main body of the naval armament of Xerxes²⁸⁹.

This bold measure was immediately carried into execution, to the astonishment of the Persian admirals. When they saw the Grecian fleet, so inferior to their own, both in equipment and number of ships, advancing against them, they imputed the challenge to excess of folly, and considered the confederates as delivering themselves up to inevitable destruction²⁹⁰. Their chief concern accordingly was, to encompass the Greeks; not doubting of an easy and speedy victory²⁹¹.

But the Grecian commanders, aware of their danger, drew their fleet into a circle, at a signal given, and turned the heads of all their ships against the extended line of the exulting barbarians²⁹². At a second signal, they began the engagement; crowding into a narrow space, and having the enemy in front on every quarter²⁹³: an advantage of no small importance, in the ancient manner of fighting at sea, where the damage was chiefly done by the prows of the hostile galleys, against the sides of their antagonists. The Greeks, therefore, though thus surrounded, took thirty sail of the barbarian fleet in the short season of light that remained to them; and, when darkness drew on, they returned with their prizes to Artemisium²⁹⁴. The Persian commanders, at the same time, returned to Aphité²⁹⁵; little satisfied with the hot reception they had found, and discouraged by the loss they had sustained.

289. Id. *ibid.*291. Id. *ibid.*293. Id. *ibid.*295. Id. *ibid.*

290. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. x.

292. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. xi.294. Herodot. *ubi sup.*



The armada of Xerxes, however, was soon to suffer a ruder shock. The night following the battle, which was fought in the height of summer, the sea was agitated by a tremendous storm, accompanied with loud claps of thunder, bursting from the caverns, and resounding from the rocks of mount Pelion; while dead bodies, and pieces of wreck, were driven in such heaps into the road of Aphité, that the oars of the barbarian fleet were impeded, and the seamen filled with the most awful apprehensions of impending ruin²⁹⁶. In this consternation they remained till morning; for so long did the peals of horrid thunder continue unremitted, the raging fury of the waves, and incessant torrents of rain²⁹⁷.

But terror was the chief distress experienced by the barbarians at Aphité. How different was the fate of the two hundred ships, that were sent to occupy the passage of the Euripus!—Assailed by the thunder-storm in the most open part of the Ægean sea, with the navigation of which the commanders were very little acquainted, they all either foundered amid the waves, or were driven upon the rocky and excavated shores of Eubœa²⁹⁸; where they were utterly wrecked, and every man on board perished²⁹⁹. “Such was the will of the Deity,” observes Herodotus, “that the Persian naval armament might be brought nearer to an equality with the Grecian fleet³⁰⁰.”

Ignorant of this disaster, the barbarians stationed at Aphité beheld with joy the morning light³⁰¹; and

296. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. xii.

297. Id. *ibid.*

298. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xiii.

299. Id. *ibid.* It seems to have been the wreck of these ships, which rolled, during the night toward Aphité.

300. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. xiii.

301. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xiv.

PART I.

happy in having rode out the nocturnal storm, after their unsuccessful engagement, they were content to remain quiet for that day³⁰². But the Greeks, who had the same morning received a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ships, and with them the welcome information, that the whole division of the barbarian fleet, which had been sent to circumnavigate Eubœa, had perished in the late convulsion of the elements, were less peacefully disposed³⁰³. Encouraged by these fortunate, and unexpected circumstances, they resolved again to try the strength and skill of the enemy at sea. They accordingly disposed their fleet in order of battle, and advanced toward Aphité about sun-set, as the evening before; attacked and cut off the Cilician squadron, and returned unmolested to Artemisium³⁰⁴.

The following day the Persian commanders, enraged at having been thus insulted by an inferior force, and fearing the displeasure of Xerxes, adopted more vigorous councils. In order to avoid the disgrace of a third attack from the Greeks, they unmoored their fleet about noon, and advanced toward Artemisium, in the form of a crescent³⁰⁵. The Grecian admirals, seeing themselves in danger of being surrounded in their station, also weighed anchor, and instantly began the fight, by rushing into the bosom of the hostile navy³⁰⁶.

By the shock of this sudden and impetuous assault, the barbarian line of battle was broken. Their large and unwieldy ships became ungovernable, and fell foul of each other. Yet did they maintain the action with obstinate courage, ashamed to yield

302. Id. *ibid.*303. Herodot. *ubi sup.*304. Id. *ibid.*

305. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xv. xvi.

306. Id. *ibid.*

the combat to an enemy they deemed so inconsiderable³⁰⁷. In consequence of this gallant effort, the Greeks lost many men and ships; but the barbarians, a much greater proportion of both³⁰⁸. And, after a bloody conflict, which was long and hotly urged, the embattled fleets voluntarily retired, by a kind of tacit consent, to their former stations³⁰⁹; neither of the parties having a right to claim the victory³¹⁰. The dead and the wreck, however, remained with the Greeks³¹¹. In this great battle, the Egyptians distinguished themselves most on the side of the Persians; the Athenians, on that of the Greeks³¹².

But the confederates, notwithstanding the glory they had acquired, in maintaining their station against such an enormous naval armament, found their ships so much shattered, but especially those of the Athenian division, that they deliberated on abandoning the defence of the Euripus, and retiring to the interior parts of Greece³¹³. During these deliberations, or at least before any positive resolution had been taken, an advice-boat arrived at Artemisium, with an account of the fate of Leonidas and his army³¹⁴.

The Grecian admirals, who intended to have victualled their fleet with the cattle left in the island of Eubœa³¹⁵ (for the inhabitants had not sufficiently availed themselves of the delay procured by Themistocles), when informed that the forces of Xerxes were in possession of the neighbouring continent, no longer hesitated what course they should pursue,

307. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. xvi.

308. Id. *ibid.*

309. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

310. Id. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. xvi.


311. Herodotus. lib. vii. cap. xviii.

312. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. xvii.

313. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xviii.

314. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. xxi.

315. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xix.

PART I.  nor a moment delayed their departure³¹⁶: but instantly crowding sail, steered for the Saronic gulf, between the coast of Attica and Peloponnesus. The Corinthians formed the van, and the Athenians the rear of the confederate fleet, in this abrupt voyage³¹⁷.

Meanwhile Themistocles, who seems not to have approved of the sudden flight of the confederates from Artemisium, and who had formed hopes of the desertion of the Asiatic Greeks from the Persian monarch³¹⁸, sailed in one of the swiftest of the Athenian galleys to the usual watering place; and there wrote on the landing-stones, the following inscription, which was read by the Ionians next day³¹⁹.
 “ Men of Ionia! how culpable are you, in engaging
 “ in a league against your progenitors, in order to
 “ reduce Greece to a state of servitude?—But it is
 “ not yet too late to take part with us. If this, how-
 “ ever, you cannot conveniently do; let us conjure
 “ you, at least, to withdraw yourselves speedily
 “ from the Persian cause, and persuade all the Io-
 “ nians to follow your example. Or should strong
 “ necessity compel your adherence, and neither of
 “ these alternatives be found practicable, a middle
 “ course still remains: when we come to an engage-
 “ ment, cease to act with vigour; always remember-
 “ ing, that you are sprung from the Athenians, and
 “ that the enmity between us and the barbarians,
 “ was first excited in your quarrel³²⁰.”

In thus writing, says Herodotus, I conjecture Themistocles had a double purpose in view:—That if this inscription should be read only by the Ionians, they might be induced to join the confederates; or if it was made known to the Persian commanders, and re-

316. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxi.

317. Id. ibid.

318. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xiv.

319. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxii.

320. Id. ibid.



ported to the king, that the Ionians and all the Asiatic Greeks, would fall under suspicion, and thenceforth be trusted with no station in the line of battle³²¹. It appears to have been read only by the Ionians; yet was it not attended with the desired effect, though it could not fail to make an impression upon some of their more generous leaders.

As soon as the Greeks quitted their station, an Eubœan mariner sailed to Aphité, and carried intelligence of their departure to the barbarians³²². But the Persian commanders, suspecting the informer, detained him under a guard; while they sent some light vessels, to ascertain the truth of his report³²³. These vessels returned with a confirmation of the fact; and the whole barbarian fleet weighed anchor, about sunrise next morning, and steered for Artemisium³²⁴. There they continued till noon, when they proceeded to Histiaea³²⁵; took possession of that town, and ravaged the sea-coast in their progress southward³²⁶.

While the naval armament of Xerxes lay on the coast of Eubœa, he sent an invitation to the admirals of the several nations that composed it, as well as to the Persian commanders, to come to Thermopylæ, and witness his triumph³²⁷. Thither they repaired; and, to their astonishment, saw only exposed to view the bodies of one thousand barbarians, though twenty thousand had been slain; nineteen thousand of that number having been secretly interred, by order of the king, and their graves strewed with leaves³²⁸. But they beheld, at the same time, four thousand Greeks, lying in heaps upon the ground

321. Herodot. ubi sup.

322. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxiii.

324. Herodot. ubi sup.

326. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xxiii.

327. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxiv.

323. Id. ibid.

325. Id. ibid.

328. Id. ibid.

PART I. where they had gallantly fought³²⁹. These they supposed to be all Lacedæmonians and Thespians; “though there were,” adds the candid historian, “also helots among them³³⁰.”

When this pompous farce had been acted, which did not conceal the loss of Xerxes from the penetrating glance of his subject allies, the naval officers returned to the fleet³³¹; which, after three days, prosecuted its voyage toward the harbours of Athens; while he continued his route to that city, through Phocis and Bœotia, with his army³³².

In the meantime, the Grecian navy had taken its station in the strait between the island of Salamis and the coast of Attica³³³. This station it occupied by the advice of Themistocles³³⁴; not only as the most proper place for giving battle to the enemy, but for affording relief to his distressed countrymen³³⁵. That distress was now, in truth, deeper than the powers of language can express.

The selfish Peloponnesians, instead of marching into Bœotia with all their forces to meet the army of Xerxes, as Themistocles and the citizens of Athens expected, were employed in strengthening the fortifications of the Corinthian isthmus, in order to secure their own peninsula³³⁶. The Athenians were, therefore, thrown into the utmost consternation, at seeing themselves left exposed to the fury of the incensed barbarians.

329. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xxv. This circumstance leads us to conclude, that the number of Greeks, who fought at Thermopylæ, was greater than before represented by Herodotus; but that additional number, he lets us understand, consisted of slaves. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxv.

330. Id. ibid.

331. Herodot. ubi sup.

332. Id. ibid. et seq.

333. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xl. Corneil. Nepot. *Vit. Themist.*

334. Id. ibid.

335. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xl. et. seq.

336. Id. Historiar. ubi sup.

In this dreadful extremity, after having in vain implored the assistance of their Peloponnesian confederates, the Athenian people embraced a resolution worthy of immortal remembrance, and the imitation of all maritime states. Disdaining submission to the Persian monarch, and rising above despair, they determined to abandon that territory so dear to them, and the city which had so long been the sacred seat of freedom, and the general asylum of Greece; the temples of their gods, and the sepulchres, of their forefathers; and embark on board their fleet, with their wives, children, slaves, and most valuable effects³³⁷.


Conformable to that memorable resolution, which had been prompted by Themistocles, the Athenian fleet left the confederates at Salamis, and sailed to the harbours of Athens³³⁸. Such of the citizens as were able to bear arms, were employed in manning their unoccupied gallies; in repairing the loss of seamen at Artemisium, or the absence of the Plataean marines, whom they had landed in Bœotia³³⁹; while the women, children, slaves, and household goods, were transported to the friendly city of Troezen, on the coast of Argolis, or to the islands of Ægina and Salamis³⁴⁰; some old and indigent men, who refused to desert the acropolis, and the hallowed mansions of their tutelar Minerva, only remaining behind³⁴¹.

When the Athenians had lodged their families in those places of temporary safety, they rejoined the confederate fleet in the straits of Salamis, with one hundred and eighty triremes³⁴²; without including

337. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xli. Plut. *Vit. Themist.* et Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. (Edit. Hanov. Typ. Wecheliani, 1604.) vol. ii. p. 12.

338. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xl. xli. 339. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. xli. 340. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xli. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

Vit. Themist. 341. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. li. et Plut. 342. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. xli—xliv.

PART I.  the twenty sail they had lent to the Chalcidians of Eubœa, and which here unbroken also made their appearance³⁴³. Most of the maritime cities of Peloponnesus furnished an additional number of ships; some that had sent none to Artemisium, now brought their quotas to the general rendezvous; and all the sea-faring people, from the gulf of Ambra-cia to the confines of Illyria, except the Corcyrians, and their colonies of Epidamnus and Apollonia, joined the confederates with their naval force³⁴⁴; so that the Grecian navy, when fully assembled, consisted of three hundred and seventy-eight ships of war, beside gallies of fifty oars³⁴⁵.

Immediately after the Athenians abandoned their country, the barbarian fleet took possession of the harbours of Athens³⁴⁶; and Xerxes having ravaged Phocis, entered Bœotia with the main body of his army³⁴⁷. There he was joined by a division of forces, which he had sent by the foot of mount Parnassus, to pillage the temple of Apollo at Delphos, before he reached Orchomenos³⁴⁸.

That division advanced within sight of the holy city, but failed in its attempt to seize the treasures of the prophetic god; in consequence of the religious horror infused by the awful solemnity of the place, augmented by a dreadful thunder-storm; which breaking upon the summits of mount Parnassus, with tremendous explosion, threw down such immense fragments of rocks upon the barbarians, many of whom were worshippers of Apollo, as made them relinquish all thoughts of their sacrilegious

343. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xlv.

344. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xlii—xlvi.

345. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xlviii.

346. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxvi.

347. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. l.

348. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxxiv. xxxv. xxxviii.

enterprise,

enterprise, and betake themselves to sudden flight³⁴⁹. In this crisis of terror, and uproar of the elements, the Delphians, who had deserted their city on the approach of the enemy, rushing from the caverns of the mountain, where they had concealed themselves under arms, made frightful havoc among the fugitives, and completed their apprehensions of divine vengeance³⁵⁰.

About the time that the Persian monarch was joined by the remains of this unfortunate division, he burnt the hostile cities of Thespia and Plataea³⁵¹; whose inhabitants, warm in the cause of freedom, had fled to the Corinthian isthmus³⁵². And Xerxes, having left a garrison in Thebes, and all Bœotia in his interest behind him, passed the frontiers of Attica, and proceeded toward Athens, venting his fury upon the deserted towns and villages³⁵³. Athens made a defence beyond what could have been expected, in its then deserted state.

The few old and indigent citizens, who, on the general evacuation of their country and its capital, obstinately refused to quit the acropolis or citadel, and the temple of Minerva, which stood within it, literally interpreting the response of the oracle, that

349. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xxxvii. xxxviii. et Diod. Sicul. vol. ii. lib. xi. p. 12. These circumstances were magnified by the Greeks into a miraculous interposition of the Delphic god, for the preservation of his sacred seat; and two large rocks, torn from the two summits of mount Parnassus, were long shewn to his superstitious worshippers, by the ministers of the oracle, in proof of the supernatural deliverance. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xxxix. Diod. Sicul. vol. ii. lib. xi. p. 12, 13.

350. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xxxviii. They declared, on their return to the army, that they saw two figures of more than human size, hewing them down, and urging their flight. Id. ibid.

351. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. l. Diod. Sicul. vol. ii. lib. xi. (Edit. above quoted) p. 13.

352. Id. ibid.

353. Herodot. et Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

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“the wooden wall should remain impregnable,” had fortified that citadel with pallisades, and gates of wood³⁵⁴. These they resolved to defend to the last man³⁵⁵. Xerxes, therefore, found himself under the necessity of investing the place; and was not a little embarrassed how to accomplish its reduction, thus surrounded with a double wall³⁵⁶. At length, however, a mode of attack was adopted that promised success. The Persian forces took post upon the hill Areopagus; and having wrapped the heads of their arrows in tow, to which they set fire, shot them into the works of the besieged³⁵⁷.

In consequence of this artifice, and the vast flights of arrows sent by so prodigious a body of men, the Athenian garrison soon saw the pallisades, in which they had placed so much confidence, involved in flames³⁵⁸; yet did they persist in holding out, and disdainfully rejected the terms offered through the Pisistradid party in the army of Xerxes³⁵⁹. And when the Persians attempted to break open the gates, they were assailed, and repulsed, with large stones, hurled by the defendants from the walls of the acropolis³⁶⁰.

But these difficulties were at last surmounted; by the ingenuity, rather than by the arms of the besiegers. Having discovered an accessible part in the fortifications of the acropolis, behind the gates and the glacis, where the garrison had placed no guard, as they did not suppose that an assault was there practicable, the Persian soldiers conquered the steep ascent, and scaled the wall near the temple of Aglaura, the daughter of Cecrops³⁶¹.

354. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. li.

355. Id. *ibid*.

356. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lii.

357. Id. *ibid*.358. Herodot. *ubi sup*.359. Id. *Historiar*. lib. viii. cap. lii.360. Id. *ibid*.

361. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lili.

When the miserable remnant of the Athenians saw the enemy within the works of the citadel, some threw themselves headlong from the fortifications, while others fled to the temple of Minerva³⁶². But that asylum proved no sanctuary. The incensed barbarians forced open the hallowed gates; and slew, without distinction, all the suppliants who had taken refuge in the sacred mansion³⁶³. They next pillaged the temple of the guardian goddess; and concluded their bloody triumph, with setting fire to every part of the acropolis³⁶⁴. After this devastation, the capital of Attica seems to have been placed under the government of the Athenians of the Pisistradid party³⁶⁵; who had sought protection at the court of Sardis; accompanied the Persian monarch in his march, and pointed his arms against Greece³⁶⁶.

As the chastisement of Athens was the leading object in the expedition of Xerxes, he no sooner saw himself master of that city, than he sent off a courier to Susa, to acquaint Artabanus of his success³⁶⁷. When he had dispatched this messenger, and taken measures for securing his conquest, he went on board his fleet in the Phaleron harbour or road, in order to consult his naval officers concerning their future operations³⁶⁸. For that purpose, he took his seat in the royal galley, and commanded the admirals of the various maritime nations to take seats in council according to their rank³⁶⁹. The king of Sidon sat first, the king of Tyre next; and

362. Id. *ibid.*

363. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

364. Id. *ibid.*

365. This inference may be fairly drawn from the proposals made to the garrison, through that party and other circumstances in the subsequent part of the narration of the venerable father of history. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lii. liv. et seq.

366. Herodotus, *passim*.

367. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. liv.

368. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxvii.

369. Id. *ibid.*

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After the council was fully formed, Xerxes ordered Mardonius to put the question to each member separately, "Whether they ought to hazard a naval engagement?"—Mardonius accordingly took the sense of the whole assembly, beginning with the king of Sidon³⁷¹. They were all for giving battle to the Grecian fleet except Artemisia, the maritime heroine of Halicarnassus³⁷²; who declared against another action at sea, and supported her dissent by very strong arguments.

"Tell the king," said she, "Mardonius, that as I was not backward in the engagement off the island Eubœa, I have a right to deliver my sentiments freely in regard to his affairs, without being suspected of wanting zeal in his service. My advice then is, that he ought to spare his ships, nor hazard without necessity a sea-fight; for the Greeks are as much superior to the barbarians in such combats, as men are to women. But where is the necessity of a naval engagement?—Is he not already in possession of Athens, for the humiliation of which the war was undertaken?—Is he not, in effect, master of the rest of Greece?—for what power will henceforth attempt to resist his arms on land?—Nor is this all: he is also master of the sea. And if he will order his fleet to abstain from battle, and either remain here with his army, or march into Peloponnesus, he will finally attain the object of his enterprise.

"If the king adopt the first of these measures," continued Artemisia, "the Grecian navy will not be

370. Herodot. ubi sup.

371. Id. lib. viii. cap. lxxviii.

372. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxviii.

“ long in a condition to oppose him; but must dis-
 “ perse, and return to its several harbours. For I
 “ am informed, that there is not provisions in the
 “ island of Salamis, or on board the fleet, to sup-
 “ port it for any length of time. And if he lead
 “ his army into Peloponnesus, all the maritime
 “ powers of that peninsula will return to the defence
 “ of their respective cities; for it cannot be expect-
 “ ed, when their own country is invaded, that they
 “ will maintain their present station, and fight for
 “ the deserted, and now conquered country of the
 “ Athenians. But if the king embrace the resolu-
 “ tion of immediately giving battle at sea, I fear,”
 added she, “ that the defeat of his naval armament,
 “ may be followed by a similar disaster to his forces
 “ on land³⁷³.”

When the report of the proceedings of the council was made to Xerxes, he expressed no dissatisfaction at the freedom with which Artemisia had delivered her dissent, though it interfered with his desire of putting a speedy end to the war. On the contrary, as he had always esteemed her for her heroism and zeal in his cause, he thenceforth honoured her with more peculiar marks of distinction and confidence³⁷⁴; yet did he resolve, in conformity with the opinion of the majority of the naval commanders, to give battle to the enemy at Salamis, as soon as the necessary measures could be taken for that purpose³⁷⁵.

This resolution, if not altogether prudent, was by no means so rash as it has been represented by modern historians. For Herodotus conjectures, that the naval armament of Xerxes was now as large as when it arrived at cape Sepias³⁷⁶; the loss

373. Id. *ibid.*

374. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxix.

375. Id. *ibid.*

376. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. lxvi.

PART I. of ships, by the storms in the Grecian seas, and the engagements with the confederated Greeks, being balanced by the subsequent accession of force from the maritime powers of Greece, both in the islands and on the continent; who had swelled the barbarian fleet in its course from Artemisium, and crowded to it in proportion to its progress³⁷⁷.

But Xerxes had other reasons for wishing to give battle to the enemy at sea, and in their present station, beside the superiority of his naval strength, and his desire of terminating the conquest of Greece by one great blow³⁷⁸. He suspected that his maritime forces had not done their utmost at Aphité and Artemisium, and resolved to be spectator of the engagement at Salamis³⁷⁹. The same day this resolution was taken, he ordered his land-forces to march toward Peloponnesus³⁸⁰.

The admirals of the confederated Greeks were less united in their councils, than those of the barbarian monarch. After their navy was fully assembled at Salamis, Eurybiades, the commander in chief, had desired them to deliberate, “Whether he
“should remain in that station, or sail to the Corin-
“thian isthmus, and wait the approach of the barba-
“rian fleet on the coast of Peloponnesus³⁸¹?”—The majority of the council of war declared for sailing to the isthmus; because, if they should there be vanquished, they might return to the defence of their several cities³⁸².

377. Id. *ibid*.

378. If he had proved victorious at Salamis, all Peloponnesus, the only unconquered country in Greece, must instantly have submitted to him; as he could have landed troops within the fortifications at the Corinthian isthmus, while the main body of his army advanced on the side of Megara. His resolution of hazarding a naval engagement, was, therefore, magnanimous.

379. Herodor. lib. viii. cap. lxix.

380. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxi.

381. Id. *Historiar*. lib. viii. cap. xlix.

382. Id. *ibid*.

When the Peloponnesian leaders had come to this determination, for by them the majority was formed, Eurybiades received intelligence, that Xerxes had entered the territory of Attica, and was marking his route with fire³⁸³. These alarming news were speedily followed, by an account of the fall of the citadel of Athens³⁸⁴; which threw the whole council of war into such consternation, that some of the commanders, not waiting the result of its deliberations, went on board their ships, in order to retire: and those that remained adopted the resolution of giving battle to the enemy near the Corinthian isthmus³⁸⁵. On the approach of night the council broke up, and the Grecian admirals repaired to their several squadrons³⁸⁶.

While Themistocles, the Athenian commander in chief, who had ineffectually opposed a change of station, was ruminating on the calamities of his country, in returning to his own ship, he was met by his friend, Mnesiphilos³⁸⁷; a venerable sage, who had early instructed him in the principles of government and politics, and who still attended him as a companion and counsellor³⁸⁸. Mnesiphilos eagerly asked, the issue of the deliberations of the council of war; and being told, that the majority had resolved to sail to the isthmus, and fight off the coast of Peloponnesus, "Then," exclaimed he, "they will not fight at all. For if Eurybiades quit Salamis, the Peloponnesian chiefs will return to their respective cities; and neither he, nor any other commander, will be able to prevent the fleet from dispersing: so that Greece, in such event, will be lost for lack of council!—Haste, therefore, to Eurybiades; press him to get this resolution re-

383. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. 1.

384. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lvi.

385. Id. ibid.

386. Herodot. ubi sup.

387. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lvii.

388. Plat. Vit. Themist.

"voked,

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“voked, and endeavour to procure one for remaining here³⁸⁹.”

Struck with the force of this admonition, Themistocles left Mnesiphilos without making any reply, and went on board the ship of the Spartan admiral³⁹⁰. Having there obtained an audience of the commander in chief, and permission to deliver his sentiments with freedom, on the important subject that had prompted his unexpected visit, he urged so many, and such weighty arguments, for revoking the determination of the council, that Eurybiades consented to go ashore, and again assemble the great naval officers³⁹¹.

When the new council of war met, Themistocles warmly declaimed on the measures which he thought expedient for the confederated Greeks to pursue, in their present circumstances, before Eurybiades had explained his reasons for convening them a second time³⁹². This misplaced ardour was rudely checked by Adimantus, the Corinthian admiral, who was for adhering to the former resolution. “They who, at the public games, Themistocles, rise before their turn,” said he, “are made to sit down with stripes³⁹³.”—“True,” replied Themistocles; “but those that never rise, are never honoured with the victor’s crown³⁹⁴.”

After this mild retort, which conciliated the favour of the more cool and experienced leaders, Themistocles turned to the commander in chief; and addressed him in a speech equally distinguished by decent moderation, and deep knowledge of naval affairs. “The conservation of Greece, O Eurybiades,”

389. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lvii.

390. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lviii.

392. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lix.

394. Herodot. ubi sup.

391. Id. ibid.

393. Id. ibid.

said he, “ in her present perilous situation, depends
“ upon you. And this deliverance you may effect,
“ by giving battle to the enemy here, in conformity
“ with my opinion; but not by following the counsel
“ of those leaders, who contend for carrying up the
“ fleet to the Corinthian isthmus. For if we come
“ to action before the isthmus, we shall fight in an
“ open sea; a disadvantage to us of no small moment,
“ because of our inferiority in the size and number
“ of our ships. But whatever be the issue of such
“ an engagement, we must, by abandoning our sta-
“ tion, lose Salamis, Ægina, and Megara³⁹⁵.”

“ Nor will Peloponnesus,” continued Themisto-
cles, “ be safe; for the land-forces of Xerxes will
“ certainly attend his naval armament. If you con-
“ sult the dictates of prudence, you will not, there-
“ fore, lead the barbarians thither, and expose to
“ danger the last refuge of the unhappy Greeks;
“ especially as we shall, by remaining in the bay of
“ Salamis, defend that peninsula as effectually as at
“ the isthmus; while the Athenians preserve their
“ children and wives, and all fight with many advan-
“ tages on their side. For here if we give battle to
“ the enemy, we shall engage in a narrow strait,
“ with comparatively few ships against an immense
“ number; a station which, under such circum-
“ stances, it ought to be our business to maintain,
“ as much as theirs to draw us into the open sea³⁹⁶.
“ And we may hope,” added he, “ to derive yet
“ farther benefit from such a conduct; may reason-
“ ably hope, should we here defeat the hostile fleet,
“ as I trust we shall, that it will never advance to
“ the Corinthian isthmus, nor the barbarian army
“ beyond the limits of Attica, but both retire in
“ disorder³⁹⁷.”

395. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lx.

396. Id. ibid.

397. Herodot. ubi sup.

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~~~~~ No sooner had Themistocles concluded his speech, than Adimantus, the Corinthian admiral, again attacked him; sarcastically observing, that he ought to be silent in council, as he had no country to fight for<sup>398</sup>; alluding to the condition of Attica, then in the hands of the enemy:—and that it would be time enough for him to deliver his opinion, when he could say he had a home<sup>399</sup>.

Themistocles, thus insulted, threw many just reproaches upon Adimantus and the Corinthians; and replied, that he had yet a city and a state superior to any they could boast: the Athenians had two hundred ships of war, armed and manned by themselves and their associates, and which no power in Greece was able to resist<sup>400</sup>. Having vindicated himself and his country, in this manly manner, he turned to Eurybiades, and keenly said,

“ If you remain here, you will acquire the reputation of a patriotic leader; if not, you will be accounted the subverter of the liberties of Greece. For the issue of the war depends upon the Athenian fleet. But be assured, unless you agree to give battle at Salamis, that we will take on board our children and wives, and sail to Siris, on the coast of Italy; where it has been of old predicted by the oracle, that we should build a city. And you, and your Peloponnesian confederates, may perhaps remember my advice, when it is too late<sup>401</sup>.” Alarmed at this threat, the council of war acceded to the opinion of Themistocles; and the whole confederate fleet made preparations for receiving the attack of the enemy, in its present station<sup>402</sup>.

398. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxi.

399. Id. ibid.

400. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lxi.

401. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxii.

402. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxiii. lxiv.

The Grecian naval commanders, however, were under no few apprehensions concerning the issue of the expected engagement; and the Peloponnesian chiefs were still dissatisfied at the thought of fighting for the territories of the Athenians, while their own country was in danger<sup>403</sup>. That danger was, indeed, great; though their country was now better secured, than when they left it.

The confederated states of Peloponnesus had, by this time, not only fortified the difficult pass of Sciron which was considered as the key of their peninsula, but had drawn a rampart across the Corinthian isthmus, from sea to sea<sup>404</sup>. That wall and ditch, which they meant to defend against the army of Xerxes, if he should force the pass of Sciron, had been finished by the indefatigable labours of the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Elians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Philasians, Træzenians, and Hermionians, under the conduct of Cleombrotus, brother to Leonidas, who had fallen so glorious at Thermopylæ<sup>405</sup>. All these people were zealous in the cause of their country; but the rest of the Peloponnesians forbore to repair to the common standard, although the Olympian and Carnian festivals were past<sup>406</sup>.

This remissness of a considerable part of the Peloponnesian body, and the rapid progress of the arms of Xerxes by land, as soon as made known to the naval officers from that peninsula, filled them with new apprehensions and discontent. Alarmed at the fate with which their families and friends were threatened, they clamorously accused Eurybiades of

403. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. lxx.

404. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lxxi.

405. Id *Histor.* lib. viii. cap. lxxii.

406. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxii.

**PART I.** want of firmness; and a third council of war was called, in order to prevent an open mutiny<sup>407</sup>.

In that council the debates were long and warm. The Peloponnesian admirals contended, as formerly, for sailing to the Corinthian isthmus, and there encountering every danger for the preservation of their country; while they reprobated the idea of maintaining their present station, and fighting for a territory already in the hands of the enemy<sup>408</sup>. But the Athenians, Æginetes, and Megarians, urged the expediency of giving battle at Salamis<sup>409</sup>.

During these debates Themistocles, fearing a division of the Grecian navy, as he saw no probability of being able to induce Eurybiades, and other Peloponnesian admirals, to confirm their former resolution, left the council; and resolved to bring on by stratagem, an engagement before the fleet could separate<sup>410</sup>. With that view he applied to Sicinus; a man who had lived in his family, and been entrusted with the education of his sons<sup>411</sup>.

This confidential person Themistocles sent in a small vessel, to deliver the following message to the commanders of the barbarian fleet. “ The Athenian  
“ admiral, who favours the cause of the Persian monarch, has dispatched me privately to inform you,  
“ that the Grecian naval officers, distracted by fear,  
“ have resolved to seek safety in flight; and that you  
“ have now an opportunity of gaining a complete victory, unless you negligently permit their escape.  
“ Divided among themselves, they will not only be

407. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. lxxiv.

408. Id. *ibid.*

409. Herodotus, *ubi sup.*

410. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. lxxv.

411. Id. *ibid.*

“ unable to resist your force, but you will have the  
“ farther advantage of beholding those commanders,  
“ who are in your interest, fighting against such as  
“ oppose you<sup>412</sup>. ”

In consequence of this message, which obtained full credit with the Persian admirals, and even with the monarch himself<sup>413</sup>, a body of troops was instantly landed in the little island of Psyttalea, lying between Salamis and the continent of Attica<sup>414</sup>; in expectation (as that island is situated near the place where the battle was likely to be fought), that the most disabled of the Grecian ships would be driven thither, and might be taken or destroyed by the forces there stationed<sup>415</sup>. And about midnight the barbarian fleet quitted the road of Phaleron; and forming a semicircle round the western side of the island of Salamis, encircled the whole Athenian coast, from Munychia to Elusis and the frontiers of Megara, in order to prevent the Grecian navy from escaping; while the troops of Xerxes lined the neighbouring shore, on purpose to cut off all communication between the fleet in the bay of Salamis and the Grecian army at the Corinthian isthmus<sup>416</sup>.

Meantime the leaders of the confederated Greeks, assembled in council, not knowing they were encompassed by the forces of Xerxes, continued their debates with heat and violence<sup>417</sup>. In the midst of those debates, Aristides arrived at Salamis from Æginæ<sup>418</sup>. Laying aside all personal animosity, and

412. Herodot. ubi sup.

413. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxxvi. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 14. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

414. Herodot. ubi sup.

415. Id. *ibid.*

416. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxvi. et seq. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 14. Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

417. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxviii.

418. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxxix.

**PART I.** burning with zeal for the service of his country, he sent for Themistocles, his former rival<sup>419</sup>; and through whose intrigues, as we have seen, he had been banished by the ostracism. That sentence had been revoked by the Athenians on the approach of Xerxes<sup>420</sup>; yet Aristides, whatever might be his motives for such delay, had not hitherto joined the confederates. But now judging his presence necessary, and resolved to conquer or perish with his ungrateful fellow-citizens, he had left Ægina, on hearing that the Peloponnesian admirals were determined to retire to the Corinthian isthmus<sup>421</sup>.

When Themistocles appeared, Aristides said, "We ought at present, as formerly, to contend, who is most worthy of the favour of his country. And, as a prelude to this new competition, I can assure you, that more arguments are not necessary to prevent the Peloponnesians from withdrawing their ships; for they cannot now effect a retreat, as we are encircled with enemies. Go, therefore, to the council of war, and declare this danger<sup>422</sup>."

"The intelligence you bring," replied Themistocles, "is as grateful as the manner of announcing it is gracious. You tell me you have seen, what I wished should take place, and endeavoured to procure; for necessity required, that those commanders, who would not voluntarily stay here, and give battle to the barbarians, should be compelled to remain. But this important information the council must hear from your lips; as no regard will be had to my words, on such a subject<sup>423</sup>."

Aristides accordingly entered the council, and acquainted the Grecian commanders, that, in sailing

419. *Id. ibid.*

421. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxix.

423. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxa.

420. *Plut. Vit. Aristid.*

422. *Id. ibid.*

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from Ægina, he with difficulty eluded the vigilance of the enemy, whose naval force had surrounded the whole confederate fleet<sup>424</sup>. Fresh dissensions, however, arose among the members of the council; the greater number giving no credit to the report of the Athenian patriot<sup>425</sup>. These dissensions continued, until a ship, belonging to the island of Tenos, which had deserted from the armament of Xerxes, arrived at Salamis, and confirmed the former intelligence<sup>426</sup>.

Now convinced of their danger, all the Grecian commanders made preparations for giving battle<sup>427</sup>. And when an assembly was held, about day-break, for that purpose, Themistocles declared his opinion of the event, and exhorted his countrymen and confederates, to acquit themselves in a manner worthy of the great occasion, and the glorious cause in which they were engaged<sup>428</sup>. Thus animated, the Grecian admirals went on board their ships, and weighed anchor; and the barbarians, seeing the confederate fleet in motion, bore down without loss of time. But the Greeks lay upon their oars, and kept off; until the captain of an Athenian galley, breaking out of the line, dashed his armed prow into the side of one of the enemy's largest ships, which vauntingly seemed to bid defiance to every opponent; and by that gallant effort brought on a general engagement, as he could not otherwise be extricated<sup>429</sup>.

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The Grecian fleet now consisted of three hundred and eighty triremes, or ships of the line<sup>430</sup>; and the naval armament of Xerxes of above twelve hundred,

424. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. lxxxī.

425. Id. *ibid.*

426. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxxii. lxxxiii.

427. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxxiii.

428. Id. *ibid.* et Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 14.

429. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxxiv. *Æschyl. Persæ.* Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

430. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lxxxii.

according

**PART I.** according to the computation of Herodotus<sup>431</sup>. This computation is supported by the authority of Æschylus, the tragic poet; who was present at the battle of Salamis, and says

“ A thousand ships (for well I know the number),

“ The Persian flag obey'd : two hundred more

“ And seven, with speediest sail that swept the seas<sup>432</sup>.”

But if these two hundred and seven swift ships were triremes, they must have been lighter built than those that composed the body of the fleet; which had high sterns, lofty decks, and were heavy and unwieldy<sup>433</sup>.

In regard to the order of battle, Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus are divided<sup>434</sup>: nor is it possible to reconcile them. I shall, therefore, follow the narration of Herodotus, as hitherto; inserting only such particulars from Diodorus as seem consonant to probability, and do not interfere with the testimony of the original historian.

The Athenians formed the left wing of the Grecian fleet, extending toward Elusis, and fronting the Phœnicians<sup>435</sup>; and the Lacedæmonians, and their

431. Compare Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lxxxix. clxxxiv. clxxxv. with lib. viii. cap. lxvi.

432. Æschyl. *Persæ*. This is precisely the number of ships of the line assigned by Herodotus (*Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. lxxxix.) to the barbarian navy, when reviewed by Xerxes off Doriscus.

433. Plut. *Vit. Themist.* et Herodot. lib. vii. viii. passim.

434. Diodorus places the Lacedæmonians, to say nothing of other differences, on the left wing of the Grecian fleet (*Biblioth.* lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 15.), and Herodotus (*Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. lxxxv.) on the right.

435. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxxv. The Egyptian squadron, which was also stationed off the coast of Elusis, in order to prevent the retreat of the Greeks (Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 14.), appears to have formed no part of the line of battle.

Peloponnesian confederates, occupied the Grecian right wing, which extended toward the Peiræus, and was opposed to the Ionians and other Asiatic Greeks, who constituted the enemy's left wing<sup>436</sup>. The Æginetes and Megareans seem to have composed the centre of the Grecian fleet, and have fronted the Cyprians, Pamphylians, and the remnant of the Cilician squadron<sup>437</sup>. The engagement, as we have already seen, was begun in consequence of an Athenian ship breaking out of the line, and closing with one of the barbarian navy. That ship was commanded by Aminias, the brother of Æschylus; and, if we may believe the poet, sunk her antagonist<sup>438</sup>.

Animated by this daring exploit, the confederated Greeks raised the war-song, while the trumpets sounded the charge<sup>439</sup>. The battle, which ensued, was hot and obstinate; for the barbarians and Asiatic Greeks, assured that their behaviour was noticed by the Persian monarch, who had separated them into national squadrons, in order to inspire them with emulation, as well as to enable them to preserve concert, and whose superb throne was seated under mount Ægaleos, on the most elevated part of the neighbouring shore, exerted themselves with intrepid courage<sup>440</sup>. But no sooner were their headmost ships defeated, and their line broken, by the Athenians and Æginetes, than all was uproar and confusion<sup>441</sup>. For want of room to act, the ships, which had not yet been engaged, in pressing forward, fell foul of those that were disabled, and the bay of Salamis became one immense wreck<sup>442</sup>.

436. Id. *ibid.* et Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 14.

437. Compare Diodorus, lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 15, with Herodotus, *ubi sup.* et seq.

438. Æschyl. *Persæ*.

439. Id. *ibid.*

440. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxxvii.—xc. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 15. Plat. *Vit. Themist.*

441. Id. *ibid.*

442. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lxxxix. Æschyl. *Persæ*.



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About the same time that the barbarian right wing was thrown into disorder by the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians, and their Peloponnesian associates, had broken the Asiatic Greeks, on the left<sup>443</sup>. The Phœnicians, as an apology for their discomfiture, accused the Ionians of treachery<sup>444</sup>; but Xerxes was witness to the gallant exploits, and bore honourable testimony to the valour of his Grecian allies<sup>445</sup>. Thus defeated on both wings, and all ruin in the centre, the naval armament of the great king had recourse to flight, and made the best of its way toward Phaleron<sup>446</sup>. But it suffered severely, before it could reach that port. For the Athenians destroyed those flying ships, which ventured to resist in the general rout; while the Æginetes, who guarded the straits of Salamis, did no less execution upon such as escaped out of the battle<sup>447</sup>. Forty Grecian ships are said to have been sunk or rendered unfit for service, and two hundred sail of the barbarian fleet perished in this engagement<sup>448</sup>. The Grecian seamen saved themselves by swimming; but most of the barbarians being less skilled in that art, and having no place of refuge, shared the same fate with their ships, being literally buried in the waves<sup>449</sup>.

The confederated Greeks, however, made no distant pursuit. Satisfied with their victory, they employed themselves in collecting the wreck that floated on the coast of Salamis, and in preparing for a new engagement<sup>450</sup>. Meanwhile Aristides, taking with him a chosen body of men, all of Athenian blood,

<sup>443</sup>. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xc. Diodorus (lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 15.) ascribes the defeat of the Asiatic Greeks also to the Athenians, after they had routed the Phœnicians, Cyprians, &c. but with no degree of probability.

<sup>444</sup>. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xc.

<sup>445</sup>. Id. *ibid.*

<sup>446</sup>. Herodot. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xci.

<sup>447</sup>. Id. *ibid.*

<sup>448</sup>. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi vol. ii. p. 16.

<sup>449</sup>. Herodotus,

lib. viii. cap. lxxxix.

<sup>450</sup>. Id. lib. viii. cap. xcvi.

passed over to Psyttalea, and put to the sword the Persian troops, which had been landed in that island<sup>451</sup>.

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The defeat at Salamis occasioned great confusion in the councils of the Persian monarch, as it utterly deranged his measures. After deliberating what course he should pursue, he resolved to return into Asia<sup>452</sup>. And, as a prelude to such return, he ordered his fleet, during the ensuing night, to quit the coast of Attica, and sail to the Hellespont<sup>453</sup>; lest the Greeks should break down his bridges, and cut off his retreat<sup>454</sup>. This resolution was taken in concert with Mardonius<sup>455</sup>, who had never placed much confidence in the fleet; and who demanded only the choice of three hundred thousand men, to prosecute the war by land<sup>456</sup>.

Various accounts, my lord, have been given of the retreat of Xerxes; but I shall follow the narration of the venerable father of history, who had best access to information.

451. Herodot. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xcv. et Plut. Vit. Aristid.

452. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xcvi.—civ. The retreat of Xerxes, which has commonly been ascribed to motives of fear, seems to have been dictated by reasons of state. He knew that the defeat of an armament, in a distant quarter, was soon followed by a revolt in the heart of the empire. And he might, without the imputation of mean jealousy, suspect of ambitious designs his uncle Artabanus; who had one while opposed the invasion of Greece, and at another, given it his hearty concurrence (Herodot. lib. vii. passim.); apparently the most artful method political intrigue could devise of exciting discontents against the monarch, and infusing an idea of his own superior wisdom.

453. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cvii.

454. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xcvi.

455. Mardonius did not directly advise Xerxes to retreat; but he did the same, in effect. Vid. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. c. cl.

456. Herodotus, Historiar. lib. viii. cap. c.

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The disappointed monarch having conducted the whole body of his forces into Thessaly, Mardonius there selected three hundred thousand of the flower of his army; with the exception of the immortal band, consisting (as formerly observed), of ten thousand Persian foot perpetually kept full, and commanded by Hydarnes, who insisted on accompanying his sovereign with that body of guards<sup>457</sup>.

From Thessaly, where Mardonius proposed to take up his winter-quarters, Xerxes prosecuted his march to the Hellespont. There he found his fleet ready to receive him<sup>458</sup>. In his march he was attended by sixty thousand of the troops of Mardonius, under Artabazus, who led them speedily back toward Thessaly<sup>459</sup>. The king embarked on board the fleet, with the remains of his army (which had suffered greatly by famine and its attendant diseases), his bridges over the Hellespont having been shattered by a storm<sup>460</sup>. And he was quickly landed at Abydos<sup>461</sup>: to the great joy of his oriental subjects, to whom his life was peculiarly dear<sup>462</sup>. Little solicitous of the success of his ambitious enterprise, they were chiefly anxious for his personal safety<sup>463</sup>. From Sestos, he marched to Sardis<sup>464</sup>; and there kept his court, until the fate of the army under Mardonius was determined, when he returned to Susa.

457. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxiii.

458. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxvii. cxxx.

459. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxvi.

460. Herodot. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxii.

461. Id. *ibid.* et lib. viii. cap. cxxx. Herodotus, though ignorant of the story of the cock-boat, a forgery of later times, was not unacquainted with another account of the passage of Xerxes from Europe into Asia, beside the one he has adopted. But he sets that account at nought; and refutes it both by arguments and circumstances. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxviii—cxx.

462. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xcvi. xcix.

463. Id. *ibid.*

464. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxvii. cxxx.

LETTER XIII.

THE HISTORY OF GREECE, FROM THE RETREAT OF XERXES, TO THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYCALE, AND TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PERSIANS OUT OF EUROPE.

THE Grecian naval commanders no sooner understood that the Persian fleet had quitted the harbours of Attica, than they stood to sea<sup>1</sup>. At the isle of Andros, having come up with none of the enemy's ships, they called a council of war; in which Themistocles proposed, that they should sail directly to the Hellespont, and break down the bridges of Xerxes<sup>2</sup>. But Eurybiades, the Spartan admiral, and commander in chief of the armament, was of a different opinion. He said, that nothing could be more hurtful to Greece than the destruction of those bridges; for, if the Persian monarch, thus intercepted, should be compelled to remain in Europe, he would surely make some bold attempt by land<sup>3</sup>. He argued, therefore, that the Greeks ought to favour the retreat of Xerxes; and that, after his arrival in Asia, if they found themselves in force, they might then carry the war thither, and oblige him to fight for his own territories<sup>4</sup>.

To this counsel all the Peloponnesian admirals adhered; and Themistocles, whose ardour had prompted him to bolder measures, seeing the strength of the cool reasoning of Euribyades, and the impossibility

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1. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cvlii.

2. Id. ibid.

3. Herodot. ubi sup.

4. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cvlii.

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of swaying, by the majority of votes, the resolution of the Spartan admiral, gave a new turn to his discourse, and thus addressed the Athenians: “ I have often  
 “ seen, and oftener heard, that men, constrained by  
 “ necessity, have renewed the combat, and recovered  
 “ their former losses. Therefore, since we have  
 “ found means to dispel the cloud of enemies, that  
 “ threatened us and all Greece with ruin, let us no  
 “ farther pursue the fugitives. But, as our affairs  
 “ are in so prosperous a state, having vanquished  
 “ the navy of the great king, let us remain in Greece;  
 “ provide for ourselves and our families; rebuild our  
 “ houses, and sow our lands with all diligence; de-  
 “ ferring our expedition to Ionia and the Hellespont,  
 “ until the return of spring<sup>5</sup>.

Themistocles, ever willing to make friends, sensible of the turbulence of the Athenian democracy, the versatile humour of the people, and the probability of his being obliged to seek refuge in the dominions of the Persian monarch, seized this opportunity to send a private message to Xerxes, who had not yet quitted Athens, claiming the merit of having dissuaded the Greeks from sailing to the Hellespont, and breaking down his bridges<sup>6</sup>; though, as Thucydides observes, nothing could be more false<sup>7</sup>.

The next measure of this accomplished statesman and commander has been thought no less selfish. Under pretence of chastising the inhabitants of the Grecian islands, for siding with Xerxes, though he knew they were constrained so to do, he meant to pillage them. On Andros he first made an attack; because the people of that island had refused to comply with his demands<sup>8</sup>. He told them the Athenians

5. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cix.

6. Id. lib. viii. cap. cx.

7. Thucydides, lib. i. cap. cxxxvii.

8. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxi.

were come thither accompanied by two powerful deities, Persuasion and Force; and, therefore, they must pay the sum required. They replied, that the Athenians, supported by such powerful goddesses, were consequently great and prosperous; but that the Andrians, confined to narrow territory, and having two unpropitious goddesses, Poverty and Impossibility, constantly residing among them, they could pay no money, while under the tutelage of those deities; adding, that the strength of Athens was not greater than their inability<sup>9</sup>,

Andros was accordingly besieged, though ineffectually. And during the time Themistocles lay before it, he sent threatening messages to the other islands, and extorted money from the inhabitants of several of them; but especially from the Carystians and Parians<sup>10</sup>. The Parians, by their liberality, escaped the visit of the Grecian fleet<sup>11</sup>; not so the Carystians, who seem to have been severely handled<sup>12</sup>,

After the Greeks had raised the siege of Andros, and ravaged the territory of Carystus, on the southern side of the island of Eubœa, they returned to Salamis<sup>13</sup>. There a new scene displayed itself; the division of the spoil. After setting aside what portion they intended to consecrate to the gods, they divided the remaining booty among them<sup>14</sup>. They then sailed for the Corinthian isthmus; in order to confer the olive crown on the admiral, who should be found most worthy of it, by his behaviour in the battle of Salamis<sup>15</sup>.

9. Id. *ibid.*

10. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. cxii.

11. Id. *ibid.*


12. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

13. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxxi.

14. Id. *ibid.*

15. Id. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. cxxiii.

## PART I.

 The Grecian manner of ascertaining the priority of naval merit was not a little solemn. Each of the admirals brought in, and laid upon the altar of Neptune at the Isthmus, the names of the commanders he judged worthy of the first and second place<sup>6</sup>. But what was truly singular on this occasion, and which must astonish your lordship, initiated in the polite manners of modern Europe; “every one, thinking he had performed his own part best, wrote down his own name first, and the name of Themistocles second<sup>7</sup> :”—so that setting aside the vanity of self-love, a decisive judgment was given in his favour. Mutual jealousy, however, prevented the Grecian admirals from formally giving such decision; and they returned to their several harbours, without bestowing the honorary crown<sup>8</sup>.

Dissatisfied with the conduct of his associates, Themistocles repaired to Sparta, in hopes of there receiving the honour he claimed. The Spartans gave him a splendid reception and treated him with the greatest respect. But, they did not implicitly grant his request. They decreed the prize of valour to their own naval commander, Eurybiades; and that of address and prudence, to Themistocles; honouring each with an olive crown<sup>9</sup>. They also gave to Themistocles the most magnificent chariot in Sparta<sup>10</sup>. And after bearing these testimonies to his merit, and expressing their approbation of his conduct, three hundred Spartans of the equestrian order attended him to the frontiers of Laconia<sup>11</sup>; “the single instance we know,” says Herodotus, “of any man being accompanied by the Lacedæmonians at his departure<sup>12</sup>,”

While

16. Id. *ibid*,

17. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

18. Id. *Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxxiv.*

19. Id. *ibid*.

20. Herodotus, *lib. viii. cap. cxxiv.*

21. Id. *ibid*.

22. *Historiar. ubi sup.* Those honours, however, cost Themistocles dear.

While the Greeks were occupied in dividing the spoil, and apportioning the merit of their naval commanders, the Persians were more seriously employed. Encouraged by the bold resistance made at Thermopylæ, the victory at Salamis, the flight of the barbarian fleet, and the retreat of Xerxes, some Macedonian towns on the Grecian frontier had ventured to throw off the Persian yoke<sup>23</sup>. These Artabazus undertook to reduce, after he had conveyed his sovereign to the Hellespont; and marched back with his body of sixty thousand men, to the borders of Thessaly<sup>24</sup>. Against Potidæa, which had first revolted, Artabazus turned his arms<sup>25</sup>. But finding Olynthus also disposed to revolt, he besieged that place at the same time; and when he had taken it, he brought out the Olynthians to a neighbouring morass, and put them all to the sword<sup>26</sup>.

After the reduction of Olynthus, Artabazus directed his whole force against Potidæa. But the Potidæans, hardened by the military execution inflicted upon the Olynthians, baffled his most vigorous efforts for three months<sup>27</sup>. Then the tides rose so high, and continued so long, that the Persian general, seeing the shore deluged with water, and choked with mud, retired toward Pallene<sup>28</sup>. But before he had completed one half of his march, so great an inundation broke from the sea, in consequence of an unusually high tide, that such of his troops as could not swim, perished in the waves; and the greater part of those that could, were killed by the Potidæans who had pursued them in boats<sup>29</sup>. The remainder

dear. His acceptance of them awakened a jealousy among the Athenians, which occasioned his loss of the command of the fleet. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 22. edit. sup. cit.

23. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxvi.

24. Id. ibid.

25. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. viii. cap. cxxvii.

26. Id. ibid.

27. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxxix.

28. Id. ibid.

29. Herodot. *Historiar.* ubi sup.



PART I. Artabazus conducted to the camp of Mardonius in  
 ~~~~~ Thessaly<sup>30</sup>.

Nothing else memorable happened during the winter, either by sea or land. The army of Mardonius kept quiet in its cantonments, in Thessaly and Macedonia, and the Persian fleet lay at Cumé³¹; where it had taken its station after landing Xerxes, and the wretched rabble of his mutilated host, at Abydos³².

Ant. Chr.
479.
Olympiad
lxxv. 1.

Spring awakened both the Greeks and Persians to action, though with mutual diffidence of each other's strength. The Persian fleet advanced to Samos, in order to overawe the Iopians³³; and the Grecian naval force assembled at Ægina³⁴. The Greeks afterward took station at Delos, and there remained until the latter part of summer, afraid to proceed farther³⁵; and fear also restrained the Persians from advancing beyond Samos³⁶.

An equal degree of diffidence appeared in the proceedings of both parties by land. Before Mardonius quitted his camp in Thessaly, he endeavoured to detach the Athenians from the Grecian confederacy. With this view, after consulting the Grecian oracles, he sent Alexander I. king of Macedonia, to negotiate with them, in the name of the Persian monarch³⁷. A fitter agent he could not have chosen. Though naturally a man of high spirit, Alexander was become a deep and crafty politician who enjoyed the confidence both of the Greeks and Persians.

30. Id. *ibid*.

31. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxx.

32. Id. *ibid*.

33. Herodotus, *ubi sup*.

34. Id. *Historiar*. lib. viii. cap. cxxxi.

35. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxxxii.

36. Id. *ibid*.

37. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxxvi. cxi.

In order to escape punishment, for the assassination of the Persian nobles, he gave in marriage, as we have seen³⁸, his sister Gigea, and a large sum of money, to Bubares³⁹; a Persian of high rank, sent to inquire into that bloody transaction⁴⁰. And, instead of joining the Greeks, and making with them a common stand against the Asiatic invaders, he had politically preserved his fealty to the Persian monarch⁴¹; willing seemingly to see the Grecian republics humbled, and in hopes of profiting by their weakness, after the forces of the great king should be withdrawn. The conduct of Perdiccas, his son, pupil, and successor, justifies this conjecture.

But whatever might be the views of Alexander, the Athenians were ignorant of them. They considered him as a prince of Grecian extraction, well disposed to their interests, and endeared to them by mutual acts of friendship and hospitality⁴². They received him accordingly. But, with a liberality peculiar to themselves, they did not admit his public audience, until the arrival of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors⁴³; that they might convince Sparta, still the governing state, and all Greece, of their magnanimous attachment to the common cause.

38. Let. xi.

39. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xxi.

40. Id. ibid.

41. Macedonia had been subjected to the Persian dominion, as we have seen, (Lett. xi.) by Mardonius, in the reign of Darius. (Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xliv.) Alexander was then on the Macedonian throne; and, though he affected friendship to Greece, and claimed at Olympia his Grecian descent (Herodot. lib. v. cap. xxii.), he had ever since publicly adhered to the Persian interest.

42. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxxvi.

43. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxliii. For they knew that the Lacedæmonians, as soon as they heard of the deputation of the king of Macedonia, on the part of the barbarian, would send ambassadors to Athens. Id. ibid.

When

PART I.

When the Athenians were assembled⁴⁴, in presence of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, the king of Macedonia spoke to the following purport. “Men of Athens, Mardonius hath sent me to inform you, that he has received a message from the king, in these words:—I forgive the Athenians all the injuries I have suffered from them. Therefore, Mardonius, act thus:—Restore them partly their country, with the power of retaining their own laws; and grant them part of any other country they shall choose. Moreover, if they will form a league with me, rebuild all their temples that I destroyed⁴⁵.”

“These are the instructions that were sent to me,” added Alexander, in the name of Mardonius; “and I am under the necessity of executing them, unless you reject the conditions⁴⁶.” He afterward offered several arguments in the character of the Persian general, in favour of the propositions of

44. As the families of the Athenians were still absent (Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxlii.), at Salamis, Troezen, or on board the fleet, this assembly could consist only of the senators, and other principal citizens: who had returned to their desolated capital, for the purpose of transacting public business. For although it does not appear, that Xerxes left any garrison in Athens, it was in too ruinous a state, and too little secure, for the people to return to it, until they were acquainted with the fate of the army under Mardonius.

45. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxl. The destruction of the Grecian temples and idols by the Persians, as I have formerly had occasion to observe (Lett. x.) was the natural consequence of the purity of their national religion; in the principles of which the Persian monarchs were carefully instructed. Hence their detestation of idolatry, and the rage with which they assailed its sacred mansions. The proffer of Xerxes to rebuild the Athenian temples, was, therefore, a greater sacrifice, than the proposed restitution of the territory of the republic, or the addition of any other Grecian domain. In offering only to restore part of the Athenian territory, he seems to have intended, not doubting of the success of Mardonius, to establish a military station in Attica.

46. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxl.

Xerxes;

Xerxes; and then, in his proper character, he said,
 “ Those, Athenians, are the matters Mardonius com-
 “ missioned me to declare to you. On my own part,
 “ I shall forbear to mention my friendship for your
 “ state; because the present is not the only instance
 “ in which you have experienced it. But let me
 “ beseech you to hearken to the message of Xerxes;
 “ for I foresee the impossibility of the Greeks being
 “ long able to contend with the force of the Persian
 “ empire. Had I not been convinced of this, I should
 “ never have consented to bring you such a message.
 “ Accept, therefore, the munificent propositions of
 “ the Persian monarch. You alone of all the con-
 “ federated Greeks, and the most exposed to depre-
 “ dation, hath he condescended to forgive the injuries
 “ committed against him; and, if you shall embrace
 “ his proffered friendship and alliance, great will be
 “ the power and glory of Athens⁴⁷.”

The arguments of the king of Macedonia roused
 the Spartan ambassadors; and they spoke to this
 effect: “ The Lacedæmonians have sent us hither
 “ to request that you will introduce no novelties into
 “ the affairs of Greece, nor listen to the propositions
 “ of the barbarian; because such proceedings are
 “ unjust and dishonourable to any Grecian people;
 “ and least of all becoming the Athenians, for many
 “ reasons. In the first place, you were the authors
 “ of the war, which has now spread through all
 “ Greece. And what can be more shameful, than
 “ that the Greeks should be brought into servitude
 “ by means of the Athenians?—who have, in times
 “ past, rescued so many states from slavery.

“ We affectionately take part in your sufferings;
 “ we are grieved to see you twice lose the produce

47. Id. *ibid*.

PART I.

“ of your lands, and be so long deprived of the com-
 “ fort of your families and habitations. But, in com-
 “ pensation, the Lacedæmonians and the other con-
 “ federates promise, to provide subsistence for your
 “ wives; and all other persons belonging to you,
 “ unfit to bear arms, until the termination of the war.
 “ Be not, therefore, seduced by the delusive colour-
 “ ing, which Alexander the Macedonian has put
 “ upon the Persian’s message to Mardonius. He
 “ acts in conformity with his character and condi-
 “ tion: he aids the tyrant, because he is a tyrant
 “ himself. But if you judge wisely, you will pur-
 “ sue a different line of conduct; for you know that
 “ the barbarians are equally void of faith and truth⁴⁸. ”

When the Spartan ambassadors had done speak-
 ing, the Athenians gave the following answer to the
 king of Macedonia⁴⁹. “ We know the power of the
 “ Persian monarch is much greater than ours; and,
 “ therefore, enlargement on that invidious subject
 “ might, in decency, have been spared. But, in
 “ maintainance of our liberty, we will resist his
 “ force, as long as we are able. So that your
 “ endeavours, to draw us into a league with the
 “ barbarian, will prove as ineffectual as they are
 “ disgusting. Go then, and tell Mardonius the
 “ Athenians declare, that, while the sun continues
 “ to perform his course, they will never enter into
 “ an alliance with Xerxes; but confiding in the
 “ assistance of their gods and deified heroes, whose
 “ temples and images he has contemptuously de-
 “ stroyed, and devoured with fire, will persist in
 “ prosecuting war against him⁵⁰. ”

48. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxlii.

49. According to Plutarch (in *Vit. Aristid.*), this answer was deli-
 vered by Aristides. But Herodotus gives it as the collective sense
 of the Athenian people, without naming any person. Xanthippus
 was archon for the year.

50. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxliii.

Having

Having thus answered the king of Macedonia, the Athenians next addressed the Spartan ambassadors. "In being apprehensive," said they, "that we might form an alliance with Xerxes, the Lacedæmonians have judged rightly on the common principles of human conduct; but illiberally in regard to the Athenians, whom they ought better to have known. No bribes, no promises; not all the gold in the world, and the offer of the richest and most beautiful country on the face of the earth, could induce us to join the Persians, and betray the liberties of Greece. Many and powerful are the reasons that restrain us from so acting, were we even so disposed. Among these, the first and strongest is, the destruction of the temples and images of the Grecian gods; a sacrilege, which we are bound to avenge, instead of contracting an alliance with the man who has perpetrated the atrocious crime. Then, as a Grecian people, connected by blood, and united by one language; having the same altars and sacrifices, and holding the same political opinions, the Athenians would act a disgraceful part, should they become the betrayers of Greece. Know, therefore, that so long as one Athenian warrior remains alive, we will never come to an accommodation with the barbarians⁵¹."

"For your kind attention to us," added they, "in offering to provide for our families, since we have lost our habitations and harvests, we return you thanks as gratefully as if we had received the benefit. But we shall take care to provide for them ourselves, and avoid being a burden to you. We only request, that your army be got in readiness with all possible expedition; for we have

51. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxliv.

"reason

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“ reason to apprehend, that the barbarian general
 “ will invade our territory, as soon as he hears
 “ that we have rejected the propositions of Xerxes.
 “ Therefore, to prevent his approach, the most pru-
 “ dent measure will be, to meet him with our com-
 “ bined forces in Bœotia⁵².”

The Lacedæmonian ambassadors having received this answer, accompanied with a demand in which they seemed to acquiesce, departed for Sparta. And the measures of Mardonius justified the apprehensions of the Athenians. No sooner was he informed by the king of Macedonia, of the resolution of the Athenian republic, than he quitted Thessaly, and began his march toward Attica; taking with him the forces of all the Greeks, in the Persian interest, that lay in his route⁵³.

In the prosecution of this march, Mardonius was encouraged by the Thessalian chiefs; who far from repenting of their former defection, openly espoused the barbarian cause⁵⁴. But when the Persian commander entered Bœotia, he received cooler counsel from the Thebans. Though not less zealous for the success of his arms, they deliberated more wisely. They told him that their country was the most eligible of any for him to encamp in; and if he would advance no farther, but there remain, he might become master of Greece without hazarding a battle; that the Greeks, when united, were so strong, he had found, as hardly to be conquered by all other nations. “ But if,” said they, “ you will follow
 “ our advice, you may frustrate, without difficulty,
 “ their best laid designs:—*Send money to the leading*
 “ *men of every state.* Thus you will split Greece

52. Id. *ibid.*

53. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. i.

54. Id. *ibid.*

“ into factions; and that accomplished, you may
“ easily subdue all who are not in your interest, and
“ also those that have received your bribes⁵⁵.

But this prudent counsel did not suit the ardent temper of Mardonius. He, therefore, pursued his march; entered Attica, and proceeded to Athens. He found, however, no Athenians there; those that had returned to their dismantled capital, having quitted it on hearing of his approach, and returned to Salamis, or on board the fleet, though not till they had lost all hopes of succour from the Peloponnesians⁵⁶: so that he quietly took possession of the desolated city, in the tenth month after it had been reduced by Xerxes⁵⁷.

Mardonius, proud of being master of Athens, and thinking the Athenians, a second time driven from their country, might now listen to proposals of peace and friendship with the king, sent Murchides, a Hellespontian Greek, to treat with them at Salamis⁵⁸. Murchides, on his arrival, was admitted to the Athenian senate or council of state; and after he had spoken according to his instructions, Lycidas, one of the senators, proposed that the offers of Mardonius should be referred to the assembly of the people. But the Athenians, convened in council, so swelled with rage at this motion; and those without, when informed of it, that Lycidas was instantly stoned to death. And the Athenian women, on learning the cause of the tumult, were inflamed with hate, to such a degree, that, encouraging one another, they went to the house of the execrated senator, and stoned to death his wife and children⁵⁹.

55. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. ii.

56. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. iii.

57. Id. ibid.

58. Herodotus. lib. ix. cap. iv.

59. Id. lib. ix. cap. v.

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The Athenians, thus awakened to indignation and resentment, keenly turned their eyes on their deserted condition; and sent ambassadors to Sparta, to reproach the Lacedæmonians, for having neglected to send their forces into Bœotia, in order to oppose the common enemy, and prevent the return of the barbarians into Attica. They were also instructed to remind the Lacedæmonians of the vast advantages the Persian general had offered, if they should espouse his master's cause; and to warn them, that unless the Athenians were speedily succoured, they would find unwelcome aid⁶⁰.

In this commission, the Athenian ambassadors were joined with those of Plataea and Megara⁶¹. On their arrival at Sparta, they went to the ephori; and said, "The Athenians have sent us hither to represent to you, that the Persian monarch is willing to restore our territory; and not only to form an alliance with us, on a footing of equality, but to give us any other territory we shall choose. Our veneration for the Grecian Jupiter, and our abhorrence of betraying the liberties of Greece, have withheld us from accepting his offers: yet, in reward of such firmness, we are neglected and betrayed by the Lacedæmonians.

"We know that we should consult our own interest more, by making peace with the great king, than by prosecuting the war; but we will never, unless compelled by necessity, come to an accommodation with him. This is our manner of demonstrating our sincere attachment to the confederated Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, who were in the utmost consternation, when we made such avowal, lest we

60. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. vi.

61. Id. ibid.

" should

“ should accept the conditions of Xerxes, were no
“ sooner informed of our determination never to be-
“ tray the Grecian cause, and had fortified the wall
“ upon the Isthmus to their defence, than they threw
“ off all regard for the safety of the Athenians. For
“ after they had agreed to meet us in Bœotia, in or-
“ der to oppose the Persian army, they left us to
“ shift for ourselves, and looked with indifference
“ on the irruption of the barbarians into Attica.

“ Dissatisfied with your past conduct, because
“ you have neglected to fulfil your engagements, the
“ Athenians now exhort you, to send your forces to
“ join them with all possible expedition; that, hav-
“ ing lost the opportunity of meeting Mardonius in
“ Bœotia, we may find him in Attica. And the
“ Thriasion plain is the most convenient place, in
“ our territory, for joining battle⁶².”

When the ephori had heard this remonstrance, they delayed their answer till next day, and from that day to another; studiously protracting time, from day to day, till ten days were elapsed. During this interval, all the Peloponnesians worked with the utmost diligence for finishing the fortifications of the wall at the Corinthian isthmus⁶³.

The

62. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. vii.

63. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. viii. “I can give no other reason,” says this original historian, “for the exertions the Lacedæmonians made to prevent the Athenians from taking part with the Persian monarch, when Alexander the Macedonian was at Athens, and of their total neglect of them afterward; but that, having secured the isthmus with a wall, they had no farther need of their Athenian allies. Whereas, when Alexander was at Athens, their wall was not finished; but they were hard at work on it, and much afraid of the Persians” (Herodot. ubi sup.). But he had formerly told us (*Historiar.* lib. ii. cap. cxxxix, et lib. viii. cap. xl.), that the Peloponnesians had secured the Corinthian isthmus with a wall, before the invasion of Attica by Xerxes. He must, therefore, here mean

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The day before the meeting of the popular assembly, Chileus of Tegea, a man highly esteemed by the Spartans, having learned, from one of the ephori, the substance of the Athenian remonstrance, spoke to the following purport. "The matter thus stands: "if the Athenians separate themselves from you, "and join the barbarian, he will enter Peloponnesus "by passes large enough⁶⁴, notwithstanding the "fortifications erected at the Corinthian isthmus. "Hearken, therefore, to the Athenians, before they "embrace any resolution hurtful to Greece⁶⁵."

The ephori, having deliberated on the advice of Chileus, sent out the same night, and without acquainting the ambassadors, five thousand Spartans, all heavy armed, with seven helots to attend each, under the conduct of Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus⁶⁶. These troops should have been led by Plistarchus, the son of Leonidas⁶⁷; Leutchides, the other Spartan king, being on board the fleet. But because Plistarchus was under age, the command of the Lacedæmonian army was intrusted to Pausanias, his guardian and near relation⁶⁸.

Knowing nothing of the march of this army, and intending to return to their several states, the ambassadors went early next morning to the ephori, and said, "You, Lacedæmonians! are living at your ease, "and celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus⁶⁹, while

mean such additional fortifications, as should render that wall impregnable, in the opinion of the Peloponnesian confederates.

64. Alluding to the descents that might be made, by sea, after the junction of the Athenian and Persian fleets.

65. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. ix.

66. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. x.

67. Id. *ibid.*

68. Herodotus, *ubi sup.*

69. The *Hyacinthia* was one of the highest festivals in the Spartan calendar. It lasted three days, and was celebrated with alternate mourning and rejoicing. Pausan. in *Lacon*.

"other

“ other states are exposed to ruin. But know, the
“ Athenians betrayed by you, and destitute of sup-
“ port, will make peace with the Persian monarch
“ on such terms as they can obtain⁷⁰. When we
“ have so done, and are become the allies of the
“ great king,” added the Athenian ambassadors,
“ we shall be obliged to act with him against what-
“ ever country he shall lead us. And then you will
“ see the consequence of your selfish councils⁷¹.”

After the ambassadors had thus spoken, the ephori declared to them, that the Spartan army was in full march toward the isthmus, with orders to act against the common enemy⁷². Not comprehending this discourse, the ambassadors desired to know the meaning of it; and when informed of the whole truth, and assured of it upon oath, they took their departure⁷³. Five thousand more heavy armed men, drawn from the places adjacent to Sparta, marched out, at the same time, to join Pausanias⁷⁴. So that the Lacedæmonian forces mustered, on this occasion, amounted to forty-five thousand disciplined soldiers; exclusive of the helots, one to each free man⁷⁵, that attended the second detachment of five thousand warriors, furnished by the municipal towns and country of Laconia. For the helots that accompanied the five thousand Spartans, seven to each warrior, had been regularly trained to arms⁷⁶. All the helots acted as light troops⁷⁷.

While the Lacedæmonian army was advancing to the isthmus, the Argives sent a messenger to Athens, to acquaint Mardonius of its march, under the con-

70. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xi.

71. Id. *ibid*,

72. Id. *Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xi.*

73. Id. *ibid*.

74. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

75. Id. *Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxix.*

76. Id. *ibid*.

77. Id. Herodot. lib. ix. cap. xxix.

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duct of Pausanias⁷⁸. They had undertaken to oppose it, but found themselves unequal to the attempt⁷⁹.

Mardonius no sooner received information of the march of the Lacedæmonians, than he resolved to leave Attica; it being, by reason of its irregular surface, unfit for cavalry to act in. And he had another reason for quitting it. If he should there have lost a battle, he had no means of retreat but through narrow defiles, where a small number of troops might have obstructed a great army⁸⁰. Hitherto he had not only foreborn to ravage the country, but indulgently spared it, in hopes that the Athenians would make their peace with the Persian monarch⁸¹. Understanding, however, that their resolution was now taken for war; and that they would soon make head against him, in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and other confederates, he determined to retire into Bœotia; a country more friendly to the operations of cavalry, and where the people were devoted to his master's cause⁸². But before he left Attica, in the fury of rage and chagrin of disappointment, he set fire to Athens; and demolished whatever remained standing of the walls, houses, or temples of that ancient city, and early seat of learning and civility, laying all in ruins⁸³.

The Persian commander having quitted Attica, marched toward Megara, where he was informed a body of Lacedæmonians were posted, and sent out his horse to scour the country⁸⁴: but afterward understanding that the combined forces of the Peloponnesian confederates were assembled at the Corinthian isthmus, changed his route; and was conducted

78. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xii.

79. Id. *ibid.*

80. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xiii.

81. Id. *ibid.*

82. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xiii.

83. Id. *ibid.*

84. Herodot. lib. ix. cap. xiv.

by Bœotian guides, by the way of Sphondale and Tanagra, to Colon, in the territory of Thebes⁸⁵. In that neighbourhood, he chose a defensible station for his army, and fortified it with all diligence, lest he should not have the wished for success in battle⁸⁶. This station, secured by a wall and a ditch, formed a square of ten furlongs on each side⁸⁷; and his camp extended from Erythra to the territory of Plateæa, along the river Asopus⁸⁸.

Before Mardonius entered Attica, all the Greeks, in the Persian interest, had joined him in Bœotia with their forces, except the Phoceans; who, against their will, had been compelled to take part with the barbarians⁸⁹. But soon after the return of the Persian general to Bœotia, the Phoceans also joined him with a thousand men; heavy-armed, and led by Harmocydes, a citizen of great authority among them⁹⁰. When they arrived, Mardonius sent out a party of horse, to order them to encamp by themselves on the plain. This they had no sooner done, than all the cavalry of the Persian army appeared embattled in sight⁹¹.

In consequence of this hostile array, a rumour was spread among the Grecian forces in the army of Mardonius, that the barbarian horse were commanded to massacre the Phoceans⁹². The same rumour having found its way into the supposed devoted body, Harmocydes, the Phocæan leader, thus addressed his troops:—"These men, O Phoceans! have a design to cut us off; and I believe the Thessalians are our accusers. Let me, therefore, exhort

85. Id. lib. ix. cap. xv.

86. Id. ibid.

87. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xv. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 24, vol. ii. edit. Rhodoman.

88. Id. ibid.

89. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xvii.

90. Id. ibid.

91. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xvii.

92. Id. ibid.

"every

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“ every one of you to behave valiantly on this trying occasion; for it will be more honourable for us to die bravely, fighting in our own defence, than tamely to suffer ourselves to be slaughtered. Be it ours then, to convince these barbarians, that they are not a match for a handful of Greeks, whose murder they have purposed⁹³. ”

When Harmodius had thus encouraged his followers to meet death undismayed, the barbarian cavalry, having surrounded them on all sides, advanced in battalia, brandishing their javelins; but seeing the Phocæan phalanx standing firm, combined in the closest order, and fronting every way, they faced about, and joined the Persian army⁹⁴. I cannot certainly tell, says Herodotus⁹⁵, whether this body of cavalry came to destroy the Phocæans, or only to try their courage; but, after its return, Mardonius sent them a message, in these words:—
 “ Fear no hurt, Phocæans! you have given proof that you are men of steady valour, and belied the information I had received of your character. Bear the toils of this war with fortitude; and rest assured, that you will never do more for the king or for me, than we will for you⁹⁶. ”

Meantime the Lacedæmonian army, under Pausanias, having encamped at the Corinthian isthmus, was there joined by the forces of such of the other Peloponnesians, as had the common cause at heart, or whom the fear of shame incited to arms⁹⁷. After offering their sacrifices auspiciously, the whole body of the Peloponnesian confederates, marched from the isthmus, and advanced to Eleusis⁹⁸. They sacrificed again with the same fortunate presages,

93. Herodotus, Historiar. ubi sup.

94. Id. lib. ix. cap. xviii.

95. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xviii.

96. Herodot. ubi sup.

97. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xix.

98. Id. ibid.

at that celebrated seat of superstition; and having formed a junction with eight thousand Athenians from Salamis, under the command of Aristides, they prosecuted their march for Bœotia⁹⁹. On their arrival at Erythra, the Greeks discovered the barbarian army encamped in the plain between them and the river Asopus; and after holding a council of war, they pitched their camp right opposite that of the enemy, in the branches of mount Cithæron¹⁰⁰.

Thus strongly posted, the confederated Greeks were in no haste to give battle to the barbarians. They even despised every provocation to draw them down to the plain¹⁰¹. Mardonius, therefore, sent all his cavalry, commanded by Masistius, a general in high estimation among the Persians, to force the Grecian camp¹⁰². The barbarian horse advanced to the charge in squadrons; by which mode of attack, they did great execution with their missile weapons. And, glorying in their success, they insultingly challenged the Greeks to fight, under the name of women¹⁰³.

The Megareans, who were most exposed to these insults, as they were posted nearest the plain, sent a trumpeter to the Grecian generals, with a message to the following import. “ Friends and allies! “ the Megareans say thus: We are not able alone “ to sustain the shock of the Persian cavalry; hav- “ ing had the same station from the beginning that “ we now defend, and in which we have hitherto “ maintained ourselves by our valour and fortitude, “ though not without much difficulty. And, unless “ other forces are sent to our assistance, we must “ abandon our post¹⁰⁴.”

99. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xix.

100. Id. ibid.

101. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xx.

102. Id. ibid.

103. Herodot. ubi sup.

104. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xxi.

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When that message was delivered, Pausanias, the Lacedæmonian general, as commander in chief, sounded the courage of all the confederated Greeks; to learn if the forces of any one state would voluntarily offer to march to the support of the Megareans, in their exposed station: but no such offer was made¹⁰⁵. After this silent refusal, three hundred Athenian spearmen, panting for the post of danger, started forth under the conduct of Olympiodorus the son of Lompon; and being accompanied by a party of archers, of their own choosing, long baffled all the efforts of the enemy to break into the Megarean station¹⁰⁶. But the barbarian cavalry still continuing to attack in squadrons, the Athenians, perpetually harassed, and hard pressed, were ready to give ground, when Masistius, advancing at the head of the whole body of his troops, in order to make the grand assault, his horse was wounded in the side with an arrow; and rearing, impatient of the pain, threw his rider¹⁰⁷.

The Athenians seeing Masistius fall, immediately surrounded him; and having first seized his horse, which wore a bridle of gold, and all the other furniture proportionably rich, killed him while he strove to defend himself¹⁰⁸. That, however, they did not effect without difficulty; because, beneath a purple cloak, he wore a cuirass covered with mails of gold¹⁰⁹. They tried in vain to penetrate this cuirass. That obstruction, an Athenian perceiving, thrust a spear into his head through the aperture in the helmet for the eye; and, in consequence of that wound, he fell down dead¹¹⁰.

The troops of Masistius at first knew nothing of his death; for they neither saw him, when he fell from

105. Id. *ibid*.

106. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxii.

107. Id. *ibid*.108. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xxi.109. Id. *ibid*.110. Herodot. *ubi sup*.

his horse, nor when he was slain¹¹¹. But making a halt in their evolution or retreat, to which they had been forced by the exulting Athenians, they found they had no commander; and no sooner were they apprised of the fate of Masistius, than, animating one another, they pushed their horses, in one body, against the enemy, in order to carry off the corpse of their general¹¹².

When the Athenians found the barbarian cavalry no longer attacked in squadrons, severe as such reiterated assaults were, but with their whole strength, they demanded succour from the Grecian main body. But before any aid came, the Athenian volunteers, unable to maintain their post, were forced to give ground¹¹³. The enemy's horse, however, abandoned the body of Masistius, when a detachment from the Grecian army advanced to the support of the Athenians and Megareans, and retiring to the distance of about two furlongs, to consult together, resolved to return to Mardonius, as they had lost their leader¹¹⁴.

The Greeks having thus sustained, and repelled the attack of the barbarian cavalry, were greatly heartened. And because many of their troops, from a desire to view the body of Masistius, had quitted their ranks, they placed it on a chariot, and carried it through every quarter of the camp¹¹⁵; "a spectacle worthy of admiration," says Herodotus, "because of his stature and comeliness¹¹⁶."

If the Greeks were elated at the death of Masistius, the Persians were depressed in an equal or greater degree. When the cavalry returned to the camp of

111. Id. *ibid.*

112. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxii.

113. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xxiii.

114. Id. *ibid.*

115. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxv.

116. *Historiar.* ubi sup.

Mardonius,

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Mardonius, and related the disastrous fate of their commander, the whole army broke out into the loudest lamentations; and raised such a voice of mourning, that the howling was heard wide over Bœotia¹¹⁷. Masistius, after Mardonius, stood highest in esteem, with the king and with the army, of all the Persian leaders¹¹⁸. The afflicted barbarians, in token of their sorrow for the loss of so able a general, cut off their hair, and also the manes of their horses and beasts of draught¹¹⁹.

The Greeks, however, who ought to have derived confidence from finding, that they could resist the impulse of the Median and Persian cavalry, and who had the glory and advantage of having deprived them of a gallant commander, resolved to quit their camp near Erythra, and seek a more distant post. They accordingly marched by the foot of mount Cythæron, while the barbarians were mourning the death of Masistius; and passing by Hisia, into the territory of the Plataeans, encamped in a plain, broken by defiles, in the neighbourhood of the Gargaphian spring, and the temple of the hero Androcrates¹²⁰. When they arrived there, a particular station was assigned to the forces of each state¹²¹.

117. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxiv.

118. Id. ibid.

119. Herodot. ubi sup. et Plut. *Vit. Aristid.* The death of Masistius may be considered as the ruin of the Persian affairs in Europe. For Mardonius had no other experienced general to command his cavalry, nor any on whose fidelity he could depend; Artabazus being envious of his superior rank, and inimical to the Grecian expedition. Herodotus, *Historiar.* lib. ix. passim.

120. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxv. Herodotus says, the Greeks moved to this place that they might be better supplied with water (*Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xxv.). Plutarch makes them choose it from motives of superstition (*Vit. Aristid.*). Both probably had their influence; but it is also probable, that the Greeks, in shifting their camp, sought for, at least, a temporary relief from the attacks of the barbarian cavalry, whose missile weapons had so much galled them.

121. Id. ibid.

In the distribution of these stations, a dangerous dispute arose. The Lacedæmonians occupying, as their pre-eminent post, the right of the army, the Tegeans contested with the Athenians the honour of being posted at the head of the left wing¹²²; urging both their ancient and recent exploits, as well as established custom, to justify their claim to such station¹²³. And to them the second post of honour certainly belonged, in acting only with their Peloponnesian confederates.

After the Tegeans had spoken, the Athenians offered their pretensions to the envied station. Having exhibited, by way of answer, the gallant actions of their countrymen, they magnanimously concluded thus:—"The present momentous crisis
"being utterly improper for such competitions, we
"readily refer the settling of the dispute to you,
"Lacedæmonians! and will take our station in
"whatever quarter you shall think most consistent
"with the interest of the common cause of Greece.
"Give judgment, therefore, assured of our cheerful acquiescence, and hearty co-operation. For,
"wherever we are stationed, we shall endeavour
"to do our duty as soldiers¹²⁴." The Lacedæmonians unanimously declared, that the Athenians were more worthy of the post they claimed, than the Arcadians of Tegea¹²⁵. And the Tegeans submitted to the decision.

This competition being happily settled, the Grecian forces were arranged in the following line of battle: ten thousand Lacedæmonians, under the immediate conduct of Pausanias, the commander in chief, formed the strength of the right wing of the army. And five thousand of these, being citizens

122. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxvi. xxvii. et Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*

123. *Id. ibid.*

124. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xxvii.

125. *Id. lib. ix. cap. xxviii.*

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All these forces, according to the quotas above stated by Herodotus, composed an army of forty thousand heavy armed men: and the light troops, including the forty thousand helots, that accompanied the Spartans and provincial Lacedæmonians, amounted to seventy thousand; every heavy armed Greek being attended by a light-armed soldier¹²⁸. Consequently the whole Grecian army, encamped near Plataea, consisted of one hundred and ten thousand combatants.

Mardonius, after he had celebrated the funeral of Masistius, hearing that the Greeks had quitted their

126. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxviii.

127. Id. *ibid*.

128. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xxix.

camp at Erythra, and marched into the territory of the Plataeans, instantly put his army in motion, and took post in the front of their line; disposing his forces in this manner. Over against the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans he stationed the Persians. Next to the Persians he posted the Medes; fronting the Corinthians, Potidæans, Orcomenians, and Sicyonians. The Bactrians were opposed to the Epidaurians, Troezenians, Lepræans, Tyrinthians, Mycenæans, and Philasians; the Indians to the Hermionians, Eretrians, Styrians, and Chalcideans; the Sacæ, to the Ambracians, Anactorians, Leucadians, Paleans, and Æginetes. And all the auxiliary Greeks, with the troops of Macedonia and the bordering districts, Mardonius opposed to the Athenians, Plataeans, and Megareans¹²⁹.

I have been thus circumstantial, my lord, in regard to the operations of the Greeks and barbarians; because the event of the battle, depending upon them, was finally to determine the fate of Grecian freedom and independency. But these operations, as described by Herodotus, henceforth become so complicated, that, in order to avoid tediousness, I shall hasten to the awful decision; yet without omitting any important circumstance.

The Grecian and barbarian armies remained eight days opposed to each other, in their several stations, without making any hostile attempt¹³⁰. During all

129. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxx. Herodotus computes the Grecian auxiliaries, in the army of Mardonius, at fifty thousand (Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxxi.); but declares, that their number could not be ascertained with any degree of certainty, it not having been taken (Id. ibid). Of the number of Macedonians he takes no notice, but probably includes them among the auxiliary Greeks, as we here find them posted together. The barbarian forces of Mardonius he still calculates (ubi sup.) at three hundred thousand.

130. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxxviii.

that

PART I. that time they were employed in offering sacrifices for success, and consulting augurs¹³¹; for Mardonius had a Grecian augur in his pay, and the Greeks in his camp another¹³². On the eighth day Timegenides, a Theban chief, observing the Grecian army continually augmenting, in consequence of the arrival of fresh troops, advised Mardonius to guard the passes of mount Cithæron¹³³.

Approving of this counsel, the Persian general sent a party of horse, early in the following night, to take post at the pass of Cithæron that led to Plataea; called by the Bœotians the Three Heads, but by the Athenians the Heads of Oak¹³⁴. That detachment, passing the mountain-ridge, and entering the plain on the other side, took five hundred cattle carrying provisions from Peloponnesus to the Grecian army, with the men that attended the convoy; and after slaughtering, without distinction, both man and beast, carried off what seemed fit to be preserved, and returned to the camp of Mardonius¹³⁵.

Both armies passed many days, after the surprise of this convoy, without coming to a general engagement; neither party being willing to give battle¹³⁶. Meanwhile the cavalry of Mardonius, making perpetual excursions, harassed the Grecian camp¹³⁷. In these desultory encounters, the Thebans, hearty in the Persian interest, greatly distinguished themselves; leading their forces as near as possible to the confederated Greeks, that a battle might take place¹³⁸.

131. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxxii—xxxvii.

132. Id. *ibid*.

133. Herodotus, *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xxxvii.

134. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxxviii.

135. Id. *ibid*.

136. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxxix.

137. Id. *ibid*.

138. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xxxix.

And the Persians and Medes, by whom they were supported, gave signal proofs of valour¹³⁹.

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XIII.

Ten days having thus elapsed, since the hostile armies had faced each other in the territory of Plataea, Mardonius, tired with such indecisive operations, called a council of war. Artabazus, the only Persian general of high rank that remained, moved that they should break up the camp without farther delay, and take post under the walls of Thebes; where they would find plenty of provision for themselves, and forage for their horses¹⁴⁰. Being there encamped he observed, they might accomplish the object of their enterprise at leisure; for having great store of gold, coined and uncoined, with much silver and wrought plate, if they would not be sparing of those treasures, but send them liberally to the popular leaders in each Grecian state, they might subdue all Greece without hazarding the event of a battle¹⁴¹.

The Theban chiefs, assembled on the occasion, seconded this counsel; as it corresponded with that which they had formerly given to Mardonius. But

139. Id. *ibid*.

140. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xl. If there was plenty of forage and provisions at Thebes, the Persian army might have been amply supplied with both in its present station. And far more abundantly than the Greeks, whose provisions were brought from a greater distance, and whose convoys were liable to be intercepted by the barbarian cavalry that guarded the defiles of mount Cithæron; whereas the convoys of Mardonius could suffer no interruption, in passing from Thebes to Plataea. That Bœotia could long furnish the whole Persian army with forage and provisions, the Thebans often declared (Herodot. lib. viii. ix. *passim*). I shall, therefore, set at naught every thing that is said, in regard to the scarcity of food, either for man or beast, in the camp of Mardonius; for, as already observed, the Greeks must have been in much greater want. He had money to purchase, and certain means of supply: they none, but what were precarious.

141. Id. *ibid*.

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he, despising such insidious policy, and depending upon the valour of his troops, declared for an immediate engagement¹⁴². They ought not, he said, to look idly on till farther reinforcements should join the Greeks; nor heed the sacrifices of Hegesistratus, (his Grecian auger) but resolve to fight according to the manner of the Persians¹⁴³. And he being invested with the chief command, his opinion was not controverted¹⁴⁴.

When Mardonius had embraced the resolution of fighting the enemy in contempt of timed counsels, and in defiance of the presages of hireling prophets, he called an assembly of the Grecian generals in his army; and after endeavouring to quiet their fears, in regard to the oracles that threatened the Persians with destruction in Greece, he ordered them to put their troops in martial array, and be prepared to give battle next morning¹⁴⁵.

Mardonius having taken these preparatory measures retired to his tent. The guards were set, and the army sunk in sleep¹⁴⁶. But the politic and intriguing king of Macedonia remained awake. When night was far spent, and all seemed still in the Persian camp, he mounted his horse; advanced to the Athenian guard, near which he was posted, and desired to speak with Aristides. Having obtained audience of that general, he informed him of the purpose of Mardonius, and conjured him to conceal the secret intelligence from all men but Pausanias¹⁴⁷; artfully offering a claim upon the generosity of the Greeks, if the war should terminate in their favour. “ In that

142. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xl.

143. Id. ibid.

144. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xli.

145. Id. ibid.

146. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xliii.

147. Compare Herodot. lib. ix. cap. xliv. with Plut. Vit. Aristid.

“ event,”

“ event,” said he, “ they ought to remember the
“ man who, from a desire of preserving their liber-
“ ties, and in order to prevent them from being sur-
“ prised by the barbarians, has voluntarily hazarded
“ his life. I am Alexander the Macedonian¹⁴⁸!”—
Having thus concluded, he returned undiscovered to
his station¹⁴⁹.

Aristides, attended by his principal officers, waited upon Pausanias, and communicated the information he had received from the king of Macedonia¹⁵⁰. A council of war was called; in which Pausanias, alarmed at the prospect of immediately encountering an untried enemy, proposed that the Athenians, being acquainted with the Persian manner of fighting, to which he and his troops were utter strangers, should change stations with the Lacedæmonians, and take post on the right¹⁵¹. Aristides replied, that the Athenians, as soon as they saw the disposition of the barbarian army, would have made such offer, had they not been affraid it might offend the Spartans¹⁵². The desired change was accordingly effected; the Athenians moving to the right, and the Lacedæmonians to the left wing¹⁵³.

This change of stations, though made as soon as light served, was perceived by the Bœotians. They

148. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xliv.

149. Id. *ibid.* In this perfidious boldness of Alexander I can see nothing generous, or which contradicts my former judgment of his character. Enjoying the favour of the Persian monarch, and willing to secure friends, whatever might be the event of the war, he ventured to inform the confederated Greeks of the purpose of Mardonius; in order to screen himself from their resentment, if they should prove victorious, and even to conciliate their friendship. His leading object seems always to have been the same; *ambition*, skulking under the disguise of the professed friend, and pliant but treacherous tributary.

150. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xlv. et Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*

151. Id. *ibid.*

152. Herodot. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xvi.

153. Id. lib. ix. cap. xvi. et Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*

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informed Mardonius of it, and he made a similar change in the disposition of his army; opposing the Persians again to the Lacedæmonians, and the auxiliary Greeks to the Athenians¹⁵⁴. Pausanias, on discovering that new arrangement, returned with his forces to the right of the line; and Mardonius, in like manner, moved the Persians and Medes to the left¹⁵⁵.

Fretted at such shifting of posts, in which the morning had been wasted, Mardonius, who wished to engage the Persian foot in close-fight with the Lacedæmonians, whom he had been taught to believe the bravest and firmest of all the confederated Greeks—men, who would rather die than quit their ground—now held them in contempt for their apparent pusillanimity¹⁵⁶. He, therefore, in the height of his scorn, sent a herald to challenge Pausanias to meet him with an equal number of men, Spartans against Persians. And thus to decide the quarrel between the Greeks and barbarians; the rest of the army to look on till the combat was ended, and then to join battle¹⁵⁷. Having received no answer to that message, the Persian general swelled into triumphant exultation; and, instead of pressing a general engagement, ordered his cavalry again to insult the Grecian camp¹⁵⁸.

This attack, which was more furious, and less desultory, than any of the former, threw the whole Grecian army into disorder; but especially the Lacedæmonian forces, who were driven from their station, by the showers of javelins and arrows, poured amongst them¹⁵⁹. And the cavalry of Mardonius choaked, with their trampling, the Gargaphian spring, in the Lacedæmonian quarter, which solely supplied the

154. Id. *ibid.*156. Id. *Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xlvii.*158. Herodotus, *lib. ix. cap. xlviii.*155. Herodot. *ubi sup.*157. Id. *ibid.*159. Id. *ibid.*

Greeks with water; for, although the Asopus was at no great distance, the enemy's horse had deterred them from ever approaching that river¹⁶⁰.

The Grecian generals, thus circumstanced, destitute of water for their troops, and put into confusion by the barbarian cavalry, held a council of war; in order to deliberate concerning those and other matters¹⁶¹. Bad as the want of water was, they were still more hardly pressed for want of provisions¹⁶². These they could only receive from Peloponnesus; and the troops of Mardonius being in possession of the passes of mount Cithæron, none of their convoys could safely reach the camp¹⁶³. They, therefore, resolved to move nearer Plataea, if the enemy should defer giving battle that day, and take shelter in a creek of the river Asopus, secured by hills and defiles; that they might have sufficient supply of water, and be no longer harassed by the attacks of the enemy's cavalry; which, in their present situation, they were not able to sustain¹⁶⁴. They also resolved, that when they should have reached their destined station, they would send out one half of their forces, under night, to mount Cithæron; in order to bring forward a convoy of provisions, that had stopped behind the defiles, for fear of the enemy¹⁶⁵.

Having taken these resolutions, the Greeks remained all day in their camp, and suffered much from the barbarian horse¹⁶⁶. But when that hour of night was come, at which they had agreed to decamp, the greater number, lifting their arms, marched away, without any intention of going to the place appointed: whilst others, on the breaking up of the

160. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. xlviii.

161. Herodotus,

lib. ix. cap. xlix.

162. Id. *ibid.*

163. Herodot. *ubi. sup.*

164. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. l.

165. Id. *ibid.*

166. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. li.

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camp, desirous to avoid the assault of the enemy's cavalry, hastened toward Plataea¹⁶⁷. And arriving at the temple of Juno, which stood before the city (twenty furlongs distant from the Gargaphian spring), there grounded their arms, and encamped¹⁶⁸.

Pausanias having seen these troops file off, and supposing they were marching to the general rendezvous, ordered the Lacedæmonians to follow them¹⁶⁹. This order was readily obeyed by all the leaders, except Amompharetus, the commander of the Pitanæan division. He declared, that he would not voluntarily quit his post, nor willingly bring disgrace upon Sparta¹⁷⁰. And persevering in his resolution, in spite of all arguments, he took up a stone with both his hands, and laying it at the feet of Pausanias, said, "There is my vote to testify, that we ought not to flee from the strangers¹⁷¹!" meaning the barbarians, observes Herodotus¹⁷². Hence it appears, that the Lacedæmonians, being yet rude themselves, had not hitherto applied the opprobrious appellation of barbarian to the people of foreign nations.

The dispute with Amompharetus continued till morning¹⁷³. Meanwhile the Athenians, at the request of Pausanias, remained in their post¹⁷⁴. When light began to appear, Pausanias conjecturing that Amompharetus would not be left behind, gave the signal for marching; and took his route by the hills, with the main body of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans¹⁷⁵. At the same time, the Athenians marched, in order of battle, by the way of the plain; but the Spartans, still smarting from the assaults

167. Id. *ibid.*168. Herodot. *ubi sup.*169. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. lii.170. Id. *ibid.*

171. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. liv.

172. *Historiar.* *ubi sup.*

173. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lv.

174. Id. *ibid.*175. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. lv.

of the barbarian horse, and, fearing a new attack, kept studiously on the higher grounds, above the foot of mount Cithæron¹⁷⁶.

LETTER
XIII.

When Amompharetus saw that Pausanias, and the main body of the Lacedæmonians, had actually quitted the camp, he led his troops slowly after them¹⁷⁷. And they, after a march of about ten furlongs, halted at the river Molois, where a temple stood, dedicated to the Eleusinian Ceres¹⁷⁸: they halted, in order to wait his approach, or return to his assistance, if he and his division should persist in their resolution not to quit their post¹⁷⁹. Here Amompharetus formed a junction with Pausanias; and the Lacedæmonian army prosecuted its march, but not without being harassed. For the barbarian horse, at sun-rise, going to insult the Grecian camp, as usual, and finding it deserted, pursued the Greeks, and greatly incommoded them in their march¹⁸⁰.

Intelligence of the decampment of the Greeks, by night, soon reached the ear of Mardonius; who, considering it as a flight, instantly put the Persians in motion, and came up with the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans¹⁸¹. The other commanders of the barbarian forces, seeing the Persians in pursuit of the enemy, also lifted their standards, and hastened after them; but without observing any form of discipline, or order in their march, and yelling as if they had been tearing the Greeks in pieces¹⁸².

Ant. Chr.
479.
Sept. 24.
Olympiad
lxxv. 2.

Meanwhile Pausanias, finding his troops furiously assaulted by the enemy's cavalry, which first came up with them, had dispatched a messenger on horse-

176. Id. *ibid*.

177. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lvi.

178. Id. *ibid*.

179. Herodot. *ubi. sup*.

180. Id. *ibid*.

181. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lvii. lviii.

182. Id. lib. ix. cap. lviii.

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back to Aristides, requiring support; but especially the aid of a party of archers¹⁸³. The Athenian general instantly resolved to succour the Lacedæmonians, but was prevented by the Grecian auxiliaries of Mardonius¹⁸⁴. They had, as we have seen, been opposed to the Athenians, and now attacked them¹⁸⁵.

Thus deprived of assistance, harassed by the barbarian horse, and necessitated to engage the Persian forces under the conduct of Mardonius, the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans began to offer their usual sacrifices¹⁸⁶. During these sacrifices, which were by no means favourable, they had many men killed, and more wounded; by the great number of arrows, which the Persians shot with force and effect amongst them¹⁸⁷. When Pausanias saw the Spartans so terribly galled, and their sacrifices obstructed, he turned his eyes toward the temple of Juno at Platæa, and implored the goddess, that his hopes might not be frustrated¹⁸⁸. While he was uttering this supplication, the Tegeans began to advance against the barbarians¹⁸⁹.

On the conclusion of the prayer of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians sacrificed propitiously¹⁹⁰. And then they also made head against the Persians¹⁹¹, who, laying aside their missile weapons, stood firm, and maintained an obstinate battle near the temple of Ceres¹⁹². At length, both parties joined in close-fight; and so hot was the conflict, that the Persians, finding themselves incommoded by the long spears of the Lacedæmonians, their own being comparatively short, had the hardiness to take hold of

183. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lix.

184. Id. lib. ix. cap. lx.

185. Id. ibid.

186. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lx.

187. Id. ibid.

188. Herodot. ubi sup.

189. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxi.

190. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxi.

191. Id. ibid.

192. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxi.

those dreadful instruments of death, and twist them in pieces¹⁹³. For in courage and strength, says Herodotus¹⁹⁴, the Persians were not inferior to the Greeks; but they were ill armed, little skilled in discipline, and not equal to their antagonists in military prudence¹⁹⁵. So that whenever any party of them, whether consisting of a greater or smaller number, broke in among the Lacedæmonians, it was certainly cut off¹⁹⁶; they precipitating themselves, in small bodies, upon the enemy's compacted phalanx, and having no thought or method to regain their former station, when oppressed by numbers or force. Yet, in that part of the battle, where Mardonius, mounted on a white horse, fought at the head of a thousand Persians, all chosen men, the Greeks were still vigorously pushed, and many Lacedæmonians sunk in death¹⁹⁷. And, indeed, while he remained alive, the Spartans could with difficulty keep their ground¹⁹⁸; but when he fell, valiantly contending for victory¹⁹⁹, and the brave troops that guarded his person were broken, all the Persians turned their backs and fled²⁰⁰.

The flight of the Persians proved a signal to the foot of the whole barbarian army. When they saw

193. Id. *ibid.*

194. *Historiar. ubi sup.*

195. Id. *ibid.*

196. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxi.

197. Id. *Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxii.*

198. Id. *ibid.*

199. Diodorus, as well as Herodotus, bears testimony to the courage of Mardonius. The former declares that he fell bravely fighting at the head of his troops; (*Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 24, vol. ii. edit. sup. cit.*) and the latter says, in summing up the degrees of merit of the Greeks and barbarians, at the battle of Platæa, that Mardonius was the bravest of all the Persian generals) (*Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxx.*). If Masistius had survived, or if Mardonius had been properly supported by his remaining leaders, he would have subjected Greece to the Persian dominion. If he had survived himself, he would have crushed the Lacedæmonians under the barbarian force. His death may, therefore, be regarded as the greatest event in the annals of liberty.

200. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxii.

PART I. the forces of that conquering nation routed, they abandoned the field without striking a blow²⁰¹; and ran to the fortified station, which Mardonius had chosen in the Theban territory²⁰². In their retreat, however, the barbarian infantry were protected by their own cavalry, and also by the Bœotian and Thessalian horse²⁰³. Yet many of them fell by the way; for the Greeks hotly followed up their victory, and furiously assailed the fugitives²⁰⁴.

From the slaughter committed, in this bloody pursuit, forty thousand men, under the command of Artabazus, were exempt. Being adverse to the Grecian war, and inimical to the measures of Mardonius, this general never joined battle²⁰⁵. But ashamed to remain utterly inactive, he led on his forces, late in the action, as if he had intended to charge the enemy²⁰⁶; when, observing the Persians beginning to give ground, he basely betook himself to flight, and conducted his troops with all expedition toward the Hellespont²⁰⁷. Holding the route of the midland country, he marched through Thessaly and Macedonia; proceeded to Byzantium, and was safely landed on the Asiatic coast²⁰⁸.

I must now return to the Grecian auxiliaries of Xerxes, engaged with the army under the command of Aristides. Many of these behaved ill through design²⁰⁹; but the Bœotians, and especially the The-

201. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxvi.

202. Herodot. lib. ix.

cap. lxiv. 203. Id. lib. ix. cap. lxvii.

204. Herodot. ubi sup.

205. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxv.

206. Id. ibid.

207. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxv.

208. Id. lib. ix. cap. lxxxviii. Many of the troops of Artabazus perished through famine and fatigue; and part were cut off by the Thracians, in his march from the frontiers of Macedonia to Byzantium. Id. ibid.

209. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxvi.

bans, fought a fierce battle with the Athenians²¹⁰. Unremitted in their efforts, three hundred of their chief citizens, and most valiant soldiers, were killed on the spot²¹¹. And their main body, after being broken and put to flight by the Athenians, did not follow the Persians; nor the barbarian multitude, that fought none, nor discovered any indications of valour²¹², but fled toward Thebes²¹³.

While the Athenians were pursuing the Bœotians, and the Lacedæmonians the Persians, those Greeks who had deserted the general rendezvous, as we have seen, and encamped near the temple of Juno, under the walls of Plataea, having received intelligence of the success of Pausanias, bethought themselves of their misconduct, and attempted to wipe off the disgrace by coming in for a share in the victory. They accordingly hurried back, without observing regularity in their march; the Corinthians by the route of the hills, which led directly to the temple of Ceres, and the Megareans and Philasians by the way of the plain²¹⁴. But the Theban cavalry, commanded by Asophodorus, the son of Timander, seeing the Megarians and Philasians approaching in a disorderly manner, pushed forward their horses, and instantly rushed upon them, killed six hundred upon the spot, and drove the survivors to mount Cithæron²¹⁵. The Corinthians, by keeping on the higher grounds, where cavalry could not act, seem to have suffered no less; and being joined by the remainder of the Philasians, and by the Sicyonians and Træzenians, they engaged in a fruitless pursuit of Artabazus²¹⁶.

210. Id. *ibid.*

211. Id. *Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxvi.*

212. Id. *ibid.*

213. Herodotus, *ubi sup.*

214. Id. *lib. ix. lxix.*

215. Id. *ibid.*

216. Compare Herodotus, *Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxxvi.* with Diod. *Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 25. vol. ii.*

Meantime,

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Meantime, the main body of the Persians, and also the barbarian multitude, having reached their fortified camp, had adopted every measure, the occasion admitted of, for their defence; by manning the towers, and securing the entrenchments²¹⁷. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, when they came up, found a stout resistance; so vigorous, indeed, that until the Athenians returned from the pursuit of the Bœotians, the barbarians proved too hard a match for the forces under Pausanias, who were unskilled in the manner of attacking fortifications²¹⁸. But, when the Athenians arrived, the action grew hotter on both sides, and the contest was long and obstinate. At last, however, by their valour and perseverance, the Athenians beat off the barbarians from the ramparts; passed the ditch, and opened a passage in the pallisaded wall for the Grecian assailants²¹⁹. The Tegeans first entered the breach, and plundered the tent of Mardonius; taking away, as their peculiar prize, a manger of solid brass, admirably wrought, which they afterward dedicated in the temple of the Alean Minerva²²⁰. But the rest of the booty they brought to the common heap, and deposited it along with that taken by the other Greeks²²¹.

The barbarians, after the forcing of their entrenchments, never rallied again, nor made any regular defence. Terror-struck to see so numerous an army, consisting of the levies of various nations, and speaking different languages, hemmed within a fortified station, and deprived of the means of flight, they fell into a stupifying consternation²²²; and were so easily cut in pieces by the Greeks, who rivalled each other in deeds of death, and were all alike deaf to the

217. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxix.

218. Id. ibid. et Plut. Vit. Aristid.

219. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxix.

220. Id. ibid.

221. Herodot. ubi sup.

222. Id. ibid.

voice of supplication²²³, that, of three hundred thousand men, not full three thousand escaped the sword, exclusive of the forty thousand that fled with Artabazus²²⁴.

LETTER
XIII.

The division of the spoil now took place; a booty that exceeded the warmest expectations of the Greeks, and which filled them with wonder and astonishment. This the helots had been ordered to collect²²⁵; and although they purloined part of it, which they afterwards sold to the Æginetes²²⁶, they brought into the common store great quantities of gold and silver, found in the tents of the Persian nobles; couches plated with gold and silver, bowls, and other drinking vessels of gold²²⁷. Beside these, they discovered vases of gold and silver, lying in sacks upon the baggage-waggons²²⁸. And they took the gold chains, bracelets, and scymitars with gold hilts, from the bodies of the slain; but left the rich apparel, of various colours, as of no value²²⁹.

The tenth part of this immense spoil, the Greeks dedicated to the gods of their country²³⁰. And when they had set apart that sacred portion, they distributed among themselves the remainder of the booty; consisting of gold, silver, and other treasure, together with the concubines of the Persians, and the cattle. These they distributed according to the

223. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 25, 26. vol. ii. This historian ascribes the unrelenting cruelty of the Greeks to the policy of Pausanias; who foresaw, that if quarter was given, he should be endangered by the number of prisoners (Biblioth. ubi sup.). But the undistinguishing slaughter of the barbarians may also be imputed, to the hostile animosity of the people whose country they had invaded, and whose liberties they had sought to subvert.

224. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxix.

225. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxxix.

227. Herodot. ubi sup.

229. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxix.

230. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxxx.

226. Id. ibid.

228. Id. ibid.

PART I. merit of each warrior²³¹, and seemingly according to his rank. For, to Pausanias, the commander in chief, was given the tenth of all; women, horses, camels, treasure, and of every thing else that had been carried to the common heap²³².

After the Greeks had divided the barbarian spoil, they proceeded to the burial of their dead. The Lacedæmonians made three sepulchres. In one of these, they buried Posidonius, Amompharetus, Philocyon, and Callicrates, who were of the priesthood²³³. In another, they put the Spartans and free Lacedæmonians, not of the sacred order; and in a third, the helots²³⁴. The Tegeans buried all their dead together, in one sepulchre; the Athenians did the same; and so also did the Megareans and Philasians²³⁵. "All these sepulchres," observes Herodotus²³⁶, "were filled with the bodies of men; but the rest, which are seen about Plataea, were erected (as I am informed) by the citizens of those states, who ashamed of being absent from the battle, obtained public permission to throw up funeral mounds near the place of action, in order to deceive posterity²³⁷."

This was a singular indulgence; especially if we consider that the leaders of such Grecian states were punished with exile, on their return to their several districts²³⁸. But the Greeks were zealous of national honour, and desirous of making the reputation of it general, while they had a common enemy to oppose. Even after that enemy had ceased to be formidable to the European Greeks, their apprehensions of danger from Persian ambition con-

231. Id. *ibid.*

232. Herodot. *ubi sup.*

233. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. lxxxiv.

235. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxiv.

236. *Historiar.* *ubi sup.*

238. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxvi.

234. Id. *ibid.*

237. Id. *ibid.*

tinued,

tinued, and their love of union; whereas they no sooner found themselves in security, as we shall see, than ambition sprung up among the leading states of Greece, and a violent passion for mastery²³⁹.

LETTER
XIII.

When the confederated Greeks had buried their dead, they assembled a council of war; and in that council, a resolution was taken to lead their combined forces against Thebes, and demand the partisans of the Medes²⁴⁰; but especially Timegenides and Attaginus, the ringleaders of the barbarian faction²⁴¹. And not to desist until they had destroyed that capital, if the Thebans should refuse to deliver up those abettors of tyranny²⁴². Having all assented to this resolution, they lifted their camp the eleventh day after the battle of Plataea, and marched to Thebes²⁴³. On their arrival, they demanded the obnoxious persons; but receiving a denial from the Thebans, they ravaged the country, and made approaches to the walls of the obstinate city²⁴⁴.

On the twentieth day after the commencement of these hostilities, which the confederated Greeks in-

239. Thucyd. lib. i. ii. passim. Some of these reflections might perhaps have been spared. But they will prepare the mind of the student in history for the calamitous scenes of the Peloponnesian war; when Greeks engaged with Greeks, not only with the fury of Greeks against barbarians, but with all the cruel rage of hostile savages, or of lions and tygers contending for their prey.

240. Herodot. lib. ix. cap. lxxx. On this and some other occasions Herodotus uses the term Medes, instead of Persians, for the governing people in Asia, under the recent successors of Cyrus; and Thucydides always. But, for the sake of consistency and perspicuity, I have generally retained the appellation of Persian; as being that of the royal race, by the male line. The promiscuous use of the terms Medes and Persians by the early Grecian historians, shews, however, that they were considered as compeers; not the one a conquered, and the other a commanding people.

241. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxv.

242. Id. *ibid.*

243. Herodot. *Historiar.* ubi sup.

244. Id. *ibid.*

cessantly

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cessantly prosecuted; Timegenides spoke thus to the Thebans:—"Men of Thebes! since the Greeks are resolved not to withdraw their forces, until either they have taken the city, or you have delivered us into their hands, we are far from desiring that Bœotia should suffer on our account. If, under the pretence of demanding our persons, the confederates mean to exact a sum of money, let it be levied by a general contribution; for we were not the only partizans of the Medes, but joined them with general consent; or, if they besiege Thebes, because they would have us delivered up, we are ready to justify our conduct in their presence²⁴⁵."

The Thebans, approving this proposal, which was truly generous, sent to acquaint Pausanias, that they were ready to surrender the persons he demanded²⁴⁶. Meantime Attaginus made his escape; but, in his stead, his sons were sent out to Pausanias²⁴⁷. The Spartan general, however, magnanimously discharged them, saying, "They were too young to have any share in their father's guilt²⁴⁸." Of the persons delivered up by the Thebans, some attempted to clear themselves, by pleading their innocence; and some depended for impunity upon the influence of money²⁴⁹. But Pausanias, suspecting their purpose, and unwilling to rest the decision of their fate on the suffrages of the confederated chiefs, swayed by avarice or humanity, dissolved the army; and carrying the prisoners to Corinth, put them all to death²⁵⁰.

245. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxvi.

246. Id. *ibid*.247. Id. *Historiar*. lib. ix. cap. lxxxvii.248. Id. *ibid*.

249. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxvii.

250. Id. *ibid*. Pausanias was military commander in chief; and consequently had a right to execute martial law on such as had declaredly betrayed the common cause of Greece. Therefore all reflections on the want of a formal trial, on this occasion, are frivolous and impertinent.

The same day that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea, another great battle, between the hostile nations, was fought at Mycale, on the Asiatic coast²⁵¹.—In order to make your lordship acquainted with the circumstances that led to this battle, I must relate the maritime operations of the Greeks and barbarians, during the latter part of summer.

The Persian naval force, as we have seen, had taken its station at Samos in the spring, on purpose to prevent the revolt of the Asiatic Greeks; and the Grecian fleet, which had assembled at Ægina, advanced to Delos, and there remained till the approach of autumn. Fear so long restrained the commanders of both armaments from quitting their several stations²⁵². The confederated fleet of Greece, consisting of an hundred and ten ships²⁵³, was commanded by Leutychides, one of the joint kings of Lacedæmon, of the line of Procles²⁵⁴; and the Athenian division, by Xanthippus, the son of Aripbron²⁵⁵, father of Pericles, and archon for the year. The fleet of the Persian monarch, commanded by Ithamitres and Artayntes, amounted to three hundred sail²⁵⁶.

Late in the summer, the Samians secretly sent ambassadors to the Grecian admirals at Delos; conjuring them, by the common gods they worshipped, to deliver the Asiatic Greeks from servitude; encouraging them to advance against the barbarians, by describing the unwieldiness of their ships, and assuring them of the revolt of Ionia²⁵⁷. Leutychides demanded the solemn promise of these ambassadors,

251. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxix.
lib. viii. cap. cxxxi. cxxxii.

252. Id. Historiar.

253. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxxi.

254. Id. ibid.

255. Herodot. ubi sup.

256. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxxx.
lib. ix. cap. lxxxix.

257. Herodotus,

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with their faith sacredly pledged, that the Samians would assist him and his associates. This demand being readily complied with, the Greeks remained in their station all that day, making preparations for sailing; and next day, having sacrificed auspiciously, their fleet quitted the harbours of Delos, and stood toward Samos²⁵⁸. On their arrival, they came to anchor before the temple of Juno, and took the necessary measures for securing success in a naval engagement²⁵⁹. But the Persians, informed of their approach, and having determined not to hazard a battle at sea, permitted the Phœnician squadron to return home; and resolved to sail, with the remainder of their fleet, to the coast of Ionia²⁶⁰.

That resolution the Persian admirals were induced to adopt, from a conviction of their inferiority to the Greeks in naval skill and effective force; and also from a desire of sheltering themselves under cover of their land-forces, which were encamped, to the number of sixty thousand, in the promontory of Mycale, on the neighbouring continent²⁶¹. This body of troops had been sent by Xerxes to secure the obedience of Ionia, under the conduct of Tigranes; a man surpassing all the Persian leaders, in dignity of mien and loftiness of stature²⁶².

Actuated by these motives, the naval commanders of Xerxes abandoned their station at Samos, and landed on the Ionian shore, near the venerable temple dedicated to the Eleusinian Ceres²⁶³. There having drawn their ships ashore, they encompassed them with a wall of timber and stone, secured by a ditch; not doubting, thus entrenched, to be able to sustain a siege, but also to prove victorious²⁶⁴.

258. Id. lib. ix. cap. xci—xcv.

259. Herodotus, Historiar.

lib. ix. cap. xcv.

260. Id. ibid.

261. Herodot. ubi sup.

262. Id. ibid.

263. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xcvi.

264. Id. ibid. et Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 27.

When the Greeks found, that the barbarian fleet had quitted Samos, and steered for the continent, they began to hesitate what course they should pursue; whether to return home, or proceed to the Hellespont²⁶⁵. But, having weighed both these measures, they resolved to embrace neither, but follow the enemy to the Asiatic coast²⁶⁶; and being prepared with ladders for boarding, and all other things necessary in a naval engagement, they sailed to Mycale²⁶⁷.

On their arrival near the place, the Grecian admirals could discover none of the enemy's ships; but, after bearing down to the coast, they saw the whole barbarian fleet lying within its fortified station, and a numerous army drawn up along the shore²⁶⁸. When Leutychides had surveyed the state of the enemy, and found that the Greeks must fight on land, or retire without effecting any thing, he advanced before the body of the fleet; stood in to the beach before the naval encampment, and ordered a herald thus to address the Ionians, in his name:—
“Men of Ionia! when the battle begins, remember
“liberty, and that the word is *Hebe*²⁶⁹.

In making this proclamation, says Herodotus²⁷⁰, Leutychides had two views, as Themistocles had in giving a similar admonition at Artemisium. He expected the Ionians would revolt, if his exhortation was concealed from the barbarians; and if made known, that the Asiatic Greeks would be brought under suspicion²⁷¹. And it proved more effectual than the inscription of Themistocles, as it was followed by both these consequences. For the Persian generals were no sooner made acquainted with it, than they disarmed the Samians, whose fidelity they

265. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xcvi.

267. Herodot. ubi sup.

269. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xcvi.

270. Historiar. ubi sup.

266. Id. ibid.

268. Id. ibid.

271. Id. ibid.

PART I. had most reason to suspect²⁷²; and, on purpose to detach the Milesians from the scene of action, they were appointed to guard the passes in the mountains behind Mycale²⁷³; where, as we shall have occasion to notice, they had an opportunity of gratifying their passion for revolt; and repaid suspicion with vengeance.

Ant. Chr.
479.
Olympiad
lxxv. 3.

During the apprehensions raised by the address of Leutychides to the Ionians, and while these new arrangements were making, in consequence of it, the Greeks landed without opposition, and formed in order of battle on the shore²⁷⁴. And the Persians, after they had taken those precautions against hostile attempts from the most suspected of their Ionian auxiliaries, also put themselves in a posture of defence²⁷⁵. When the Greeks were advancing toward the barbarians, a herald's staff was found on the shore, and a sudden rumour spread through the army, that the forces under Mardonius had been defeated in Bœotia²⁷⁶.

This rumour, seemingly raised by Leutychides²⁷⁷, had a wonderful effect upon the minds of the Greeks. Before firm, little anxious for their own fate, but alarmed for the safety of Greece, they advanced coolly, determined to die or conquer; but after they heard this report they came forward to the charge with more spirit and alacrity²⁷⁸. The barbarians, priding themselves in superior numbers, and the Persian generals, thirsting for revenge, also courted battle²⁷⁹.

272. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xcvi.

273. Id. ibid.

274. Id. Historiar. ubi sup.

275. Id. ibid.

276. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xcix.

277. Compare Herodotus (ubi sup.), with Diod. Sicul. (lib. xi. p. 27.). Though Diodorus differs from Herodotus, in some particulars, the information of both leads to the same conclusion.

278. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. c.

279. Id. ibid.

The Athenians, commanded by Xanthippus, with those Greeks stationed in that part of the army which they led, advanced upon the enemy, through the plain or along the shore; so that they were engaged with the Persians whilst the Lacedæmonians, and their associates on the right, were marching through broken ways at the bottom of the hills²⁸⁰.

The Persians, so long as they were covered with their bucklers, defended themselves strenuously, and gallantly maintained their ground; but when the Athenians and their brave associates advanced upon them, emulous of glory, and ambitious that they, and not the Lacedæmonians, might earn the honours of victory, the state of the action was soon changed. They struck down the shields of the enemy; and, combining themselves in close phalanx, gradually broke the firm ranks of the Persian foot²⁸¹. When the Persians, who had met their antagonists with vigour, and displayed every proof of courage, were no longer able to keep the field, they fled to their entrenchments; and the Athenians, with their valiant supporters, the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Troezenians, pursued them so closely, that they entered the camp at the same time with the fugitives²⁸².

The barbarians no sooner saw their entrenchments forced, than they all, except the Persians, betook themselves to flight²⁸³. But the Persians, naturally brave, and still zealous of national honour, though reduced to a small number, continued to defend the abandoned camp against the Greeks, pouring in on all sides²⁸⁴. Two of the Persian

280. Herodot. lib. ix. cap. ci.

281. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. ci.

282. Id. ibid.

283. Herodotus, ubi sup.

284. Id. ibid.

PART I. leaders made their escape by fleeing, Artayntes and Ithamitres, commanders of the naval forces; and two died on the field, Tigranes and Mardontes, generals of the land-forces of the great king²⁸⁵.

At length, whilst the Persians were yet fighting, and keeping at bay the Athenians and their associates, the Lacedæmonians arrived with the other division of the Grecian forces, and completed the slaughter²⁸⁶; for the victory was already gained. Meantime the Samians, who were in the Persian camp, though disarmed, had done every thing in their power to aid the Greeks; and the other Ionians at Mycale, animated by their example, boldly revolted, and fell upon the barbarian army²⁸⁷: while the Milesians, instead of guarding the passes against the enemies of Xerxes, obstructed the barbarians in their flight; took many prisoners, and showed more avidity in deeds of blood, than any of the Greeks engaged in battle²⁸⁸.

After the Greeks had killed great numbers of the barbarians, both in the action and in the pursuit, they set fire to the enemy's fleet; burnt the whole naval encampment, and brought out upon the shore all the spoil, among which were several chests of Persian money²⁸⁹; that long continued to circulate over Greece, and the acquisition of which was considered as the first stage toward corruption in the several republics.

The Grecian commanders, after their victory, and the division of the spoil, returned to Samos²⁹⁰; and

285. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. ci.

286. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cii.

287. Id. ibid.

288. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. ciii.

289. Id. ibid.

290. Herodot. ubi sup.

where they deliberated, concerning the measures they ought to pursue, for preserving the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, who had contributed to their success. The Peloponnesian chiefs, having by this time received full information of the victory gained by their countrymen at Plataea, and the total overthrow of the barbarian army, proposed that the people of those states which had leagued with the Persian monarch should be expelled, and the Ionians settled in their territories and cities of commerce²⁹¹. But the Athenians were of a different opinion: they opposed the removal of the Ionians; unwilling that their fine country should be relinquished by the victorious Greeks to the vanquished barbarian enemy. And they expressed displeasure, that the Peloponnesians should presume to interfere in the affairs of their colonies; for whose protection they had resolved to exert themselves, and to which they seem to have thought their own state equal. The Peloponnesians yielded to the opinion of the Athenians²⁹². And the commanders of the Grecian fleet, after they had exacted an oath from the leaders of the Samians, Lesbians, and other islanders, that they would be their constant confederates, sailed for the Hellespont; in order to break down the bridges of Xerxes²⁹³.

Meantime the remains of the barbarian forces, which had fled over the heights behind Mycale, hastened their march to Sardis²⁹⁴. On their arrival in that city they found the Persian monarch still there²⁹⁵, but Xerxes, soon after he received information of the burning of his fleet, and the destruction of his army under Mardonius, quitted the Lydian capital,

291. Id. *ibid.*

292. Id. *Historiæ*. lib. ix. cap. cv.

293. Id. *ibid.*

294. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cvi.

295. Id. *ibid.*

PART I. and removed to Ecbatana²⁹⁶; leaving the preservation of Asia Minor to the care of his generals.

The Grecian fleet, in its way to the Hellespont, being attacked by a storm, was forced to come to anchor near Lecton²⁹⁷. Thence proceeding to Abydos, the commanders discovered, that the bridges, which they expected to have found standing, were removed; and as the destruction of these was the prime object of their voyage, Leutychides, the commander in chief, determined to return to Greece with the Peloponnesian navy²⁹⁸. But Xanthippus, the Athenian admiral, resolved to stay, and make an attempt upon the Thracian Chersonesus²⁹⁹. Accordingly, after the departure of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians and their allies sailed from Abydos; and, landing in the Chersonesus, besieged Sestos³⁰⁰.

To that city, as the strongest in those parts, great numbers of people, from the adjacent country, had repaired, when they heard that the Grecian fleet was arrived in the Hellespont; and, among others,

296. Diod. Sicul. *Biblioth.* lib. xi. p. 28, edit. sup. cit. Herodotus takes no notice of the removal of Xerxes to Ecbatana; but lets us understand (*Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. cvii.) that, about this time, he returned to Susa. It seems more probable, however, that he took the way of Ecbatana than Babylon. If so, the story told by Arrian (*Exped. Alexand.* lib. vii. p. 480. edit. sup. cit.), and so often repeated, of his destroying the temple of Belus, in his retreat from Greece, must be regarded as a fable. For, although, it appears, that he ordered the Ionian temples to be pillaged and destroyed (*Cic. de Legib.* lib. ii. Strabo. *Geog.* lib. xiv.), after the new revolt of the Asiatic Greeks, and before his departure from Sardis, policy would prevent him in the present unprosperous state of his affairs, from provoking the Babylonians by such insults. And I may add, that the Chaldean religion differed so little from the Magian, that pious zeal could hardly prompt him to such an outrage.

297. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cxiii.

298. Id. *ibid.*

299. Id. *Historiar.* lib. ix. cap. cxii.

300. Id. *ibid.*

Oiobazos,

Oiobazos, a Persian officer, who had already ordered all the materials of the bridges to be brought thither³⁰¹. The inhabitants were Æolians; but a great multitude of Persians, and their confederates, had drawn together, in order to defend the place³⁰². The government of the whole province was in the hands of Artayctes, a Persian leader of profligate manners; who, by imposing a fraud upon Xerxes, was permitted to plunder the shrine and temple of the deified hero Protesilaus, at Eleus, where many rich offerings had been made³⁰³.

This governor being now besieged by the Athenians in Sestos, was utterly unprepared for defence; having never thought of being attacked by the Greeks, who came upon him unexpectedly³⁰⁴. While the Athenians were employed in the siege, autumn set in; and the soldiers and seamen, uneasy to be so far from home, besought their leaders to conduct them back to their own country³⁰⁵. That request the commanders refused; saying they would persevere until they took the place, or were recalled by the people of Athens³⁰⁶.

Meantime the soldiers in the garrison of Sestos were so severely pressed by famine, as to be reduced to the necessity of boiling the cords of their beds; and when that wretched food failed, Artayctes and Oiobazos, with the remainder of the Persian troops, made their escape by night from the land-side of the wall, at a place where the besiegers had not stationed a sufficient guard³⁰⁷. When morning appeared, the citizens opened their gates; and part of the Athenian forces entered the place, while the greater number, informed of the flight of the Persians, went in pursuit of them³⁰⁸.

301. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cxiv.

303. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. cxv.

305. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cxvi.

307. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. cxvii.

302. Id. ibid.

304. Id. ibid. et seq.

306. Id. ibid.

308. Id. ibid.

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In this service, the Athenians were assisted by the Thracians of Apsinthus; who, seizing upon Oio-bazos, as he fled through their territory, sacrificed him to Plestorus, a Thracian god, according to their custom, and slew all his associates³⁰⁹. The fate of Artayctes and his followers was also severe. Having quitted Abydos later than the former party, they were overtaken at the river Ægos; where, after they had gallantly defended themselves, all that escaped the sword, were made captives, and carried back to Sestos³¹⁰. Artayctes, in atonement for the robbery of the temple of Protesilaus, offered one hundred talents of silver; and to the Athenians, two hundred talents, if they would spare the life of himself and his son³¹¹. But Xanthippus, the Athenian commander, would not agree to this proposal; partly, because his mind revolted against it, and partly because the people of Eleus insisted on vengeance being taken for the sacrilege committed on the shrine of Protesilaus³¹². He, therefore, ordered Artayctes to be impaled at a stake, and his son to be stoned to death before his eyes³¹³.

When the Athenians and their allies had thus taken Sestos, and perpetrated these cruelties, they returned with their fleet to Athens; carrying, beside other trophies and riches, all the materials of the bridges of Xerxes, in order to be consecrated in the Grecian temples³¹⁴; as memorials of the triumph of liberty, animating disciplined valour over barbarian force and despotic ambition.

309. Herodotus, lib. xi. cap. cxviii.

310. Id. ibid.

311. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. cxix.

312. Id. ibid.

313. Herodot. ubi sup.

314. Historiar. lib. cap. ix. cxx.

LETTER XIV.

GREECE, AND THE GRECIAN COLONIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA MINOR, FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE PERSIANS TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

LETTER
XIV.



THE recent triumph of the Greeks over the myriads of the Persian monarch, with the consequent re-establishment of their liberty and independency, and the pride of having broken the fetters of their Asiatic colonies; the flourishing condition of the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily; the emulation of talents among the citizens of the same state, and between the members of the different states of the republican body of Greece, during the prosperous period of forty-eight years, from the expulsion of the barbarians to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, gave to the human faculties a spring, and to the human character a degree of energy, that we seek for in vain in the annals of any other people. Then manners were polished, and political talents employed, with equal profundity and address; then all the powers of genius were awakened, and all the ingenuity of art was called forth; then lived the lyric poets Simonides and Bacchylides, and Pindar, the prince of lyric poets, who celebrated the peaceful triumphs of the Olympian victors; Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, who progressively brought Grecian tragedy to perfection; and Phidias, who attained to an height of excellence in statuary, that has never perhaps been exceeded; then broke out in the funeral orations of the Athenians, that blaze of eloquence

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eloquence which so long attracted the admiration of mankind; then wrote Herodotus, who has recorded, with the pen of truth, the important events of the Persian war, and whatever he could collect, on good authority, relative to the more early transactions of the Greeks; then Anaxagoras began to open, at Athens, the sources of true philosophy, and to remove the superstitious fears that had formerly distracted the human race concerning the phenomena of nature.

The particular merit of these illustrious men, my lord, I shall afterward have occasion to estimate, in carrying forward the progress of arts, manners, literature, and philosophy in Greece, to the downfall of Grecian freedom and independency. At present we must trace the progress of that political jealousy, between Athens and Sparta, that ultimately gave birth to the Peloponnesian war; and observe the measures, taken by both states, for acquiring the dominion of Greece, with the various pretexts under which they endeavoured to conceal their ambitious views.

The Lacedæmonians, as we have seen, had been jealous of the rising grandeur of Athens, from the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ to the beginning of the Persian war¹. That jealousy, excited by the prosperity of the Athenians under a free government, but especially by the growth of their commerce and naval power, provoked the Spartan state to seek the restoration of Hippias². The fear of the barbarians induced the Lacedæmonians to take part in the common cause of Greece; but their aids were always tardy³. Their selfish policy had a perpetual reference to the safety of Peloponnesus; whereas the Athenians,

1. Lett. xi.

2. Id. et anct. cit.

3. Lett. xii. xiii. passim.

actuated by more generous principles, stood boldly forward, on all occasions, in support of general liberty, without particularly regarding the welfare of their own state. They frankly changed stations with the Lacedæmonians at Plataea; they perpetually laid aside punctilio, and little-minded pride; and, in every battle, whether at land or on sea, they had distinguished themselves by their courage and conduct⁴. The Athenian name accordingly acquired a lustre, that threw Spartan valour into shade.


Sparta, however, still asserted her pre-eminence, and attempted to dictate to every other Grecian state. Athens, warranted by public opinion, and conscious of her own power and glory, keenly felt the indignity. And hence, from the termination of the Persian invasion, the jealousy between the two states became mutual. Yet the Athenians who had readily yielded, during the barbarian struggle, the chief command to the Lacedæmonians, both by land and sea, continued to temporise, and seemingly still admitted the controul of Sparta.

These reflections, my lord, bring us again into the line of our narration. The Athenians had deprived Themistocles of the command of their fleet, during the last year of the Persian war, in consequence of the honours conferred on him at Sparta⁵; which excited the jealousy of his fellow citizens⁶. But that war was no sooner ended, than popular favour flowed with full tide toward the exalted merit of the conqueror at Salamis. Themistocles was the creator of the Athenian navy; and he had, on all occasions, discovered a degree of patriotism and

4. Id. *ibid*.

5. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 22, vol. ii. edit. sup. cit.

6. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxv. et Plut. *Vit. Themist*.

PART I.  political sagacity, that entitled him to the confidence of his countrymen. He was now to give new and signal instances of both.

Ant Chr.
478.
Olympiad
lxiv. 2, 3.

When the Athenians returned to their desolated territory, and the ruins of their city, after the final expulsion of the Persians, they brought back, from the places of refuge, their wives and children, with all their remaining effects, and vigorously applied themselves to the rebuilding of their capital, and surrounding it with walls; only a few pieces of the former fortifications being left standing⁷. But no sooner were the Lacedæmonians informed of the Athenian ardour for restoring this rival city to its former beauty and strength, than they sent an embassy to Athens, requiring the Athenians to desist from rebuilding their walls⁸: under pretence, that all the cities without the Corinthian isthmus ought to be unwall'd; in order that Xerxes, should he again invade Greece, might not have the power of converting, as formerly, its fortified towns into military stations; and urging that, in such emergency, the fortifications of Peloponnesus would afford a safe retreat for the whole Grecian people⁹.

Themistocles penetrated the jealous fears of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, notwithstanding the mysterious veil under which their apprehensions were concealed. And the Athenians, by his advice replied, that they would send ambassadors to Sparta, to deliberate on the requisition made¹⁰.

No sooner had the deputies of that domineering republic taken their departure, than this accomplished

7. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxxix.

8. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. xc.

9. Id. *ibid.* Diod. Sicul. *Biblioth.* lib. xi. p. 31. vol. ii. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. in *Vit. Themist.*

10. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xc.

statesman opened to the Athenian senate his purpose of amusing the Lacedæmonians. His plan was approved; and he was joined in an embassy to Sparta, along with Aristides and Abromychus¹¹. He accordingly set out for the place of his destination; but his colleagues, at his own request, were to remain at Athens, until the wall of the city was sufficiently high for defence¹². Not a little political address was requisite for the management of such a business. But the Athenian legislator was equal to it.

When Themistocles arrived at Sparta, he demanded no public audience; but, by studied evasions, protracted time. When pressed on the subject, he answered, that he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, who were detained by urgent affairs; expressed his surprise at their delay, and expected they would soon be with him¹³. As the Lacedæmonians had a good opinion of Themistocles, they sustained these excuses; but being informed through other avenues, that the wall of Athens was not only rebuilding in the meantime, but raised to a considerable height, they could no longer remain incredulous¹⁴. Apprised of this, Themistocles entreated them not rashly to be biassed by rumours, but to depute, from among their own citizens, a certain number of men of respectability and approved veracity, who might, from a view of the works, report the truth¹⁵.

With that proposal, the Lacedæmonian senate complied. Meanwhile Themistocles sent secret instructions to the Athenians, to detain the Spartan delegates (though with as little appearance of restraint as possible), until the return of their own am-


11. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xc. xci.

12. Id. lib. i. cap. xc.

13. Id. *ibid*.

14. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xci.

15. Id. *ibid*.

PART I.  bassadors; for his colleagues were by this time arrived, and had assured him, that the wall of Athens was now fit for defence¹⁶. But he was afraid the Lacedæmonians, when they discovered the true state of the works, would put him and the other ambassadors under arrest¹⁷. From this danger, however, he was happily freed. The Athenians not only attended to his instructions, but the Spartan delegates behaved with such insolence, as to be justifiably thrown into prison¹⁸.

Without being informed of this event, Themistocles had the boldness, when joined by his colleagues, and furnished with the intelligence they brought, to demand an audience, and declare to the senate of Sparta, that Athens was now so strongly walled, as to be fit for the defence of its citizens; that, therefore, in future, when the Lacedæmonians, or their confederates, should send ambassadors thither, they must address themselves to a people, who perfectly understood their own interest, and the interest of Greece; observing, that it would not be possible, with strength inferior to that of a rival power, equally to preserve, and evenly to balance the public welfare of the Grecian body¹⁹.

The Lacedæmonians, though inwardly enraged at this declaration, politically suppressed all appearance of resentment against the Athenians. The ambassadors of each state, therefore, returned home, without coming to an open rupture²⁰. Thus, adds Thucydides²¹, the Athenians, in a short time, fortified their city: and the very outside of the structure shews that it was built in haste; the foundation being laid with stones of every kind, not hewn in some places

16. Thucyd. ubi sup.

17. Id. ibid.

18. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 31, vol. ii.

19. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xci.

20. Id. lib. i. cap. xcii.

21. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xciii.

as properly to fit, but piled on at random. Many pillars also from sepulchral monuments were blended in the work; for the circuit of the wall was every where enlarged beyond the former compass of the city. Hence, collecting the materials, not only from the ruins of the old rampart, but from every place without distinction, the labour was forwarded with speed²²; men, boys, and even women bearing part in it²³.

The next measure of Themistocles, though not so essential to the present security of Athens, was yet more calculated for the future aggrandizement of his country. He persuaded the Athenians to finish the fortifications of port Peiræus, begun during the year he was archon²⁴. This haven was most commodious for shipping, it being formed by nature into three basons or harbours²⁵. And as the Athenians, elated with the success of their fleet, during the Persian war, were become more than ever intent on the augmentation of their marine, he foresaw that the fortification of the Peiræus would contribute greatly to the exaltation of their naval power, and the consequent dominion of the sea, at which he had encouraged them to grasp²⁶.

Ant. Chr.
477.
Olympiad
lxxv. 3, 4.

The wall of the Peiræus, or principal sea-port of Athens, was much stronger than that of the city. It was of such thickness, that two carts, carrying materials, could pass along it, by one another²⁷. The interior part of it was neither filled with mortar nor mud; but the whole structure was one pile of large stones hewn square, so as to close their angles

22. Id. *ibid*.

23. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 51, vol. ii.

24. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xciii.

25. Id. *ibid*.

26. Thucyd. *ubi sup*. This I have formerly had occasion to notice, in bringing forward Themistocles to view. See Lett. xii. toward the beginning.

27. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xciii.

exactly

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exactly, and grappled firmly together, on the outside, with iron cramps, fastened with lead²⁸. This wall, however, was not carried up above half the height that Themistocles intended²⁹. He planned it, both in height and breadth, for an impregnable rampart against hostile attacks³⁰. And he frequently counselled the Athenians, that, if ever they were hard pressed by land, they ought to retire into the Peiræus, and thence with their naval force make head against all opponents³¹. But there might still have been danger in making such retreat: for the walls of Athens were not yet joined to those of Phaleron and Peiræus; the building of the walls of communication, called the long walls, which connected the Athenian capital with its two havens, being only begun under the administration of Pericles³².

The Lacedæmonians, according to the reports of later writers, menaced Attica with an invasion, while the walls of the Peiræus were building³³; and all the political talents of Themistocles are said to be again called forth, in order to avert the threatening danger³⁴. But of such hostile purpose Thucydides takes no notice. He informs us, however, that the same summer the farther fortification of the Peiræus was begun, Pausanias, the Lacedæmonian admiral, formerly the Grecian commander in chief by land, and now at sea, sailed from Peloponnesus with twenty triremes or ships of the line, and was joined by an Athenian fleet of thirty sail, and by a number of armed ships furnished by their allies³⁵.

28. Id. *ibid*.29. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xciii. Yet was it sixty feet high. Potter, *Archæolog. Græc.* book i. chap. viii.30. Id. *ibid*.31. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.32. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cvii. et *Plut. Vit. Pericles*.33. *Diod. Sicul. Biblioth.* lib. xi. p. 32, 33, vol. ii. and most subsequent historians, both ancient and modern.34. Id. *ibid*.

35. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xciv.

That

That combined fleet steered for Cyprus, and reduced most of the Grecian towns in the island, which were then subject to the great king³⁶. Thence it proceeded for Byzantium, still held by a Persian garrison, and invested and took the city³⁷. But Pausanias, who seems to have conducted this naval enterprise with that superiority of courage and conduct, which had acquired him immortal renown at Plataea, became so arrogant in the exercise of his authority, as commander in chief, that all the Greeks, except the Lacedæmonians and their Peloponnesian confederates, were strongly disgusted with his behaviour; but especially the Ionians, and all who had been lately emancipated from the royal yoke⁸.

The Athenian fleet, on that occasion, was commanded by the wise and moderate Aristides, assisted by Cimon the son of Miltiades³⁹; a man of a mild disposition and engaging manners, who inherited the warlike genius of his father, and united the political talents of Themistocles with the probity of Aristides⁴⁰. To these commanders the Ionians, both of the islands and the Asiatic continent, addressed themselves; entreating the Athenian admirals, by the common tie of consanguinity, to undertake their protection, and rescue them from the insults of Pausanias⁴¹.

This request was favourably heard by Aristides and Cimon, who expressed their willingness to put a stop to such grievances, and to accommodate matters to the best of their power⁴². But before any new arrangement had been made, in consequence of these remonstrances, Pausanias was recalled by the senate

36. Id. *ibid.*

37. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

38. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. xcv. 39. Plut. *Vit. Aristid.*
et *Cimon.*

40. Id. *ibid.*

41. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xcv.

42. Id. *ibid.* et Plut. *ubi sup.*

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of Lacedæmon; many of the Greeks having carried accusations to Sparta against him, for the abuse of his power; his behaviour resembling more that of tyrant, than of a commander in chief⁴³.

Ant. Chr.
476.
Olympiad
lxxvi. 2.

Pausanius was recalled at the very time the confederate Greeks, the Lacedæmonians and their Peloponnesian associates excepted, had ranged themselves under the command of the Athenian admirals⁴⁴. On his arrival at Sparta, Pausanias was convicted of malversation in his conduct to the commanders of some states; but of the heaviest part of the charge he was acquitted, an attachment to the Persian interest⁴⁵. Yet that was thought too clear to stand in need of proof⁴⁶.

I should here, my lord, investigate the causes of the charge against Pausanias: but, for the sake of perspicuity, I shall not enter upon the subject, until I can connect those causes with their consequences; and open up the whole scene of baseness and ambitious folly, that led to the fatal catastrophe of the strangely chequered character of the conqueror at Plataea, and the captor of Byzantium.

Ant. Chr.
475.
Olympiad
lxxvi. 2.

After Pausanias had been recalled, and convicted of misdemeanor in the exercise of the chief command at sea, the senate of Lacedæmon divested him of his rank; and appointed, in his stead, Dorcis with some colleagues, to the conduct of their naval force⁴⁷. But the confederated Greeks would not submit to these leaders⁴⁸; they, therefore, returned home⁴⁹. And the Lacedæmonians being at that time well-

43. Thucyd. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. xcv.

45. Thucyd. ubi sup.

47. Thucyd. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. xcv.

49. Thucyd. ubi sup.

44. Id. *ibid.*

46. Id. *ibid.*

48. Id. *ibid.*

affected

affected to the Athenians, and desirous to rid themselves of the Persian war, acknowledged the Athenians had good pretensions to the supreme command at sea⁵⁰; fearing the admirals they should send out, says Thucydides⁵¹, might farther hurt the Spartan interest, already injured by Pausanias.

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XIV.

Ant. Chr.
475.
Olympiad
lxxvi. 3.

Having thus obtained the chief command at sea, by the voluntary tender of the whole Grecian confederacy, the Athenians fixed the quotas, both of ships and money, that each state was to furnish, for carrying on hostilities against the Persian monarch; in order to revenge the injuries which the Greeks had suffered from the invasions of the barbarians⁵². This, at least, was the pretext for demanding these quotas⁵³; and hence the Athenian office of general receivers of Greece, whose business it was to collect the contributions of the several states⁵⁴. The first contribution levied by the Athenians, in consequence of the power with which they were vested, amounted to four hundred and sixty talents⁵⁵, or about ninety thousand pounds sterling. The temple of Apollo, in the island of Delos, was chosen as the common treasury⁵⁶.

In that temple, the Athenians, when acknowledged sovereigns of the Grecian sea, originally held their deliberations with free and independent confederates; who sat in council with them, and had a vote in all public resolutions⁵⁷. But they gradually enlarged their authority with the increase of their naval power⁵⁸: so that, before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the greater number of the confe-

50. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xcv.

51. Id. ibid.

52. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xcvi.

53. Id. ibid.


54. Thucyd. ubi sup.

55. Id. Bell. Peloponnes, lib. i. cap. xcvi.

56. Id. ibid. et seq.

57. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xcvi.

58. Id. ibid. et seq.

PART I.  derated states, both of European and Asiatic Greece (as we shall have occasion to see), were actually become Athenian tributaries.

I must now return to the accusation of Pausanias for treason, and bring forward the grounds of that charge. The barbarian Xerxes (as this great and magnificent monarch is contemptuously called by the Grecian writers), ignorant as he has been represented of his true interest, did not overlook the advantageous situation of Byzantium; destined one day to become the seat of the Roman emperors, and where the sublime sultan still holds his court. In that city, on his retreat from Greece, Xerxes had left a strong garrison⁵⁹; in order to preserve the obedience of Thrace and Macedonia, his remaining dominions in Europe.

Over the troops in the garrison of Byzantium were placed several officers of high rank; Persian noblemen, and even princes of the blood royal⁶⁰. These, Pausanias treated with lenity, when he made himself master of the fortress; and, on purpose to ingratiate himself with the great king, he secretly conveyed them to the Asiatic coast, pretending they had made their escape⁶¹. This treachery was managed by Gongylus, the Eretrian; a man fit for such a business, and to whose custody Pausanias had committed the prisoners⁶².

Gongylus also carried a letter to the Persian monarch from Pausanias; containing a proposal of marriage with the daughter of that monarch, and an offer

59. Compare Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xciv. cxxviii. with Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 34. vol. ii. edit. sup. cit.

60. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxviii.

61. Id. ibid.

62. Thucyd. ubi sup.

to bring Sparta and Greece under his dominion⁶³.
 “ I think I have power,” said Pausanias, “ to accom-
 “ plish these events, if my schemes could be made
 “ known to thee. Should, therefore, my offer meet
 “ thy approbation, send down to the coast some
 “ trusty person, through whom we may negotiate⁶⁴.”

Xerxes (who, according to the narration of Thucydides, seems still to have been at Sardis), on receiving that letter, sent Artabazus down to the coast, with orders to take upon him the government of Dascylos⁶⁵; Megabates, the former governor, having been removed⁶⁶, on purpose to procure an unsuspecting situation for this confidential negociator. To Artabazus was entrusted a letter for Pausanias at Byzantium, with an injunction to shew him the royal signet⁶⁷; and instructions, that, if the Spartan commander should charge him with any orders, he should execute them with all diligence and fidelity⁶⁸.

The letter of the Persian monarch was to the following purport:—“ King Xerxes thus answereth
 “ Pausanias. For the men whom thou hast safely
 “ sent over to me, from Byzantium, grateful thanks
 “ are laid up for thee in our house, to be held in
 “ perpetual remembrance, and indelibly recorded.
 “ Thy words also please me. Therefore let neither
 “ night nor day make thee remiss, in seeking the
 “ accomplishment of any thing thou hast propound-
 “ ed: nor let any expenditure of gold and silver,
 “ or any number of troops necessary to effectuate
 “ thy designs, impede them. But confer, on all
 “ things, freely with Artabazus; a man of probity,
 “ and a faithful servant, whom I have sent to thee.

63. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxxviii.

64. Id. *ibid.*

65. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxix.

66. Id. *ibid.*

67. Thucydid. *ubi sub.*

68. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxxix.

“ With

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“ With him consult concerning thine own affairs
 “ and mine; that they may be conducted in the
 “ manner most consistent with our mutual honour
 “ and advantage⁶⁹. ”

On receiving this letter, Pausanias was so much elated, that he could no longer govern his imperious spirit. Departing from the modes and customs of his native country, he went abroad at Byzantium apparelled after the Persian fashion, and refined his table into Persian sumptuousness⁷⁰. He even carried his indiscretion so far, as to travel through Thrace attended by Persian guards⁷¹. He became more difficult of access⁷²; and so haughty and tyrannical in the exercise of command⁷³, that the greater number of the naval confederates, as we have seen, put themselves under the conduct of the Athenian admirals, before the senate of Sparta recalled him to answer the accusations against him.

Though convicted of misbehaviour, and divested of the command of the Lacedæmonian fleet, Pausanias was too high-minded to profit by the escape he had made from the charge of treason. Blinded by the illusions of ambition, or presuming on the influence of bribes for impunity, if his towering projects should fail; perhaps choosing rather to hazard impeachment, and suffer its most dreaded consequence, than live in a state of inaction and degradation, he returned to the Hellespont (in a Hermionian trireme galley, fitted out at his own expense), without the authority of the Spartan government⁷⁴.

The prosecution of the barbarian war was the pretext assigned by Pausanias for thus returning, in a private station, to the scene of action⁷⁵; but his true

69. Id. *ibid*.

70. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxv.

71. Id. *ibid*.72. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.73. Id. *ibid*.74. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxxxi.
lib. i. cap. cxxviii.

75. Thucyd.

motives were less patriotic. Aspiring at the sovereignty of Greece, he sought an opportunity of renewing those negotiations which he had begun the former year with the Persian monarch⁷⁶. Suspected, and forced to quit Byzantium by the Athenians, now invested with the chief command at sea, he withdrew to Colossæ on the Asiatic coast⁷⁷. Meantime information being conveyed to Sparta, that he had chosen his residence there for treasonous purposes, the ephori dispatched a herald to him; ordering his return by the messenger if he would avoid being declared an enemy to the state⁷⁸.

Pausanias, whose ambitious designs were not yet ripe for execution, sensible he could never accomplish them, unless he could clear himself from suspicion, readily obeyed the summons of the ephori⁷⁹; confident that, with money, he could defeat any criminal accusation⁸⁰. He was, however, thrown into prison; but afterward procured his enlargement (probably through the aid on which he depended for impunity), and offered to repel any charge that should be brought against him, by submitting to a public trial⁸¹.

Having no proof of the treason of Pausanias, neither the Spartan senate nor the ephori durst accuse

76. Id. lib. i. cap. cxxviii. cxxxi.

77. Id. ibid.

78. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxi.

79. Id. ibid.

80. Thucyd. ubi sup. I have formerly had occasion to observe (letter v.), that the institutions of Lycurgus were only calculated for a narrow republic; and that the Lacedæmonians, when they began to enlarge their views, to which they were prompted by their military government, would revolt against such restraints. We accordingly find them the first corrupted people in Greece. About the time that Pausanias gave into Persian luxury, and presumed on the venality of the Spartan senate and popular assembly, Leutychides, the joint Spartan king, was notoriously convicted of betraying the cause of his country for money. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. lxxii.

81. Id. ibid.

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him criminally; nor durst his private enemies venture to solicit an impeachment⁸²; he being nearly allied to the throne, and at that time invested with regal authority, as guardian-regent to his nephew Pleistarchus, son of Leonidas, yet in his minority⁸³. But his late extravagant behaviour; and his affectation of barbarian customs, afforded strong suspicion of his guilt; and infused a general apprehension, that he would never conform to the simplicity and equality of Spartan manners⁸⁴. Other particulars were also now called to mind, in which he had formerly deviated from the austere institutions of his country⁸⁵; or given way to ambitious vanity, in contradiction to the modest reserve of Spartan pride. Among the latter, the most striking instance was an inscription which he had, of his own authority, ordered to be engraved on the golden tripod dedicated at Delphos by the confederated Greeks, after the battle of Plataea, as the choicest part of the Persian spoil⁸⁶. That inscription was to the following purpose:—
 “ After Pausanias, general of the Greeks, had routed
 “ the Persian forces, he offered this memorial of his
 “ victory to Phœbus⁸⁷. ”

Though this inscription was instantly erased, by order of the Lacedæmonians, who placed on the tripod, in its stead, merely the names of the several states that had borne part in the overthrow of the barbarians, and joined in making that oblation to Apollo, yet was it now recollected to the prejudice of Pausanias; and, from the circumstances of his late behaviour, considered as a proof that he had been equally guilty in times longer passed⁸⁸. The Spartan senate had also received information, which,

82. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxii.

83. Id. ibid.

84. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxxxii.

85. Id. ibid.

86. Thucyd. ubi sup.

87. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxxxii.

88. Id. ibid.

says Thucydides, was true⁸⁹, that he was tampering with the helots; having promised them their liberty, and the privilege of citizens of Sparta, if they would rise at his command, and co-operate with him in all his designs⁹⁰.

But even this information did not induce the Lacedæmonians to bring forward an impeachment of Pausanias. They disdained to place so much confidence in the evidence of slaves, as to depart from the forms of their constitution, in order to punish him; but adhered to the ancient maxim of the state, never to be hasty, without unquestionable proof, in proceeding against a citizen of Sparta, to give a sentence not to be reversed⁹¹. At length, however, the fullest evidence against Pausanias was obtained, through a confidential servant, who was to convey to Artabazus the last letters he had written to the Persian monarch⁹².

This man, alarmed at observing, that no person sent on those errands had ever returned, broke open the letters committed to his charge⁹³. And finding he was destined to the fate his fears foreboded, and which had been that of others, his murder being expressly enjoined, he carried the letters to the ephori⁹⁴. But although they were now more than ever convinced of the guilt of Pausanias, they were desirous of farther evidence than the letters afforded, before they would hazard an accusation of treason against him⁹⁵. It was therefore contrived, that his devoted servant should go to the sanctuary at Ténarus as a suppliant, and take refuge in a cell divided by

89. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxxxii.

90. *Id.* *ibid.*

91. *Thucydid.* lib. i. cap. cxxxii.

92. *Id.* *ibid.*

93. *Thucydid.* *ubi sup.*

94. *Id.* *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxxxiii.

95. *Id.* *ibid.*

a partition ;

PART I. a partition; in the interior part of which might be concealed some of the ephori⁹⁶.

Pausanias informed of the supplication of his favourite minion, and suspected catamite, went to the sanctuary at Tenarus, and asked the cause of his there taking refuge⁹⁷. The man complained bitterly of the clause in the letters relative to himself; and expostulated warmly, "Why he, who had been so
" trusty to his master, during the whole course of
" his negotiations with the king, should now be
" doomed to the fate of his meanest tools⁹⁸." Pausanias confessed the truth of all that he alledged; begged him not to be exasperated at what appeared; encouraged him to quit his sanctuary, by an assurance that he should not be hurt; and earnestly entreated him to go the journey with all possible speed, nor obstruct by his fears the schemes in agitation⁹⁹.

What answer the destined messenger returned, we are not informed; but it does not appear that he quitted his sanctuary. And Pausanias seems to have had too much reverence for religion, to attempt to drag him from his cell. The ephori, however, satisfied with the avowal of his master, which they had distinctly heard, withdrew; and being now fully convinced of his treasonous designs, proposed to apprehend him on his return to Sparta¹⁰⁰. Such an attempt they made; but Pausanias penetrating their purpose, from their menacing look, took shelter in a cell belonging to the temple of Minerva Chalcæca¹⁰¹. There surrounded by guards, in order to prevent his escape, he was starved to death¹⁰².

96. Thucyd. ubi sup.

97. Id. ibid.

99. Id. ibid.

101. Id. ibid.

98. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxiii.

100. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxxxiii.

102. Thucyd. ubi sup.

Thus

Thus perished Pausanias, the successful competitor of Mardonius, and the deliverer of Greece from Asiatic slavery. To say that he had not a mind of sufficient strength, to look down undazzled from that height of renown to which he was exalted, in consequence of the victory at Platæa, would perhaps be injurious to his character; but his mind was surely little suited to the austere institutions of Lycurgus, which repressed every approach to luxury or splendour. Toward these Pausanias seems naturally to have been strongly borne¹⁰³; and, as ambitious rule was his predominant passion, he appears to have been fretted at the thought of being obliged to relinquish his authority, and sink into the condition of a private subject, when his nephew should attain the age that entitled him to assume the reins of government, and supreme command. Hence his desire of attaining a superior situation, his treachery to his country, and his proffered alliance with Xerxes. The extravagance of his conduct may be accounted for from other circumstances. Having fallen in love with a young lady of noble birth, while at Byzantium, and forced her to yield to his wishes, he inadvertently stabbed her in the dark, as she was coming to his bed¹⁰⁴; supposing her to be an assassin. Her ghost seemed ever after to haunt him¹⁰⁵; and the struggles of remorse and treasonous ambition disordered his brain¹⁰⁶.

We must now return to the affairs of Athens. The Athenians, under the conduct of Cimon, soon after they were invested with the supreme command at sea, laid siege to Eïon, a town on the river Strymon, still possessed by the Persians; took it,

103. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cxxxi. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxx.

104. Plut. Vit. Cimon.

105. Id. ibid.

106. Plut. ubi sup. et Cornel. Nepot. Vit. Pausan.

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and sold all the people found in it for slaves¹⁰⁷. Such is the concise narration of Thucydides, whom I have chosen to follow, because of his accuracy. But Herodotus, a primary authority, informs us of other particulars¹⁰⁸; that Boges, the Persian governor of Eion, refused to accept of any conditions, lest the king should suspect him of cowardice. And that persisting in this resolution, even after his provisions were exhausted, he ordered a great fire to be kindled; and having killed his wife and children, together with his concubines and menial servants, threw their bodies into the flames; then mounting the walls of the city, threw all the gold and silver remaining into the river Strymon; and, when he had so done, threw himself into the fire¹⁰⁹.

The Athenians afterwards landed on the island of Scyros, held by the Delopians; and, having reduced

107. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xeviii. Plutarch says that Cimon left an Athenian colony at Eion, the neighbouring country being remarkably beautiful and fertile (Vit. Cimon.); and that he was there permitted to erect three marble hermæ, as memorials of his victory, with inscriptions below each. Two of these have much merit.

I.

" Where Strymon with his silver waves
 " The lofty tow'rs of Eion laves,
 " The hapless Mede with famine prest,
 " The force of Grecian arms confest.

II.

" Let him, who born in distant days,
 " Beholds these monuments of praise;
 These forms that valour's glory save,
 And sees how Athens crowns the brave,
 " For honour heave the patriot sigh,
 " And for his country learn to die!"

Plut. Vit. Cimon.

Among the captives, sold for slaves by Cimon, we must not include the Persian garrison; for, we are told by Plutarch (Vit. Cimon), he had the profitable experience, that the Persians redeemed their prisoners at a great ransom.

108. *Historiar.* lib. vii. cap. cvii.

109. Herodot. ubi sup.
 it;

it, treated the inhabitants in the same manner they did those of Eion, settling in it a colony of their own people¹¹⁰. They also commenced hostilities against the Carysthians of Eubœa, and compelled them to submit on such terms as Athens thought proper to impose¹¹¹. Against the Naxians, who had revolted from the naval confederacy, the Athenians next made war, and subdued them by a siege¹¹². This, observes Thucydides, was the first confederate state, that was enslaved to gratify the aspiring ambition of the Athenians¹¹³; but all the rest, as revolts afforded pretence, successively shared the same fate¹¹⁴.

The causes of such revolts were various; but they chiefly had their origin in the deficiencies of the quotas of the confederates, or in their backwardness to common service¹¹⁵. Those the Athenians were empowered to exact: and they exerted their authority with rigour; laying heavy loads upon men, who had neither been accustomed, nor were willing to bear oppression¹¹⁶. These impositions, however, the confederates had much facilitated by their own conduct. For, through a reluctance of joining in naval expeditions, the majority of them, in order to redeem their personal attendance, agreed to contribute certain sums of money, adjudged equivalent to the expense of furnishing the ships at which they were rated¹¹⁷. The sums paid on such occasions to the Athenians, were employed in augmenting their own navy¹¹⁸: so that the tributary states,

110. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xcvi. The Athenians, we are told by Plutarch (Vit. Cimon.), were authorised by the Amphictyonic council to undertake the reduction of Scyros, the Delopians being addicted to piracy.

111. Id. ibid.

112. Thucyd. ubi sup. cap. xcvi.

113. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i.

114. Id. ibid.

115. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xcix.

116. Id. ibid.

117. Thucyd. ubi sup.

118. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xcix. Many of these oppressions,

PART I. states, thus drained, found whenever they presumed to revolt, that they had parted with the sinews of war; and, therefore, were under the necessity of submitting¹¹⁹.

Ant. Chr.
471.
Olympiad
lxxvii. 2.

Themistocles, who had raised the Athenians to such a height of naval power, but whom their jealousy had excluded from command since the invidious honours conferred on him at Sparta, after the glorious battle of Salamis, was expelled by the ostracism¹²⁰ the same year that Naxos was reduced, and Pausanias punished for treason. This expulsion was effected through the influence of Cimon, now high in popular favour, and the interest of Alcmaeon, head of the long powerful house of that name¹²¹; Aristides declining openly to take part in the political intrigue, for the banishment of Themistocles¹²². But a temporary exclusion from his country, was not the sorest ill this great man was doomed to suffer.

When the Lacedæmonians had punished the treason of Pausanias, they sent ambassadors to Athens, to accuse Themistocles of also carrying on a treasonable correspondence with the Persian monarch¹²³. This they pretended to have discovered from the papers of their ill-fated commander¹²⁴. But Plutarch declares, that Themistocles (although he had listened to the propositions of his friend, Pausanias, without betraying him) withstood every temptation, offered

sions, as I shall afterward have occasion to shew, were exercised under the much praised administration of Aristides; the first general receiver, and inspector of the quotas and contributions of the Grecian naval confederates. Plut. Vit. Aristid.

119. Id. ibid.

120. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Themist.

121. Plut. Vit. Cimon. et Themist.

122. Id. Vit. Aristid. et Themist.

123. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxv.

124. Id. ibid.

by the Lacedæmonian chief, to draw him into a conspiracy against the liberties of Greece¹²⁵. The prosecution against him, may, therefore, be considered as the effect of the vengeance and mortified pride of Sparta; ashamed to have produced, in her vaunted deliverer, the first machinator of Grecian slavery.

The Lacedæmonians had many reasons for seeking vengeance on Themistocles. He had acquired for the Athenians, that superiority at sea, which enabled them to obtain the supreme command of the Grecian naval force. This, the disciples of Lycurgus now wished to regain, notwithstanding the prohibition of their legislator, as they found it to be intimately connected with sovereignty on land¹²⁶. He had walled the city of Athens, as we have seen, so as to be impervious to their attacks; and he had fortified the Peiræus, for the protection of that navy which he had created, and for the security of the enlarging commerce and growing marine force of the Athenian republic.

But the Lacedæmonians had another, and yet stronger reason, for persecuting the exiled Themistocles. When the Spartan senate attempted, soon after the victory at Platæa, to exclude from the council of Amphictyons all those states that had taken part with the Persian monarch, this profound politician opposed the motion, and got it set aside¹²⁷. He foresaw, that if the Thessalians, Argives, and Bœotians, were excluded from the assembly of the Grecian delegates, the Lacedæmonians and their Peloponnesian confederates would preserve a preponderating influence, by reason of their superior number of votes¹²⁸; and consequently, on every

125. Plut. Vit. Themist.

126. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 38.

127. Plut. Vit. Themist.

128. Id. ibid.

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occasion of jealousy, be able to turn against Athens the majority of the republican body of Greece.

Of the arguments used by Themistocles, on that important occasion, we are but imperfectly informed. We only know, that he awakened the pride of the Amphictyonic council, by shewing the insignificancy into which it would sink, from the exclusion of the defaulting states¹²⁹; and that this argument was found sufficient to obstruct the purposed decree against them.

Benefits are soon forgot. Yet it appears, that the Thebans for a time laid aside their jealousy of Athens, and retained some degree of gratitude for her interposition in their favour. The Athenians also revered Themistocles, while struggling with difficulties, from which he only could relieve them; but no sooner was their naval superiority established, than they became violently jealous of the man, who had raised them to such an height of prosperity¹³⁰. That jealousy was fostered by Aristides; who, although he prudently declined appearing as the rival of his former competitor and expeller, so far relaxed in his political principles, in order to humble the towering Themistocles, as to make a sacrifice to popular favour of the balance of the Athenian constitution. This he did, in procuring a decree of the public assembly for laying open the office of archon, which had hitherto, conformable to the institutions of Solon, been confined to the first order in the state, to citizens of all the inferior classes¹³¹.

Cimon,

129. Plut. ubi sup.

130. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Themist.

131. Plut. *Vit. Aristid.* Aristides had learned to temporize, on other occasions. For we are told by Plutarch (*ibid.*), that when he had settled the articles of the naval alliance, he called upon the confederates

Cimon, who had risen to popular favour under the wing of Aristides, and through Lacedæmonian influence¹³², incited the prosecution of the expelled Themistocles¹³³; and Leobotes, the son of Alcmaeon, joined the Spartans in accusing him directly of treason¹³⁴. As the illustrious exile could not defend himself in person, he answered by letters the principal articles of the impeachment¹³⁵; observing, that he, who was born to command, and incapable of submitting to servitude, could never entertain the thought of selling himself and the liberties of Greece to enemies and barbarians¹³⁶.

The Athenian people, however, whom Themistocles had so long governed, and whose versatile humour he had experienced and feared, listened to the arguments of his accusers¹³⁷. An order was accordingly issued for apprehending him, and bringing him to answer for his conduct, before an assembly of the Grecian delegates, at Sparta¹³⁸. Finding himself deserted by his countrymen, and exposed to the vengeance of the Lacedæmonians, he declined standing trial; and, having been outlawed for trea-

federates to confirm them with an oath, which he himself took on the part of the Athenians; yet, when the urgency of affairs required the Athenians to govern Greece with a tighter rein than those articles justified, he advised them to let the consequences of the perjury rest with him, and pursue the path that expediency pointed out (Plut. ubi sup.). And when it was debated in council, whether the treasure deposited at Delos, belonging to the naval confederates, should remain there, or be brought to Athens, though contrary to the articles of the confederacy?—he said, on its coming to his turn to speak, that “it was not just, but it was expedient!” Plut. Vit. Aristid.

132. Plut. Vit. Themist.

133. Id. Vit. Cimon. et Themist.

134. Plut. Vit. Themist.

135. Id. ibid. et Diod. Sicul.

lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 41.

136. Plut. Vit. Themist.

137. Id. ibid.

138. Plut. ubi sup. et Diod. Sicul. lib. xi.

vol. ii. p. 42.

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son, he quitted Argos, where he had chiefly resided since his banishment¹³⁹, and fled to Corcyra; from Corcyra to the Molossian territory; and thence (being still pursued) to Pydna in Mecedonia, whence he passed into Asia Minor¹⁴⁰.

When Themistocles landed at Ephesus, he learned that Xerxes, on whose gratitude he had claims, and to whom he meant to apply for protection, no longer filled the oriental throne. Artaxerxes, surnamed Longimanus, the third son of that monarch, had lately obtained the Persian sceptre¹⁴¹; in consequence of events too memorable to be omitted, though not immediately connected with the affairs of Greece, or those of her Asiatic colonies.

Artabanus, commander of the guards of Xerxes, having conspired the murder of his sovereign, and the usurpation of the crown, communicated his designs to the eunuch Mithridates, one of the officers of the king's household. Mithridates entered into the views of Artabanus; who being secretly introduced, by night, into the royal bed-chamber, killed Xerxes¹⁴². No sooner had Artabanus perpetrated this atrocious crime, than he hastened to Artaxerxes, and told him that Darius, his eldest brother, had murdered the king in order to get immediate possession of the throne; exhorted him to revenge the death of his father, and seize with guiltless hands the sceptre¹⁴³.

139. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxv. Unwilling to abandon the narration of Thucydides, yet finding it impossible to reconcile that narration, in what regards the flight of Themistocles, to any system of chronology, I have related the facts without marking the dates, or attempting to reconcile the conjectures of chronologers concerning the coincidence of events.

140. Id. lib. i. cap. cxxxvi. cxxxvii.

141. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxvii.

142. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 52.

143. Id. *ibid*.

Artaxerxes

Artaxerxes listened to the suggestions of Artabanus, who offered him the assistance of the royal guards¹⁴⁴. The guards were mustered, and Darius was slain. Artaxerxes instantly assumed the imperial ensigns; but the murderous Artabanus had resolved that his reign should be short. Having assembled his sons, he boastingly told them, that the time for his ascending the throne was arrived. He accordingly left them; and waiting upon the king, drew his sword, and wounded him¹⁴⁵. The wound, however, happened to be slight; so that Artaxerxes, after bravely defending himself, slew the treacherous assassin with his own hand¹⁴⁶. By this gallant exploit he revenged the murder of his father, and established himself on the Persian throne; an insurrection raised by his second brother Histaspes, governor of the distant province of Bactria¹⁴⁷, being suppressed by his vigorous exertions in war¹⁴⁸.

LETTER
XIV.

Ant. Chr.
465.

Olympiad
lxxviii. 4.

Artaxerxes reigned with lustre thirty-nine years; and renewed in the seventh year of his reign, through the influence of Esther, a Jewish concubine, whom he afterward married, the edict of Cyrus for rebuilding the city, and temple of Jerusalem¹⁴⁹.

To this prince, who excelled in beauty of person¹⁵⁰, and was eminently distinguished by sweetness of temper and dignity of mind¹⁵¹, Themistocles sent a letter, when on his journey to Susa¹⁵². That letter

144. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 53.

145. Id. ibid.

146. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

147. Id. ibid.

148. Ctesias, cap. xxxi.

149. Ezra, chap. vii. Esther, passim. and Prideaux, Connect. book v. with the authors there-cited. See also Rollin. Hist. Ancienne, lib. vii. sect. vi.

150. Strabo, lib. xv. p. 735, edit. Casaubon. sup. cit.

151. Plut. Vit. Artaxerxes, init.

152. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxvii.

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was to the following purport: “ Themistocles, who
 “ of all the Greeks did the greatest mischief to thy
 “ house, while bound to carry on war against thy
 “ father, is coming to thee; having still a title to
 “ remuneration. For after his duty was discharged,
 “ and the hazards of Xerxes became imminent, he
 “ did him service so essential, as to overbalance for-
 “ mer injuries. Now persecuted by the Greeks for
 “ his attachment to the Persian cause, he is in thy
 “ dominions, and able to promote thy interest. But
 “ he desires a year’s delay, before he shall be called
 “ upon to unfold his designs¹⁵³. ”

Admiring the magnanimity of Themistocles, and wishing to enjoy the benefit of his counsels, Artaxerxes granted the delay he requested¹⁵⁴. And he, during that term of indulgence, applied himself so diligently to the study of the Persian language and the manners of the east, that, at the expiration of the year, when he appeared at court, and obtained audience, he was able to converse with the king not only without the help of an interpreter, but with all the ease of a native of Persia¹⁵⁵.

This talent proved a new recommendation to Themistocles; and, in conjunction with his lately acquired knowledge of oriental customs and manners¹⁵⁶, raised him to the highest favour at the court of Susa. Artaxerxes, flattered by his pretended projects for the conquest of Greece, and charmed with the frequent instances he gave of superior understanding, took him into his particular friendship and confidence¹⁵⁷;

153. Id. *ibid*.

154. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxviii.

155. Compare Thucyd. *ubi sup.* with Cornel Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Themist.

156. Plut. Vit. Themist.

157. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxviii.

and,

and, as a distinguished mark of that friendship, as well as confidence, conferred on him the government of three Greek cities in Asia Minor—Magnesia, Lampsacus, and Myus, the revenues of which were appropriated solely to his use¹⁵⁸.

Themistocles was greatly beloved and respected in his Asiatic government; and, after his death, (which I shall have occasion to notice in the order of events) a magnificent monument was erected to his memory, at the public expense, and his statue was placed in the forum of Magnesia¹⁵⁹. That monument remained to the time of Plutarch¹⁶⁰: and then his statue was still to be seen in the temple of Diana Aristobule¹⁶¹; from which it appeared, says the philosophical biographer, that his aspect was as heroic as his soul¹⁶².

I must now, my lord, resume the naval history of Greece. But it will be proper, before we enter upon this subject, to display the civil and political character of Cimon; whom we have seen invested with the command of the confederate fleet, and whose enterprises were attended with such success.


Cimon, after the expulsion of Themistocles, had no equal in Athens; Aristides, his venerated friend, being now in the decline of life, and little more than the spectator of his triumphs. Cimon took a more certain road to popularity, than either Aristides or Themistocles. Instead of despising money like the former, or hoarding it like the latter, unless when expended on some magnificent public spectacle, he paid a prudent attention to wealth, but without discovering any marks of rapacity; and being

158. Id. *ibid.* 159. Thucyd. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. *ubi sup.*

160. Plut. *Vit. Themist.*

161. Id. *ibid.*

162. Plut. *ubi sup.*

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“ He’s not a villain but a debauchee,
 “ Whose careless heart is stole by wine and women.”

And those of Cratinus, the comic poet, in one of his pieces entitled Archilochi:

“ Even I Metrobius, though a scrivener, hoped
 “ To pass a cheerful and a sleek old age,
 “ And fare to my last hour at Cimon’s table;
 “ Cimon! the best and noblest of the Greeks,
 “ Whose wide-spread bounty vied with that of heaven¹⁶⁵.”

Gorgias, the Leontine, therefore bears just testimony to his character, in saying, That he got riches to use them; and used them so, as to be honoured on their account¹⁶⁶.

Ant. Chr.
 470.
 Olympiad
 lxxvii. 3.

It accordingly appears, that although Cimon, in his convivial meetings, might often exceed the bounds of temperance, his generous hospitality did not lead him to neglect the service of his country. The year after the taking of Naxus, he sailed with the confederate fleet to the Asiatic coast, and added to the maritime league all the Grecian cities in Caria and Lycia¹⁶⁷; which, on being assured of support, revolted from the Persian monarch, and put themselves

163. Plut. Vit. Cimon.

164. Id. ibid.

165. Plut. ubi sup.

166. Id. ibid.

167. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 46.

under the protection of Athens¹⁶⁸. Such towns as belonged to the natives, and were held by Persian garrisons, Cimon reduced¹⁶⁹.

LETTER
XIV.

While the Athenian admiral, after having made these acquisitions, lay off Cnidus and Triopium, he received intelligence, that a Persian fleet was assembled, on the coast of Pamphylia; and a Persian army mustered on land¹⁷⁰. Weighing anchor, he stood to sea with two hundred Athenian triremes¹⁷¹. Those gallies had been built by Themistocles, but were enlarged by Cimon¹⁷². He met the hostile fleet at the mouth of the river Eurymedon, consisting of three hundred and fifty sail¹⁷³; gave it battle, defeated it, and took or destroyed two hundred triremes¹⁷⁴.

The Persian army advanced close to the shore. But it appeared to Cimon an arduous undertaking, to make a descent in defiance of such a body of forces; and with men fatigued in the late engagement at sea, to encounter on land a superior body of fresh troops¹⁷⁵. Finding, however, the Greeks elevated in courage and spirit by their recent victory, and desirous to be led against the enemy, he disembarked his heavy-armed infantry, yet warm from the fight. All ardour, they rushed forward with loud shouts. The Persians stood and received their attack with firmness. A sharp conflict ensued; in which the bravest, and most distinguished of the Athenians were slain. But at length, though with much difficulty, the barbarians were broken¹⁷⁶: and Cimon had the honour of being victorious both by

168. Id. *ibid*.

169. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. ubi sup.

170. Plut. Vit. Cimon.

171. Id. *ibid*.

172. Plut. ubi sup.

173. Id. Vit. Cimon.

174. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. c.

175. Plut. Vit. Cimon.

176. Id. *ibid*.

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The Persian monarch¹⁷⁹, according to Plutarch, was so much humbled by these defeats, that he acceded to a peace, which confined his dominion in Asia Minor to a day's journey on horseback from the Grecian sea; and by which he engaged, that none of his gallies, or ships of war, should ever come within the Cyanean and Chelidonian isles¹⁸⁰; relinquishing to the Athenians the sovereignty of the Ægean, and to the Asiatic Greeks their freedom. But I shall refer this treaty to a later period, on the authority of Diodorus¹⁸¹; a period, when the Athenian naval power was more highly exalted, and when the haughty and exasperated Xerxes no longer swayed the Persian sceptre.

The great success of Cimon, at the river Eurymedon, gave new lustre to his already popular and heroic character. And Athens, enriched and adorned

177. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. c. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Cimon.

178. Plut. Vit. Cimon.

179. The monarch here alluded to must have been Xerxes; for, according to all ancient chronologers, he reigned twenty or twenty-one years. The circumstances connected with the flight of Themistocles, as related by Thucydides, form the only objection to this chronology. But, accurate as that historian generally is, it seems more reasonable to suppose he was mistaken in some of those circumstances, than to subvert the order of events, and throw all history into confusion, in order to render his narrative consistent. If we set aside the single circumstance of Naxos being besieged by the Athenians, when Themistocles passed into Asia (Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxvii.), all may be reconciled. For we know not exactly, when the prosecution against him, for treason, commenced; what time his trial occupied; nor how long he wandered from place to place, in danger of being apprehended, before he left the European shore, and sought refuge in the Persian dominions.

180. Plut. Vit. Cimon.

181. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 74. edict. sup. cit.

with the Persian spoils¹⁸², prosecuted, under his liberal administration, new schemes of wealth, of glory, and ambition. Commerce, conquest, and colonization, equally occupied her views; and being now unrivalled mistress of the Grecian seas, she rapidly pressed forward in her naval career.

The first object that engaged the avidity of the Athenians, was a territory on the coast of Thrace, containing gold mines. That territory belonged to the island of Thasus¹⁸³; and some disputes having arisen with the Thasians, concerning the trade to those coasts, they withdrew themselves from the maritime league¹⁸⁴. Cimon seized this occasion of quarrel to assemble the confederate fleet; sailed to the refractory island; defeated the Thasian squadron, and disembarked a strong body of forces¹⁸⁵. But the Thasians, after losing a battle on land¹⁸⁶, took refuge within their walls, and made an obstinate resistance.

Ant. Chr.
469.
Olympiad
lxxvii. 4.

During the siege of Thasus, the Athenians sent a colony, consisting of about ten thousand people to a place on the river Strymon called the Nine-Ways, but afterward Amphipolis¹⁸⁷.

They became masters of the Nine-Ways, by expelling the Edonians¹⁸⁸; but, advancing farther into the country, they were all cut off at Drabescus, by the united forces of the barbarous natives, who were inimical to the settlement of that new colony¹⁸⁹.

182. Plut. *Vit. Cimon*. He first built, says this Grecian biographer, those elegant and noble structures, for disputation and exercise at Athens, that were afterward so much admired. He planted the forum with plane trees; and into the academy, which before was a dry and unsightly spot, he brought water, and sheltered it with groves. Id. *ibid*.

183. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. c.

184. Id. *ibid*.

185. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

186. Id. *ibid*.

187. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. c.

188. Id. *ibid*.

189. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

Meanwhile

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
468.
Olympiad
lxxviii. 1.

Meanwhile the Thasians, closely besieged, had implored the assistance of the Lacedæmonians; entreating them to divert the Athenian force, by breaking into Attica¹⁹⁰. Unknown to the Athenians, the Spartan senate agreed to the request of the Thasians¹⁹¹; but the shock of an earthquake, which laid Sparta in ruins, and other circumstances connected with it precluded the irruption of the Lacedæmonians in favour of the Thasians¹⁹². The helots, now mostly descendants of the ancient Messenians, and generally known by the name of Messenians¹⁹³, seized this opportunity to break their fetters, and take vengeance on their cruel and imperious masters. They rose in rebellion, and advanced to Sparta¹⁹⁴; but being gallantly opposed by Archidamus (joint king of Lacedæmon along with Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias), who headed the Spartan army¹⁹⁵, they retreated, and took possession of Ithome¹⁹⁶; the last resort of the liberty of their brave but unfortunate forefathers, whence they made frequent excursions.

Ant. Chr.
467.
Olympiad
lxxviii. 2.

This intestine war gave full employment to the Lacedæmonians. And the Thasians, deprived of their interposition, surrendered to the Athenians upon terms, after having sustained a siege for three years¹⁹⁷. Those terms were, that the Thasians should level their walls; give up their armed ships; pay to the naval confederacy, and to Athens as the head of that confederacy, the whole arrears of their stipulated contribution for the public service; furnish their proportion punctually in future, and quit all pretensions to their territory on the continent, and to the mines¹⁹⁸.

190. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. ci.

191. Id. *ibid.*

192. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. ci.

193. Id. *ibid.*

194. Thucyd. *ubi sup.* Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 48, vol. ii. et Plut. *Vit. Cimon.*

195. Diod. Sicul. et Plut. *ubi sup.*

196. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. ci.

197. Id. *ibid.*

198. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

As the war against the rebels in Ithome ran out into length, the Lacedæmonians demanded the aid of their allies; and, among others, of the Athenians¹⁹⁹. An Athenian army was accordingly sent to their assistance, under the command of Cimon²⁰⁰; although not without strong opposition from the democratical party in Athens, who beheld with pleasure the humiliation of Sparta, and were unwilling to extricate that rival state from the embarrassments in which it was involved²⁰¹. But the eloquence and influence of Cimon prevailed over all popular arguments²⁰². Hence the formidable body of forces with which he was furnished.

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XIV.

Ant. Chr.
466.
Olympiad
lxxviii. 2.

The chief reason, says Thucydides²⁰³, why the Lacedæmonians required the assistance of the Athenians, was the reputation of their superior skill in the attack of fortifications²⁰⁴. The long continuance of the siege of Ithome had convinced them of the necessity of such skill, after they had in vain attempted to take it by storm²⁰⁵. Yet it appears that, through impatience and inexperience in such operations, they persisted in that mode of attack, even after the arrival of the Athenians. For we are told, by the accurate contemporary historian, that the first open enmity between Athens and Sparta broke out during this siege²⁰⁶; and on the following account.

The Lacedæmonians, when they found that Ithome could not be carried by storm (their only mode of attack, and in which they engaged their allies), grew jealous of the intrepid courage, and new-acquired

199. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cii.

201. Plut. Vit. Cimon.

203. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cii.

205. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cii.

206. Thucyd. ubi sup.

200. Id. ibid.

202. Id. ibid.

204. Id. ibid.

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which required longer time to accomplish its purpose than the direct assault, though not so slow as the old method of blockade. And, regarding them as an alien people; who, in the course of their operations, might be tampering with the besieged Messenians, and create them fresh troubles, they dismissed them on pretence that they had “no longer any need of their assistance²⁰⁷.”

But this pretence, under which the Lacedæmonians endeavoured to hide their jealousy, did not deceive the Athenians²⁰⁹; especially as they alone, of all the Spartan allies, had been sent home²¹⁰. Convinced they had deserved better treatment from the Lacedæmonians, they thought themselves insulted²¹¹. Therefore, disregarding the league between Athens and Sparta against the Persian monarch, they formed an alliance with the Argives, who had sided with that monarch, and also with the Thessalians, the former allies of the great king; both being included in the same confederacy²¹². As a prelude to this new league, Cimon had been banished by the ostracism²¹³; because of his attachment to Sparta, which he sought to conceal under the mask of liberal policy²¹⁴.

Ant. Chr.
465.
Olympiad
lxxviii. 3.

On the expulsion of Cimon, the administration of the Athenian government fell under the direction of Pericles, the son of Xanthippus; who was blest by

207. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cii. This seems the only rational interpretation of the concise remark of Thucydides. That the Athenians were then possessed of such new skill will not be disputed. They seem to have acquired it during the sieges of Eion and Thasus; and afterward fully displayed it, as we shall have occasion to see, at the siege of Potidæa.

208. Id. ibid.

209. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cii.

211. Thucyd. ubi sup.

213. Plut. Vit. Cimon. et Pericles.

210. Id. ibid.

212. Id. ibid.

214. Id. ibid.

nature with extraordinary mental endowments, and who added, to the advantages of family and fortune, a liberal education²¹⁵. He had before this time taken the lead in public affairs, while Cimon was absent on naval expeditions; and he had generously declined urging an accusation against that commander for treason, in having received bribes from the king of Macedonia, when he accomplished the reduction of Thasus, and compelled the relinquishment of its continental territory²¹⁶. But growing in power, and actuated by principle, he took a decided part in expelling Cimon by the ostracism²¹⁷. And his great political talents, which he turned to the side of the democratical party; his polished eloquence, and force of argument, enabled him to obtain his end²¹⁸. Pericles, however, was under the necessity of making a reluctant sacrifice to popularity. He had found it expedient to propose, through Ephialtes, a favourite demagogue, that the

215. Plut. Vit. Pericl. Pericles had many preceptors, but the one to whom he was most indebted, was Anaxagoras, the Clazomenian, denominated the Intellect; either says Plutarch (*ubi sup.*), in admiration of his superior understanding, and knowledge of the works of nature, or because he was the first who clearly proved, that the universe owed its formation neither to chance nor necessity, but to a pure and unmixed mind.

Charmed with the company of this philosopher, and instructed by him in the most sublime sciences, Pericles acquired not only an elevation of sentiment, with a loftiness and purity of style, far above that of all former public speakers, but a composed gravity of countenance; a clear and even tone of voice, an easy deportment, and a degree of mental firmness, which no vehemence of oratory could disturb (Plut. Vit. Pericl.). Nor were these the only advantages Pericles derived from the lessons of Anaxagoras. From these, he learned to overcome the terrors, which the various phenomena of the heavens excite in the minds of all who know not their causes; and which, by reason of their ignorance, fill them with a tormenting fear of the gods, that the study of nature, engendering sober piety, only can cure. *Id. ibid.*

216. Plut. Vit. Cimon et Pericles.

217. *Id. ibid.*

218. Plut. *ubi sup.*

: more

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more important causes, cognizable only by the court of areopagus, according to the institutions of Solon, should be brought before the assembly of the people²¹⁹; and that this assembly should order all disbursements from the public treasury²²⁰. Thus the Athenian people, without any adequate balance in the constitution, became sovereigns of the state. And their giddiness rendered them very unfit for such a trust.

Though the alliance of the Athenians with the Argives, the ancient and inveterate enemies of the Lacedæmonians, would have enabled them to carry on war to advantage against Sparta, during her intestine troubles, they took no hostile step against that rival state, till after the surrender of Ithome. This mild forbearance may be ascribed to the magnanimity of Pericles! who, although he was obliged to court the favour of the people, in order to obtain the direction of public affairs, was by no means disposed to foster antipathies, having naturally a contempt for democratical popularity²²¹.

Pericles, however, embraced every political occasion to exalt the power of Athens, and weaken that of Sparta; at the same time, that he employed the forces of the state in naval expeditions. He it was, we may presume, who encouraged the Megareans to throw off the Spartan alliance, and form a league with Athens²²². They had been engaged in a hostile dispute with the Corinthians, in which they were not supported by the Lacedæmonians. That dispute was concerning their boundaries²²³.

In consequence of this new league, the Athenians acquired a great accession of strength and security.

219. Aristot. Polit. lib. ii. cap. xii. et Plut. Vit. Pericl.

220. Id. ibid.

221. Plut. Vit. Pericl.

222. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. ciii.

223. Id. ibid.

The territory of Megara, almost wholly mountainous, formed a bold barrier against invasions from Peloponnesus. Its situation, fronting the Corinthian isthmus, in a manner commanded the communication between that peninsula and Northern Greece; and its two harbours, Nisæa and Pagæ, one on the Saronic gulf, the other on the Crissæan bay, were valuable openings to a naval and commercial people. Small wonder, therefore, that the administration of Athens, headed by Pericles, engaged in the defence of the Megareans, and took them under its protection.

Little, however, can be said in favour of the generosity of the Athenian ministry, on this occasion. Under pretence of providing, in the most effectual manner, for the safety of their new allies, they took the most politic measures for holding them in perpetual subjection. Megara and Pagæ (no doubt at the requisition of the protecting state) were put into the hands of the Athenians²²⁴; and consequently garrisoned with Athenian troops. And the Athenians built for the defence of the Megareans, the long walls that reached from Megara to Nisæa, its port, and took upon themselves the guarding of those walls²²⁵; seemingly that a body of forces, disembarked from the Athenian fleet, might be enabled to relieve that city, if besieged, without being obstructed by the enemy.

Before the Athenians were put in possession of Megara, the Lacedæmonians had recovered Ithome. The Messenians in that fortified station, unable to hold out any longer, agreed to evacuate it, in the tenth year of the siege, on the following conditions: "That the public faith of Sparta should be pledged

Ant. Chr.
458.
Olympiad
lxx. 3.

224. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. ciii.

225. Id. ibid.

PART I. “ for their safety, until they could quit Pelopon-
 “ nesus; into which they engaged never to return²²⁶.”
 They accordingly marched out, with their wives and
 children, and obtained reception from the Atheni-
 ans; who afterward settled them at Naupactus,
 which they had taken from the Ozolæan Locrians²²⁷.

During the latter years of the siege of Ithome, the Athenians and their naval confederates had fitted out and sent a fleet of two hundred sail against Cyprus²²⁸. Great part of that large and fertile island had still remained, or again been reduced under the Persian dominion; and if the Athenians could have expelled the Persian garrisons, and brought the Grecian cities to enter into their naval confederacy, they would have attained most important objects to a people, who aspired at the unrivalled sovereignty of the sea. And those, it appears, they might have attained, had they confined their ambition to Cyprus. But certain unforeseen circumstances drew that ambition toward Egypt.

Inarus, the son of Psammitichus, a Libyan prince, and king of the Libyans bordering on Egypt, taking advantage of the civil wars that followed the murder of Xerxes, and the accession of Artaxerxes Longimanus, had encouraged great part of the Egyptians to revolt from the Persian dominion²²⁹. The insurgents chose Inarus for their leader²³⁰: and he, having routed the Persian forces, and slain Achæmenes, the governor, who headed them, expelled the collectors of the tribute, and abolished every badge of servitude²³¹. Standing in need, however, of naval

226. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. ciii.

227. Id. *ibid*.

228. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. civ.

229. Id. *ibid*.

230. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. civ.

231. Compare Herodot. lib. iii. cap. ii. et lib. vii. cap. vii. with Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 54. vol. ii.

support, in order to repel the maritime attacks of the Phœnicians, as well as to prevent them from enabling the Persians to invade Egypt by sea, he applied to the Athenian commanders lying off Cyprus²³²; and they and the confederate admirals, allured by the advantages held out, relinquished the Cyprian expedition (seemingly without the authority of the Athenian administration), and steered with their fleet for the Egyptian coast²³³. Having safely arrived there, they sailed up the Nile; and became masters of that river, and of two-thirds of the city of Memphis²³⁴. They even made an attack upon the remaining division called the *white wall*²³⁵; which was defended by the vanquished Medes and Persians, who had fled thither for refuge, and by such of the Egyptians as had not joined in the general

232. Diodorus (*Biblioth.* lib. xi. p. 54, vol. ii.) says, that Inarus sent ambassadors to Athens, and obtained the assistance of the Athenian republic by liberal promises of mutual benefit. But Thucydides, whose narration I have followed, takes no notice of such embassy: he even makes it evident, that it never took place (*Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. civ.). The sagacity of sir Walter Raleigh enabled him to see this matter in its proper light. *Hist. of the World*, book iii. chap. vii. sect. v.

233. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. civ. Mr. Mitford has taken great pains to vindicate Pericles and his colleagues, in the Athenian administration, from the accusation of impolicy, in giving up the expedition against Cyprus, for the possible advantages to be derived from an alliance with the Egyptian insurgents (*Hist. of Greece*, chap. xiii. sect. ii.); but, as I have above observed, it does not appear that the Athenian administration had any concern in the measure. I must, however, agree with Raleigh (*Hist. of the World*, book iii. chap. vii. sect. v.) that it was bad policy in the Athenian commanders to abandon the reduction of Cyprus for the support of the Egyptian malecontents. The great lure seems to have been freedom of access to the Egyptian harbours, which had been shut against the Greeks since the beginning of the Persian war; with the probability of forming in that country commercial, if not military establishments. But they ought to have considered, how difficult and doubtful an undertaking it would prove, to restore the independency of Egypt, before they gave up a practicable enterprise, pregnant with solid advantages.

234. Id. *ibid.*

235. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. civ.
revolt

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revolt of their countrymen²³⁶. But this fortification was so strong, and so vigorously defended, that all the efforts of Inarus and his Grecian allies to reduce it, proved abortive. The Athenians, however, lay before it four years²³⁷; and so long they seem to have been in possession of the navigation of the Nile.

In the course of this siege, Artaxerxes employed various expedients, in order to induce the Athenians to withdraw their forces from Egypt. He attempted, though without effect, to bribe the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica²³⁸; and he applied to Themistocles for the execution of those projects, he had hinted, for the humiliation of Greece²³⁹. And that high-minded chief, in a conflict between patriotism and gratitude, is said to have drank poison²⁴⁰; that he might not be instrumental to the ruin, or sully the glory of his country²⁴¹.

Artaxerxes, however, having quelled the commotions in his oriental dominions, was enabled to act with more vigour, and turn the strength of the empire toward the west. He accordingly sent Megabazus, a Persian nobleman, and distinguished commander, with a great army into Egypt by land²⁴². This army defeated the Egyptians and their allies

236. Id. *ibid.*

237. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cix. cx.

238. Id. lib. i. cap. cix.

239. Plut. Vit. Themist.

240. Id. *ibid.* et Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxviii.

241. The Athenians, repenting of their prosecution of Themistocles, honoured him with a monument in the Peiræus (Pausan. lib. i. init.): and thither his bones are said to have been carried by his relations (Id. *ibid.*). Hence the following verses, preserved by Plutarch:

“ Oft as the merchant speeds the passing sail,
 “ Thy tomb, Themistocles! he stops to hail;
 “ When hostile ships in naval combat meet,
 “ Thy shade attending, hovers o’er the fleet.”

Plut. Vit. Themist.

242. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cix.

in battle²⁴³; drove the Greeks out of Memphis; and, at last, shut them up in the isle of Prosopis²⁴⁴ in the Nile, near the vertex of the Delta. There (seemingly by the help of a naval armament) the Persian commander kept them blockaded for eighteen months²⁴⁵. During that time, having drained the channel between Prosopis and the Egyptian shore, by turning the water into a different course, he stranded all their ships, and rendered the island almost part of the continent²⁴⁶. He then led his troops across the drained channel, and carried the place by assault²⁴⁷. As the Athenians and their naval confederates had made a brave defence, and sustained a long siege, the greater part of them appear to have been cut off by disease or the sword²⁴⁸; and of those that escaped, a few only arrived safe at Cyrenè, to which they had directed their flight, the rest having fallen in their march through Libya²⁴⁹.

But the loss of this fleet and army was not the only misfortune the Athenians and their allies suffered in Egypt. After the disaster at Prosopis, a Grecian fleet of fifty sail, fitted out by the naval confederates, arrived at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, in its way to Memphis; still ignorant of the fate of

243. Id. *ibid*.

244. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

245. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cix.*

246. Id. *ibid*.

247. Thucyd. *ubi sup*. In that extremity, we are told by Diodorus, the Athenians set fire to their fleet, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy; then embraced the heroic resolution of fighting to the last man, rather than be made prisoners; that Megabazus, and the other Persian commanders, perceiving their desperate purpose, and having had proofs of their valour, offered them terms; by which they were permitted to depart out of Egypt, without molestation; and that, marching through Libya to Cyrene, they arrived safe, beyond their hopes, in their own country (*Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 58, vol. ii.*). But this account, though it admits of much embellishment, so violently contradicts the narrative of the accurate contemporary historian Thucydides, that I have not ventured to adopt it.

248. Thucyd. *lib i. cap. x.*

249. Id. *ibid*.

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the former armament, which it was destined to succour²⁵⁰. Assailed, on entering the river, by the missile weapons of the Persian land-forces from the shore, and attacked from the sea by a Phœnician fleet, it was almost wholly destroyed; a few ships only having the fortune to escape²⁵¹. To complete the horrors of the Egyptian revolt under Inarus, that prince was betrayed to the Persians, and crucified²⁵². Yet was not Egypt entirely reduced under the Persian dominion. Amyrtæus, an Egyptian leader, who had seized the fen-country, still maintained his independency²⁵³; by means of his inaccessible situation, and the valour of his adherents²⁵⁴.

Ant. Chr.
457.
Olympiad
lxxx. 4.

While the Athenians and their naval confederates were engaged in the Cyprian and Egyptian expeditions, many important events, my lord, took place in Greece. Of these I shall only notice the most consequential.—A war having broke out between Athens and Ægina, a great battle was fought, near that island by the fleets of the two maritime powers²⁵⁵. Both parties being joined by their respective allies, the fight seems to have been obstinate and bloody; but victory ultimately remained with the Athenians, who took seventy of the hostile ships²⁵⁶; landed upon Ægina, under Leocrates, and invested the capital²⁵⁷. Yet could not the vigilance of the besiegers prevent the Æginetes from receiving a reinforcement from Peloponnesus²⁵⁸.

Meantime the Corinthians, and their Peloponnesian allies, made an irruption into the territory of Megara²⁵⁹; thinking it impossible for the Athenians to

250. Thucyd. ubi sup.

251. Id. ibid.

253. Id. ibid.

255. Id. lib. i. cap. cv.

257. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cv.

259. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cv.

252. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cix.

254. Thucyd. ubi sup.

256. Id. ibid.

258. Id. ibid.

march an army into that territory, as they had so large a force already abroad, in Egypt and Ægina²⁶⁰; or, if they resolved to succour the Megareans, that the siege of Ægina must be raised²⁶¹. The Athenians, however, recalled not their army from Ægina; but sent out all the old and young men left in Attica, fit for military service to the aid of the Megareans, under the command of Myronides, a leader hitherto little known to fame: and he fought an indecisive battle with the Corinthian army²⁶². Both parties retired, yet each thought itself entitled to the honour of victory²⁶³.

And, on the departure of the Corinthians, the Athenians found themselves so far victorious, as to venture to erect a trophy²⁶⁴. But the Corinthian youths, when they got home, meeting with nothing but reproaches from the elder citizens, resolved to return to the field of battle, and put in their claim also to the victory²⁶⁵. Accordingly, having allowed themselves twelve days of ease, to recruit their strength after their fatigues, they marched back, and began to erect a trophy in rivalry²⁶⁶. This the Athenians observing, sallied out of Megara with a loud shout, and put those employed in erecting the trophy to the sword²⁶⁷. The Corinthian army, which abetted the claim to victory, was at the same time put to flight²⁶⁸; but made good its retreat without much loss, the main body getting home safe²⁶⁹.

260. Id. *ibid.*

261. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

262. Id. *ibid.*

263. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cv.*

264. Id. *ibid.*

265. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

266. Id. *ibid.*

267. Thucyd. *lib. i. cap. cv.*

268. Id. *ibid.*

269. Thucyd. *lib. i. cap. cvi.* The Athe-

nians, instead of pursuing the Corinthians to the isthmus, or the pass of Geranea, employed themselves in stoning to death a party that had missed its way; and which they surrounded in a piece of enclosed ground, in the neighbourhood of Megara. Id. *ibid.*

PART I.

The Phocæans were about this time embroiled with the Dorians, the progenitors of the Lacedæmonians²⁷⁰; and having taken one of the Dorian cities, the Lacedæmonians marched out to succour the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy armed men, natives of Laconia, and ten thousand of their allies²⁷¹; commanded by Nicomedes, the son of Cleombrotus, in right of Pleistionax, the son of Pausanias, yet a minor²⁷². After forcing the Phocæans to restore the town they had taken from the Dorians, the Lacedæmonian army was ready to come home, but diffculted about the manner of returning to Peloponnesus. If they attempted such return by sea, the Athenians were ready to intercept them in the Crisean bay²⁷³. Nor did they think it safe to prosecute a march by land through the pass of Geranea, as Megara and Pagæ were in the possession of the Athenians: for the pass of Geranea, at all times difficult, was now guarded by a body of Athenian troops²⁷⁴. They, therefore, resolved to halt for a time in Bœotia, and seize an opportunity of returning unmolested²⁷⁵.

But while the Lacedæmonians lay in Bœotia, some of the aristocratical party at Athens having negotiated with them, for the subversion of the popular government; and that negotiation being suspected, if not known by the people, the main body of the Athenian citizens burst out against the enemies of their constitution; assisted by a thousand Argives, and the respective quotas of their other allies, as they could be collected, in the whole amounting to fourteen thousand men²⁷⁶. They fought at Tanagra in Bœotia; and the victory remained with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, but the loss was great on both sides²⁷⁷.

The

270. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cvii.

271. Id. ibid.

272. Thucyd. ubi sup.

273. Id. ibid.

274. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cvii.

275. Id. ibid.

276. Thucyd. ubi sup.

277. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cviii.

The Athenians, it appears, would have gained the battle, had the
Thessalian

Ant. Chr.
456.
Olympiad
lxxxi. 1.

The Lacedæmonians now pursued their march through the territory of Megara, and returned home by Geranea and the isthmus²⁷⁸. But the Athenians were less peaceably disposed. On the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra, they took the field against the Bœotians, under the command of Myronides; gave them battle, and gained a complete victory at Oenophyta. In consequence of this victory, they seized all the territories of Bœotia and Phocis; levelled the walls of Tanagra; and took from the Opuntian Locrians two hundred of their richest citizens for hostages²⁷⁹. On this run of success, the Æginetes surrendered to the Athenians on the following terms: they agreed to demolish their fortifications, give up their ships of war, and pay an annual tribute²⁸⁰.

LETTER
XIV.

Ant. Chr.
456.
Olympiad
lxxxi. 2.

Athens, thus victorious, both over her maritime enemies and hostile neighbours, resolved to chastise the Peloponnesians, for their interference in favour of the Æginetes, and their invasion of the Megarean territory. A naval armament, under Tolmidas, the son of Tolmaius, was accordingly sent to visit the coasts of that peninsula²⁸¹. The Athenian commander, in the course of his operations, burnt the Lacedæmonian docks; took Chalcis, a Corinthian settlement on the river Euenus, in Ætolia; and making a descent on the coast of Sicyon, defeated the Sicyonians in battle²⁸².

Ant. Chr.
455.
Olympiad
lxxxi. 2.

Next year, the Athenians dispatched to the relief of their countrymen, engaged in the siege of Memphis, that fleet of fifty sail, the destruction of which, in the Mendesian branch of the Nile, I have had

Ant. Chr.
454.
Olympiad
xxxii. 3.

Thessalian cavalry done their duty; but they, in the heat of action, went over to the Lacedæmonians. Thucyd. ubi sup.


278. Id. ibid.

279. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. viii.

280. Id. ibid.

281. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cviii.

282. Id. ibid.

PART I.  occasion to mention, in relating the result of the Athenian expedition to Egypt. But ruinous as the Egyptian expedition was, the strength of the Athenian republic was now so great, that the loss of the armament engaged in the support of Inarus seems to have been little felt. The administration of Athens, therefore, thought itself warranted to attempt the restoration of Orestes, a Thessalian prince, who had been expelled his dominions. For this purpose, an Athenian army, in conjunction with the forces of Bœotia and Phocis, which Athens, as the sovereign state in Northern Greece, had a right to demand, entered Thessaly, under the conduct of Myronides, and advanced as far as the city of Pharsalus²⁸³.

Ant. Chr.
453.
Olympiad
lxxxii. 4.

The Athenians and their confederates made themselves masters of the adjacent country, but were not able to keep it; for the Thessalian horse, by their rapid movements, cut off all detachments²⁸⁴: so that the invading army was under the necessity of remaining in a body²⁸⁵. Nor were the invaders, under these circumstances, able to reduce Pharsalus; they, therefore, returned home, without accomplishing the object of the war, or performing any thing worthy of their force²⁸⁶.

Not discouraged by the failure of this enterprise, dictated by resentment and generosity, rather than policy, the Athenians continued to spread the terror of their arms, and display their naval strength on the northern coast of Peloponnesus. Having a fleet in the harbour of Pagæ, at the bottom of the Crissæan or Corinthian bay, they embarked on board it a thousand land-forces²⁸⁷. And Pericles, whose influence

283. Thucyd. lib. cap. cxi.

284. Id. *ibid*.

285. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

286. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. xi.

287. Id. *ibid*.

was now sufficiently established at Athens, to enable him to quit the scene of politics, and engage in active service, took the command of this naval armament²⁸⁸. He made a descent on the coast of Sicyon, and defeated the Sicyonian army, that endeavoured to set bounds to his ravages; then, holding his course westward, along the coast of Peloponnesus, he received a reinforcement of Achaians; and sailing to the opposite coast of Acarnania, landed his forces, and invested Oenias²⁸⁹. But having failed in an attack upon that city, he reimbarked his troops, and carried home his fleet with a considerable booty²⁹⁰.

LETTER
XIV.

Ant. Chr.
453.
Olympiad
lxxxi. 4.

Three years after the return of Pericles to Athens, a truce for five years was concluded between the Athenians and the Peloponnesian confederates²⁹¹. This cessation from hostilities, in Greece, allowed the Athenians leisure to turn their views toward more distant scenes of action; and their ambition again fixed upon Cyprus. A fleet of two hundred ships of war, furnished by them and their naval confederates, was accordingly prepared, and sent against that desirable island, under the command of Cimon²⁹²; whose term of banishment was now expired, but who had been recalled soon after the battle of Tanagra²⁹³. Sixty sail of this fleet, Cimon, whilst he lay off Cyprus, detached to Egypt, at the request of Amyrtæus, who still maintained his independency in the fen-country²⁹⁴: the main body, he employed in the siege of Citium²⁹⁵.

Ant. Chr.
450.
Olympiad
lxxxii. 3.

During the siege of that Phœnician settlement, Cimon died²⁹⁶; and the Grecian land-forces, dis-

288. Thucyd. ubi sup. et Plut. Vit. Pericl.

289. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxi.

290. Id. ibid. et Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 66. vol ii.

291. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxii.

292. Id. ibid.

293. Plut. Vit. Cimon.

294. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxii.

295. Id. ibid.

296. Thucyd. ubi sup.

tressed

PART I.

Ant. Chr.
449.
Olympiad
lxxxii. 4.

tressed with famine, abandoned the enterprise, and marched to the heights of Salamis²⁹⁷. There they gave battle to the Persian army, at the same time that the Grecian fleet sustained the attack of the naval force of the Persian monarch; consisting of the Phœnician, Cyprian, and Cilician squadrons²⁹⁸; and they gained a decisive victory on both elements²⁹⁹. Being afterward joined by the squadron sent to Egypt, the Athenians and their naval confederates, when the season of action was over, returned triumphant to their several harbours³⁰⁰.

Ant. Chr.
448.
Olympiad
lxxxiii. 1.

Artaxerxes, in consequence of the defeat of his fleet and army, tired of contending with the hardy Greeks, and seeing the folly of longer maintaining his father's quarrel, deputed an embassy to Athens for putting a stop to farther hostilities³⁰¹. A negotiation accordingly took place, and the Athenians, finding the conquest of Cyprus no easy undertaking, were satisfied with dictating the following terms: (1.) That the Grecian cities, over all Asia, should enjoy perfect freedom, and be governed by their own laws; (2.) That no Persian ship of war should be seen, in the wide extent of sea, between the Cyprian and Chelidonian isles, or from the mouth of the Euxine to the coast of Pamphylia; (3.) That no Persian commander, by land, should advance with an army, within three days journey of the Asiatic coast, circumscribed by these limits³⁰². And the Athenians stipulated, on their part, no more to invade the territories of the Persian monarch³⁰³.

Thus

297. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxii.

298. Id. *ibid.*

300. Id. *ibid.*

302. Id. *ibid.*

299. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxii.

301. Diod. Sicul. lib. xiii. p. 74, vol. ii.

303. Id. *Biblioth.* lib. xii. p. 75, vol. ii.

The reality of this treaty has been disputed by a modern historian (Mr. Mitford); and the articles of it had been questioned as far back as the time of Plutarch (*Plut. Vit. Cimon*). But he tells us, that in the collection

Thus freed from foreign warfare, and debarred hostilities with their Peloponnesian antagonists, the Athenians might now, by commerce and colonization, have risen to a degree of wealth and power, which no Grecian state would have been able to rival, had they exercised with moderation their authority over their naval confederates. But, having reduced most of these to the condition of tributaries, they multiplied their exactions beyond patient bearing³⁰⁴; so that all, who had any hopes of recovering their independency, revolted from the rigorous domination³⁰⁵. And hence the troubles in which Athens was involved, when she might have enjoyed the most perfect peace, and uninterrupted prosperity.

But before I relate the defection of the Athenian naval confederates, my lord, I must notice some intervening dissensions.

The jealousy between Athens and Sparta, though smothered, was not extinguished; nor the spirit of hostile opposition. Of this one instance will suffice. The Lacedæmonians, as the governing people in Greece by land, having recovered the temple of

collection of Athenian state-papers, made by Craterus, there was found a copy of the articles of that peace, the same in substance with those above inserted (*Id. ibid.*). It is also noticed by Greek writers who lived soon after it was concluded: it is expressly mentioned by Isocrates (*Orat. Areopag.*), and it is alluded to by Plato (*Dial. Menexen.*). Yet Mr. Mitford, for reasons best known to himself, has boldly affirmed, that Plato, in the dialogue before cited, "virtually contradicts the existence of such a treaty" (*Hist. of Greece*, chap. xii. sect. iii.); whereas he, in the character of Socrates, says that the Athenians, by their expeditions to Cyprus, Egypt, and other places, taught the great king to fear for the safety of his own dominions, instead of planning the destruction of Greece; and that peace (obviously with the Persian monarch) was concluded while Athens was in her glory. *Plat. Dial. Menexen.*

304. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xcix.

305. *Id. lib. i. passim.*

PART I. Delphos from the Phocæans, who had seized it, restored it to the Delphians³⁰⁶. No sooner, however, were the Lacedæmonian forces, employed in that service, withdrawn, than an Athenian army took the field, and delivered the disputed temple to the Phocæans³⁰⁷. This was a severe blow to the pride of Sparta; yet prudence made that haughty state conceal its mortification, and forbear taking any new step in favour of the Delphians.

Ant. Chr.
447.
Olympiad
lxxxiii. 2.

Ant. Chr.
446.
Olympiad
lxxxiii. 2.

Next year after that holy war, as it was called, the Athenians were engaged in hostilities with their Bœotian allies or tributaries³⁰⁸. Many of those, whom they seem not to have treated with more lenity than their naval confederates, had been compelled to seek refuge in exile³⁰⁹; and, combining together, had returned, and seized Orchomenos and Cheronæa³¹⁰. Against the Bœotian patriots the Athenian government sent an army, under the command of Tolmidas; and he having taken and plundered Cheronæa, placed an Athenian garrison in it, and withdrew³¹¹. But, in his return, he was attacked at Coronea by a body of the exasperated exiles; who, having been joined by some Locrian and Eubœan fugitives, had marched out of Orchomenos³¹². A furious battle ensued; but victory remained with the Bœotian patriots, who made great slaughter of the Athenians, and took many prisoners³¹³. In consequence of this defeat, the Athenians evacuated Bœotia; and, in order to obtain the ransom of their prisoners, agreed to a peace. By the articles of that treaty, all the expelled Bœotians were

306. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxii.

307. Id. *ibid.*

308. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxiii.

309. Id. *ibid.*

310. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

311. Id. *ibid.*

312. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxiii.

313. Id. *ibid.*

settled in their old habitations, and the whole people recovered their former liberty and rights³¹⁴.

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XIV.

The flame of liberty, at all times contagious, rapidly spread. Immediately after the restoration of freedom and independency to Bœotia, Eubœa revolted³¹⁵. And scarcely had Pericles landed in that island with an army, in order to reduce the insurgents, when he received intelligence of the revolt of Megara³¹⁶; that the Peloponnesians were meditating an incursion into Attica; and that the Megareans had put the Athenian garrison, in their capital, to the sword; those troops excepted that had thrown themselves into Nisæa, its sea-port³¹⁷. And that the Megareans had effected this revolution through the aid of the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians³¹⁸.

Ant. Chr.
445.
Olympiad
lxxxiii. 3.

On receiving that information, Pericles reembarked his forces, and returned to Athens³¹⁹. Meantime the Peloponnesian confederates, having entered Attica, laid the country waste as far as Eleusis and Thria; under the command of Pleistionax, son of Pausanias, one of the joint kings of Sparta³²⁰: but extending their ravages no farther, returned home³²¹.

No sooner were the Athenians freed from this invasion, than they again transported an army into Eubœa, under the command of Pericles, and quickly completed its reduction³²². The inhabitants of Histiaæ were wholly ejected, and that city and its territory peopled with an Athenian colony³²³; but terms

314. Thucyd. ubi sup.

315. Id. Bell Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxiv.

316. Id. ibid.

317. Thucyd. ubi sup.

318. Id. ibid.

319. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxiv.

320. Id. ibid.

321. Thucyd. ubi sup.

322. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxiv.

323. Id. ibid.

were

PART I. were granted to the other cities in the island, and tranquillity re-established according to treaty³²⁴.

Ant. Chr.
444.
Olympiad
lxxxiii. 4.

The year after the submission of Eubœa, the Athenians concluded a peace, to last for thirty years with the Lacedæmonians and their allies³²⁵. In consequence of that treaty, Nisæa, Chalcis, Pagæ, and Trœzene, lately held by the Athenians, were restored to the Peloponnesian confederates³²⁶.

Ant. Chr.
440.
Olympiad
lxxxv. 1.

In the sixth year of this peace, while Athens was flourishing under the administration of Pericles, in all the useful and ornamental arts, a war broke out between the Samios and Miletus concerning Priene³²⁷. The Milesians having been worsted in the hostile competition, had recourse to the Athenians, to whom they grievously complained against the Samians³²⁸. In this complaint some private citizens of Samos joined³²⁹; seemingly dissatisfied with the predominance of the aristocratical party in the government of that city and island. The Athenians, therefore, putting to sea with a fleet of forty sail, landed upon Samos, where they established a democracy³³⁰; and

324. Thucyd. ubi sup.

325. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxv.

326. Id. ibid.

327. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxv.

328. Id. ibid.

329. Thucyd. ubi sup.

330. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxv. The Athenians acted against sound policy, in attempting to establish a democratical form of government in all their tributary states; without duly considering, whether that government was agreeable to the majority of the inhabitants, or consistent with the preponderation of wealth and power in such states: and the Lacedæmonians erred, in like manner, by endeavouring to establish an aristocracy, wherever they had influence so to do (Thucyd. lib. i. passim.). Pericles, who had risen to authority at Athens, as we have seen; by taking the lead of the popular party, encouraged the Athenians in their passion for establishing democracies, while he repressed their spirit of conquest (Plut.

and: exacted from the Samians fifty boys, and an equal number of grown men, as hostages³³¹.

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These hostages the Athenians deposited at Lemnos³³². And, on the departure of their fleet from Samos, they left a garrison in the capital, to secure the obedience of the island³³³. But a body of Samians, who would not submit to the new form of government, and who had fled to the continent, having gained the confidence of the most powerful citizens of Samos, and the friendship of Pissuthnes, the Persian governor of Sardis, passed over by night into their native city³³⁴. They first directed their efforts against the popular party, and got a majority of them secured through aristocratical influence³³⁵. They next conveyed away, by stealth, the Samian hostages from Lemnos; then openly revolted, and delivered the Athenian garrison, with its officers, to Pissuthnes³³⁶. Elated with this success, the Samians prepared to renew the war against Miletus; the Byzantines having joined them, in their resistance of the authority of Athens³³⁷.

The Athenians were no sooner informed of that revolt and its consequences, than they sent against Samos a fleet of sixty gallies³³⁸. But a division of sixteen sail was detached for other services; some

Vit. Pericl.). That may be considered as the greatest error in his liberal administration. But he had thrown too much power into the hands of the people to be able to controul their humours, which he had excited. If he had possessed generosity enough to have relinquished his station in the republic (no small sacrifice), his declared opposition to Sparta (Plut. ubi sup.), which he considered as true patriotism, would have restrained him from so doing.

331. Id. ibid.

332. Thucyd. ubi sup.

333. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxv.


334. Id. ibid.

335. Thucyd. ubi sup.

336. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxv.

337. Id. ibid.

338. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxvi.

PART I.  to lie off the coast of Caria, and observe the motions of a Phœnician squadron, and others to steer for Chios and Lesbos, and there give a summons for aid³³⁹. The remaining forty sail, commanded by Pericles, and nine colleagues, gave battle, near the isle of Tragia, to the Samian fleet, consisting of seventy sail, twenty of which had land-forces on board, and gained a signal victory³⁴⁰. The Samian fleet was then on its way from Miletus.

Twenty sail afterward arrived from Athens, to reinforce the fleet under Pericles, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos³⁴¹. Encouraged by this accession of strength, the Athenians and their allies landed on the island of Samos; discomfited the Samians in battle, invested their capital by land, and at the same time blocked it up by sea³⁴². But Pericles withdrew sixty sail of the confederate fleet from this service, and steered with all expedition for the coast of Caria, on being informed that a Phœnician fleet was coming to the relief of Samos³⁴³.

During the absence of the Athenian naval commander, the Samians manned their fleet; quitted the harbour, sunk the ships stationed to guard it, and defeated all those that attempted to oppose them³⁴⁴. Having thus victoriously accomplished their purpose, by beating off the confederate fleet, they remained masters of their own haven for fourteen days; during which time they made what importations or exportations, they thought fit³⁴⁵. But, on the return of Pericles, their harbour was again blocked up³⁴⁶. And he having received fresh supplies from

339. Id. *ibid.*340. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*341. Id. *ibid.*342. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxv.*343. Id. *ibid.*344. Thucyd. *lib. i. cap. cxvi.*345. Id. *ibid.*346. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

Athens in forty ships, under Thucydides, and Agnon, and Phormio; with twenty sail, under Tlepolemus, and Anticles, besides thirty from Chios and Lesbos, the Samians found farther resistance impracticable³⁴⁷. They, therefore, having sustained a siege for almost nine months, surrendered on the following terms:—That they should demolish their walls; give hostages; deliver up their fleet; and reimburse, by stated payments, the expense of the war³⁴⁸. The Byzantines also negotiated; and were again received under the protection of the Athenian government, on the same terms their obedience had been held, as subject allies, before their revolt³⁴⁹.

LETTER
XIV.

The same year that Samos was reduced, and Byzantium submitted to the Athenians, a dispute arose between Corinth and its colony of Corcyra concerning Epidamnus; which gave birth to events, that furnished pretexts for commencing, and immediately led to the horrid Peloponnesian war. I say furnished pretexts; for Thucydides delivers as his opinion, That the growth of the Athenian power, which had awakened the jealous fears of Sparta; was the true, though not the avowed cause of that war³⁵⁰.

Ant. Chr.
440.
Olympiad
lxxxv. 1.

The progress of the dispute between Corinth and Corcyra, my lord, I shall distinctly trace, as it serves

347. Id. *ibid*.

348. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxvi.

349. Id. *ibid*.

350. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxiii. A remarkable instance of the alarm excited by the growth of the Athenian power, and the apprehended necessity of curbing it, occurred during the siege of Samos. An assembly of the Peloponnesian delegates, it appears, was held at Sparta, in order to deliberate, "Whether the Samians should be supported in their revolt?"—and divided upon the question (Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xl.). But the deputies from Corinth, the principal maritime state, opposing the motion, it was dropt (Id. *ibid*). The Corinthians, as we shall have occasion to see, claimed favour from Athens, for this dissent.

PART I. to elucidate a subject little understood:—"the dependence of the Grecian colonies on the mother-countries, and the authority exerted over them by the parent-states."

We have formerly had occasion to notice³⁵¹, the early settlement of a colony from Corinth in the island of Corcyra. The happy situation of that island for commerce, with the genius of the Corinthian settlers for traffic, soon enabled them to build on the continent, toward the bottom of the Ionian sea, the cities of Epidamnus and Apollonia³⁵². These new settlements were made under the sanction, with the assistance³⁵³, and consequently placed under the controul, of Corinth.

Epidamnus, which gave rise to the present dispute, became gradually great and populous³⁵⁴, and seemingly had asserted independency. But this city being afterward harassed with seditions, for many years, was brought low; and the neighbouring barbarians, taking advantage of the feuds among the Epidamnians, deprived them of the greater part of their territory³⁵⁵. To this evil another, and yet more distressing, succeeded. The body of the citizens of Epidamnus, having expelled the leaders of the aristocratical party, with which they had been so long struggling, the aspiring exiles sought shelter among the barbarians; and committed depredations upon the Epidamnians, both by land and sea³⁵⁶.

351. Lett. ii.

352. Compare Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxiv. with Strabo, lib. vii. p. 316, edit. sup. cit.

353. Vid. Thucyd. et Strabo, ubi sup.

354. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxiv.

355. Id. ibid.

356. Thucyd. ubi sup.

Suffering much from these depredations, the Epidamnians sent ambassadors to Corcyra, as their mother-country; beseeching the Corcyræans, “not to behold their destruction with eyes unconcerned, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and deliver them from the barbarian war³⁵⁷.” The Epidamnian ambassadors appeared in the habit of suppliants; sitting down in the temple of Juno, in the act of imploring. But the Corcyræans, notwithstanding that humble posture, sanctioned by religion, dismissed the ambassadors, without regarding their supplication³⁵⁸.

The Epidamnians thus denied the aid of Corcyra, applied to Corinth, the sovereign state, by the advice of the Delphic oracle³⁵⁹. The Corinthians, willing to exert their authority over their refractory colonies in the Ionian sea, readily received the submission of Epidamnus³⁶⁰. In so doing, however, they were not actuated merely by motives of interest, but also by those of resentment. They wished to humble the Corcyræans; who had not only contemptuously disavowed their civil controul, but even refused to yield them the honours owed by Grecian colonies to their founders at public festivals³⁶¹.

The Corcyræans had been emboldened to throw off the controul of Corinth, and maintain their independency, by their great wealth and formidable navy; they having now no less than one hundred and

357. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxiv.

358. Id. *ibid*. What might be the motive for such obduracy, is not explained by Thucydides, nor easy to be conjectured; but the former pride of the Epidamnians, in asserting independency, might probably be the cause, with a wish of seeing them more completely humbled, that the Corcyræans might take advantage of their distress, and subject them to the condition of tributaries.

359. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxv.

360. Id. *ibid*.

361. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

PART I.

twenty triremes³⁶², or ships of war of the largest size then in use. The Corinthians, however, ventured to undertake the support of Epidamnus; encouraged adventurers to settle in it; and sent thither a body of troops to serve as a garrison³⁶³. These in order to avoid the danger of being intercepted by the Corcyraean fleet, marched from the bottom of the Ambracian gulf to Apollonia³⁶⁴; which still, it appears, acknowledged the supremacy of Corinth. From Apollonia the adventurers and troops, consisting of Corinthians, Leucadians, and Ambracians, seem to have passed to Epidamnus by sea.

No sooner were the Corcyraeans informed of the interposition of Corinth, in favour of the Epidamnians, than their rage was kindled³⁶⁵: and a consequent circumstance blew it into a flame. The Epidamnian exiles arrived at Corcyra; where, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, and claiming the rights of consanguinity, they conjured the Corcyraeans to undertake their restoration; and drive out the garrison and new inhabitants, that Epidamnus had received from Corinth³⁶⁶. The Corcyraeans speedily put to sea with a fleet of twenty-five sail, which was soon augmented by a reinforcement; and commanded the Epidamnians to receive their exiles, under peril of their indignation³⁶⁷. The Epidamnians disregarded the threat, and were deaf to the haughty mandate. The Corcyraeans, therefore, with a fleet of forty sail, and an army on land; composed of the exiles whom they pretended to restore, and a band of Illyrians,

362. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxv.

363. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxvi.

364. Id. *ibid.*

365. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

366. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxvi.

367. Id. *ibid.*

began

began hostilities³⁶⁸. Having blocked up the city on all sides, they made proclamation, That such of the Epidamnians as were willing, and the strangers, might depart without molestation; but, if they remained, that they would be treated as enemies³⁶⁹. As that proclamation had no effect, the Corcyræans and their allies invested Epidamnus, which was seated on an isthmus, and commenced a regular siege³⁷⁰.

On receiving intelligence of this siege, the Corinthians drew their forces together³⁷¹. They also gave public notice, that a new colony was going to Epidamnus, and that all, who engaged in the adventure, should have equal privileges with their predecessors; that if any person was disposed to have the benefits of the colony, yet unwilling immediately to embark, he might deposit fifty Corinthian *drachmas*, and be excused his personal attendance³⁷². The number who embarked for immediate colonization was large, and also of those that deposited money³⁷³.

But the measures of the Corinthians, for the relief of Epidamnus, did not stop here. They sent to the Megareans, requiring an aid of ships, that their convoy might not be obstructed by the Corcyræans; and received a supply of eight sail, with four from the Paleans of Cephallenia³⁷⁴. The same requisition being made to the Epidaurians, they sent five ships: a single ship, from Harmione, joined the Corinthian fleet; two, from Træzene; ten fitted out by the Leucadeans, and eight by the Ambracians³⁷⁵. From the Thebans and Philacians, the Corinthians requested money; from the Elians, empty ships and money³⁷⁶.

368. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxvi.

369 Id. ibid.

371. Id lib. i. cap. xxvii.

373. Thucyd. ubi sup.

374. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxvii.

375. Id. ibid.

370. Thucyd. ubi sup.

372. Id. ibid.

376. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxvii.

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The number of ships, fitted out by the Corinthians themselves, amounted to thirty, and carried three thousand heavy-armed soldiers³⁷⁷.

When the Corcyraeans were informed of these preparations, they sent ambassadors into Peloponnesus; and endeavoured to negotiate with Corinth, through the mediation of the Lacedaemonians and Sicyonians³⁷⁸. To the several proposals of the Corcyraean deputies, the Corinthians answered, that if they would withdraw their fleet, and their barbarian forces from before Epidamnus, they would consider of an accommodation; for, while their friends were suffering the miseries of a siege, they could not, in honour, debate the question of right to the colony³⁷⁹. The Corcyraeans replied, That if the Corinthians would recal their forces, they would do the same. And they persisted in declaring (for they had before made such proposal), that they were willing to submit the matter in dispute to a fair trial, in Peloponnesus, before such states as both parties should approve; a suspension of hostilities, in the meantime, to take place at Epidamnus:—and to which ever party the colony should be adjudged, by that it should be held³⁸⁰.

Ant. Chr.
439.
Olympiad
lxxxv. 2.

The Corinthians, however, acceded to neither of these alternatives: but, as soon as they had manned their ships, and those of their allies had joined them, they dispatched a herald to declare war against Corcyra; then weighing anchor, with a fleet of seventy-five sail, steered for Epidamnus³⁸¹. When they had advanced as far as Actium, in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, they were met by a Corcyraean herald,

377. Id. *ibid*.

378. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxviii.

379. Id. *ibid*.

380. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

381. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. xxix.

forbidding

forbidding them, at their peril, to proceed³⁸². Meantime, the Corcyræans were busied in equipping and manning their ships; and no sooner did they learn that the herald brought back no pacific proposition from the Corinthians, than their fleet, consisting of eighty sail (forty being employed in the siege of Epidamnus), went in quest of the enemy; and drawing up against them, brought on an engagement³⁸³. An undisputed victory was gained by the Corcyræans, and fifteen Corinthian ships were destroyed³⁸⁴.

The same day that battle was fought, Epidamnus surrendered to the Corcyræans, on the following conditions: That the strangers found in the place, should be sold for slaves, but the Corinthians only detained prisoners of war³⁸⁵. In token of their naval victory, the Corcyræans erected a trophy on the lofty promontory of Lucimna, which looked toward the scene of action; and when they had thus displayed the signal of the triumph of their island, on its eastern ridge, they put to death all the captives they had made, except the Corinthians, whom they held in chains³⁸⁶.

Meantime the Corinthian fleet, and the squadrons of their allies, that had been vanquished in flight, retired to their several harbours³⁸⁷. The Corcyræans, therefore, remained masters of the Ionian sea with all its bays and gulfs; and sailing first to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, laid waste its territory; then, landing on Peloponnesus, burnt the dock of Cylene, belonging to the Eleans, because they had furnished the Corinthians with ships and money³⁸⁸.

382. Id. *ibid*.

383. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxix.

384. Id. *ibid*.

385. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

386. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxx.

387. Id. *Ibid*.

388. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxx.

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Ant. Chr.
438.
Olympiad
lxxxv. 3.

In this manner the Corcyræans, during the remainder of the season of action, continued to harass the Corinthian colonies and the coasts of their allies³⁸⁹. Nor was a check given to their ravages, until the beginning of the following summer. Then a Corinthian fleet and army were sent to take station at Actium, and along the shore of the Chimerium of Thesprotia³⁹⁰. There they lay to protect Leucas and other places from the depredations of the enemy³⁹¹. And the Corcyræans, on the arrival of this armament, posted themselves at Leucimna, over against it, with a naval and military force. Yet, neither party venturing to attack the other, they remained quiet, in their opposing stations, during the whole summer; and, on the approach of winter, both parties withdrew to their respective homes³⁹².

Ant. Chr.
437.
Olympiad
lxxxv. 3, 4.

But bolder measures were ripening in the councils of Corinth. Ashamed of their naval defeat, and exasperated against the Corcyræans, the Corinthian rulers had employed the remainder of the foregoing year, and all this, in building ships of war³⁹³. Sparing neither labour nor money to get a formidable fleet ready for sea, they sent agents throughout Peloponnesus, and over all other parts of Greece, to hire mariners into their service³⁹⁴.

The Corcyræans, hearing of these vast preparations, were alarmed, and with reason; for they were in league with none of the Grecian states; nor had they ever sought to be comprehended in either the Athenian or Lacedæmonian confederacy³⁹⁵. They now, however, saw it prudent to seek the alliance of

389. Id. *ibid*.

390. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

391. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxx.*

392. Id. *ibid*.

393. Thucyd. *lib. i. cap. xxxi.*

394. Id. *ibid*.

395. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes lib. i. cap. xxxi. xxxii.*

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Ant. Chr.
437.

Olympiad
lxxxv. 4.

Athens; and, therefore, publicly resolved to send ambassadors thither, in order to procure the support of that state³⁹⁶. Gaining intelligence of this purposed negociation, the Corinthians also dispatched an embassy to Athens; with instructions to prevent, by all possible means, the junction of the Athenian naval strength to that of Corcyra³⁹⁷.

The Athenian popular assembly having met, after the arrival of the deputies of the contending powers, the heads of both rose up to plead the cause of their principals³⁹⁸; and the Corcyræans spoke to this effect: “ Men of Athens! it is but just, that they, “ who come, as we do, to implore the aid of a people, with whom they are in no alliance, and on “ whom they have never conferred any benefit, “ should make it appear, that what they request will “ be attended with profit, or at least not prejudicial “ to the granters. Persuaded they can make this “ evident in their own case, the Corcyræans have “ sent us hither to solicit your alliance³⁹⁹.

“ Our invariable maxim hitherto has been, to enter “ into no league, that we might not be drawn into “ hostile dangers. But now, involved in war with “ the Corinthians, we see the necessity of a change “ of policy. For, although, with our own strength, “ we repulsed them in a naval engagement, they are “ again preparing to attack us; and with a force, “ which we are apprehensive, we may not be able to “ resist. If they subdue us, the danger will be “ great to all Greece. It is, therefore, allowable in “ us to apply to you, and to every other Grecian “ state for succour. And should you comply with

396. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxxi.

397. Id. ibid.

398. Thucyd. ubi sup.

399. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxxii.

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“ our request, at this alarming crisis, you will con-
 “ fer an obligation, the memory of which can never
 “ be obliterated. You will, at the same time, acquire
 “ lasting honour, in having lent aid to them that suf-
 “ fered, not to those that committed injustice. Nor
 “ will your advantages be few, in admitting us into
 “ the number of your confederates⁴⁰⁰.

“ We, Athenians! are masters of the greatest
 “ naval force in Greece, except yours. It behoves
 “ you then to consider, how fair an occasion offers of
 “ the greatest benefit to yourselves, of the greatest
 “ mortification to your enemies; when that power,
 “ the accession of which you would have purchased
 “ at any price, comes voluntarily to throw itself into
 “ your confederacy! And what is yet more, enabling
 “ you, in accepting it, to gain the applause of man-
 “ kind, while you acquire an increase of strength⁴⁰¹.

“ If any Athenian think, that a war, in which we
 “ may do service to Athens, will never happen, he
 “ doth not penetrate the views of the Lacedæmo-
 “ nians; nor those of the Corinthians. Alarmed
 “ at your naval force, the Lacedæmonians are now
 “ meditating hostilities; and the Corinthians, already
 “ powerful by sea, have begun with us, in order to
 “ open the way for attacking you. This they have
 “ done, that we might not (united by common
 “ wrongs) make a common defence against them.
 “ Hence it is your interest to accept the alliance we
 “ offer; and counteract their violent designs, before
 “ they are ripe for execution⁴⁰².

“ Should the Corinthians accuse you of injustice,
 “ for presuming to interfere in the affairs of their

400. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxxii. xxxiii.

401. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxxiii.

402. Id. lib. i. cap. xxxiii. xxxiv.

“ colonies, let them learn, that a colony payeth
 “ honour and regard to the mother-city, so long as
 “ fostered by her; but, when injuriously treated, it
 “ becomes alienated. For colonists are sent out, in
 “ order to better their condition; to enjoy equal
 “ rights with the people that remain at home, not
 “ to be made their slaves⁴⁰³. That the Corinthians
 “ have injured us, is manifest; for, when invited to
 “ submit the controversy concerning Epidamnus to
 “ a judicial trial, they chose rather to appeal to arms
 “ than equity for a decision⁴⁰⁴. Let such behaviour
 “ toward us, their kindred, therefore teach you not
 “ to be seduced by their delusive arguments, nor
 “ delay to comply with our request.

“ By admitting us into your confederacy, you
 “ will not violate your treaty with the Lacedæmo-
 “ nians, as we are not in league with them; for by
 “ that treaty, it is expressly stipulated, that any Gre-
 “ cian state, not included in the Athenian, or Lace-
 “ dæmonian confederacy, may enter into either⁴⁰⁵.
 “ And hard would it be, while the Corinthians have
 “ liberty to man their fleets out of every state com-
 “ prehended in the Lacedæmonian confederacy, and
 “ from all other parts of Greece—to no small amount
 “ even out of places under the Athenian dominion
 “ —hard would it be, should we be debarred not
 “ only your alliance, but every other means of pro-
 “ curing Grecian aid⁴⁰⁶.

“ The advantages of such alliance to you, we have
 “ endeavoured to prove. But the argument that to
 “ us appears of greatest weight, and which we wish
 “ chiefly to press, is this; that our enemies are ene-
 “ mies also to you, and not weak ones, but able to

403. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxxiv.

404. Id. ibid.

405. Id. lib. i. cap. xxxv.

406. Id. ibid.

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“ make those who oppose them feel their ven-
 “ geance⁴⁰⁷. We offer you a naval, not a terrestrial
 “ league:—and the reasons for rejecting the latter,
 “ cannot be equally strong for refusing the former;
 “ especially to you, Athenians! whose chief aim it
 “ should be, to let none be masters of a navy beside
 “ yourselves; or, if that cannot be effected, to make
 “ those your friends, who are most powerful at
 “ sea⁴⁰⁸.

“ The present deliberation is not confined to Cor-
 “ cyra: it also very nearly concerns Athens. Be
 “ therefore assured, Athenian citizens, that he
 “ among you doth not best provide for the welfare
 “ of his country, who hesitates to receive into your
 “ confederacy an island provided with all the requi-
 “ sites of being a serviceable ally, or an injurious
 “ enemy:—an island so conveniently situated in the
 “ course to Italy and Sicily, that it can prevent any
 “ fleet from coming thence to Peloponnesus, and
 “ conduct any from Peloponnesus, thither⁴⁰⁹; to say
 “ nothing of its commodiousness in other respects.
 “ In conclusion, to reduce all to one short argu-
 “ ment, wherein every Athenian citizen is con-
 “ cerned, and whence it will appear, that we are not
 “ to be abandoned—there are in Greece but three
 “ naval powers of any consequence; Athens, Corinth,
 “ and Corcyra. Now if you suffer two of those
 “ powers to be incorporated, by letting us be sub-
 “ dued by the Corinthians, you must, in future,
 “ make head against the naval force of both Pello-
 “ ponnesus and Corcyra; but, if you admit us into
 “ your alliance, you will, with a fleet considerably
 “ augmented, have only to contend with the Corin-
 “ thians and their Peloponnesian confederates⁴¹⁰.?”

407. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxv.

408. Id. ibid.

409. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxvi.

410. Id. ibid.



When the Corcyræan ambassadors had concluded their reasoning, the Corinthians thus addressed the Athenians, by way of reply, “ As the Corcyræans “ have not employed their arguments merely to procure the favour of your alliance, but have accused “ us of violence and injustice, we are laid under the “ necessity of vindicating ourselves. Though our “ colony, they have ever been refractory, and now “ wage open war against us; pleading, that they “ were not sent out to suffer oppression⁴¹¹. And “ we affirm, in our defence, that we did not send “ them to the island of Corcyra, to be exposed to “ their insults and outrages; but to be held by us, “ with fit honour and reverence, in dependence on “ the parent-state. Under such dependence are all “ colonies held, and such venerated obedience do “ they pay us; nor are any other people so much “ beloved by their colonies as we. It therefore “ appears, that the Corcyræans can have no just “ cause of complaint; and that, without some flagrant injury, we should not have been prompted “ to declare war against them. But allowing we “ had erred in the exercise of our authority, it “ would only have been decent in them to have submitted; and, in that case, it would have been “ dishonourable in us to have demanded, what “ their moderation yielded, if found oppressive or “ unjust⁴¹².

“ To their pride, and the insolence of wealth, the “ multiplied transgressions of the Corcyræans, may “ justly be ascribed. Hence it was, that they “ claimed no right to Epidamnus, while it was “ harassed with intestine feuds; but when we came “ to its assistance, they seized it, and still detain it “ by force⁴¹³. Nor was it before they had besieged “ that city, but when they thought we were intent

411. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxxvii. xxxviii. cap. xxxviii.

412. Id. lib. i.

413. Id. ibid,

“ on

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“ on relieving it, that they had recourse to the spe-
 “ cious pretence of an equitable negociation⁴¹⁴. Yet,
 “ not content with the violences they have there
 “ committed, the Corcyræans are here presuming to
 “ seek an alliance with you; and, on the merit of
 “ being rebels against us, to demand your protec-
 “ tion⁴¹⁵. But their proper season for an application
 “ to Athens was, what time their affairs securely
 “ flourished, not when they are beset with dangers;
 “ and when you, by no means, their accomplices,
 “ must fall under equal censure with them, if you
 “ interpose in the present war⁴¹⁶.

“ It is now incumbent on us, Athenians! to con-
 “ vince you, that you cannot, without violation of
 “ justice, receive the Corcyræans into your confe-
 “ deracy. For, granting it to be expressly stipu-
 “ lated, in the treaty between you and the Lacedæ-
 “ monians, That any of the states, not particularly
 “ mentioned, may go into either league at their dis-
 “ cretion; yet the intent of the stipulation extendeth
 “ not to such states, as join one party to the preju-
 “ dice of another; but is confined to those that,
 “ having withdrawn from either league, are in need
 “ of support⁴¹⁷. If you join the Corcyræans, how-
 “ ever, you will not only become auxiliaries to them,
 “ but also enemies to the Corinthians, who are your
 “ allies by treaty⁴¹⁸.

“ Right, above all things, would it be for you to
 “ preserve a neutrality. But, if that you dislike, join
 “ with us in opposition to the Corcyræans; for to the
 “ Corinthians you are bound by political engage-
 “ ments, but with the Corcyræans you have never
 “ negociated even for a truce⁴¹⁹. By no means, there-
 “ fore, establish a precedent for receiving revoltors
 “ from the Lacedæmonian league, by abetting the

414. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xxxix.

415. Id. ibid.

416. Thucyd. ubi sup.

417. Id. lib. i. cap. xl.

418. Id. ibid.

419. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xl.

“ cause of Corcyra⁴²⁰. We Corinthians did not, on
“ the revolt of Samos, give our suffrage against
“ you, when the Peloponnesian deputies were divid-
“ ed upon the question, “ Whether the Samians
“ ought to be supported?” Then we publicly main-
“ tained, that every state hath a right to proceed
“ against its own dependents⁴²¹. And if you receive,
“ and undertake the defence of dependents, that have
“ been refractory, you will find, that the greater
“ number will come over to the Peloponnesian
“ confederacy; and that you have established a
“ precedent, more hurtful to yourselves than to
“ us⁴²².

“ Having thus cleared up to you, Athenians! the
“ points of justice, according to the general laws of
“ Greece, we have only to add a word of advice,
“ and offer the claim of favour;—such favour, as
“ we dare affirm, ought not, upon a principle of
“ gratitude, be denied to the Corinthians; who are
“ not your enemies so far as to injure you, nor ever
“ were burdensome friends⁴²³. When formerly (be-
“ fore the Persian invasion), you were in want of
“ trireme gallies, in your war with Ægina, you were
“ supplied by Corinth with twenty⁴²⁴. The service
“ we then did you, with that more recent concern-
“ ing Samos, when we prevented it from receiving
“ any support from the Peloponnesians, enabled you,
“ on those occasions, to vanquish the Æginetes, and
“ chastise the Samians⁴²⁵. Recollect these things,
“ and acknowledge that we ought to be requited.”

The Corinthian ambassadors now proceeded to enforce their advice, having concluded the plea of

420. Id. *ibid*.


421. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

422. Id. *ibid*.

423. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xli.

424. Id. *ibid*.

425. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

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 “the dread of which the Corcyræans encourage you
 “to act unjustly, yet lie in embryo, and should not
 “induce you to engage in immediate hostilities with
 “us⁴²⁶. Besides, it would be prudent, to lessen the
 “jealousy between Corinth and Athens, bred by
 “the proceedings at Megara⁴²⁷. Meantime, suffer
 “not yourselves to be allured by the promised junc-
 “tion of a strong naval force from Corcyra; for,
 “never to act unjustly against equals, is a firmer
 “security of power, than any that can be built on
 “temporary plausibilities, in seeking the enlarge-
 “ment of that power through a series of dangers⁴²⁸.”

“Our present condition, Athenians! resembles
 “that in which you were situated, when we openly
 “declared at Sparta, that every state hath a right
 “to proceed, as may seem fit, against its own de-
 “pendents⁴²⁹. We now, therefore, hope that you,
 “who have received such suffrage from us, will not
 “prejudice us by yours. Make us the just requital;
 “always remembering, that this is the season, when
 “they that aid us are our chief friends, and those
 “that league against us, our greatest enemies. Re-
 “ceive not then the Corcyræans into your alliance;
 “nor abet them in their rebellious contempt of our
 “authority. For thus you will best consult your
 “own interest, while you preserve your honour and
 “dignity⁴³⁰.”

Both parties having now been heard, the Athenians
 met twice in full assembly, in order to deliberate on
 the arguments offered by the heads of the two embas-
 bassies. In the first meeting, they were swayed by the

426. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xlii.

427. Id. ibid.

428. Thucyd. ubi sup.

429. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xliii.

430. Id. ibid.

reasonings of the Corinthians; but, in the second, they changed their minds, and came to a resolution to form a defensive alliance with the Corcyræans⁴³¹. A war with Peloponnesus seemed to them inevitable. They were, therefore, unwilling to leave Corcyra, which had so strong a navy, to fall a prey to the Corinthians. They even wished to break those two naval powers against each other; that they might, on any emergency, be the better able to contend with the Corinthians, and the other maritime powers of Greece not included in their own confederacy⁴³².

The position of the island of Corcyra had also its weight, in the deliberations of the Athenians; it appearing most conveniently situated in the passage to Italy and Sicily⁴³³, whither the Athenians had begun to turn their views.—And to the Grecian colonies, flourishing in those fine countries, I shall divert your lordship's attention, before we enter on the massacres of the Peloponnesian war. In the meantime, I must carry forward the contest between Corinth and Corcyra, after Athens took part in it; and relate the events that farther awakened the jealousy of Sparta, and furnished her with the pretexts that enabled her to engage her confederates in that war, which so long desolated Greece, and made it a scene of horrors.

The Athenians, for the reasons already given, admitted the Corcyræans into their alliance⁴³⁴: and, soon after the departure of the Corinthian ambassadors, they sent ten ships to the support of their new confederates⁴³⁵; under the command of *Lacedæmonius*,

431. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xliv.

432. Id. ibid.

433. Thucyd. ubi sup.

434. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xlv.

435. Id. ibid.

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the son of Cimon⁴³⁶; Diotimos, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles⁴³⁷. Their instructions were, "by no means to attack the Corinthians, unless they stood against Corcyra, and endeavoured to make a descent upon that island or some of its dependencies; but if they did, to use their utmost efforts to oppose them⁴³⁸." These instructions were delivered, in order to avoid the infraction of the treaty of peace⁴³⁹, subsisting between the Athenians and Peloponnesians.

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436.
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lxxxv. 4.

When the Corinthians had completed their naval preparations, they steered for Corcyra, with a fleet of one hundred and fifty sail⁴⁴⁰. Ten of these ships were fitted out by the Eleans, twelve by the Megareans, ten by the Leucadeans, twenty-seven by the Ambracians, one by the Anactorians, and ninety by the Corinthian state⁴⁴. The quotas from the allied cities, had each their respective commanders, who

436. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xlv. Cimon, as I have had occasion to observe, was warmly attached to the Lacedæmonians; by whose interest, at Athens, he had been supported, when he first engaged in public affairs, and set himself in opposition to Themistocles (Plut. Vit. Cimon. et Themist.). Nothing can more strongly prove that attachment, than the above-mentioned name of his son, now one of the Athenian naval commanders (Thucyd. ubi sup.); *Lacedæmonius*! a name that discovers a degree of partiality seemingly inconsistent with common prudence.

Cimon, however, in continuing to manifest his regard for the Lacedæmonians; or as it has been termed, his adoration of them (Plut. Vit. Cimon.), after the exaltation of his military character, and the establishment of his political influence in the Athenian administration, might be actuated by motives of patriotism as well as gratitude. He might wish to moderate the jealousy between Athens and Sparta, and to soften the animosity between the citizens of the two states, by assimilating their manners; in tempering Athenian levity with a degree of Spartan gravity.

437. Id. ibid.

438. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xlv.

439. Id. ibid.

440. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xlvi.

441. Id. ibid.

are not named by Thucydides; and the Corinthian division was commanded by Xenocleides, the son of Euthycles, with four colleagues⁴⁴².

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This confederate fleet, having rendezvoused off that part of the Grecian continent, which looks toward Corcyra, set sail from Leucas, and arrived at the promontory of Chimerium in Thesprotia⁴⁴³. There, between the river Acheron and the Thyamis, the Corinthians and their allies fixed their marine station, or naval camp⁴⁴⁴. Meanwhile the Corcyræans, informed of the approach of the Corinthian armament, had manned an hundred and ten ships; under the command of Meiciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus: and taken their station, accompanied by the Athenian squadron, at one of the little islands named Sybota, situated between Corcyra and the coast of Thesprotia⁴⁴⁵.

The Corcyræan land-forces, augmented with an aid of a thousand heavy-armed Zacynthians, were posted at the promontory of Leucymna, opposite the Sybota⁴⁴⁶. Nor were the Corinthians destitute of land-forces. They had ready, on the adjacent continent, a numerous army of barbarians⁴⁴⁷; the people of that coast having ever been their friends⁴⁴⁸.

When the Corinthians were ready for a naval engagement, they weighed anchor before day-break, having taken in provisions for three days⁴⁴⁹; and, steering in quest of the enemy, they discovered by dawn, the Corcyræan fleet then under sail, and advancing against them⁴⁵⁰. Thus opposed to each other

442. Thucyd. ubi sup.

443. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xlvii.

444. Id. ibid.

445. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xlvii.

446. Id. ibid.

447. Thucyd. ubi sup.

448. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xlvii.

449. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xlviii.

450. Id. ibid.

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and equally eager for fight, both fleets formed in order of battle⁴⁵¹. In the Corcyræan right-wing was stationed the Athenian squadron: the main body of the fleet was wholly composed of Corcyræan ships, divided into three squadrons; each of which was respectively under the command of one of their three admirals⁴⁵². In the right of the Corinthian fleet were stationed the squadrons of the Megareans and Ambracians: in the centre, the ships of the other allies, in their several arrangements; the Corinthians themselves forming the left wing, as their ships were the best sailers; in order to oppose the Athenians, and the right of the Corcyræans⁴⁵³.

The signals were no sooner hoisted⁴⁵⁴, than the hostile fleets ran against each other, and began the engagement; both parties having filled their decks with bodies of heavy-armed men, beside many that drew the bow or tossed the javelin⁴⁵⁵. But their operations still resembled somewhat the awkward method of former times; for, although the battle was hotly contested, it very much resembled an engagement on land, few exertions of naval skill being discovered⁴⁵⁶. The greatest hope of victory was placed in the heavy-armed men, fighting on the decks; where, fixed to their posts, they combatted hand to hand,

451. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xlviii.

452. Id. ibid.

453. Thucyd. ubi sup.

454. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. xlix. The signal was given by hanging out of the admiral's galley a gilded shield, or a red flag. During the elevation of this signal, the fight continued; and by its depression, or inclination to the right or left, the several squadrons were directed, in what manner to attack their enemies or retreat from them (Potter, *Archeolog. Græc.* book iii. chap. xxi. et auct. cit.). The elevation of the signal was attended with the sound of trumpets; which was begun in the admiral's galley, and propagated through the whole fleet. Id. ibid. et auct. cit.

455. Id. ibid.

456. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xlix.

while

while the gallies remained motionless⁴⁵⁷. They took no advantage of tacking or shifting of stations; but contended for mastery, merely by dint of strength and courage, without any dexterity in seamanship⁴⁵⁸.

The tumult was great on all sides, and the whole action full of disorder; during which, the Athenians, habituated to a more active and improved mode of naval operations, relieved the Corcyræans wherever they were hard pressed, and also endeavoured to intimidate the enemy⁴⁵⁹. But they refrained from any direct attack; remembering with awe, the orders of the Athenian state⁴⁶⁰.

The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. For the Corcyræans, stationed on the left, having put their antagonists to flight, chased them, when dispersed, to the continent; and, continuing the pursuit to their naval camp, landed instantly, and set fire to their abandoned tents, and carried off all the baggage⁴⁶¹. In that wing, therefore, the Corinthians and their allies were vanquished, and the Corcyræans were indisputably victorious; but, in the left wing, where the Corinthians solely engaged, they obtained an easy victory, as twenty of the Corcyræan triremes had gone off in pursuit of the ships of the broken right wing⁴⁶².

Seeing the Corcyræans thus distressed, the Athenians came up to their support more openly than before their defeat; they having hitherto foreborn any direct attack⁴⁶³. And when the chace was evidently begun, and the Corinthians followed up their

457. Id. *ibid.*

458. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

459. Id. *ibid.*

460. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. xlix.

461. Id. *ibid.*

462. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

463. Id. *Be!! Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. xlix.

victory,

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victory, then every Athenian bestirred himself to fight⁴⁶⁴. There was no longer any leisure for reserve; Corinthians and Athenians, compelled by necessity, encountered one another⁴⁶⁵.

In the ardour of pursuit, the Corinthians towed not after them the hulks of the vessels they had rendered unfit for action, but turned all their attention to the men; cruising at large, more to slaughter than take alive⁴⁶⁶. And having not yet discovered the defeat of their right wing, they slaughtered, through ignorance, their own friends⁴⁶⁷. For, as the accurate contemporary historian observes, the number of ships being great on each side, and covering a wide extent of sea, they were not able, after the line of battle was broken, to distinguish the victors from the vanquished; Greeks against Greeks having never engaged in a naval conflict with so large a number of ships⁴⁶⁸.

But after the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyræans to Leucymna, they returned to look after the enemy's shattered vessels, and their own dead⁴⁶⁹. Most of the floating carcasses they took up, and carried to Sybota; a desert haven on the coast of Thesprotia, bearing the same name with the adjacent islands⁴⁷⁰; and there also lay their barbarian auxiliaries⁴⁷¹. Having performed this duty to their slain friends, the Corinthians assembled their fleet, and sailed to Leucymna in quest of the Corcyræans; who, with such of their ships as were fit for service, or able to keep the sea, came out together with the Athenian squadron, to meet the insulting victors, apprehensive that they meditated a descent⁴⁷².

464. *Id. ibid.*465. *Thucyd. ubi sup.*466. *Id. lib. i. cap. l.*467. *Id. ibid.*468. *Thucyd. lib. i. cap. l.*469. *Id. ibid.*470. *Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. l.*471. *Id. ibid.*472. *Thucyd. ubi sup.*

The day was then far spent; yet the Corcyræans had sung their *pæan*⁴⁷³, and were preparing to renew the fight, when the Corinthians, to their surprise, suddenly slackened sail⁴⁷⁴. They had descried a squadron of twenty ships, sent from Athens, as they rightly conjectured, to the support of the Corcyræans, and gradually fell back⁴⁷⁵. The Corcyræans, when informed of the approach of these ships, which were concealed from the view of their fleet by the encircling shore, also fell back, and regained their station at Leucymna. It was then almost dark, and the Corinthians had put about, and dissolved their order of battle⁴⁷⁶. For a while the Corcyræans were in great consternation, lest the squadron coming up should be an aid to the enemy; but their fears were quickly dispelled, as the Athenian reinforcement reached their station soon after it had been descried⁴⁷⁷.

Next morning the Athenian squadron, now consisting of thirty sail, accompanied by such of the Corcyræan ships as were fit for sea, weighed anchor, and stood for the coast of Thesprotia, where the Corinthian ships lay; in order to try, whether they would hazard a new engagement⁴⁷⁸. But the Corinthians declined accepting the challenge; their thoughts being then employed about their return home, and the manner of accomplishing it; lest the Athenians, judging the peace broken, as they had met in hostile opposition, might obstruct their passage⁴⁷⁹. They, therefore, sent an advice-boat, though without the solemn protection of a herald, to sound the purpose of the Athenian commanders⁴⁸⁰.

473. It was usual for the Greeks, before they began an engagement, to sing a *pæan* or hymn to Mars; and one to Apollo, when the fight was ended. Suidas, sub. voc.

474. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. li.

575. Id. ibid.

476. Thucyd. ubi sup. 477. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. li.

478. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lii.

479. Id. ibid.

480. Thucyd. ubi sup.

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436.
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lxxxvi. 1.

The message delivered was to the following purport:—"Men of Athens! ye are guilty of injustice, "in beginning war and violating treaties; for you "hinder us from taking due vengeance on our enemies, by lifting your arms against us. If you are "determined to obstruct our course, either to Corcyra or any other place, whither we are disposed "to go, dissolve the treaty of peace; and, laying "violent hands on the Corinthians here present, "treat them as enemies⁴⁸¹."

That message was no sooner reported, than the whole body of the Corcyræans exclaimed, with one voice, "Take, and kill them!" But the Athenians, more moderately disposed, returned this answer:—"Men of Peloponnesus! we neither begin war nor "violate treaties, but have come hither to aid our "Corcyræan allies. You may, therefore, sail to "whatever place you please: we hinder you not; "but if you make an hostile attempt upon Corcyra, "or any of its dependencies, we will oppose you to "the utmost of our power⁴⁸²."

Having received the foregoing answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians, as a prelude to their returning home, erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent⁴⁸³. Meantime the Corcyræans were employed in picking up the wreck of the ships, and the bodies of the dead; which, by favour of the wind and tide, now rolled toward them⁴⁸⁴:—and, as if they also had obtained the victory, they erected a trophy in one of the Sybota islands⁴⁸⁵.

The grounds of the pretensions of each party are thus assigned by Thucydides:—"The Corinthians set

481. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. liii.

482. Id. ibid.

484. Id. ibid.

483. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. liv.

485. Thucyd. ubi sup.

up a trophy, because they had maintained superiority in the late naval engagement throughout the day; and, therefore, had been enabled to pick up the greater part of the wreck and the dead; because they had taken a greater number, not less than one thousand prisoners, and shattered or sunk about seventy of the enemy's ships⁴⁸⁶. The Corcyræans raised a trophy, because they had sunk or disabled full thirty of the hostile fleet; and, after the arrival of the Athenians, had recovered the dead bodies driving toward them, and the wreck; because the Corinthians, tacking about, had retired from them, the preceding evening, as soon as they descried the Athenian reinforcement; and because, when they went, this morning, to offer them battle at Sybota, they durst not come out to decide the contest⁴⁸⁷."

The Corinthians, in their homeward passage, fraudfully seized the settlement of Anactorium, on the southern side of the Ambracian gulf⁴⁸⁸. It belonged, in common to them and the Corcyræans; but they now put it wholly into the possession of the Corinthian settlers, and then returned to their own havens⁴⁸⁹. Eight hundred of their Corcyræan prisoners, who had been slaves, the Corinthians sold, on their arrival in their own country, in the public market⁴⁹⁰; while they retained in safe custody, and treated not only with lenity but indulgence, two hundred and fifty free inhabitants of Corcyra; in hopes, as many of them were persons of distinction, they might, after their ransom and return, enable Corinth to regain its controul over that refractory colony and valuable island⁴⁹¹.

486. Id. lib. i. cap. liv.

487. Id. ibid.

488. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lv.

489. Id. ibid.

490. Thucyd. ubi sup.

491. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lv.

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The Athenian fleet having, as before related, enabled the Corcyraeans to maintain their independency, quitted the Ionian sea, and returned home⁴⁹². But this interference was not forgot: it furnished the Corinthians, and their Peloponnesian confederates, with the first ground of quarrel with Athens; because the Athenian state, while in alliance with them, had assisted the rebellious colony of Corcyra, in a naval engagement against the forces of the mother country⁴⁹³.

Other causes of quarrel, tending to war, soon arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians⁴⁹⁴. These, my lord, I shall bring forward to view, in a form as concise as possible.

The Athenians, conscious they had roused the resentment of the Corinthians, and apprehensive of its consequences, commanded the inhabitants of Potidæa; a Corinthian colony seated upon the isthmus of Pallene, but allied with, and tributary to Athens⁴⁹⁵: to demolish part of the wall of their city, to give hostages for their quiet submission, to dismiss the *epidemiurgi*; and not to receive, in future, the magistrates so named, annually sent them from Corinth⁴⁹⁶.

The deeper reasons of the Athenians, for issuing this order, are thus explained by Thucydides.

492. Id. *ibid*.

493. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

494. Id. lib. i. cap. lvi.

495. Id. *ibid*.

496. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lvi. These magistrates were such as the Grecian mother-cities usually deputed to superintend the public affairs of their colonies, and regulate their civil government (See Wasse and Ducker's Thucydides, p. 39, note 62, et auct. cit.). But how the Athenians consented to let such magistrates be sent from Corinth to Potidæa, after it became tributary to them, is not accounted for by any commentator on the above-cited passage.

“ They

“ They were apprehensive of the revolt of Potidæa at the instigation of Perdiccas; the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and of the Corinthians; and of their seducing into the same defection, the other Athenian dependencies in Thrace⁴⁹⁷. For the Corinthians were obviously at variance with them; and Perdiccas, formerly their friend and ally, was now become their enemy⁴⁹⁸. ”

The causes of the enmity of the king of Macedonia are not difficult to trace. He had grown jealous of the Grecian settlements on the coasts of his kingdom, and on those of Thrace, and wished to expel the intruders: but being pliant, artful, and temporizing, like his father Alexander, he concealed his purpose, until his power had gathered such strength as gave him some probability of success; especially with the prospect of turning the two great commercial and colonizing powers, Athens and Corinth, against each other. And the Athenians, aware of his designs, had endeavoured to divide his strength, by supporting the pretensions of his brother Philip to a part, or the whole of the Macedonian monarchy⁴⁹⁹.

Alarmed at this attempt to dismember his kingdom, if not to deprive him of the regal dignity, Perdiccas sent confidential agents to Sparta, in order to stir up against the Athenians a Peloponnesian war⁵⁰⁰; to draw over the Corinthians to his interest, and bring about a revolt of Potidæa⁵⁰¹. He had also been intriguing with the Chalcidæans of Thrace, and the Bottiæans, in hopes to induce them to revolt at

Ant. Chr.
435.
Olympiad
lxxxvi. 2.

497. Id. *ibid*.

498. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lvii.

499. Id. *ibid*. et lib. ii. cap. c. See also Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 105, vol. ii.

500. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lvii.

501. Id. *ibid*.

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the same time⁵⁰²; rightly concluding, that if he could effectuate a combination of the barbarian people, in his neighbourhood, he might hazard a war against the Athenians with greater probability of success⁵⁰³.

The Athenians having discovered the machinations of Perdiccas, and desirous to prevent the revolt of their tributary cities on the northern shores of the Ægean sea, sent an armament against his territories; consisting of a fleet of thirty sail, and a thousand heavy-armed men, under the conduct of Archestratus, associated with ten other commanders⁵⁰⁴. To these commanders they gave positive orders, to take hostages from the Potidæans; to demolish their walls, and keep a watchful eye over the neighbouring cities⁵⁰⁵.

502. Thucyd. ubi sup.

503. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lvii. Nothing can more fully shew the power of Athens, both by land and sea, than the apprehensions of so great a prince as the king of Macedonia, on engaging in hostilities with her. It must, however, be observed, that although the dominions of the Macedonian monarch were extensive, and his subjects numerous and warlike, the various tribes of rude people, that acknowledged his sway, might be said still to live in a state of barbarous independency, under their own chieftains; and would support him in no war, to which they were not disposed by their interest, or actuated by their antipathies (Herodot. lib. viii. ix. et Thucyd. lib. i. ii. passim.). And I shall here offer a remark, which I shall often have occasion to repeat, that the power of Athens wanted a proper foundation. Her own territory formed too narrow a basis, and all beyond it was fluctuating. Her colonies, beside being factious, were liable to expulsion from the countries in which they were settled: and her tributary allies were disposed to revolt. Her best policy, therefore, was the cultivation of peace with her neighbours; the worst, the prosecution of war. Her colonies were already sufficiently extensive for the pursuits of commerce, and the support of naval force. The eager grasping at distant territory, as we shall have occasion to see, wrought her ruin.

504. Id. ibid.

505. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lvii.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile the Potidæans had sent ambassadors to Athens, in order to dissuade the Athenian administration from the prosecution of harsh measures against them⁵⁰⁶. And they had, at the same time, dispatched an embassy to Sparta, along with one from Corinth, instructed to procure a promise of redress, if the Athenians should persist in their haughty command⁵⁰⁷. But when their negociation at Athens proved ineffectual, and the Athenian fleet had embarked in an expedition both against them and the king of Macedonia; when the Lacedæmonians had promised to make an irruption into Attica, if the Athenians should act hostilely against Potidæa, then all parties prepared for war; Perdiccas, the Potidæans, Chalcideans, and Bottiæans, combined by a league of mutual defence and support⁵⁰⁸.

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Nor was this all. Perdiccas prevailed with the Chalcideans, to abandon and demolish their towns upon the sea-coast; and afterward to remove to Olynthus, and fortify and defend that city with their united strength⁵⁰⁹. And to the people, who had thus relinquished their homes, he made a cession of that part of Mygdonia, which lay round the lake of Bolbe; for their subsistence, during the war with the Athenians⁵¹⁰.

Before the arrival of the Athenian fleet of thirty sail, Potidæa and the other tributary cities had revolted. The commanders, therefore, judging it impossible, with their present strength, to reduce those cities to obedience, and also act against Perdiccas, directed their course to Macedonia⁵¹¹; thus pursuing

506. Id. lib. i. cap. lviii.

507. Id. ibid.

508. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lviii.

509. Id. ibid.

510. Thucyd. ubi sup.

511. Id. lib. i. cap. lix.

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Ant. Chr.
434.Olympiad
lxxxvi. 3.

the primary object of the armament⁵¹². Having landed their forces on the Macedonian coast they took part in the war with Philip and his associates; who had made an irruption, at the head of an army, from the higher country⁵¹³.

Meantime the Corinthians, anxious for the safety of Potidæa, sent thither sixteen hundred heavy-armed men, and four hundred light troops⁵¹⁴. The command of these forces was given to Aristeus, who had ever been a warm friend to the Potidæans; and for whose sake most of the Corinthian volunteers had engaged in the expedition⁵¹⁵. This reinforcement, consisting partly of Peloponnesian mercenaries, arrived at Potidæa on the fortieth day after the revolt of that city⁵¹⁶.

When the Athenians received intelligence of the revolt of their tributary cities, and of the arrival of the forces under Aristeus at Potidæa, they sent a fleet of forty sail, with two thousand heavy-armed men, for land-service, under the conduct of Callias and four colleagues, in order to re-establish the dominion of Athens on the northern shores of the Ægean⁵¹⁷. Callias found the Athenian troops, commanded by Archestratus, employed in the siege of Pydna; they having already reduced Therme⁵¹⁸. He joined them with his land-forces, and the whole army invested Pydna. But the Athenian commanders soon found it necessary to relinquish that enterprise for more important objects; the reduction of the rebellious cities in the isthmus of Pallene, and the expulsion of the Corinthian forces under Aristeus⁵¹⁹. They accordingly concluded

Ant. Chr.
434.Olympiad
lxxxvi. 4.512. Id. *ibid.*

513. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lix.

514. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes* lib. i. cap. lx.515. Id. *ibid.*

516. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lx.

517. Id. lib. i. cap. lxi.

518. Id. *ibid.*

519. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxi.

with Perdiccas a hasty alliance, or cessation of arms; and evacuating Macedonia, proceeded with their land forces, consisting of three thousand heavy-armed Athenians, a body of auxiliary foot, and six hundred Macedonian horse, toward Potidæa; while their fleet, amounting to seventy sail, steered along the coast⁵²⁰.

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XIV.

Expecting the Athenians, the Potidæans, with the body of Corinthian volunteers and Peloponnesian mercenaries, under Aristeus, had formed a camp near Olynthus⁵²¹. The command of the whole infantry had been given to Aristeus, by the voice of the confederates, and that of the cavalry to Perdiccas; for the faithless king of Macedonia had abruptly broken his alliance with the Athenians, and joined the Potidæans, though he did not personally make his appearance in the field⁵²².

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438.
Olympiad
lxxxvi. 4.

It was the design of Aristeus, in encamping within the isthmus of Pallene, with the body of infantry under his immediate command, to watch the motions of the Athenians, should they come forward; whilst, without the isthmus, the Chalcideans and other allies, with two hundred horse belonging to Perdiccas, were to remain at Olynthus⁵²³. And these, if the Athenians offered to attack Aristeus, were ordered to throw themselves in the rear of the enemy; and confine the assailants between two bodies of troops⁵²⁴.

Callias, the Athenian general, however, in concert with his colleagues, detached the Macedonian horse, and some other auxiliaries, to Olynthus, to prevent any sally from that city; and then breaking up their camp, which they had pitched at Gigonius,

520. Id. *ibid*.

521. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxii.

522. Id. *ibid*.

523. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. lxii.

524. Id. *ibid*.

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the Athenians marched directly for Potidæa⁵²⁵. But when they had advanced as far as the isthmus, and saw their enemies drawn up in order of battle, they also formed; and, in a short time, both armies came to action⁵²⁶. The Corinthians in the wing under Aristeus, composed of the very flower of his countrymen, soon forced their opponents to seek safety in flight; and pursued the vanquished, with execution, to a great distance⁵²⁷. But the main body of the Corinthian army, made up of Potidæans and Peloponnesian mercenaries, was routed by the Athenians: and the broken forces were chased to the very walls of Potidæa⁵²⁸.

Aristeus, on returning from the pursuit of the enemy's opposing wing, perceived the defeat of the main body of the Corinthians and their allies; and knew not which way to hazard a retreat, whether to Olynthus or Potidæa⁵²⁹. At length, however, he resolved to combine, in firm phalanx, those victorious troops that had spread terror, and still attended him; and throw himself into Potidæa, as it lay at the shortest distance⁵³⁰. This bold resolution he carried into effect, though not without difficulty and loss of men; plunging into the sea, near the abutments of the harbour, amid a shower of missile weapons, he led into the town the greater number of his brave followers⁵³¹.

The confederates, who should have come to the aid of the Potidæans from Olynthus (which was at no greater distance than sixty stadia, and situated in view), advanced a little way at the beginning of the

525. Thucyd. ubi sup.

527. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxii.

529. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxiii.

531. Thucyd. ubi sup.

526. Id. ibid.

528. Id. ibid.

530. Id. ibid.

engagement,

engagement, when the ensigns were elevated⁵³², as if they had designed to join battle; and the Macedonian horse, in the Athenian army, drew up against them, on purpose to keep them back⁵³³. But as the victory was soon gained by the Athenians, and the ensigns lowered, according to custom, the Potidæan allies retired within the walls of Olynthus, and the Macedonian horse rejoined the Athenian army⁵³⁴. After the battle, the Athenians erected a trophy, and granted a suspension of arms to the Potidæans for carrying off their dead⁵³⁵: there being killed of the Potidæans, Corinthians, and other Peloponnesians, who only were in the action, near three hundred men; and of the Athenians, one hundred and fifty, with Callias their general⁵³⁶.

The surviving Athenian commanders, without loss of time, threw up works before the city of Potidæa, on the side that faced the isthmus, and besieged it on that side; but the side toward the town of Pallene, they left as they found it⁵³⁷. For they thought their army too small, both to keep garrison within the isthmus, and send men over to the Pallene side, and besiege the place there also; being apprehensive, that thus divided, they might be overpowered by the Potidæans and their allies⁵³⁸.

When the Athenian administration was informed of the siege of Potidæa, and that no works were

532. The elevation of an ensign was a signal to join battle, the depression to desist. The ensigns of the Greeks were of various sorts; but most of them were adorned with the figures of animals, or other things having peculiar relation to the cities to which they belonged. The Athenians, for instance, bore in their ensigns the image of an owl; the bird sacred to Minerva, their tutelary goddess. See Potter's Archælog. Græc. book iii. chap. ix. et auct. cit.

533. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxiii.

534. Id. ibid.

535. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxiii.

536. Id. ibid.

537. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxiv.

538. Id. ibid.

raised

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raised on the side toward Pallene, they speedily sent thither a body of sixteen hundred heavy-armed men, under the command of Phormio⁵³⁹. Landing his troops at Aphytis, and marching easily to Potidæa, Phormio wasted the country, as he passed through it; and, as he met with no obstruction from the garrison, on his arrival at that city, he quickly raised works against the side of the wall that faced Pallene⁵⁴⁰. Thus was Potidæa strongly besieged by land, and also from the sea by the Athenian fleet⁵⁴¹.

Aristeus no sooner saw the circumvallation of the disputed city fully formed, and every hope of saving it cut off, unless unexpected aid should arrive from Peloponnesus, or something supernatural happen, then he gave this advice; that all the soldiers and citizens, except five hundred men, should seize the first favourable opportunity to quit the place, and make their escape by sea, that the store of provisions might longer support the rest; declaring his willingness to be one of those, that should remain for the defence of the walls⁵⁴². Finding his counsel rejected, and despairing of speedy relief, yet zealous to preserve Potidæa, Aristeus made his escape by sea, undiscovered by the Athenian guardships⁵⁴³. And rousing to arms the Chalcideans, among whom he took refuge, made what military efforts he could to annoy the enemy; while he endeavoured, by sending ambassadors to Peloponnesus, to procure, in that dangerous crisis, assistance to the Potidæans⁵⁴⁴. Meantime Phormio, having completed the works against the besieged city, ravaged the territories of the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, with his sixteen hundred heavy-armed Athenians, and took some small towns⁵⁴⁵.

539. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxiv.

540. Id. *ibid.*541. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

542. Id. lib. i. cap. lxv.

543. Id. *ibid.*

544. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxv.

545. Id. *ibid.*

These

These, says Thucydides⁵⁴⁶, were the reciprocal causes of the dissention between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Corinthians were enraged at the Athenians for besieging Potidæa; a Corinthian colony, and in which were shut up both Corinthians and other Peloponnesians⁵⁴⁷. And the Athenians were stung with resentment at the proceedings of the Peloponnesians, in seducing to revolt a city in alliance with, and tributary to them: and openly taking part, by a voluntary expedition, with the Potidæan rebels⁵⁴⁸.

A general war, however, had not yet taken place between the jealous powers: common hostilities were suspended for a time. Hitherto it was only a particular dispute between the Corinthians and Athenians⁵⁴⁹. But no sooner were the Corinthians informed, that the circumvallation of Potidæa was perfected, than their wrath flamed like a fire-brand, and they strove to make the war general. With this view they requested their allies to send ambassadors to Sparta; and thither their own ambassadors repaired, and accused the Athenians of having violated the treaty, concluded for thirty years, and wronged the Peloponnesians⁵⁵⁰.

On this occasion, all the Peloponnesian confederates seem to have sent ambassadors to Sparta, except the Æginetes. And they, though not openly by an embassy, from a dread of offending the Athenians, yet privately instigated the Peloponnesians to war; alleging, that they were not permitted to govern themselves by their own laws, as by the articles of the treaty they ought to have been⁵⁵¹.

546. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. lxxv.

547. Id. *ibid.*

548. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

549. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. lxxvi.

550. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxvii.

551. Id. *ibid.*

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Olympiad
lxxxvii. 2.

The Lacedæmonians, taking advantage of these accusations, summoned to appear before them, as the governing people in Greece by land, not only the delegates of their Peloponnesian confederates, but those of all the other Grecian states, that had any charge to prefer against the Athenians; and when the several ambassadors arrived, they were admitted to the senate or grand council of Sparta, composed of the kings, the nobles, and ephori, and commanded there to represent their grievances⁵⁴². The ambassadors of every state laid their accusations; but the Megarean delegates offered the heaviest charge. They complained, that, contrary to treaty, they were debarred the Athenian markets and havens⁵⁵³. And, last of all, the Corinthian ambassadors, after they had suffered others to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, spoke to the following purport⁵⁵⁴.

“ Although we have frequently suggested to you,
 “ Lacedæmonians! the injuries we were apprehensive
 “ of suffering from the Athenians, yet have you not
 “ deigned to inquire into the grounds of such apprehensions. Nor was it to prevent our losses, but
 “ after we had felt their weight, that you convened

552. Thucyd. ubi sup.

553. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxxvii.

554. This and the subsequent speeches, in the Spartan senate and Athenian popular assembly, during the negotiations preparatory to the Peloponnesian war, throw more light upon the political state of Greece at that time, than all the disquisitions of modern historians and antiquarians; while they confirm some important historical facts, which otherwise would rest solely on the authority of Herodotus: I shall, therefore, give the substance of the whole. It is of little consequence to inquire, whether Thucydides used the very words and arguments of the speakers?—He tells us himself (Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxii.) that he could not always do so; but that he had adhered to the arguments pertinent in each debate (Id. *ibid.*). It is enough to know, that he was a contemporary historian, acquainted with the civil and military affairs of Greece; and that he had access to the best information.

“ these

“ these confederates. Now assembled in council,
“ we ought no longer to deliberate, whether we have
“ been injured, but how to obtain redress. Having
“ already planned their measures, the aggressors are
“ not debating what step they shall take, but are ac-
“ tually making attacks upon the sufferers, who have
“ yet come to no resolution⁵⁵⁵.

“ We are not ignorant by what means the Athe-
“ nians, with gradual advances, encroach upon their
“ neighbours. Believing their designs still undiscover-
“ ed, they act with less boldness, because you, La-
“ cedæmonians! are deaf to the injuries they com-
“ mit; but when they find you are alarmed, yet irre-
“ solute, they will press more daringly forward in the
“ career of ambition. For you are the only Grecian
“ people who protect your allies not with arms, but
“ with promises. You indeed enjoy the reputation
“ of having been cautious and circumspect; but for
“ that reputation you are more indebted to fame than
“ to truth, as we ourselves know. You suffered the
“ Persian monarch to advance, from the remotest
“ parts of the earth, into the heart of Greece, and
“ endanger Peloponnesus, before you opposed him
“ as became your state. Even now you forbore to
“ repress the usurpations of the Athenians, not seat-
“ ed at a distance, but in your very neighbourhood:
“ chusing rather to expose yourselves to their inva-
“ sion, than invade their territory: and thus lay your-
“ selves open to the hazard of war against a full
“ grown power, which you might have curbed in its
“ growth. Have not the Athenians wrested from us
“ Corcyra? and do not they, at this moment, besiege
“ Potidæa, by sea and land?—The latter of these
“ places lies most conveniently for extending our

⁵⁵⁵. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxviii.

“ settlements

PART I.

“ settlements in Thrace, and the former could have
 “ supplied Peloponnesus with a greater navy, than
 “ any of her confederate states. Yet on neither of
 “ these colonies, so important and valuable, durst the
 “ Athenians have made an attempt, if the Lacedæ-
 “ monians had mustered their forces, and those of
 “ their allies, and threatened Attica⁵⁵⁶.

“ Let no man in this assembly think, that, in
 “ speaking thus, we are actuated more by resentment
 “ than reason. If ever the citizens of any state had
 “ cause to throw blame on their confederates, we
 “ surely have. You seem not only void of fellow-
 “ feeling, but unacquainted with the character of the
 “ people against whom you must soon wage war⁵⁵⁷.”
 Here the Corinthian orators drew an exaggerated
 contrast between the ardent, adventurous, yet perse-
 vering spirit of the Athenians, and the cool courage,
 dilatory councils, and hesitating temper of the La-
 cedæmonians; then added, by way of conclusion,

“ Such are the people with whom we have to con-
 “ tend. And are not ye, O Lacedæmonians! sen-
 “ sible, that they, who timely prepare for war, and
 “ manifest a determined resolution to right them-
 “ selves, whenever they are injured, will longest live
 “ in the enjoyment of peace?—Away, therefore, with
 “ the maxims of that slow-moving policy, which hath
 “ hitherto regulated your affairs. Hasten to relieve
 “ Potidæa, by a speedy invasion of Attica, as you have
 “ promised: leave not your friends and kinsmen at
 “ the mercy of their most inveterate enemies; nor
 “ compel us and others, to seek, in despair, a new
 “ alliance. Bestir yourselves in a manner worthy of
 “ your ancestors; exert a degree of strength suited to

556. Id. lib. i. cap. lxviii. lix.

557. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lix. lxx.

“ that

“ that high rank which you hold in Peloponnesus; lest
“ Sparta be deserted by her confederates, and her
“ glory sink with her pre-eminence⁵⁵⁸. ”

Ambassadors from Athens happened to be residing at Sparta, for the transacting of other business, when the Corinthian ministers spoke to the foregoing effect: and they thought proper to demand an audience of the Lacedæmonians, as soon as informed of what had been said to the prejudice of the Athenian state⁵⁵⁹. Having obtained admission into the Spartan senate-hall, where the Peloponnesian deputies were assembled, they delivered their sentiments in the following manner.

“ It was not the purpose of our embassy, Lacedæ-
“ monians! to engage in disputations with your con-
“ federates, but to conduct the affairs we were de-
“ puted to adjust. Yet being made acquainted with
“ the clamour raised against the Athenians, we
“ have (by permission) entered this assembly—not
“ to answer the accusations of the complaining
“ states; for you are not the judges, before whom
“ either they or we ought to plead⁵⁶⁰: we appear only
“ to prevent you from forming, at the instigation of
“ your allies, rash and dangerous resolutions, on mat-
“ ters of the greatest importance to the future welfare
“ of Athens and of Sparta⁵⁶¹. We wish farther to
“ convince you, That, notwithstanding the charges
“ exhibited against us, we possess justly, what we
“ have hitherto obtained; and that the Athenian
“ state is worthy of honour and respect⁵⁶². ”

558. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxxi.

559. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxii.

560. Seemingly alluding to the council of Amphictyons, or assembly of delegates from the states-general of Greece, which only was competent to judge of such disputes.

561. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxiii.

562. Id. *ibid*.

PART I.

In order to prove this position, the Athenian ambassadors gave a display of the achievements of their countrymen, and the conduct of their republic during the Persian war, from the battle of Marathon to the retreat of Xerxes; concluding thus:—"to our aid, indeed, at last you came; but not until you were more alarmed for your own safety, than for ours. Had we, overcome with fear, gone early over to the Persian monarch, as others did; or had we not latterly boldly stood out, and dared to throw ourselves on board our fleet, the barbarians, without a struggle, would leisurely have determined the fate of Greece⁵⁶³.

"Our power, Lacedæmonians! ought not, therefore, to excite that envious jealousy with which we are beheld by the Grecian states. Our power, superior as it is, was by no means the effect of violent encroachments. For, as you would not stay with us to glean the reliques of the Persian war, to us the associated states were forced to have recourse; and entreat us to lead them to its completion⁵⁶⁴. Thus, obliged to be in action, by the necessary contingency of affairs, we have advanced our power to its present height; first from a principle of fear, then from a principle of honour, and latterly from motives of interest⁵⁶⁵.

"When blamed by many, when necessitated to reduce to obedience some confederates, who had revolted from us; when you, Lacedæmonians! no longer well-disposed toward us, were actuated by jealousy and envy, we saw it inconsistent with our interest to endanger our security by giv-

563. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxiv.

64. Id. lib. i. cap. lxxv.

565. Id. *ibid.*

“ ing up our power, as every defection from us would
“ have proved an accession of strength to you⁵⁶⁶.
“ No political body will throw any reproach upon
“ men, who try every expedient to ward off the extre-
“ mities of danger⁵⁶⁷.

“ To you, Lacedæmonians! we have little occa-
“ sion to use such arguments; for it is your policy
“ to manage the states of Peloponnesus as best suits
“ your interest, and to prescribe them law⁵⁶⁸. And
“ had you remained at the head of the naval confe-
“ deracy, and persevered in maintaining that invi-
“ dious superiority by sea, we are well convinced,
“ that you would soon have become no less odious
“ to your allies than the Athenians; and consequent-
“ ly would have been under the necessity, either of
“ ruling with rigour or to have risked the loss of your
“ sway⁵⁶⁹. It therefore appears, that we have done
“ nothing to excite surprise, in accepting a supre-
“ macy voluntarily offered; in firmly maintaining it,
“ thus accepted, upon those three preponderating
“ principles, fear, honour, and interest⁵⁷⁰.

“ The maxim on which we have acted was not es-
“ tablished by us; it being a law of nature, for the
“ weaker to be held under by the stronger. Nor was
“ power our only reason for accepting rule; we took
“ the government upon us because we thought our-
“ selves worthy of sovereignty. For truly deserving
“ of praise are they, who having obtained dominion
“ over others, are juster in the exercise of sway,
“ than their degree of power makes necessary for
“ maintaining that dominion⁵⁷¹. Hence we have rea-
“ son to conclude, that were our power lodged in
“ other hands, the moderation with which we have
“ used it, would soon be made conspicuous; and yet

566. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxv.

567. Id. ibid.

568. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxvi.

569. Id. ibid.

570. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxxvi.

571. Id. ibid.

PART I. “this moderation hath not exempted us from
 “blame. It hath even proved the cause of calum-
 “ny⁵⁷².”

That seeming paradox the Athenian ambassadors illustrated, by observing, that in suits against their dependents they were often worsted in their own courts; and that, although ever submitting to fair and impartial trials, they were nevertheless reputed tyrannical⁵⁷³. “None considering,” added they, “that those states that have dominion over others, “and treat not their subject allies with the modera-
 “tion we observe, are seldom accused of severity.
 “And for this substantial reason; where tyranny
 “prevails, there can be no room for appeals to jus-
 “tice⁵⁷⁴. But our dependents (accustomed to con-
 “test with us on an equal footing) if they suffer ever
 “so little damage, either by a judicial sentence or
 “the exercise of legal authority, take in worse part
 “the loss they sustain, when they think equity on
 “their side, than if, setting aside law, we had forc-
 “ibly seized their property⁵⁷⁵.

“The Asiatic Greeks long bore with patience the
 “tyranny of the Persians; yet our government they
 “think oppressive. To them it may so seem; for,
 “to subjects, the present is always grievous⁵⁷⁶. And
 “if, by our overthrow, you should acquire dominion
 “over them, you would perceive that friendly dispo-
 “sition toward Sparta, which a dread of Athens hath
 “occasioned, quickly to vanish; especially, should
 “you assert your sway with that high authority
 “which you did during your short command against
 “the Persian monarch⁵⁷⁷. Form, therefore your
 “resolutions on this subject with deliberation; as on

572. Thucyd. ubi sup.

573. Id. lib. cap. lxxvii.

574. Id. ibid.

575. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxvii.

576. Id. ibid.

577. Thucyd. ubi sup.

“ a matter of great importance: nor hearken so far to
“ the calumnies of other states, as to embroil your-
“ selves with us without reason. Reflect well on the
“ uncertainties of war, before you engage in it. For,
“ protracted into length, it generally issues in cala-
“ mities; from which, at present, we both are
“ equally distant: and to the lot of which of us they
“ will fall, can only be determined by the train of
“ events⁵⁷⁸.

“ Men, who go rashly to war, are often eager to
“ execute enterprises that ought, in point of time, to
“ be second to something more important; and,
“ when they have failed in their undertakings, they
“ listen to the dictates of reason⁵⁷⁹. But as we are,
“ by no means, guilty of such rashness, nor perceived
“ it in you, we exhort you, while recourse may be
“ had to healing measures, not to break the treaty;
“ not to violate your engagements, but to let the con-
“ troversy between us be decided, according to the
“ articles of the peace, by fair arbitration⁵⁸⁰. If this
“ proposal ye reject, Lacedæmonians! we call the
“ gods, you have sworn by, and who take cogni-
“ zance of oaths, to bear witness, that if you begin
“ the war, we will endeavour to avenge ourselves,
“ by whatever conduct you shall set us an exam-
“ ple⁵⁸¹.”

When the Lacedæmonians had heard the accusa-
tions of their allies against the Athenians, and also
what the Athenians had urged in their own vindica-
tion, they ordered both parties to withdraw, and
entered into serious consultation among themselves.
The majority concurred in declaring, that the Athe-
nians had acted unjustly; and that a war against them
ought to be speedily begun⁵⁸². But Archidamus,

578. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. lxxviii.

579. Id. *ibid.*

580. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxviii.

581. Id. *ibid.*

582. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxix.

PART I. the venerable Spartan king, a man of sound understanding and cool temper, endeavoured thus to moderate the ardour of his subjects.

“ The war, Lacedæmonians, which is at present
 “ the subject of your deliberations, you will find,
 “ calmly considered, big with important consequences;
 “ and, therefore, it ought not rashly to be
 “ undertaken⁵⁸³. For, although in disputes with
 “ our Peloponnesian neighbours, we have ever a
 “ competent force in readiness, and can quickly reduce
 “ them to reason, the case must be very different
 “ in acting against the Athenians; a people,
 “ whose most valuable territories are remote, and
 “ whose naval skill and strength is great; a people,
 “ who are provided with all the requisites of war—
 “ with arms, shipping, horses, and men; with wealth,
 “ both public and private, beyond what any other
 “ Grecian state can furnish;—a people, who have
 “ numerous dependent states, on which they levy
 “ tribute. Whence then the motive for sanguinely
 “ rushing into war with such an enemy⁵⁸⁴?

“ But should we declare war against the Athenians,
 “ unprovided as we are, on what can we depend
 “ for success? On our naval force?—In that,
 “ we are inferior; and much time would be required,
 “ should we make such declaration, before we
 “ could equal them at sea⁵⁸⁵. Or is it on our wealth,
 “ that we shall depend?—In this, we are still more
 “ deficient; for we neither have it in any public fund,
 “ nor can we readily raise it by private contribution⁵⁸⁶.
 “ Yet some over-confident spirits may perhaps
 “ believe, that we so far exceed the Athenians

⁵⁸³. Id. lib. i. cap. lxxx.

⁵⁸⁴. Id. ibid.

⁵⁸⁵. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxx.

⁵⁸⁶. Id. ibid.

“ in numbers, and military skill, that we can easily
“ march into the territory of Attica, and lay it waste
“ by repeated incursions. Other territories, how-
“ ever, of large extent, are subject to Athens. From
“ these, by sea, she will import all necessary sup-
“ plies⁵⁸⁷. But should we even be able to induce
“ the Athenian tributaries to revolt, we shall want a
“ naval force to support them in their rebellion; as
“ the majority of them are seated on islands. What
“ then will be the result of this projected war? For,
“ if we are not able to contend with the Athenians
“ at sea, or to divert those revenues by which their
“ navy is maintained, we shall only, by declaring
“ war against them, hurt ourselves. And, in such
“ event, to be obliged to desist from hostilities, will
“ stain our honour; especially, if we shall be thought
“ the violators of the treaty⁵⁸⁸.

“ Be not therefore elated, Lacedæmonians! with
“ the vain hope, that this war will soon be brought
“ to a close, if we can lay waste the territory of At-
“ tica. I see cause, on sure grounds of reasoning,
“ to fear that we shall transmit the purposed war as
“ a legacy to our children; for, it is by no means
“ consistent with the character of the Athenians,
“ either to be slaves to their soil, or to shrink from
“ danger⁵⁸⁹. Yet am not I so void of principle—of
“ political prudence, generosity, or patriotism, as to
“ advise you to abandon your confederates to the
“ outrages of the Athenians, or to connive at the
“ encroachments of a rival power. I seek only to
“ persuade you, not hastily to commence hostilities:
“ nor, in the short space of one day, precipitantly to
“ determine a question, that involves the fate of so
“ many cities, so many men, and so much wealth
“ and honour⁵⁹⁰.

587. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxxi.

588. Id. ibid.

589. Thucyd. ubi sup.

590. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxxxii. lxxxv.

PART I.

“ My advice is, to send ambassadors to Athens;
 “ in order to remonstrate, before the assembled peo-
 “ ple, concerning the attack of Potidæa, and other
 “ complaints of our allies against the Athenian state;
 “ but without discovering any eagerness for war, or
 “ symptoms of pusillanimity, if war should be found
 “ necessary⁵⁹¹. Meantime, let every thing be got
 “ in readiness for the apprehended rupture. Thus
 “ will our resolutions be more wisely formed, and
 “ our preparations strike into our enemies greater
 “ terror⁵⁹². ”

The force of this speech, which must have carried general conviction, was diverted by Sthenelaidas, one of the ephori; who addressed the Lacedæmonians, in words to the following effect. “ The ha-
 “ rangues of the Athenians, for my part, I cannot
 “ comprehend. They have enlarged exceedingly in
 “ praise of themselves; but they have said nothing
 “ to disprove the charges against them—that they
 “ have done injury to our confederates, and to Pe-
 “ loponnesus. And if they behaved well during the
 “ Persian war, but have acted unjustly since its ter-
 “ mination, they deserve to be doubly punished;
 “ because, instead of improving, they have degene-
 “ rated into ill⁵⁹³. But we continue the same peo-
 “ ple we then were; and will not, if we are wise,
 “ overlook the wrongs done to our allies, nor wait
 “ any longer to avenge them, their sufferings being
 “ past bearing.

“ But the Athenians, forsooth, have a great deal
 “ of money, and ships, and cavalry! Be these things
 “ as they may, we have worthy allies, whom we
 “ ought not to desert; nor leave to be defended
 “ by pleadings, since it was not by words they were

591. Id. *ibid*.

592. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxxv.

593. Id. lib. i. cap. lxxxvi.

“ injured. On the contrary, we ought, with all expe-
“ dition, and with all our strength, to seek revenge⁵⁹⁴.

“ How we should deliberate, when we have been
“ wranged, let no man pretend to inform me; it
“ would better have become the perpetrators of vio-
“ lence to have deliberated before they committed
“ injustice. Vote then the war, Lacedæmonians!
“ with a spirit becoming the dignity of Sparta; and
“ neither suffer the Athenians to grow yet greater,
“ nor betray your confederates. But, with the
“ gods on our side, let us march out against the
“ authors of usurpation and tyranny⁵⁹⁵.”

Sthenelaidas having thus spoken, put the question in the Lacedæmonian senate, by virtue of his office, as president of the college of ephori. But as the members gave their suffrage by vote, and not by ballot, he said that he could not distinguish the majority; and therefore ordered them to divide upon the question, “ Whether the Athenians had broken the treaty?”—They accordingly rose up, and divided; and a great majority appeared on the side that held the treaty to be broken⁵⁹⁶.

On this report being given, the Lacedæmonians called in the deputies of their confederates, who had been ordered to withdraw, and told them that they had come to a resolution, That the Athenians had infringed the treaty, by acts of violence and oppression; but that they were desirous again to put the question, in an assembly of all their confederates, convoked on purpose; that by taking their measures in concert with their allies, they might vigorously carry on the war, if voted by common consent⁵⁹⁷.

594. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxxvi.

595. Id. ibid.

596. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. lxxxvii.

597. Id. ibid.

PART I.



Ant. Chr.
432.
Olympiad
lxxxvii. 1.

When the Lacedæmonian senate had thus made known its resolution, the Peloponnesian deputies departed for their several homes; and the Athenian ambassadors, having ended their business, stayed not long behind⁵⁹⁸. This vote of the Lacedæmonian senate, That “the treaty was violated,” observes Thucydides⁵⁹⁹, was passed in the fourteenth year of the peace, concluded for thirty years, after the conquest of Eubœa⁶⁰⁰.

Ant. Chr.
431.
Olympiad
lxxxvii. 2.

The Lacedæmonians, conformable to their late resolution, having summoned the deputies of all their confederates to attend at Sparta; in order to put to a general vote, “Whether or not war should be undertaken against the Athenians?”—the ambassadors of the numerous constituents of their alliance arrived, and assembled in one common council⁶⁰¹. Various were the arguments offered, by the several deputies; but the majority seemed disposed to declare for war. Meanwhile the Corinthians, alarmed for the fate of Potidæa, and zealous for the commencement of hostilities, stood up and spoke to the following purport:

“We can no longer, confederates! blame the Lacedæmonians: we can neither accuse them of indifference nor delay; for they have not only voted the war themselves, but summoned us hither to give their resolution our concurrence. The purpose of the Corinthians, in addressing you, therefore is, to convince you of the necessity of hostilities; and that, although seated on the coast, and depending upon traffic for our prosperity, we are not altogether selfish in so advising. For the people planted in places remote from the sea, will soon find that,

⁵⁹⁸. Thucydid. ubi sup.

⁵⁹⁹. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxxxvii.

⁶⁰⁰. Id. ibid.

⁶⁰¹. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxix.

“ unless

“ unless they defend those in lower situations, they
“ will be obstructed in carrying to the shore the
“ fruits of their fields; and also in receiving those
“ needful supplies, with which commerce furnishes
“ inland territories⁶⁰². Hence we wish to make
“ them sensible, that if they abandon the defence
“ of the people in maritime districts, the danger will
“ reach the interior country; and, consequently,
“ they are interested no less than we in the issue of
“ the present deliberations⁶⁰³.

“ Other arguments, we hope, will convince you,
“ Peloponnesians! that you ought to make, without
“ the smallest hesitation, the necessary exchange of
“ peace for war. For, although it be the maxim of
“ the prudent to preserve peace as long as they can,
“ it is the duty of the brave, when injured, to re-
“ nounce peace, and have recourse to arms; and,
“ when successful in arms, to lay them down again
“ by peaceful treaty⁶⁰⁴. We, having been grossly
“ injured, and in many instances aggrieved by the
“ Athenians, are taking up arms; and, when we
“ shall have avenged ourselves on our enemies,
“ will put a stop to hostilities, and offer terms of
“ peace⁶⁰⁵.

“ Success in war depends upon many circumstan-
“ ces; and from many of those we may presume,
“ that we shall prove victorious. We surpass the
“ Athenians in numbers, and martial skill on land;
“ and being natives of one peninsula, armed and dis-
“ ciplined alike, we will act with more vigour and
“ concert⁶⁰⁶. In naval force the Athenians are su-
“ perior; but we shall be able to equal them in that,
“ by employing our private wealth, or borrowing

602. Id. lib. i. cap. cxx.

603. Id. ibid.

604. Thucyd. ubi sup.

605. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxxi.

606. Id. ibid.

PART I.

“ the treasures laid up at Delphos and Olympia, to
 “ equip a navy⁶⁰⁷. We may even, by so borrowings;
 “ and giving greater wages, draw off all the foreign
 “ mariners in the Athenian service; for the fleets
 “ of Athens are not manned merely with native sea-
 “ men. Her naval strength is rather mercenary
 “ than internal; whereas our power, on land, is al-
 “ together self-supported⁶⁰⁸. And when once we
 “ have gained an equality in maritime skill, our in-
 “ born courage will soon secure us victory at sea.
 “ For that dauntless spirit, which we inherit from
 “ nature, it is impossible for them to purchase; but
 “ we may acquire, through practice, a superiority
 “ in naval operations⁶⁰⁹.

“ The sums of money, by which these ends are
 “ chiefly to be obtained, we must respectively con-
 “ tribute. And while the Athenian dependents are
 “ never slow in sending those quotas that rivet
 “ slavery on them, would it not be a shameful dere-
 “ liction of patriotism in us, who wish to be aveng-
 “ ed on our enemies, and seek to secure our liberty
 “ and independency, should we refuse to submit to
 “ necessary contributions? or to store up wealth
 “ to be plundered by the Athenians, which may
 “ eventually purchase oppressions and miseries for
 “ ourselves⁶¹⁰.

“ But we have other expedients within our reach
 “ for the successful prosecution of this war:—the
 “ probability of effecting a revolt of the dependents
 “ of Athens; and, in consequence of that, a dimi-
 “ nution of her revenue, the essence of her strength;
 “ the erecting of forts within her territory; and the
 “ occurrence of many other events, not yet to be
 “ foreseen⁶¹¹. For war, by no means, yields to the

607. Thucydid. ubi sup.

608. Id. lib. i. cap. cxxi.

609. Id. ibid.

610. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxi.

611. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxxii.

“ direction

“ direction of a preconcerted plan; but, in its pro-
 “ gress, methodises its own course⁶¹².

LETTER
 XIV.

“ Through toil to earn virtues, is hereditary to
 “ Peloponnesians. It becomes you, therefore, with
 “ many confidence to declare for war. The oracle
 “ of a god prescribes it⁶¹³! that god himself hath
 “ promised his assistance⁶¹⁴: and all the Grecian
 “ states without the isthmus, are ready to join you⁶¹⁵;
 “ some from a principle of fear, and some from mo-
 “ tives of interest⁶¹⁶. Nor on you will the breach
 “ of the peace be charged. The prophetic god, in
 “ advising war, evidently judges the peace to be
 “ already broken; you will only then, by commenc-
 “ ing hostilities, act in redress of its violation⁶¹⁷.
 “ For breach of faith is not to be imputed to those
 “ that arm to revenge it, but to the faithless ag-
 “ gressors⁶¹⁸.

“ Reflect, confederates! that our affairs are come
 “ to a momentous crisis; that we have suggested
 “ the most adviseable measures, and give your votes
 “ for war⁶¹⁹. Be not alarmed at its dangers; but
 “ animate yourselves with the hope of a long and
 “ advantageous peace produced by it. For peace,
 “ procured by war, is ever the most lasting; and
 “ danger can never be diverted by tamely shrinking
 “ from hostilities through a love of the benefits of

612. Id. *ibid*.

613. When the Lacedæmonians consulted the oracle of Apollo at Delphos, after the breaking up of the former assembly of the Peloponnesian deputies, “ Whether the war voted would be successful?” —they received this response:—“ That if they carried on war with
 “ all their strength, they should be conquerors; and that the God
 “ himself would aid their cause, both invoked and uninvoked.”
 Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxviii.

614. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxiii.

615. Id. *ibid*.

616. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. i. cap. cxxiii.

617. Id. *ibid*.

618. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

619. Id. lib. i. cap. cxxiv.

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“ peaceful tranquillity⁶²⁰. Let us, therefore, roused
 “ by this certain conclusion, That a state in Greece
 “ has started up into usurpation and tyranny, and in-
 “ differently aims at the subjugation of us all; her
 “ arbitrary plan being partly executed, and partly in
 “ agitation—let us rush against her at once, and pull
 “ her down⁶²¹. Then shall we pass the remainder of
 “ our days exempt from trouble, and also deliver from
 “ servitude the many already inthralled Greeks⁶²².”

The Corinthians in this manner spoke; and the Lacedæmonians, having heard the opinions of the deputies, both of the greater and smaller states, put the question; and the majority voted for war⁶²³. But although war was thus voted, it was impossible for the Peloponnesians, unprepared as they were, immediately to commence hostilities with any prospect of success. It was therefore agreed, That each state should get in readiness, with all convenient speed, its proportion of force:—and, in less than a year, the Peloponnesian army was ready for action⁶²⁴. Meantime several embassies, charged with various accusations, were sent from Sparta to Athens; in order to procure delay, and furnish a colourable pretext for the meditated invasion of Attica.

The first embassy from Sparta to Athens, had for its object the subversion of the administration, if not the banishment of Pericles; on an accusation that his ancestors, by the mother's side, had been guilty of sacrilege⁶²⁵. By the second embassy, the Lacedæmonians required the Athenians to quit the blockade

620. Id. *ibid*,

621. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxiv.

622. Id. *ibid*.

623. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxv.

624. Id. *ibid*.

625. Id. Bell. Peloponnes, lib. i. cap. cxxvi. cxxvii.

of Potidæa, and permit Ægina to govern itself at its own discretion; but they more especially insisted, That the decree, prohibiting the Megareans the Attic havens and markets, should be revoked⁶²⁶. The Athenians admitted none of these demands.

At length the final embassy from Sparta to Athens arrived, under the conduct of Ramphias, Melisippus, and Agesander; who, setting aside all other points in dispute, spoke thus:—"The Lacedæmonians are desirous of peace; and peace, therefore, Athenians! you may have, if you will permit the Greeks to govern themselves according to their own laws⁶²⁷;" or, in other words, declare their colonies and tributary states independent.

The Athenians summoned the popular assembly, which consisted of people of all ranks, and in which every one was at liberty to deliver his sentiments. And they determined, after deliberating on all the matters in debate, to return a definitive answer⁶²⁸. Many spoke on this occasion, and several were divided in their opinions; some insisting on the necessity of war, and others maintaining that peace ought not to be obstructed by the decree in regard to the Megareans, which it was adviseable to repeal⁶²⁹. At length Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, a man of the greatest abilities both for action and debate⁶³⁰, stood up, and spoke to this purpose.

"I hold, Athenians! the same opinion, which I have often had occasion to declare;—That we ought not to yield to the demands of the Pelopon-

626. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxxxix.

627. Id. *ibid*.

628. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

629. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes*. lib. i. cap. cxxxix.

630. Id. *ibid*.

"nesians.

PART I.

nesians. The treacherous designs of the Lacedæ-
 monians against us were formerly evident; nor are
 they less manifest at this moment. For, although
 it is expressly stipulated, in the articles of the
 treaty between us, That, in all controversies of
 right, we shall mutually submit to legal decisions;
 each party, during the dependence of the suit, to
 hold what it possesses: yet have they never enter-
 ed such suit against us; nor will they accept of a
 judicial trial, when offered by Athens⁶³¹. Their
 accusations against us they are determined to sup-
 port by arms, and not by evidence. And hither
 they now come, no longer to remonstrate, but to
 command. They order us to raise the siege of
 Potidæa; to allow the Æginetes to govern them-
 selves by their own laws; to repeal the decree
 against the Megareans; and, lastly, to restore in-
 dependency to our Grecian colonies and tributa-
 ries⁶³²; the former planted at great expense, the
 latter acquired by conquest or compact, and both
 protected by our arms.

Let not, therefore, one Athenian believe we
 go to war for a trifling matter, should we only
 refuse to repeal the decree against the Megareans.
 The stress the Lacedæmonians lay upon it—name-
 ly, that if repealed a war will not ensue, is noth-
 ing but a specious colouring. Nor think there will
 be any ground for self-accusation, though, for so
 trifling a matter, you should have recourse to arms;
 for that matter, trifling as it may seem, includes
 within it the full proof of the constancy of Athe-
 nian spirit⁶³³. Should we, for example, submit to
 this demand, we shall soon be required to make
 some sacrifice of greater moment; as if our conde-
 scension had been the consequence of fear. But
 if we, at once, strenuously refuse to listen to the

631. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxi.

632. Id. ibid.

633. Thucyd. ubi sup.

“ demands of the Lacedæmonians, we shall convince
 “ them, that they must treat with us, in future, as
 “ with men who are their equals⁶³⁴. LETTER
XIV.

“ Hence I exhort you, Athenians! at the present
 “ crisis, either to yield the Lacedæmonians obe-
 “ dience, before you suffer damage from them; or,
 “ if we shall determine on war, which to me seem-
 “ eth most expedient (be the pretext weighty or
 “ light), not to give way to the smallest demand,
 “ lest we render the tenure of what we possess, pre-
 “ carious and unstable⁶³⁵. For not only the greatest,
 “ but the least demand, if authoritatively imposed
 “ by equals, hath a tendency to make those that sub-
 “ mit to it slaves⁶³⁶. But that we may now hazard
 “ a war, with as fair a prospect of success as our
 “ rivals, permit me to offer the reasons, and attend
 “ to their weight.

“ The Peloponnesians are a people, who subsist
 “ by their bodily labour, and who have neither pri-
 “ vate wealth nor public funds. Accordingly, with
 “ wars of long continuance, or wars by sea, they are
 “ utterly unacquainted; and the wars, in which they
 “ have been embroiled with one another, have been
 “ short and transient, in consequence of their pover-
 “ ty⁶³⁷. A people so circumstanced can neither fit
 “ out a fleet, nor often send their armies abroad⁶³⁸.
 “ Funds of money are, to a state, much surer sup-
 “ ports of war, than contributions exacted by force.
 “ And men, who subsist by the labour of their hands,
 “ are more ready, on momentous occasions, to sup-
 “ port the state with their personal service, than
 “ with their money⁶³⁹. For their bodies, though
 “ exposed to danger, they presume will escape death;

634. Id. *ibid*.

635. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxli.


636. Id. *ibid*.

637. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxli*.

638. Id. *ibid*.

639. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

“ but

PART I.  “ but their money they apprehend will too surely be
 “ exhausted, if the war should run out into length⁶⁴⁰.

“ The state of the Peloponnesians I judge to be
 “ such, or nearly such as I have described it; but
 “ our state is exempt from the defects, which I have
 “ pointed out in theirs, while it enjoys other advan-
 “ tages far beyond their rivalling⁶⁴¹. For, granting
 “ that they may invade our territories by land, we
 “ also can make descents upon theirs by sea. And
 “ whether Peloponnesus or Attica shall be wasted
 “ with fire and sword, admits of no comparison: for,
 “ in the former case, they will have no other coun-
 “ try to repair to, but what they must acquire by
 “ force of arms; whereas we have large tracts of
 “ land to seek refuge in, both in the islands and on
 “ the continent⁶⁴².

“ Of vast consequence is the dominion of the sea.
 “ But regard it with attention! If we, Athenians,
 “ were seated in an island, whether should we or
 “ the Peloponnesians be subdued with greater faci-
 “ lity?—The solution of the question is easy, con-
 “ sidering our naval force: and our present situation
 “ is nearly the same with that proposed⁶⁴³. Let us,
 “ therefore, give up the produce of our fields, eva-
 “ cuate our villages, and confine our defence to the
 “ sea and the city of Athens; nor be so much exas-
 “ perated at the Peloponnesians, as to hazard a battle
 “ against superior numbers, for the sake of our ter-
 “ ritory, but behold unmoved their devastations.
 “ And for this important reason, our houses and
 “ lands are of small value, compared with the lives
 “ of our people; for lands and houses are by men

640. Id. *ibid*.

641. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxliii.

642. Id. *ibid*.

643. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxliii.

“ acquired

“ acquired and possessed, but can never produce
“ men⁶⁴⁴. Of those we need not fear the want.

LETTER
XIV.

“ Might I presume, Athenians! on my powers of
“ persuasion, I should enjoin you to march out, and
“ commit the waste with your own hands; in order
“ to convince the Peloponnesians, that you will nei-
“ ther meet them in the field, nor submit to their
“ imperious demands, for all the inroads they can
“ make⁶⁴⁵. And I see many causes to hope for vic-
“ tory, in this threatening war, if you will not plunge
“ into unnecessary dangers; for I am more afraid
“ of our own adventurous spirit, in seeking the en-
“ largement of dominion, than of the force or skill
“ of the enemy⁶⁴⁶.

“ But these matters I shall afterward have occa-
“ sion to explain, in the course of the war, if it
“ should take place. At present, let us dismiss the
“ Spartan ambassadors, with the following answer:
“ —That we will open our markets and havens to
“ the Megareans, provided the Lacedæmonians, in
“ their prohibition of foreigners, will except us and
“ our confederates; for neither our act relative to
“ Megara, nor theirs for the exclusion of foreigners,
“ is prohibited in the articles of the treaty⁶⁴⁷: That
“ we will also permit the Grecian states, under our
“ dominion, to govern themselves at their own dis-
“ cretion, if they had such right when the treaty was
“ concluded; provided the Lacedæmonians will, at
“ the same time, withdraw the command they lay
“ upon the states in their own confederacy, of regu-
“ lating themselves by that form of government
“ which best suits the Spartan interest, the aristo-
“ cratical! and allow them the choice of their own
“ polity: That farther, we will submit to a judicial

644. Id. *ibid*.

645. Thucydid. *ubi sup*.

646. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxliv*.

647 Id. *ibid*.

“ decision,

PART I. “ decision, according to the articles of peace; and
 “ that, although we will not begin war, we will
 “ avenge ourselves on those that shall⁶⁴⁸. Such an
 “ answer is consistent with justice, and becomes the
 “ dignity of the Athenian state⁶⁴⁹.”

Ant. Chr.
 431.
 Olympiad
 lxxxvii. 2.

Pericles having spoken to the foregoing purport, and the Athenians thinking, that what he advised was most for their advantage, voted in conformity to his exhortation⁶⁵⁰. They also returned an answer to the Lacedæmonians according to his directions, though not in the words of his motion;—“ That
 “ they would do nothing upon command, but were
 “ ready to submit the matters in dispute to a judicial
 “ decision agreeable to treaty, upon a fair and equal
 “ footing⁶⁵¹.” On this answer being given, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors took their departure; and here all negociation, between the rival states, came to a close⁶⁵².

According to the chronological order of events, the Peloponnesian war, my lord, ought now to engage our attention. But before we enter on the history of that war, I shall, conformable to my plan, offer to your lordship’s notice, by way of introduction, a view of the progress of the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily, on which the hostile powers depended for support.

648. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxliv.

649. Id. ibid.

650. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxlv.

651. Id. ibid.

652. Thucyd. ubi sup. Though hostilities were not immediately begun on the departure of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors from Athens, no communication was thenceforth held between the jealous and suspicious powers, without the intervention of a herald. Thucyd. lib. i. cap. cxlvi.

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Common

ANCIENT EUROPE.

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Amunition
is mostly wanted

LETTER XV.

wanted

111

PROGRESS OF THE GRECIAN COLONIES IN ITALY AND
SICILY, TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR, WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE SURPRISE OF PLATÆA
BY THE THEBANS.

W

W

THE planting of the principal Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily, I have formerly had occasion to mention, and also to notice their early growth¹; in consequence of which Sicily suddenly rose to eminence in arts and arms, and the Grecian settlements in that island, and in the more southern part of Italy, soon became so extensive and cultivated, as to acquire the name of Magna Grecia, or "Great Greece²."

LETTER
XV.

W

W

Of the progressive advancement of the Sicilian Greeks in arts, polity, naval and military power, we are very fully informed by a native historian³, who had made it his business to inquire minutely into their affairs. But of the stages in the progress of the Grecian colonies in Italy, before the Peloponnesian war, we have little certain information, and few particulars of their history. We only know, that most of them had become wealthy, powerful, and populous; and that they had diffused the knowledge of arts, literature, and philosophy, among the comparatively barbarous natives; that Rhegium and Tarentum were flourishing cities; that Crotona,

1. See letter v. vol. i. p. 323, 324, and p. 338, 339.

2. Strabo, lib. vi. passim.
iculiensis.

3. Diodorus Siculus, or

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Ant. Chr.
446.
Olympiad
lxxxiii. 3.

which the Samian philosopher had made his abode, and where he kept his crowded school, was the head of a strong and well regulated state; that Sybaris, where luxury and sensuality long reigned, and had risen to such a height of refinement as became proverbial, had sunk under the arms and the valour of the Crotonian disciples of Pythagoras; that the Sybarites, in their distress, had applied to Athens for succour; that a body of Athenian and other Grecian adventurers, among whom was numbered the historian Herodotus, embarked for their support; and founded, in the neighbourhood of the ruins of Sybaris, the city of Thurium, to which Charondas gave excellent laws⁴.

But before I speak of the laws of Charondas, my lord, I must notice those of an earlier date; of Zaleucus, legislator to the Epizephyrian Locrians; a colony sent to Italy by the Locrians of Ozolis.

In what age Zaleucus promulgated his laws, we are not certainly informed. But it must have been before the days of Pindar; for he represents the Epizephyrian Locrians as a civilized people⁵: and no people can be civilized without laws. Zaleucus is said to have been one of the scholars of Pythagoras⁶. But at whatever time he lived, or by whatever means he acquired his learning, the preface to his laws is one of the most valuable remains of antiquity.

4. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 76.—83, (vol. ii. edit. sup. cit.) et seq. See also Strabo, lib. v. vi. passim.

5. Pind. Olymp. xi. This ode is addressed to Agesidamus of Locris; who obtained at the olympic games, the victory in the exercise of the castus, in the seventy-fourth olympiad.

6. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 84, vol. ii. Dr. Warburton, however, has endeavoured to prove, that Zaleucus legislated before the time of Pythagoras. *Divine Legation of Moses*, book ii. sect. iii.

“ It is necessary,” said he, “ that every citizen
“ should, in the first place, firmly believe in the ex-
“ istence of the gods. This belief all will readily
“ be induced to entertain, when looking up to the
“ heavens, they contemplate the wonderful beauty
“ and harmony of the celestial bodies. These,
“ they will find, could neither be the effect of for-
“ tuitous causes, nor the work of man! and there-
“ fore, they must adore the gods, as the bestowers
“ of all the benefits that mankind enjoy, in conse-
“ quence of the order of the universe. In so doing,
“ they ought to purify their minds from vice; for
“ the gods delight not in costly sacrifices, but in the
“ just and honourable actions of virtuous men⁷.

“ But they, whose passions are so impetuous as
“ not to suffer them to persevere in virtue, and
“ whose minds have acquired a bias towards vice;
“ these, whether men or women, citizens or sojourn-
“ ers, ought to reverence the gods; meditate upon
“ their nature, and reflect on the punishments which
“ divine justice has in store for wicked human
“ beings. They ought to set before their eyes the
“ dreadful hour of death, at which all must arrive;
“ when the memory of past evil actions will sting
“ every vicious soul with remorse, accompanied
“ with the fruitless wish, that they had regulated
“ their conduct by the principles of religion and vir-
“ tue. Each man, therefore, ought so to watch
“ over his actions, as if that hour was ever present
“ to him⁸.”

The laws of Zaleucus were worthy of such an in-
tro-duction. His criminal code had the merit of being
the first among any European people, that by fixing
the penalty for every crime, left not the degree of

7. Apud Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 85, vol. ii.

8. Apud Stobæum, Serm. xlii.

PART I.

punishment at the direction of the magistrate⁹. Nor were his civil ordinances less excellent. Taking advantage of those two great springs that actuate human conduct, and supply in many instances, the place of laws, and even of morals—the love of honour and the fear of shame, he enjoined, that no citizen should be implacable in his resentment against another; but that all should so manage their passions, as soon to be reconciled with their adversaries:—and if any man acted otherwise, that he should be accounted no better than a barbarian¹⁰.

On the same principle, in order to restrain licentiousness and wasteful expense, so hurtful to infant communities, Zaleucus enacted a law, that no free-born woman, when she went abroad, should be attended by more than one handmaid, unless she were drunk; that no such woman should walk out under night, unless with an intention to play the harlot; nor wear golden ornaments, or garments embroidered with gold, unless with the same intent. And that no man should wear a gold ring, or a purple cloak, unless he had been guilty of fornication or adultery¹¹.

By these dishonourable exceptions, and conditions of indemnity, which were punishments in themselves, Zaleucus effectually restrained the Locrians of Italy from luxury and excess; for none, observes Diodorus¹², were willing to expose their character to the contempt or derision of their fellow-citizens, by owning themselves guilty of such transgressions.

From the laws of Zaleucus we are naturally led to consider those of Charondas; who lived, as

9. Strabo, lib. vi. p. 260, edit. sup. cit.

10. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 85, vol. ii.

11. Id. ibid.

12. Biblioth. ubi sup.

already observed, in a later age. In the meantime, I must say a few words of the Grecian colony planted at Thurium, in the territory of Sybaris.

The city of Thurium formed an oblong square; the breadth of which was marked by three parallel streets, and the length, cross-cut by four: and when all these streets were filled with houses, it appeared very compact and beautiful¹³. But unhappily, the Thurians continued not long in peace among themselves. A violent dissention broke out between the old and new people; in consequence of which a sedition took place, and all the Sybarites were either expelled or put to the sword¹⁴. The new comers having thus got the whole city, and also its territory into their power, and finding the country very fertile, and more than sufficient for them, invited over adventurers from Greece, in order to cultivate the ground. And among these they divided both the houses in the city that were vacant, and the lands in their district that were unoccupied¹⁵.

The inhabitants of Thurium soon grew rich; and entering into a league with the Crotonians, thenceforth managed their affairs with much discretion¹⁶. Having established a democratical form of government, on the model of that at Athens, they divided the citizens into ten tribes: to which they gave

13. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 78. vol. ii.

14. Id. ibid. The causes of this sedition are thus explained by Diodorus. The Sybarites shared all the chief places of magistracy among themselves, leaving only the inferior offices to the new colonists; and the wives of the ancient inhabitants were admitted to sacrifice, before those of the late adventurers. Beside these seeds of dissention, the Sybarites engrossed, and divided among them, all the lands near the city; so that none were left for the people, who had rescued them from ruin, but such as lay at a distance. Biblioth. ubi sup.

15. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

16. Id. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 78.

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names, corresponding to the several countries whence the settlers had emigrated⁷. And from among the most learned and sagacious of their body, they chose, for their legislator, Charondas; who, after examining the laws of every country, collected what statutes he judged to be best suited to his purpose, and digested the whole into one code; adding, at the same time, many laws of his own framing⁸. The most remarkable of the latter, I shall offer to your lordship's consideration.

Charondas, like Zaleucus, in framing his laws, had generally a reference to the love of honour and the fear of shame. Hence he instituted, that whoever married a second wife, and brought in a step-mother among his children⁹, should be removed from the senate, and excluded the popular assembly; judging that he, who could be so imprudent in the affairs of his own family, could never wisely advise the state. For they that have been once well married, he concluded, ought to rest satisfied with such happiness; and such as have been unfortunate in their first match, and yet, against their own experience, commit a second fault, in the same line of conduct, deserve justly to be noted as fools²⁰. His law against false accusers was still more marking. He enacted, that they should, when convicted, be led through the city crowned with the shrub tamarish, a species of brier, that it might be made evident to all the people, they had been guilty of the most atrocious baseness²¹.

17. Id. *ibid*.

81. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 79, vol ii.

19. Id. *ibid*. For the most shocking and cruel discords, observes Diodorus, (*ubi sup.*) often arise in families, between parents and children, through the tricks and devices of stepmothers. Hence the frequent, and horrid scenes of baseness of this kind, represented on the stage by tragedians.

20. Diod. Sicul *ubi sup.*

21. Id. Biblioth. lib xii. p. 79.

Charondas made likewise a law, never instituted by any former legislator, concerning the keeping of bad company; imposing a heavy fine on such as should be convicted of that offence. For he had found by observation, that both the manners and the minds of good and honest citizens were often depraved by associating familiarly with wicked men; who drew them aside, from the pure paths of virtue, into all the foul sinks of vice; and that such company, like an epidemical disease, infected the best hearts with its corrupting contagion²².

But the ordinance of Charondas that has been most admired, as it more eminently marks the liberality of his institutions, and their superiority in that respect to those of preceding legislators, was a law relative to the education of children. He ordained, That all the children of the citizens of Thurium should learn to write; and that the city should pay the wages of their teachers²³. For he knew, that poor citizens were not able to afford the expense: and, consequently, they must otherwise have lost the benefit of such instruction for their children—of the art of writing, which he, in the first place, justly preferred above all other arts, says Diodorus; as by the help of it many things conducive to the public good are preserved, and transmitted to posterity—suffrages, decrees, wills, laws, the opinions of wise men, the answers of the gods, and the learning of philosophers²⁴.

22. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 80.

23. Id. ibid.

24. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. "Life is due to nature," remarks this sagacious historian, "but how to live well, we owe to the writings of the learned; so that Charondas far exceeded those preceding legislators, who had appointed physicians, at the public charge, for the curing of private men's distempers; for they provided only remedies for the diseases of the body, but he a cure for ignorance, and the diseases of the soul." Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 80.

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Charondas framed other two laws no less worthy of his sagacity than the foregoing. The estates of orphans he ordered to be intrusted to the next of kin on the father's side; but the superintendence of their education, and the custody of their persons, he intrusted to the nearest relations on the mother's side²⁵. And for these substantial reasons;—The relations on the mother's side had no interest to make any attempt against the orphan's life, as his estate could never descend to them; and the danger of personal harm was prevented, on the part of the kindred on the father's side, because the orphan's person was not committed to their custody. Beside, as the estate of the orphan was to devolve, in case of death, to his paternal kinsmen, it was to be presumed, that they would take care to preserve and improve it, on the prospect of the possibility of its becoming theirs²⁶.

The other law alluded to, was framed for the correction of those, That deserted their station in battle, or refused to lift arms in defence of their country. Former legislators had punished such delinquency with death; but Charondas only enacted, That they, who had been guilty of it, should sit three days in the agora, or market place, cloathed in the habit of women²⁷. And this punishment, though more moderate than those decreed in other states, for the same pusillanimity, did so operate upon the people of Thurium, as effectually to deter them from cowardice and effeminacy; they thinking it better to face danger, and die honourably in the field, than to suffer shameful disgrace at home, for neglect of duty²⁸.

The affairs of Sicily, the largest of all the islands in the Mediterranean, must next engage our attention.

25. Id. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 81.

26. Id. ibid.

27. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

28. Id. lib. xii. p. 82.

And these will bring under our view those of Carthage. The early progress of the Carthaginian commerce I have formerly had occasion to notice²⁹. And they had attained such an height in naval power at the beginning of the fifth century before the christian æra, that their alliance was courted by Xerxes, when he proposed to invade Greece³⁰.
They

29. Lett. ix.

30. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 1, vol. ii. To such an alliance Xerxes would naturally be led by the Phœnicians, his most powerful naval confederates; who, though they owned his sway, were still governed by their own kings. And the kings of Sidon and Tyre sat, in solemn deliberations, above all other subject princes; the former on the right, and the latter on the left hand of the Persian monarch (Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxvii. lxxviii.). Hence we learn, that Tyre was still regarded as the "daughter of Sidon," as Carthage was of Tyre. The close connexion between the Tyrians and Carthaginians, marking blood-relationship, is indeed manifested through the scope of their history.—And the affection of the whole Phœnician people for the Carthaginians seems to have been so strong as even to have prevented any quarrels arising from rivalry in commerce. They would, therefore, be induced, by motives of friendship as well as policy, to place the Carthaginian state under the protection of the great king; that it might escape his sword, should he prove victorious, by making with him and them a common cause against the aspiring Greeks; their rivals in trade and naval force, who had expelled them the islands in the Ægean sea, and who daily pressed upon their colonies in Cyprus and Sicily.

The only substantial objection to this alliance is, That no mention is made of it by Herodotus. But the positive and circumstantial evidence of Diodorus (lib. xi. p. 1. 16. 21. vol. ii.), is more than a balance to such negative argument, setting aside what I have before stated on the subject; especially as he, being a native of Sicily, had better access to information than Herodotus, who owns that he drew his information of the Carthaginian invasion of that island chiefly from *Sicilian reports* (Herodot. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clxv. clxvi. clxvii.). Diodorus had also an opportunity, by his residence in Italy, and his travels in Africa, after the conquest of Carthage by the Romans, to be informed of the Carthaginian affairs in times past; formerly concealed from foreigners by the jealousy of the government of that republic.

That the Carthaginians were at that time sufficiently powerful to be thought worthy of such alliance is evident, not only from their

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They acceded to his alliance³¹; but their force was broken, as we shall have occasion to see, by the Grecian colony of Syracuse, then under the sovereignty of Gelon.

With the rise of Gelon to the head of the Syracusan government, I shall resume my account of the Grecian colonies in Sicily. But before I enter on that subject, I must say a few words of the former inhabitants of this island.

The Cyclops and Lestrygons, observes Thucydides³², are said to have been the most ancient inhabitants of Sicily; but he declares, that he could neither discover their race, whence they came, nor whither they afterward betook themselves³³. Poetical amusements, adds he, must here suffice; or such information, as every man picks up for his own use³⁴.

What information the Greeks picked up concerning these ancient people, we know not; but Homer, the most early Grecian poet, whose works have been preserved, and whose testimony is considered as historical evidence, has represented both as barbarous and cruel monsters, who delighted in shedding human blood, and in gorging human flesh, without

more early treaty with the Romans, concluded twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes; whence it appears, that they were then in possession of the coast of Africa from the *Sirtus Minor*, almost to the pillars of Hercules; of the western coast of Sicily, and of the whole island of Sardinia (Polyb. lib. iii. cap. xxii. xxiii.): but also from the testimony of Herodotus (lib. vii. cap. clxv.), in speaking of their invasion of Sicily, during the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, with an army of three hundred thousand men (id. *ibid.*); composed partly of native troops, and partly of troops collected from various nations under their sway, or procured with their money, as mercenaries.

31. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 16. 21. vol. ii. edit. sup. cit.

32. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. vi. cap. ii.

33. Id. *ibid.*

34. Thucyd. ubi sup.

the preparation of roasting or boiling³⁵; and Virgil, the prince of Roman poets, degraded them into the character of low mechanics³⁶. But a learned modern antiquarian³⁷ has endeavoured to rescue the Cyclops from such degradation; and to shew, that they were ingenious artists, great builders, and skilled in the forging of metals; at a time when the European nations and the greater part of mankind, were unacquainted with that art³⁸.

After the disappearance of the Cyclops and Lestrigons, Sicily is said to have been inhabited by the Sicanians³⁹; an Iberian people, who had been compelled to remove from the banks of the Sicanus⁴⁰; now the Segre, a river of Catalonia in Spain. From them, Sicily, which had formerly been called Trinacria, from its triangular figure, formed by its three promon-

35. Hom. Odyss. lib. ix. x. passim. This venerable bard, however, has preserved a reply of the Cyclops, to Ulysses and his companions, that places their character (at least in their own estimation) in a higher point of view.

“ Know then, we Cyclops are a race above

“ Those air-bred people, and their goat-nurs'd Jove.”

Hom. Odyss. lib. ix.

36. Æneid. lib. viii. ver. 424, 425. Here we find them represented as mere blacksmiths :

“ Ferrum exercebant vasto Cyclopes in antro,

“ *Brontesque, Steropesque, et nudus membra Pyracmon.*”

Id. ibid.

37. Mr. Bryant.


38. See New System of Ancient Mythology, vol. i. p. 495—516.

“ Thus,” concludes Mr. Bryant, “ have I endeavoured to shew the true history and antiquity of this people. And we may learn from their works, that there was a time when they were held in high estimation. The notion of the Cyclops framing the thunder and lightning for Jupiter, seems to have arisen from the Cyclopians engraving hieroglyphics of this sort upon the temples of the solar deity. They were denominated from their worship Culops; *Cu-Coel-Ops*, “ Domus Coeli Pythonis.” And their chief deity, the sun, among other titles, was stiled Acmon, and Pyracmon.”

39. Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. ii.

40. Id. ibid.

tories,

PART I.  tories⁴¹, received the name of Sicania⁴². The Sicani were supplanted in their most valuable possessions by the Siceli or Siculi, an ancient Italian tribe⁴³; who, flying before the arms of the Opici, crossed the Sicilian strait on rafts; and, having vanquished the Sicani in battle, drove them from the central lands to the southern and western districts, and changed the name of the island from Sicania to Sicelia, Siculia, or Sicilia⁴⁴. And they retained possession of the midland and northerly parts of that island, to the time of Thucydides⁴⁵, or the æra of the Peloponnesian war.

The Phœnicians had early formed settlements all round the Sicilian coast⁴⁶. They secured the capes and bays, together with the small circumjacent isles, for the benefit of trading with the natives⁴⁷. But when the Greeks began to pass over to Sicily in considerable numbers, and there to fix their abode, the Phœnicians abandoned the bulk of their settlements; and, uniting together, seated themselves at Motya, at Saloeis, and Panormus, now Palermo, near to Elemi, secure of the safety of their settlements in these quarters from their alliance with this people, and because the passage from Panormus to Carthage was short⁴⁸. The ancestors of the Elemi were Trojan adventurers; who, after the subversion of the kingdom of Priam, and the destruction of Troy by the Greeks, had landed on the Sicilian shore. They occupied the country in the neighbourhood of the Sicani, and took the general name of Elemi⁴⁹. Their cities were Erix and Egesta⁵⁰.

41. Strabo, lib. vi. p. 265.

42. Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. ii.

43. Diod. Halicarnassensis, lib. i. cap. ix.

44. Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. ii. Diod. Sicul. lib. v. init. Diod. Halicarnassensis, lib. i. cap. xxii.

45. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. vi. cap. ii.

46. Id. ibid.

47. Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. ii.

48. Id. ibid.

49. Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. ii.

50. Id. ibid.

The first Greeks that settled in Sicily were the Chalcidæans of Eubœa⁵¹. Thucles led the colony; built the city of Naxos, and erected the altar of Apollo the Guide⁵²; which was still to be seen in the time of Thucydides⁵³, and on which the deputies, sent from that city, to consult the oracles of the solar deity, offered sacrifice before they began their voyage⁵⁴. The year after the establishment of the Chalcidæans at Naxos, in Sicily, Archias, a Corinthian of the race of Hercules, heading a colony, gave a beginning to the city of Syracuse⁵⁵. Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, each leading a band of adventurers, founded the city of Gela in conjunction, on the river of the same name, forty-five years after the founding of Syracuse⁵⁶.

But our information concerning the Grecian colonies in Sicily is very imperfect, until the reign of Gelon; king or tyrant of Syracuse, as the Greeks called him, in their abhorrence of monarchical rule. This extraordinary man was a native of the city of Gela⁵⁷, whence he probably derived his name. He greatly signalized himself in the wars, which Hippo-

51. Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. iii.

52. Id. *ibid.* Every Grecian colony was sent out under the patronage of some deity, whose oracle had been consulted concerning its success (Cicero, *Nat. Doer.* lib. i.); but chiefly under the guardianship of Apollo (Id. *ibid.*). Hence Callimachus,

“ ’Tis through Apollo’s tutelary aid
“ That men go forth to regions distant far,
“ And cities found : Apollo ever joys
“ In founding cities.”

Hymn. ad Apoll.

53. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. vi. cap. iii.

54. Id. *ibid.*

55. Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. iii. The fifth year after the founding of Syracuse, the Chalcidæans of Naxos, having driven back the Siceli, built the city of Leontium; and afterward Catania. Id. *ibid.*

56. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes.* lib. vi. cap. iv. In the hundred and eighth year after the founding of Gela, the Geloans built Acragas (id. *ibid.*), or Agrigentum.

57. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cliii.

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crates, prince of Gela, carried on against the neighbouring states⁵⁸. Many of these he subjected; and he had almost made himself master of Syracuse, after having defeated the forces of that state⁵⁹. But although he failed in this enterprise, he obliged the Syracusians to deliver up to Hippocrates the city of Camarina, which they had founded, and continued to hold under their jurisdiction⁶⁰.

Hippocrates afterward made war on the Siceli, or Siculi, and was slain at the siege of Hybla⁶¹. On this event, under pretence of asserting the rights of Euclides and Cleander, the sons of Hippocrates, whose authority the Geloans refused to own, Gelon had recourse to arms, and subjected his fellow-citizens; but, instead of supporting the young princes in the government, he seized the sovereignty of Gela for himself⁶². Other circumstances contributed to his aggrandizement, while they served to confirm and extend his sway.

The democratical party in Syracuse, having expelled the heads of the aristocratical faction, Gelon undertook to restore the exiles. They had taken refuge in Casmene, a Syracusian town. Thence Gelon conducted them to Syracuse; and so great was the terror of his name, and the confidence in his character, that the citizens readily opened their gates; readmitted the exiles, and put him in possession of the supreme power⁶³.

No sooner did Gelon find himself master of this large and strong city, which he valued above all

58. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. cliv.

59. Id. ibid. Syracuse was saved by the interposition of the Corinthians and Corcyræians. Herodot. ubi sup.

60. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cliv.

61. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clv.

62. Id. ibid.

63. Herodot. ubi sup.

others, than he placed Gela under the government of his brother Hiero, confining his attention chiefly to Syracuse⁶⁴. And it was worthy of his highest regard; its situation being commanding, its harbours commodious, and its territory remarkably fertile⁶⁵. Gelon needed such a place, in order to enable him to maintain his sway over his lately acquired territories; comprehending many considerable towns, and extending along the whole eastern coast of Sicily⁶⁶. His first care was, to augment the population of his capital. For this purpose, he destroyed the city of Camarina, and transferred the inhabitants to Syracuse⁶⁷. He also carried thither part of the inhabitants of Gela, granting to both, the privilege of citizens⁶⁸.

Gelon likewise conferred the same privilege on part of the Megarean and Eubœan colonists, who had resisted his authority. Having vanquished them in the field, he reduced their towns, and transplanted the more wealthy and respectable inhabitants into his favourite city; allowing them all the rights

64. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clvi.

65. Strabo, lib. vi. p. 273, edit. sup. cit. The whole island of Sicily early was, and still is, distinguished for its fertility. To its early and natural fertility, Homer bears testimony :

“ The soil untill’d a ready harvest yields,
“ With wheat and barley wave the golden fields;
“ Spontaneous wines from weighty clusters pour,
“ And genial Jove descends in every show’r.”

Odys. lib. ix.

And Diodorus informs us, that in the territory of Leontium, and many other parts of Sicily, wheat grew without culture in his time. (*Biblioth.* lib. v. init.) The island was, therefore, sacred to Ceres; who thence is said to have communicated her blessings to mankind (*Id. ibid.*). And surely, adds the Sicilian historian (*ubi sup.*), none can confer greater benefits than those bestowed by her (the art of husbandry, and the laws to which it gave birth), which include both being and well-being. See also Cicero, *Ad Verrim*, passim.

66. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cliv.

67. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clvi.

68. Id. *ibid.*

PART I. of denizens⁶⁹. But sensible of the difficulty of governing a numerous and disaffected populace, he ordered the inferior class of free people to be sold in the market of Syracuse for slaves; and under the express condition, that they should be transported out of the island of Sicily⁷⁰.

Through the military efforts, and wise policy of Gelon, whose peculiar study it was to promote agriculture and every useful art, the Syracusians rapidly rose to an astonishing height of power and grandeur; so that the friendship of this prince was courted not only by the Grecian colonies in Sicily and Italy, but also by the ancient Grecian states.

The Lacedæmonians and Athenians, the leading people among the confederated Greeks, sent ambassadors (as I have formerly had occasion to observe⁷¹), soliciting the aid of Gelon against Xerxes, the tremendous Persian monarch, when he was preparing to invade Europe with the myriads of Asia⁷².

Ant. Chr.
480.
Olympiad
lxxv. 1.

The reply of Gelon, on that occasion, is full of historical matter, and highly worthy of regard. “Men of Greece!” said he, “your presumption is great, in desiring me to take part with you, for repelling the barbarian king; seeing you denied me your aid, when I implored it against the barbarian army of the Carthaginians⁷³. I am surely under no obligation to states that refused to assist me in my necessity; and left all I now possess to the hazard of falling into the hands of barbarians. But because my affairs have taken a favourable turn, and the barbarian war is carried on against

69. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clvi.

70. Id. ibid.

71. Lett. xii.

72. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clvii.

73. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clviii.

“Greece, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians now
“condescend to remember Gelon⁷⁴. LETTER
XV.

“I might retaliate contempt, were I so disposed;
“but I shall not imitate your example. On the contrary,
“I am ready to supply you with two hundred ships,
“twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, two thousand
“heavy-armed cavalry, two thousand bowmen, two
“thousand slingers, and two thousand light-horse⁷⁵.
“I will also undertake to supply the whole Grecian
“army with corn, during the continuance of the war.
“But I cannot agree to perform these engagements,
“unless I am made commander in chief of the
“Greeks. Nor will I appear in the field, or send
“any succour to Greece, unless on these condi-
“tions⁷⁶.”

Syagrus, the Spartan ambassador, on the conclu-
sion of this speech exclaimed, “How would Aga-
“memnon, the grandson of Pelops, grieve to hear,
“that the Lacedæmonians had yielded the supreme
“command to Gelon and the Syracusians! For-
“bear, therefore,” added he, “to mention this
“proposal again. If you are willing to aid Greece,
“resolve to march under the conduct of the Lace-
“dæmonians; for, if you are too proud to act under
“their command, we will not accept your assist-
“ance⁷⁷.”

“Spartan friend!” replied Gelon, “though insult-
“ing language hath a natural tendency to rouse the
“indignation of men, I shall not retort your inso-
“lence. But as you so passionately affect the su-
“preme command, I cannot forbear to tell you, that
“I might, with more justice aspire to that honour,

74. Id. *ibid*.

75. Id. *Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clviii.*

76. Id. *ibid*.

77. *Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clix.*

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“ because I have a far greater number than you, both
 “ of marine and land-forces⁷⁸. However, as you
 “ are so averse from the requisition I have made, I
 “ will abate something of my first pretensions. If
 “ you insist on commanding the army, I shall have
 “ the conduct of the fleet; or, if you would rather
 “ command at sea, I will be commander on land⁷⁹.
 “ One of these conditions you must resolve to accept,
 “ or return home, without obtaining any succour
 “ from me⁸⁰. ”

When Gelon had made this proposal, the Athenian ambassador, preventing the answer of the Lacedæmonian delegate, answered thus:—“ King of
 “ Syracuse! the Greeks have sent us to you, not to
 “ request a general, but an army.⁸¹ We offered no
 “ objection to the demand you made of command-
 “ ing all the Greeks, both by land and sea; because
 “ we were satisfied, that the answer of the Spartan
 “ ambassador would, on that subject, be sufficient
 “ for the honour and interest of both states. But as
 “ you have thought proper to require, since your
 “ relinquishing the whole command, the supreme
 “ command by sea, we must inform you, that al-
 “ though the Lacedæmonians should be willing to
 “ comply with that demand, the Athenians will never
 “ allow you such pre-eminence. For the honour of
 “ the command by sea belongs to us, unless the Lacedæmonians themselves shall take it: if they have
 “ that intention, we will not oppose them; but we
 “ will never yield the naval command to the people
 “ of any other state⁸¹. ”

To this declaration Gelon made the following reply:—“ Athenian stranger! you seem to abound
 “ as much in men who would command, as destitute

78. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clx.

79. Id. ibid.

80. Herodot. ubi sup. et Aristot. Politic. lib. viii. cap. xii.

81. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxi.

“ of those who should obey; and as you and the La-
“ cedæmonians seem resolved to retain the whole
“ power in your own hands, depart from my domi-
“ nions⁸².” The disappointed ambassadors accord-
ingly quitted Sicily.

From the offer of Gelon to assist the Greeks with so great a naval and military force, if they would invest him with the chief command, it appears that he was unacquainted with the treaty between Xerxes and the Carthaginians, or at least with its object; the subjection of the Grecian colonies in Sicily and Italy to the Persian monarch⁸³. Gelon seems even to have been ignorant of the hostile purpose of the Carthaginians; who, soon after, invaded Sicily with an army of three hundred thousand men⁸⁴; composed not only of native troops, but of Phœnicians, Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians, Sardinians, and Corsicans⁸⁵; conveyed in three thousand transports and victualling ships, accompanied by two thousand ships of war⁸⁶.

Such an armament could not have been assembled to revenge a petty quarrel between the Sicilian tyrants, or princes of Himera and Agrigentum, at the instigation of the tyrant of Rhegium, as Herodotus injudiciously relates⁸⁷. It must have been prepared by the utmost efforts of the Carthaginian state, assisted by the money of Xerxes; in order to accomplish the reduction of the Grecian settlements in Sicily and Italy, as Diodorus informs us⁸⁸.

82. Id. lib. vii. cap. clxii. 83. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 1. 16. vol. ii.

84. Herodotus, Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clxv. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 16, vol. ii.

85. Id. ibid.

86. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

87. Historiar. ubi sup.

88. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 1. 16, vol. ii. If the Carthaginians were not in alliance with Xerxes, or hired to promote his views, they acted most unwisely in attempting the conquest of an island, to which his arms were expected speedily to extend. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. clxiii.

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But whatever may be the motives of nations for committing hostilities, they generally endeavour to exhibit a decent pretext for their violences, and take advantage of some circumstance that will favour their purpose. Terillus, prince of Himera, had been dispossessed by Theron, prince or tyrant of Agrigentum⁸⁹. When the Carthaginian forces, under Hamilcar, the son of Hanno, landed in Sicily, they pretended to revenge the quarrel of Terillus⁹⁰. Disembarking at Panormus, they accordingly directed their efforts against Himera, then in the possession of Theron, whose daughter Gelon had married⁹¹.

Theron, seeing this city invested by so numerous an army, dispatched messengers to Gelon, imploring his speedy aid⁹². The tyrant, or prince of Syracuse, on the first notice he had of the danger of Theron, assembled an army of fifty thousand foot, and five thousand horse, and marched with all expedition to the assistance of his father-in-law⁹³.

Hamilcar, on investing Himera, which was a place of great strength, had ordered two large camps to be completely fortified⁹⁴. In one of these he placed his land-forces; and in the other, his ships, which he directed to be drawn ashore; posting in the naval camp all his mariners, and the troops designed for sea-service, to protect the fleet⁹⁵.

Gelon, in his march to Himera, intercepted a courier carrying letters from the inhabitants of Seli-

89. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxv. clxvi.

90. Id. *ibid*.

91. Diodorus Siculus, lib. xi. p. 16, 17, vol. ii. The Carthaginian fleet had been attacked by a storm, on the coast of Africa; and the ships, on board which the horses and war-chariots had been embarked, were lost. Id. *ibid*.

92. Id. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 17, vol. ii.

93. Id. *ibid*.

94. Diod. Sicul, Biblioth. ubi sup.

95. Id. *ibid*.



mus, confederates of the Carthaginians, to Hamilcar; by which he was let to understand, that the Carthaginian general was to offer next morning, in the naval camp, a solemn sacrifice to Neptune; and that he had directed the Selinuntian cavalry to join him, that day, in the same camp⁹⁶. Taking advantage of this intelligence, Gelon selected an equal number of his own cavalry, ordering them to advance to the enemy's camp, at the appointed hour, as if they had been the Salinutines⁹⁷. His orders were put in execution; and the body of Syracusan cavalry was admitted without the smallest suspicion, into the Carthaginian naval encampment⁹⁸.

Hamilcar was then engaged in sacrificing, and the greater number of the marine forces were attending him unarmed⁹⁹. The Syracusan cavalry, therefore, advancing without opposition to the Carthaginian leader, slew him according to the command of Gelon; cut in pieces most of his men, and set fire to the Carthaginian fleet¹⁰⁰.

Gelon, who in this critical conjuncture, had notice of the success of his stratagem, by a signal given from the top of a neighbouring mountain, drew out his army, and attacked the Carthaginian military camp¹⁰¹. The hostile army at first made a gallant resistance; but when intelligence arrived of the death of Hamilcar, their commander in chief; and when they, at the same time, saw all their fleet in a blaze, the troops betook themselves to a precipitant flight¹⁰². Then the slaughter was dreadful. No fewer than a hundred and fifty thousand men we are told, were killed in the battle and pursuit¹⁰³.

96. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 17, vol. ii.

97. Id. lib. xi. p. 18.

98. Id. ibid.

99. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

100. Id. ibid.

101. Id. *Biblioth.* lib. xi. p. 18, vol. ii.

102. Id. ibid.

103. Diod. Sicul ubi sup.

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Gelon, after the battle near Himera, rewarded all his troops, that in action, had signalised themselves; but especially the body of horse, to which he was chiefly indebted for his victory¹⁰⁵. The richer part of the Carthaginian spoils, which were of an immense value, Gelon offered to the gods; adorning with them the temples of Syracuse and Himera¹⁰⁶. The captives he shared with his ally Theron, who employed them in public works; and so many were taken, belonging to the Carthaginian fleet and army, that, to use the words of the Sicilian historian, “all the inhabitants of Africa seemed to have been transplanted into Sicily¹⁰⁷.” Some of the citizens of Agrigentum, that had more eminently distinguished themselves, got each five hundred slaves¹⁰⁸. They were all put in chains, and set apart for public labour; and, on this occasion it was, that the Agrigentines built their famous temple, and constructed those sewers, so much admired by the ancients, and called Pheaces, from Pheax, the overseer and designer of the works¹⁰⁹.

Twenty ships only, of the two thousand ships of war, and three thousand transports and victuallers, of which the Carthaginian fleet is said to have consisted, happening to be out at sea, made their escape; and these, before they reached Carthage, were all wrecked in a storm¹¹⁰. But a few men, being saved in a small

104. Id. *ibid*.

105. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 19, 20, vol. ii.

106. Id. *ibid*.

107. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 21, vol. ii.

108. Id. *ibid*.109. Diod. Sicul. *ubi sup*.110. Id. *Biblioth*. lib. xi. p. 19, vol. ii.

boat, carried to the Carthaginian capital intelligence of the total defeat of the army of the republic, and the destruction of its fleet¹¹¹.

LETTER
XV.

The grief, consternation, and despair, which such an unexpected disaster occasioned in that city, no language can express. During the first impressions of this consternation, the Carthaginians dispatched ambassadors to Sicily, with injunctions to make peace with Gelon upon any terms¹¹². The ambassadors, on landing at Syracuse, threw themselves at the conqueror's feet, and begged him to receive their republic into favour¹¹³. Gelon listened to them with generous magnanimity; and, being softened into compassion, granted them peace, on the following terms:—That they should pay two thousand talents of silver, in order to defray the expenses of the war; build two temples in which the articles of the treaty should be lodged, and held sacred; and that, for the future, they should abstain from offering human sacrifices¹¹⁴.

But humiliating as these conditions may appear, the Carthaginians did not think them too high a price for peace, which was become absolutely necessary to them in the then state of their affairs; especially as the defeat of the Persian fleet at Salamis, and the consequent retreat of Xerxes, had deprived them of all hopes of succour from their great ally¹¹⁵. They

111. Id. *ibid*.

112. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 20, 21, vol. ii.

113. Id. *ibid*.

114. Diod. Sicul. *ubi sup*. This last article shews the humanity of Gelon's disposition. And it must have been peculiarly mortifying to the Carthaginians; for nothing is so humbling to a people, as any alteration prescribed in their religious rites.

115. According to Herodotus (*Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clxvi.*), the Greeks defeated the Armada of Xerxes at Salamis, on the same day that Gelon gained the victory over the Carthaginian forces, in the neighbourhood of Himera.

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even exceeded the articles of the treaty, by sending to Demaretia, Gelon's wife, a crown of gold, valued at three hundred talents of that metal¹¹⁶. This crown Gelon converted into money; and coined pieces of gold, called Demaretia¹¹⁷; which are admired by modern antiquarians for the beauty of their execution¹¹⁸.

Nothing can so fully demonstrate the prodigious overthrow, which the Carthaginians suffered on this occasion, and their loss both of naval and military force, as their total inaction, on the side of Sicily, for almost a century, after the battle fought near Himera. Meantime the Sicilian Greeks made rapid advances in wealth and power: and surpassed all the neighbouring nations in civility, refinement, and attention to the elegant arts.

Gelon, soon after his victory, having received information of the defeat of the armada of Xerxes at Salamis, and of the retreat of that magnificent monarch, the declared enemy of the Grecian name, disbanded his forces¹¹⁹. His native troops he ordered to retire to their several homes; and his mercenaries he quartered in places at a distance from the metropolis¹²⁰.

During this season of peaceful tranquillity, Gelon summoned a general assembly of the inhabitants of Syracuse; desiring them to come armed, as if they had been to encounter an enemy¹²¹. When they met, he appeared among them, in the habit of a

116. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 21, vol. ii.

117. Id. ibid.

118. *Mem. de Travoux*, l'Ann. 1727, p. 1449. Mitford, *Hist. of Greece*, cap. xi. sect. i.

119. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 21, vol. ii. lib. xiii. cap. xxxvii.

lian. *Var. Hist.*

120. Id. ibid.

121. Diod. Sicul. et Ælian, ubi sup.

private citizen, unarmed, and unattended¹²²; and gave them an account of his whole conduct, in peace and in war; shewing to what uses he had applied the sums of money with which he had been entrusted, and in what manner he had exercised his authority:—observing, that he had never in view any thing but the public good; yet, if they thought he had abused his authority, they might inflict on him what punishment they thought fit, as he was unarmed, and without guards, and they all armed, and in force to execute vengeance¹²³.

The Syracusians, charmed with so candid a declaration, but more especially with the confidence reposed in them, applauded with loud acclamations the speech of Gelon; styling him their benefactor, their deliverer, their king¹²⁴. This last title, which Gelon had hitherto declined, the citizens obliged him to accept before he quitted the assembly; and entreated him to continue in the exercise of sovereignty¹²⁵. Nor did their gratitude stop here. A decree was instantly passed, settling the succession to the kingdom of Syracuse, after the death of Gelon, on two of his brothers, Hiero and Thrasybulus. And because he had, by coming without arms or guards into the assembly, put his life into the hands of the people, the Syracusians (willing to transmit to the latest posterity the memory of a circumstance so much to his honour) ordered a statue to be erected, representing him in the simple civic habit in which he had then appeared¹²⁶.

The citizens of Syracuse had no reason to repent of having invested Gelon with the ensigns of royalty;

122. Id. *ibid.*

123. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 21, vol. ii. Elian, *Var. Hist.* lib. xiii. cap. xxxvii.

124. Id. *ibid.*

125. Diod. Sicul. et Elian, *ubi sup.*

126. Id. *ibid.*

PART I.

for he was so attentive to the happiness of his subjects, that he made monarchy appear the best of governments, to a people ever jealous of freedom¹²⁷. He took care, however, to secure his sway against the danger of democratical tumults, by bestowing all the rights of Syracusan citizens on ten thousand foreign soldiers¹²⁸; who had acted under him as mercenaries, and distinguished themselves by their valour and fidelity. Nor does this strong measure seem to have given violent disgust; for Gelon continued to preserve not only the love and esteem, but to command the admiration of his subjects to the end of his reign¹²⁹. These regards he owed to his humanity, truth, and sincerity; never wilfully injuring any one, nor ever making a promise, which he did not fulfil to the extent of his power¹³⁰.

The encouragement of agriculture was one of the chief objects of Gelon's policy. With this view, he took much pains to make his subjects consider the cultivation of the ground as an honourable employment. He even animated the husbandmen by his presence; and set them an example of industry, by spending his leisure hours in labouring in the fields¹³¹. But his purpose, in promoting agriculture, was not merely to render the Syracusan territory, naturally rich and fertile, more productive: he sought also to inure his subjects to useful toil, and by these to preserve them from the many disorders, which inevitably attend on a life of indolence and sloth¹³². A declared enemy to luxury, pomp, and soft indulgence, he used his utmost efforts to banish from his dominions

127. Plut. Vit. Diod.

128. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 55, vol. ii.

129. Id. p. 30.

130. Plut. in Apophth. p. 175, edit. Lutet. Paris, 1624.

131. Id. ibid.

132. Plut. ubi sup.

the practitioners of all the arts that have a tendency to debauch the manners, or enervate the courage of a people¹³³.

LETTRE
XV.

Through the prudent policy, and wise government of Gelon, regulated by the strictest maxims of equity, plenty abounded over the whole Syracusan territory, and the laws were respected in every city¹³⁴. And, in consequence of his signal victory over the Carthaginians, who no longer approached the Sicilian shores, together with the conciliating measures he employed to quiet dissensions among the several states, Sicily enjoyed profound peace during the reign of Gelon¹³⁵: a short, but happy period. He died in the sixth year after he had been publicly declared king¹³⁶. He was buried within the nine towers, where his queen had been interred; stupendous edifices, twenty-five miles distant from Syracuse:—and thither his funeral was attended by the whole body of the citizens¹³⁷. The Syracusians erected a magnificent monument over his grave, and decreed him the honours due to deified heroes¹³⁸.

Ant. Chr.
474.
Olympiad
lxxvi. 3.

This monument, observes Diodorus¹³⁹, was afterward destroyed by the Carthaginians, in warring against the Syracusians; and the nine towers were demolished, through envy, by the tyrant Agathocles. But, adds the Sicilian historian, neither violence, nor envy, nor time, which ruin all things, could extinguish the lustre of Gelon's name, or efface the memory of his illustrious actions¹⁴⁰; engraved by love and gratitude in the hearts of the Syracusians¹⁴¹.

Gelon

133. Id. Apoppth. p. 173. 134. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 29, 30, vol. ii. 135. Id. ibid. 136. Id. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 30. 137. Id. ibid. 138. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 139. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 30, vol. ii. 140. Id. ibid.

141. Nothing can more strongly demonstrate the sincere love and veneration of the Syracusians for the memory of Gelon, than the respect which

PART I.

Gelon was succeeded in the Syracusan throne by his brother Hiero, who reigned eleven years and eight months¹⁴². This accomplished prince sullied the glory of the beginning of his reign, by an unmanly jealousy of his brother Polyzelus; whom he suspected, because of his popularity, of a design to usurp the sceptre¹⁴³. He, therefore, became diffident of the Syracusians, and disgusted them by employing only foreigners to attend upon his person, and form his guards¹⁴⁴. Nor did the jealousy of Hiero confine itself to these precautions. Having raised an army to assist the Sybarites, besieged by the Crotonians, he proposed that Polyzelus should head it, and pass into Italy; both to remove him to a distance, and in hopes that he might fall in battle¹⁴⁵. But Polyzelus, suspecting his brother's purpose, refused the command; and, in order to avoid the resentment of Hiero, sought refuge in the court of Theron, king of Agrigentum¹⁴⁶.

Hiero made great preparations for war, designing to take vengeance on the fugitive, and also on his protector¹⁴⁷. Meantime the inhabitants of Himera, being grievously oppressed by Thrasideus, the son of Theron, their governor, and not daring to complain to his father, whose partiality they dreaded, secretly sent ambassadors to Hiero; offering to deliver up to him their city, and join him against his rival, the

which they paid to his statue, an hundred and thirty years after his death. When Timoleon was rescuing them from the tyranny of Dionysius the younger, and the statues of their former kings were ordered to be removed from their pedestals, and sold to defray the expenses of the war (Plut. Vit. Timol.), the statue of Gelon was honourably excepted (id. *ibid.*); and allowed singly to maintain its place, amid all the rage of democratic fury.

142. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 20.

143. Id. p. 37.

144. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 37, vol. ii.

145. Id. *ibid.*

146. Diod. Sicul. *ubi sup*

147. Id. *ibid.*

king

king of Agrigentum¹⁴⁸. But the Syracusan monarch, detesting such treachery, discovered the negociation of the Himerians to Theron¹⁴⁹; who, warmed with gratitude, laid aside all rivalry, and became his confidential friend; interposed his influence in favour of Polyzelus, and prevailed upon Hiero to receive him into favour¹⁵⁰. Henceforth, perfect harmony seems to have subsisted between the kings of Syracuse and Agrigentum, during the remainder of the reign of Theron.

During this term of Sicilian tranquillity, Hiero and Theron, the most illustrious and munificent princes of their time, were eminently distinguished by their triumphs at the Olympic and other Grecian games; by their liberality to men of learning and genius, who were hospitably entertained, and patronised at their splendid courts¹⁵¹; and who repaid their patronage, by celebrating their virtues and victories.

The immortal Pindar thus rapturously speaks of Theron:

“ Ye Choral Hymns, harmonious lays,
 “ Sweet rulers of the Lyric string!
 “ What God, what Hero’s godlike praise
 “ What mortal shall we sing?
 “ With Jove, with Pisa’s¹⁵² guardian god,
 “ Begin, O Muse! th’ Olympic Ode.
 “ Alcides, Jove’s heroic son,
 “ The second honours claims;

148. Diod. Sicul. *Biblioth.* lib. xi. p. xxxvii.

149. Id. *ibid.*

150. Diod. Sicul. *ubi sup.*

151. Xenoph. *Hieron.* et Schol. in Pind.

152. Pisa and Olympia have been mistaken for the same place; but they were distinct. Olympia stood in the territory of Pisa, and at no great distance from that city.

“ Who

PART I.



" Who, offering up the spoils from Augeas won,
 " Establish'd to his sire th' Olympic games ;
 " Where, bright in wreaths of conquest, Theron shone.
 " Then of victorious Theron sing,
 " Of Theron hospitable, just, and great !
 " Fam'd Agrigentum's honour'd king,
 " The prop and bulwark of her towering state ;
 " A righteous prince ! whose flowering virtues grace
 " The venerable stem of his illustrious race.

 " A race long exercised in woes,
 " Ere, smiling o'er her kindred flood,
 " The mansion of their wish'd repose,
 " Their sacred city stood ;
 " And through amaz'd Sicilia shone
 " The lustre of their fair renown.
 " Thence, as the milder fates decreed,
 " In destined order born,
 " Auspicious hours with smoother pace succeed ;
 " While power and wealth the noble line adorn,
 " And Public Favour, Virtue's richest meed.
 " Forth from this venerable root
 " Enesidamus¹⁵³ and his Theron spring ;
 " For whom I touch the Dorian flute,
 " For whom triumphant strike my sounding string.
 " Due to his glory is the Aonian strain,
 " Whose virtue gain'd the prize on famed Olympia's
 plain.

 " Alone in fam'd Olympia's sand
 " The victor's chaplet Theron wore ;
 " But with him on th' Isthmæan strand,
 " On sweet Castalia's shore¹⁵⁴,

153. Theron's father.

154. The Isthmæan games were celebrated at the isthmus of Corinth, whence they took their name; and the Pythian games, on the banks of the river or brook Castalia, in Phocis, proceeding from a fountain at the foot of mount Parnassus.

“ The verdant crowns¹⁵⁵, the proud reward
 “ Of victory, his brother¹⁵⁶ shared;
 “ Copartner in immortal praise,
 “ As warm’d with equal zeal
 “ The light-foot courser’s generous breed to raise,
 “ And whirl around the goal the fervid wheel.
 “ The painful strife Olympia’s wreath¹⁵⁷ repays:
 “ But wealth with nobler virtue join’d,
 “ The means and fair occasions must procure;
 “ In glory’s chace must aid the mind
 “ Expense, and toil, and danger to endure:
 “ With mingling rays they feed each other’s flame,
 “ And shine the brightest lamp in all the sphere of fame.

 “ Come on! thy brightest shafts prepare,
 “ And bend, O Muse! thy sounding bow;
 “ Say, through what paths of liquid air
 “ Our arrows shall we throw?
 “ On Agrigentum fix thine eye;
 “ Thither let all thy quiver fly.
 “ And thou, O Agrigentum, hear!
 “ While with religious dread,
 “ And taught the laws of virtue to revere,
 “ To Heavenly Vengeance I devote my head,
 “ If aught to Truth repugnant now I swear;
 “ Swear, that no state revolving o’er
 “ The long memorials of recorded days
 “ Can shew, in all her boasted store,
 “ A name to parallel thy Theron’s praise;
 “ One to the acts of friendship so inclined,
 “ So famed for virtuous deeds, and love of humankind.
 “ Yet

155. The Isthmæan crown was composed either of parsley, or the branches of the pine-tree, and the Pythian crown was formed of the branches of the laurel.

156. Xenocrates.

157. The Olympian wreath or crown was formed of the branches of the sacred olive, which grew near the temple of Minerva at Athens. As the victors passed along the stadion, after they had received the crown, they were saluted with the acclamations of the spectators,

PART I.



“ Yet hath obstreperous Envy sought to drown
 “ The goodly music of his sweet renown ;
 “ While, by some frantic spirits borne along
 “ To mad attempts of violence and wrong,
 “ She turned against him Faction’s raging flood,
 “ And strove with evil deeds to conquer good¹⁵⁸.
 “ But who can number every sandy grain
 “ Washed by Sicilia’s hoarse-resounding main ?
 “ Or who can Theron’s generous works express,
 “ And tell how many hearts his bounteous virtues
 bless¹⁵⁹.”

The Theban bard addresses Hiero, in language no less expressive of approbation.

“ Who along the desert air
 “ Seeks the faded starry train,
 “ When the sun’s meridian car
 “ Round illumines th’ ætherial plain ?
 “ Who a nobler theme can chuse
 “ Than Olympia’s sacred games ?
 “ What more apt to fire the muse,
 “ When her various songs she frames ?
 “ Songs in strains of wisdom dress’d,
 “ Great Saturnius to record,
 “ And by each rejoicing guest
 “ Sung at Hiero’s festive board.

“ In pastoral Sicilia’s fruitful soil,
 “ The righteous sceptre of imperial pow’r
 “ Great Hiero wielding, with illustrious toil,
 “ Plucks every blooming virtue’s fairest flow’r,

spectators, accompanied with a shower of herbs and flowers poured on them from every side. See West’s *Dissertation on the Olympic Games*, sect. xvi. et auct. cit.

158. The poet here alludes to a sedition raised against Theron, by two of his kinsmen, who had received many obligations from him. Schol. in Pind. Olymp. ii. 159. Pind. Olymp. ii. West’s *Translat.*

“ His

“ His royal splendour to adorn :
 “ Nor doth his skilful hand refuse
 “ Acquaintance with the tuneful Muse
 “ When round the mirthful board the harp is borne¹⁶⁰.

“ Down then from the glittering nail
 “ ‘Take, O Muse ! thy Dorian lyre¹⁶¹;
 “ If the love of Pisa’s vale
 “ Pleasing transports can inspire ;
 “ Or the rapid footed steed
 “ Could with joy thy bosom move,
 “ When unwhipt, with native speed,
 “ O’er the dusty course he drove ;
 “ And where deck’d with olive, flows
 “ Alpheus ! thy immortal flood¹⁶²,
 “ On his Lord’s triumphant brows
 “ ‘The Olympic wreath bestow’d :—

“ Hiero’s royal brows, whose care
 “ Tends the courser’s noble breed ;
 “ Pleas’d to nurse the pregnant mare,
 “ Pleas’d to train the youthful steed.
 “ Now on that heroic land
 “ His far beaming glories beat ;
 “ Where, with all his Phrygian band
 “ Pelops fix’d his honour’d seat ;
 “ Pelops, by the god beloved,
 “ Whose strong arms the globe embrace¹⁶³;
 “ When, by Jove’s high orders moved,
 “ Clotho bless’d the healing vase.

160. This, it seems, was a custom among the ancient Greeks, that every one might discover his skill in music, by touching the instrument.

161. The term Dorian is here given to the lyre, in order to intimate, that this ode was adapted to the Dorian mood, the most solemn of the three kinds of Grecian music; namely, the Dorian, Lydian, and Phrygian.

162. The Alpheus was a river in Elis, on whose banks the Olympic games were celebrated.

163. Neptune.

PART I.



- “ Forth from the cauldron to new life restored,
 “ Pleased with the lustre of his ivory arm¹⁶⁴.
 “ Young Pelops rose; so ancient tales record,
 “ And much those tales unheeding mortals charm;
 “ While gaudy Fiction, decked with art,
 “ And dress’d in every winning grace,
 “ To Truth’s unornamented face
 “ Preferr’d, seduces oft the human heart.
- “ Happy he, whose glorious brow
 “ Pisa’s honour’d chaplets crown;
 “ Calm his stream of life shall flow,
 “ Shelter’d by his high renown.
 “ That alone is bliss supreme;
 “ Which, unknowing to decay,
 “ Still with ever-shining beam
 “ Gladdens each succeeding day.
 “ Then for happy Hiero weave
 “ Garlands of Æolian strains;
 “ Him these honours to receive
 “ The Olympic law ordains.
- “ Nor more worthy of her lay
 “ Can the Muse a mortal find;
 “ Greater in imperial sway,
 “ Richer in a virtuous mind.

164. The fabulous story of Pelops is to the following purport. Tantalus, king of Phrygia, the father of Pelops, being to give, in his turn, a dinner to the gods; but, having nothing fit to offer them, killed his son Pelops: and, after having cut him in pieces and boiled him, set his flesh upon the table. Jupiter, however, having discovered the impious cheat, ordered Mercury to put the members again into the cauldron; whence, by the power of the Fates, the handmaids of Jupiter, Pelops came out alive again. And to supply the loss of his arm, devoured by some of the hungry deities, who were unwilling to be defrauded of their expected meal, the Fates bestowed upon him an arm of ivory.

“ Heaven,

- “ Heaven, O King! with tender care
 “ Waits thy wishes to fulfil,
 “ Then ’ere long will I prepare,
 “ Placed on Chronium’s sunny hill ¹⁶⁵,
 “ Thee in sweeter verse to praise,
 “ Following thy victorious steeds;
 “ If to prosper all thy ways,
 “ Still thy guardian god proceeds.
- “ Fate has in various stations placed mankind:
 “ In royal power the long gradations end:
 “ By that horizon prudently confined,
 “ Let not thy hopes to farther views extend.
 “ Long may’st thou wear the regal crown,
 “ And may thy bard his wish receive;
 “ With thee, and such as thee to live,
 “ Around his native Greece for wisdom known ¹⁶⁶.”

But the ardour of Hiero to obtain the Olympic crown, or the honour of victory in other Grecian games, did not divert his mind from political objects, either internal or external. The same year, that he came to a reconciliation with Theron, he transplanted the inhabitants of Catana and Naxos to Leontium; re-peopled those cities and their districts with five thousand men, invited from Peloponnesus, and an equal number sent from Syracuse; and gave to Catana the name of Etna ¹⁶⁷, from the famous mountain so called, in its neighbourhood. He also sent a fleet to the assistance of the Grecian colony of Cuma, in Italy, then sorely oppressed at sea by the Tyrrhenians or Etruscans ¹⁶⁸. And the Syracusians defeated the Etruscans in a great naval engagement; sunk many of their ships; and utterly broke

165. This hill was so near Olympia, that thence might be seen all the races in the stadion.

166. Pind. *Olymp.* i. West’s *Translat.*
Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 37, vol. ii.

167. Diod. Sicul.

168. *Id.* p. 39.

PART I. the maritime force¹⁶⁹ of that ancient, and long powerful people.

Some years after these events, Hiero was victor in the chariot race at the Pythian games. On that occasion, Pindar addressed to him the following ode, pregnant with historical matter.

“ Hail, Golden Lyre ! whose heaven-invented string
 “ To Phæbus and the black-hair'd Nine belongs ;
 “ Who in sweet chorus, round their tuneful king,
 “ Mix with thy sounding chords their sacred songs.
 “ The Dance, *gay Queen of Pleasure !* thee attends ;
 “ Thy jocund strains her listening feet inspire ;
 “ And each melodious tongue its voice suspends,
 “ Till thou, Great Leader of the Heavenly Quire !
 “ With wanton art preluding givest the sign :—
 “ Swells the full concert then with harmony divine.

“ Then of their streaming lightnings all disarm'd
 “ The smouldering thunderbolts of Jove expire ;
 “ Then by the music of thy numbers charm'd,
 “ The Birds' fierce monarch¹⁷⁰ drops his vengeful ire :
 “ Perch'd on the sceptre of the Olympian King,
 “ The thrilling darts of harmony he feels ;
 “ And indolently hangs his rapid wing,
 “ While gentle sleep his closing eye-lids seals ;
 “ And o'er his heaving limbs, in loose array,
 “ To every balmy gale the ruffling feathers play.

“ Ev'n Mars, stern god of violence and war,
 “ Soothes with thy lulling strains his furious breast ;
 “ And, driving from his heart each bloody care,
 “ His pointed lance consigns to peaceful rest.
 “ Nor less enraptured, each immortal mind
 “ Owns the soft influence of enchanting song ;
 “ When, in melodious symphony combined,
 “ Thy son, Latona ! and the tuneful throng

169. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

170. The eagle.

“ Of Muses, skill'd in wisdom's deepest lore,
“ The subtle powers of Verse, and Harmony explore.

“ But they on Earth, or the devouring Main,
“ Whom righteous Jove with detestation views,
“ With envious horror hear the Heavenly strain,
“ Exiled from Praise, from Virtue, and the Muse.
“ Such is Typhæus¹⁷¹, impious foe of Gods,
“ Whose hundred-headed form Cilicia's cave
“ Once foster'd in her infamous abodes;
“ Till daring with presumptuous arm to brave
“ The might of thundering Jove, subdued he fell,
“ Plunged in the horrid dungeons of profoundest Hell.

“ Now under sulphurous Cuma's¹⁷² sea-bound coast,
“ And vast Sicilia lies his shaggy breast¹⁷³;
“ By snowy Ætna, nurse of endless frost,
“ The pillar'd prop of Heaven! forever press'd.
“ Forth from those nitrous caverns issuing rise
“ Pure liquid fountains of tempestuous fire,
“ And veil in ruddy mists the noon-day skies:
“ While wrapp'd in smoke the eddying flames aspire;
“ Or, gleaming through the night, with hideous roar
“ Far o'er the reddening main huge rocky fragments pour.

“ But he, Vulcanian monster! to the clouds
“ The fiercest, hottest inundations throws,
“ While with the burthen of incumbent woods,
“ And Ætna's gloomy cliffs o'erwhelm'd, he glows.

171. Typhochus appears to have been an allegorical personage, representative of the sulphureous fire contained in the bowels of the earth, and which has broke out in various countries, both in ancient and modern times: but in Europe, chiefly from the craters in the mountains Ætna and Vesuvius (Strabo, lib. v. p. 247, 248, edit. sup cit.), to the eruptions of which Pindar confines his description.

172. Cuma stood in the neighbourhood of mount Vesuvius. Strabo, lib. v. p. 248.

173. Pindar seems here to insinuate, and Strabo supports the poetical conjecture (Geog. lib. v. p. 248.), that the ignited matter extended from Sicily to Italy; and that there was a communication, by caverns, between Ætna and Vesuvius.

“ There

PART I.

" There, on his flinty bed, outstretch'd he lies,
 " Where pointed rock his tossing carcase wounds ;
 " There with dismay he strikes beholding eyes,
 " Or frights the distant ear with horrid sounds.
 " O save us from thy wrath, Sicilian Jove !
 " 'Thou that here reign'st, adored in Ætna's sacred grove.

" Ætna, fair forehead of this fruitful land !
 " Whose borrowed name adorns the Royal Town ;
 " Raised by illustrious Hiero's generous hand,
 " And rendered glorious with his high renown.
 " By Pythian heralds were her praises sung,
 " When Hiero triumph'd in the dusty course ;
 " When sweet Castalia with applauses rung,
 " And glorious Laurels crown'd the conquering Horse.
 " The happy city for her future days
 " Presages hence increase of victory and praise.

" Thus when the mariners, to prosperous winds,
 " The port forsaking, spread their swelling sails,
 " The fair departure cheers their jocund minds .
 " With pleasing hopes of favourable gales ;
 " While, o'er the dangerous desert of the main,
 " To their loved country they pursue their way :
 " Ev'n so, Apollo ! thou whom Lycia's plain,
 " Whom Delos and Castalia's springs obey,
 " These hopes regard, and Ætna's glory raise
 " With valiant sons, triumphant steeds, and heavenly
 lays.

" For Human Virtue from the Gods proceeds ;
 " They the wise Mind bestow'd, and smooth'd the
 Tongue
 " With Elocution, and for mighty deeds
 " The nervous arm with manly vigour strung.
 " All these are Hiero's : these to rival lays
 " Call forth the Bard. Arise then, Muse ! and speed
 " To this contention ; strive in Hiero's praise,
 " Nor fear thy efforts shall his worth exceed :

" Within

“ Within the lines of Truth secure to throw,
“ Thy dart shall still surpass each vain attempting foe¹⁷⁴.

“ So may succeeding ages, as they roll,
“ Great Hiero still in wealth and bliss maintain ;
“ And joyous health recalling, on his soul
“ Oblivion pour of life-consuming pain¹⁷⁵.
“ Yet may thy memory with sweet delight
“ The various dangers and the toils recount,
“ Which in intestine wars and bloody fight
“ Thy patient virtue Hiero did surmount ;
“ What time, by Heaven above all Grecians crown'd,
“ The prize of sovereign sway with thee thy brother
found¹⁷⁶.

“ Then, like the son of Pæan, didst thou war,
“ Smit with the arrows of a sore disease ;
“ While, as along slow rolls thy sickly Car,
“ Love and amaze the haughtiest bosoms seize.
“ In Lemnos pining with th' envenom'd wound
“ The son of Pæan, Philoctetes lay¹⁷⁷ :
“ There, after tedious quest, the heroes found,
“ And bore the limping archer thence away ;
“ By whom fell Priam's tow'rs, so Fate ordain'd,
“ And the long harass'd Greeks their wish'd repose obtain'd.

174. The metaphor here used by Pindar is borrowed from one of the five exercises of the pentathlon; namely, darting, in which, he who threw his dart farthest, within certain lines, was declared victor; whereas he, whose dart struck without those lines, whatever might be the length of the throw, had no title to claim the envied crown. See West's Dissertation on the Olympic Games. sect. ix.

175. Hiero was afflicted with the stone or gravel. Schol. in Pind. Pyth. i.

176. Hiero, as I have had occasion to observe, on the authority of Herodotus (Historiar. lib. vii cap. clvi.), was invested with the sovereignty of Gela, by his brother Gelon, when the latter prince obtained possession of Syracuse.

177. The story of Philoctetesis too well known to require explanation.

“ May

PART I.

- " May Hiero too, like Pæan's son, receive
 " Recover'd vigour from celestial hands ;
 " And may the *Healing God* proceed to give
 " The power to gain whate'er his wish demands.
 " But now, O Muse ! address thy sounding lays
 " To *young Dinomenes*¹⁷⁸, his virtuous heir,
 " Sing to Dinomenes his father's praise ;
 " His father's praise shall glad his filial ear.
 " For him hereafter shalt thou touch the string,
 " And chant in friendly strains fair *Ætna's* future king.

 " Hiero for him th' illustrious city rear'd¹⁷⁹,
 " And fill'd with sons of Greece her steely tow'rs ;
 " Where, by the free-born citizen revered
 " The Spartan laws exert their virtuous powers.
 " For by the statutes which their father's gave,
 " Still must the restive Dorian youth be led ;
 " Who, dwelling once on cold Eurota's wave,
 " Where proud Taygetus exults her head,
 " From the great stock of Hercules divine,
 " And warlike Pamphylus deriv'd their noble line.

 " These from Thessalian Pindus rushing down,
 " The walls of famed Amyclæ once possess'd ;
 " And in rich Fortune's gifts and high renown,
 " Dwelt near the Twins of Leda, while they press'd
 " Their milky coursers, and the pastures o'er
 " Of neighbouring Argos ranged, in arms supreme.
 " To King and People, on the flowery shore
 " Of lucid Amena, Sicilian stream !
 " Grant the like fortune, Jove ! with like desert,
 " The splendour of their race with glory to assert.

178. Dinomenes bore the name of his grandfather.

179. The syracusians having nominated Hiero, and his brother Thrasybulus, after him, as the successor of Gelon, when they formally invested that great man with the sovereignty of Syracuse, (Schol. in Pind. Pyth. i.), Hiero was naturally led to seek a regal succession for his son. And he accordingly built and peopled for him the city of *Ætna*, in the territory of Catana, one of the most fertile districts in Sicily.

“ And do thou aid Sicilia’s hoary Lord
 “ To form and rule his son’s obedient mind ;
 “ And still in golden chains of sweet accord,
 “ And mutual peace the friendly people bind.
 “ Then grant, O son of Saturn ! grant my pray’r,
 “ The bold Phœnician on his shore detain ;
 “ And may the hardy Tuscan never dare
 “ To vex with clamorous war Sicilia’s main ;
 “ Remembering, Hiero ! how on Cuma’s coast,
 “ Wreck’d by his stormy arms their groaning fleet was
 lost.

“ What terrors, what destruction them assail’d !
 “ Hurl’d from their riven decks, what numbers died !
 “ When o’er their might Sicilia’s chief prevail’d,
 “ Their youth o’erwhelming in the foamy tide¹⁸⁰,
 “ Greece from impending servitude to save¹⁸¹.
 “ Thy favour, glorious Athens ! to acquire
 “ Would I record the Salaminian wave,
 “ Famed in thy triumphs ; and my tuneful Lyre
 “ To Sparta’s sons, with sweetest praise, should tell
 “ Beneath Cithæron’s shade what Median archers fell.

“ But on Himera’s fair wide-water’d shores
 “ Thy sons, Dinomenes¹⁸², my lyre demand ;
 “ To grace their virtues with the various stores
 “ Of sacred verse, and sing the illustrious band
 “ Of

180. Pindar, in compliment to Hiero, seems here to have blended the victory gained by this prince over the Tyrrhenians or Etruscans off the coast of Cuma, with that gained by Gelon and Theron over the Carthaginians, near Himera ; in which battle, it appears (Schol. in Pind. *Pyth.* i.) Hiero had a share.

181. This hint of a contemporary writer, That the efforts of Gelon were essential to Grecian liberty, together with the allusion that follows, to the battle of Salamis, and the destruction of the Carthaginian fleet on the coast of Sicily, corroborates the narration of Diodorus ; and proves, That the Carthaginians were then in alliance, or co-operating with Xerxes, as auxiliaries, for the extinction of Grecian freedom.

182. The father of Gelon, Hiero, and Thrasybulus ; who seem all

PART I.



" Of valiant brothers, who from Carthage won
 " The glorious meed of conquest, deathless praise!
 " A pleasing theme ; but Censure's dreaded frown
 " Compels me to contract my spreading lays :
 " In verse, conciseness pleases every guest,
 " While *each impatient blames, and loaths a tedious feast.*

" Nor less distasteful is excessive fame
 " To the sour palate of the envious mind ;
 " Who hears with grief his neighbour's goodly name,
 " And hates the fortune that he ne'er shall find.
 " Yet in thy virtue, Hiero ! persevere ;
 " Since to be envied is a nobler fate
 " Than to be pitied. Let strict justice steer,
 " With equitable hands, the helm of state ;
 " And arm thy tongue with truth ; O king ! beware
 " Of every step ; a prince can never lightly err.

" O'er many cities art thou set to deal
 " The goods of fortune, with impartial hand ;
 " And ever watchful of the public weal,
 " Unnumber'd witnesses around thee stand.
 " Then would thy virtuous ear for ever feast
 " On the sweet melody of well-earn'd fame,
 " In generous purposes confirm thy breast,
 " Nor dread expenses that will grace thy name ;
 " But scorning sordid and unprincely gain,
 " Spread all thy *beauteous sails, and launch into the main.*

" When in the mould'ring urn the monarch lies,
 " His fame in lively characters remains ;
 " Or graved in monumental histories,
 " Or deck'd and painted in Aonian strains.
 " Thus fresh and fragrant, and immortal, bloom's
 " The virtue, Croesus ! of thy gentle mind ;
 " While fate to infamy and hatred dooms

to have distinguished themselves in gaining the victory over the
 Carthaginians near Himera; where the naval and military force of
 Carthage was totally cut off or destroyed.

" Sicilia's

“ Sicilia’s tyrant¹⁸³, scorn of human kind;
“ Whose ruthless bosom swell’d with cruel pride,
“ When in the *Brazen Bull* the broiling wretches died.

“ Him, therefore, nor in sweet society
“ The generous youth conversing ever name;
“ Nor with the harp’s delightful melody
“ Mingle his odious inharmonious fame.
“ The first, the greatest bliss on man conferr’d,
“ Is in the acts of virtue to excel;
“ The second to obtain the high reward,
“ The soul exalting praise of doing well:
“ Who both these lots attains is bless’d indeed,
“ Since fortune here below can give no richer
meed¹⁸⁴.

Hiero, soon after his Pythian victory, found himself engaged in a war with the Agrigentines; under the conduct of Thrāsīdeus, the son of Theron, who had succeeded his father in the sovereignty. But he was very unlike that good and generous prince; for he no sooner assumed the sceptre, than he began to oppress his people in a tyrannical manner¹⁸⁵. Hiero, from the respect which he bore to the memory of Theron, advised his son and successor to treat his subjects with more lenity. But this wholesome advice was lost on Thrāsīdeus: and so provoked that new monarch, who was naturally a man of an irascible temper, that he entered the Syracusan territory with an army of twenty thousand horse and foot¹⁸⁶. Hiero took the field against the enraged invader, at the head of a respectable body of forces. The Agrigentine prince did not decline the combat, which was bloody; six thousand men, on

183. *Phalaris*, whose story, false or true, is too well known to require explication, but too ill authenticated to be ingrafted into the page of history.

184. Pind. *Pyth.* i. West’s *Translat.*

185. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 39, 40, vol. ii.

186. Id. *ibid.*

PART I. both sides, being slain: two thousand Syracusians, and four thousand of the invading army¹⁸⁷.

The Syracusians, however, gained a complete victory. And Thrasideus, abdicating the government of Agrigentum, in consequence of his defeat, sought refuge in the territory of the Misan Megareans; where, being condemned to suffer the punishment of death, he laid violent hands upon himself¹⁸⁸. On that abdication, the Agrigentines recovered their freedom, and entered into an alliance with Hiero¹⁸⁹. This magnanimous prince died soon after at the city of Catana, to which he had given the name of *Ætna*, and was there buried with great funeral pomp⁹⁰.

Hiero was succeeded in the government of Syracuse by his younger brother Thrasybulus, who practised all sorts of cruelty upon his subjects⁹¹. Every one that gave him the least disgust was assassinated; and the most wealthy citizens, on false accusations and unjust judgments, had their estates confiscated, and were either punished with death, or condemned to perpetual exile¹⁹².

These inhuman and tyrannical proceedings soon grew insupportable to the Syracusians; who, entering into an association, had recourse to arms, and declared Thrasybulus an enemy to the state⁹³. That cruel and rapacious prince, seeing the whole body of his people become hostile to him, attempted at first to appease them by fair words; but, finding they were resolute, he took refuge with his guards and mercenaries in the division of the city called *Acradina*, and of the adjoining island of *Ortygia*,

187. Id. *Biblioth.* lib. xi. p. 40.

188. Id. *ibid.*

189. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 40.

190. Id. *ibid.*

191. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 50, vol. ii.

192. Id. lib. xi. p. 51

192. Id. *ibid.*

the original city, which formed the great harbour: and thence made frequent sallies upon the insurgents, who were masters of the higher and more considerable division of the city, called Tyche ⁹⁴.

The Syracusians sent messengers to Gela, Agrigentum, and other Sicilian cities, desiring the inhabitants to join in the common cause of liberty, and send speedy aid to their support; as on the fate of the capital depended the whole Syracusian territory ⁹⁵. On this intimation, the people every where ran to arms; and, joining the Syracusians, encouraged them to hazard a general engagement with Thrasybulus and his mercenaries ⁹⁶. This engagement was attended with success. Thrasybulus was defeated both by sea and land; and, being closely besieged, in Acradina and the island of Ortygia, he sent deputies to capitulate with his justly incensed people ⁹⁷. The only terms he could obtain, it appears, were these: That his life should be spared, on condition that he should resign the sovereignty of Syracuse, and retire out of Sicily ⁹⁸. Compelled to submit; and having divested himself of all power and authority, he retired to Locris, in Italy, where he led a private life ⁹⁹.

On the resignation of Thrasybulus, Syracuse and the other cities, that had been subject to him, were declared free, and a popular government was every where established and maintained, within the Syracusian territory and its dependencies ²⁰⁰. Thus restored to their former liberty, the Syracusians called a general assembly, in which it was unanimously decreed, That a colossal statue should be erected to Jove the deliverer; that on the anniversary of the happy day, on which they had regained their free-

194. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 51, vol. ii.

196. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 52.

198. Id. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 52.

200. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 55, vol. ii.

195. Id. *ibid*.

197. Id. *ibid*.

199. Id. *ibid*.

PART I. dom, public games should be annually exhibited; that four hundred and fifty bulls should be annually sacrificed, in thanksgiving to the gods, and all the people feasted with the flesh²⁰¹.

The Syracusians at the same time decreed, that magistrates, according to ancient custom, should be chosen from among the chief citizens; and that none of the foreigners, who had been made denizens by Gelon, should be permitted to enjoy any civil office²⁰². This decree incensed the foreigners, who could not brook such odious distinction, after they had been put by Gelon, for their services, upon an equality with the native citizens²⁰³.

Having, therefore, complained in vain of the obnoxious decree, which deprived them of their civil rights, the naturalised foreigners, to the number of seven thousand, united together; and resolving to extort, by force of arms, what they could no longer obtain by other means, they seized Acradina and Ortygia²⁰⁴, and thence annoyed the upper part of the city of Syracuse²⁰⁵.

These foreign insurgents fortified themselves so strongly in their posts, that the native Syracusians, though far superior in numbers, could not dislodge them, after they had driven them within their walls²⁰⁶. They therefore, having vanquished them at sea, shut

201. Id. *ibid.* 202. Diod. Sicul. *ubi sup.* 203. Id. *ibid.*

204. Ortygia, where the Corinthians, who founded the city of Syracuse, first settled, appears then to have been an island (Thucyd. lib. vi. cap. iii.); but before the æra of the Peloponnesian war, it was no longer washed round by the sea (Id. *ibid.*). And, consequently was no longer an island, though generally so called by historians.

205. Diod. Sicul. Bib'lioth. lib. xi. p. 56, vol ii.

206. Id. lib. xi. p. 57.

them up closely on all sides, that they might receive no supply of provisions; and thus resolved to compel them by famine either to surrender at discretion, or to come out and hazard an engagement²⁰⁷. The besieged malecontents, who greatly surpassed their antagonists in military skill²⁰⁸, chose the latter alternative. They quitted their fortifications; joined battle with the native Syracusians; killed many, and were almost all cut off before they gave ground. But at last, they were totally routed! and the victorious Syracusians bestowed a chaplet, and pecuniary reward upon six hundred citizens that had eminently distinguished themselves in the action²⁰⁹.

The inhabitants of the other Grecian cities in Sicily, after the example of Syracuse, entered into an alliance against the mercenaries and naturalised foreigners; who had been endowed with lands and houses by different princes, in reward of their services; drove them from their possessions and restored the former proprietors to their estates and habitations²¹⁰. So that all the Grecian cities in that island were, in a short time, freed from foreigners; and the form of popular government, which had originally prevailed in each state, was re-established²¹¹.

But although the princes, denominated tyrants, and those considered as their abettors, were every where expelled in Sicily, yet in the minds of many there lay a concealed species of tyranny; which frequently disturbed the public peace, in the several states, and occasioned various tumults and commotions²¹². In Syracuse, one Tyndarion, a loquacious

207. Id. *ibid.*

208. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 57, vol. ii.

209. Id. *ibid.*

210. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 57, 58, vol. ii.

211. Id. *ibid.*

212. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 58, vol. ii.

demagogue

PART I.

demagogue, having gained, by his benefactions and plausible harangues, a powerful party among the lower order of citizens, attempted to assume the supreme power; but, being detected, both he and his accomplices were put to death for conspiring to enslave the state²¹³.

The punishment of this demagogue and his adherents did not, however, deter others from forming the like ambitious projects; for no sooner had any citizen acquired an ample fortune, than he began to entertain thoughts of wearing a diadem; and with that view, courted the favour of the people²¹⁴. In order to prevent the evils arising from such attempts, and bring down the aspiring minds of the opulent citizens, the Syracusians had recourse to a law resembling the Athenian ostracism. For as, at Athens, every citizen was to write on a shell the name of the person he believed most likely, on account of his wealth or influence, to aspire at the supreme power; in the same manner, at Syracuse, every citizen was to write on a leaf the name of the man he apprehended to be so powerful as to usurp the sovereignty, by means of his adherents²¹⁵.

When the leaves were counted, he who had most suffrages against him was banished for five years²¹⁶. This new adopted method of weakening the interest of the opulent citizens, was therefore called Petalism, from the Greek word petalon, which signifies a leaf²¹⁷.

That law, however, was attended with many ill consequences: for they, who were most able to govern

213. Id. lib. xi. p. 65.

214. Id. ibid.

215. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 65, 66, vol. ii.

216. Id. ibid.

217. Id. ibid. The leaf used, in taking the suffrages, was that of the olive-tree.

the state, being expelled, and the administration committed to the meanest of the people, many of the chief citizens, that were capable of rendering essential service to their country, fearing to fall under the punishment of petalism, withdrew from the city of Syracuse, and led private lives; not choosing, at such hazard, to concern themselves in public affairs²¹⁸. Hence all public offices being filled by men of no ability or experience, the Syracusan state, ready to fall into anarchy, was on the brink of ruin. The law of petalism was, therefore, repealed soon after it had been enacted; and the reins of government were again put into the hands of men, who knew better how to manage them²¹⁹.

Meanwhile Ducetius, a chieftain of the Siceli or Siculi, having brought under his command all the cities of that ancient people except Hybla, united them under one government²²⁰. This prince, being both wise and brave, aimed at the expulsion of the rapacious Greeks; by whom his countrymen, who had been compelled to seek shelter in the mountainous and interior parts of the island, were perpetually pillaged. With that view, he removed the citizens of Neas, the place of his birth, from the hills to the low country; and built a city near the temple of the Palici, the venerated gods of his ancestors, to which he gave the name of Palicon²²¹.

In founding the metropolis of his nation, in the neighbourhood of this celebrated seat of superstition, Ducetius discovered great political sagacity. For Diodorus informs us²²², that the temple of the Palici being built over a volcano, which emitted fiery and

218. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

219. Id. ibid.

220. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 67, vol. ii.

221. Id. ibid.

222. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 67.

PART I.

aqueous vapours, or eruptions, was peculiarly calculated to inspire holy fear, and awful reverence. His words are to the following purport. “ Within this temple, there are hollows in the earth, called *cra-tors*; not very large in compass, but of incredible depth, whence break out sparks of fire and water, as from boiling pots or cauldrons. The water cast forth resembles so many streams of fire. But there is no saying what it is, as no one hitherto ever durst approach it. For the violent irruption of the matter is so extraordinary, that it seems to be the immediate effect of some divine power!—The matter smells like brimstone, and the bottomless gulf roars, and makes a most dreadful and horrid noise. But what is most wonderful, that river of fire, though in continual motion, neither flows any length, nor makes any stay upon the land; but, with amazing force, hurls itself up into the air²²³.

“ This temple, therefore, by these striking tokens of divine presence,” adds the Sicilian historian²²⁴, “ being accounted peculiarly sacred, the most solemn oaths, in matters of controversy, were here accustomed to be taken; and due punishment was in such cases instantly executed, by divine vengeance, upon the perjured person²²⁵.

“ The temple of the Palici was also a place of refuge, whither injured servants especially fled to shelter themselves from the cruelty of their severe masters; for they thence could not be dragged, but continued safe, until mutual oaths were taken for the faithful performance of what was covenanted on both sides²²⁶. And so great was the veneration for the place, that it was never known any master broke

223. Id. p. 67; 68,

224. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 68, vol. ii.

225 Id. *ibid.* 226 Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. *ubi sup.*

his faith, there pledged, to his servant; with such an awe, through the fear of the presiding gods, was every one affected²²⁷."

LETTER
XV.

Ducetius, after he had fortified his new city, named Palicon, divided the adjacent country among the inhabitants; who grew rich and powerful in a short time, both by reason of the fertility of the soil, and the number of the people there assembled²²⁸. In consequence of this increase of strength, Ducetius was encouraged to attempt the accomplishment of his purpose of expelling the Greeks from Sicily. His first effort was against the city of Ætna, which he took²²⁹. He afterward led his victorious army against the country of the Agrigentines, and besieged Motya. The Agrigentines, assisted by the Syracusians, endeavoured to relieve it; but their combined forces were defeated by the Siculian prince, and the place was taken²³⁰.

Winter approaching, all the troops of the hostile parties returned to their several cities; and the Syracusians put to death Bilco, their general, suspected of holding a treasonable correspondence with Ducetius, and to whom they imputed the loss of their army²³¹. On the return of the season of action, they chose another general, and put under his command a new army, well appointed in all respects; with strict orders to accomplish, if possible, the destruction of the Siculian prince and his adherents²³².

The Syracusian general accordingly led out the forces of the state, and found Ducetius encamped near Nomæ. There a bloody battle was fought:

227. Id. *ibid*.

229. Id. *ibid*.

231. Id. p. 69.

228. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 68.

230. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 68, 69, vol. ii.

232. Id. *ibid*.

many

PART I.

many were killed on both sides: Ducetius, after a gallant resistance, was forced to give ground; and great slaughter of the vanquished was made, by the Syracusians, in the pursuit²³³. Most of the Siceli or Siculi, who escaped in the general carnage, fled to the forts and strong-holds in the mountains; for few had hearts so warmed with courage, as to adhere to the desperate cause of Ducetius²³⁴.

Meantime the Agrigentines retook the fortress of Motya, in which was a Siculian garrison: then marched to join the victorious Syracusians: and both armies encamped together²³⁵; in order to determine the issue of the war, between the Greeks and the more ancient inhabitants of Sicily. But Ducetius having lost all his treasure, in the late engagement, was brought to the brink of ruin²³⁶; and, therefore, incapable of opposing them. To this distress he was reduced, not only by the loss of men and money, which he had sustained, but also by other circumstances; partly through the treachery of some of his followers, and partly through the cowardice of others, who had deserted him²³⁷.

At length seeing matters brought to so desperate an extremity, that such of his countrymen, as still adhered to him, were ready to make a violent attempt upon his life, Ducetius fled from them during the night; went to Syracuse; and, while it was yet dark, entered the Agora or market-place; fell down before the altars; and, as an humble suppliant, gave up both himself and his country into the hands of his enemies²³⁸.

233. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

234. Id. ibid.

235. Diod. Sicul. *Biblioth.* lib. xi. p. 69, vol. ii.

236. Id. ibid.

237. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup.

238. Id. ibid.

The singularity of such submission drew together, in the morning, a concourse of people. And a general assembly being called, by the magistrates, it was debated, “What should be the fate of Ducetius²³⁹?”—The popular demagogues endeavoured to enflame the minds of the citizens, and incite them to take vengeance on the Sicilian prince, for his acts of hostility against them²⁴⁰. But the wiser, and more sober senators, then present, declared that the suppliant ought to be preserved; that a reverend respect must be paid to the providence of the gods, who had delivered him into their power; and that they should not have so much regard to what Ducetius deserved, as what was proper for them to do, in such case; that to slay one, whom Providence had laid, as a suppliant, at their feet, was equally unjust and ungenerous; and that to maintain the laws of piety toward the gods, and humanity toward man, but especially to such as humbly claimed mercy, peculiarly became the Syracusians²⁴¹.

On this representation, the people unanimously cried out, “Let the suppliant be safe²⁴²!”—Thus delivered from the vengeance of an incensed populace, Ducetius was sent by the Syracusians to Corinth, their mother-city; and assured, that he should be supplied, during the remainder of his life, with a comfortable maintenance, at the expense of the state, provided he did not return into Sicily²⁴³.

After the submission of Ducetius, the Agregentines became jealous of the power of Syracuse; and this jealousy, in conjunction with certain circumstances, soon kindled the flames of war between the people of the rival states. The haughty spirit of

239. Id. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 69, vol. ii.

240. Id. *ibid*.

241. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 69.

242. Id. *ibid*.

243. Diod. Sicul. *ubi sup*.

PART I. Ducetius revolting against a private life at Corinth, he broke all his engagements with the Syracusians: and pretending he was commanded by the oracle to people the pleasant sea-coast of Sicily, he got together a number of adventurers to settle there, and arrived with them in that island²⁴⁴. Some of the Sicilian chiefs joined him; and, among others, one Archonides, prince of Erbita²⁴⁵.

While Ducetius was engaged in founding his settlements, the Agrigentines, partly out of envy of the Syracusians, and partly because they had spared the Sicilian prince, their common enemy, without asking consent, commenced hostilities against the Syracusan state²⁴⁶. Great armies were raised by both parties: some of the Sicilian tribes joined one party, some the other; and war was carried on with vigour. At length, operations being brought to a crisis, the two armies encamped opposite to each other, near the river Himera: they joined battle; and, after a furious conflict, the Syracusians remained masters of the field, having killed a thousand of the Agrigentines²⁴⁷. Deeply affected with their loss, and the discomfiture of their army, the citizens of Agrigentum sent ambassadors to Syracuse, craving peace²⁴⁸. And they obtained it on such terms, as their victorious rivals thought proper to prescribe²⁴⁹.

The Syracusians, who now gave law to all the cities in Sicily, except Trinacia²⁵⁰, resolved to re-

244. Id. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 76, vol. ii. Mr. Mitford affirms (Hist. of Greece, chap. xviii. sect. i.), that the Syracusan chiefs brought back Ducetius from Corinth, "to make him instrumental to their own views, for advancing the power of their commonwealth;" but Diodorus, the only author he quotes, affords no room for such a conjecture.

245. Id. *ibid.*

246. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 76.

247. Id. *ibid.*

248. Diod. Sicul. *ubi sup.*

249. Id. *ibid.*

250. Diod. Sicul. *Biblioth.* lib. xii. p. 89, vol. ii.

duce that last strong-hold of the Siculi. For this purpose, they assembled their forces, and those of their Grecian confederates, and marched united against the place²⁵¹. The Trinacians, a brave and high-minded people (who had everpreserved their independency), though altogether unsupported²⁵², went valiantly out to meet their ambitious enemies. The battle that followed was obstinately disputed. But, at last, the gallant body of Trinacians was broken, and all the Siculian warriors died upon the spot; for none fled; and such as were wounded, preferring death to slavery, intrepidly slew themselves²⁵³. The remaining inhabitants of Trinacia (consisting, as may be conjectured, chiefly of women and children) were made captives, and the town was utterly destroyed²⁵⁴.

The Syracusians having thus reduced the last independent city in Sicily, took measures for securing their sway. They exacted tribute from all the cities in the island: and with the money so raised, they augmented their naval and military force²⁵⁵. Hence, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Syracuse, by the extent of its dominion, as well as by its real strength, was one of the most powerful republics of the people bearing the Grecian name, and using the Grecian language. Consequently its aid was of the utmost importance to both the leading powers engaged in that hostile contest. As a Dorian people, the Syracusians were disposed to favour the Lacedæmonians, and were actually in alliance with Sparta²⁵⁶; but living under a democratical, or

251. Id. *ibid*.

252. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 90. Ducetius might have assisted them; but that prince falling sick, while establishing his settlements, had already paid the debt of nature; and with his life perished his bold designs. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 89, vol. ii.

253. Id. *ibid*.

254. Diod. Sicul. *ubi sup*.

255. Id. lib. xii. p. 90, et seq.

256. Thucyd. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. vii.

PART I. mixed form of government, they were not hearty in the cause of a state, which had for the object of its ambition the establishment of universal aristocracy²⁵⁷.

Having had occasion to mention the Peloponnesian war, I shall conclude this letter with an event that immediately led to general hostilities. The event to which I allude, my lord, was the surprize of Platæa by the Thebans.

The city of Platæa, though seated in the heart of Bœotia, and possessed only of a territory about six miles square, had long resisted the controul of Thebes, the head of the Bœotian league²⁵⁸; and preserved its independency, through the support of Athens. The grateful returns of the Platæans to their Athenian protectors, and their valiant exertions in the cause of freedom, I have had occasion to display²⁵⁹. But in all states there are men, who, actuated by ambition, or influenced by avarice and rapacity, will attempt to enslave their country, or sell its independency²⁶⁰; and in every Grecian republic

257. That this was the great object of the Lacedæmonian, or Spartan state, appears from the whole scope of its history; both before the beginning, and after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war.

258. The Bœotian league, or confederacy, exclusive of Platæa, consisted of eleven cities; the deputies from which, under the name of rulers, sat at Thebes; and being divided into four councils, there directed all public affairs. Vid. Thucyd. lib. iv. v. passim.

259. See Lett. xi. xii. passim.

260. The Athenians were so fully convinced of the truth of this remark, that they precluded men of dissipated characters from speaking in the popular assembly; "it being scarce probable," observed they, "that persons of wicked lives, or desperate fortunes, should endeavour any thing conducive to the peace and prosperity of the state; but rather that they should design the confusion and ruin of it, that themselves might be enriched with the spoils of honest men, and be enabled to take their full career in licentious pleasures." Potter, Archæolog. Græc. book i. chap. xvii. et auct. cit.

there

there generally were, as we have seen, two hostile factions, one belonging to the aristocratical, and one to the democratical party, that violently struggled against each other.

In Platæa, one Naucrides and his associates, seemingly of the aristocratical faction (for Thucydides is silent on the subject), having formed a project for the aggrandisement of themselves, and the destruction of all their fellow citizens, adverse to their designs, agreed with Eurymachus, the leading man at Thebes, to deliver their city into the hands of the Thebans²⁶¹. For the Thebans, although peace was still maintained, and consequently war not actually declared, yet foreseeing war unavoidable, had a strong desire to get possession of Platæa, which had been at perpetual enmity with them²⁶². And the general tranquillity being such that no regular watch was yet kept in the city; Eurymachus was under no apprehensions of being debarred entrance²⁶³.

A body of Thebans, somewhat above three hundred, was accordingly assembled, under the conduct of two of the rulers of Bœotia, and got into Platæa about the first sleep²⁶⁴. When they had gained admission, they formed in order of battle in the agora, or place of public meeting; and, contrary to the sanguinary plot devised by the conspirators, of proceeding to the houses of their political enemies, and putting them to the sword, they directed a herald to proclaim aloud, that all who were willing to enter into league, according to the ancient custom of the Bœotians, should come and join arms with them²⁶⁵.

Ant. Chr.
431.
Olympiad
lxxxvii. 2.

261. Thucyd. lib. ii. cap. ii.

262. Id. ibid.

263. Thucyd. ubi sup.

264. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. ii.

265. Id. ibid.

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By this declaration, the Theban commanders hoped to draw the citizens of Plataea into an amicable accommodation, and gain the place without bloodshed²⁶⁶. And it had in some measure the desired effect. For the Plataeans being in great consternation, when they found the Thebans had surprised the town, soon came to a composition; and, accepting the terms offered, made no resistance, as they found violence was offered to no man²⁶⁷.

The quiet produced by this composition enabling the Plataeans to discover, that the Thebans were fewer in number than they had supposed, thought they might easily overpower them, if they ventured an attack: for the body of the people had not the least inclination to throw off the alliance of Athens²⁶⁸. The Plataeans, therefore, after conferring together, agreed that such an attack should be made; and when they had got every thing ready, in the best manner they could, having watched till the night was far spent, they rushed from their houses against the Thebans before day-break; that their enemies might be intimidated by being charged in the dark, and labour under disadvantage from their ignorance of the city²⁶⁹.

The attack was immediately begun, and both parties soon came to action. The Theban leaders, when they found themselves circumvented, had thrown their troops into a globular form; and, wherever assaulted, made a firm and successful resistance. Twice or thrice they beat back the Plataeans. But when the attacks were, with loud noise, reiterated; and when the women and menial servants, shouting and

266. Thucyd. ubi sup.

267. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. iii.

268. Id. ibid.

269. Thucyd. lib. ii. cap. iii.

screaming

screaming from the houses on all sides, threw stones and tiles among the Thebans, otherwise incommoded with the rain, which had copiously fallen that night, they were seized with fear; and, dissolving their order, fled in confusion²⁷⁰. Running therefore in the dirt and the dark, and not knowing the passages by which they could get out of the city, while pursued by men acquainted with every avenue of it, many of them were slain²⁷¹.

The gate by which the enemy had entered, and which alone had been opened by the conspirators, was by this time shut²⁷²: so that, pursued around the city, some of the Thebans mounted the walls, and hurled themselves over; but most of these were killed by the fall²⁷³. Others were separately slain, in different parts of the city. But the greater number, consisting of those who had kept in a body, threw themselves into a large house contiguous to the walls (the door of which happened to be open), believing the door of that house to be one of the city gates, and a certain passage for escape²⁷⁴. There inclosed by the Plataeans, and threatened with being consumed by fire, they agreed to give up their arms, and surrender themselves prisoners at discretion²⁷⁵.

Meanwhile a second body of Thebans, intended for the support of the former, had entered the territory of Plataea; and would have arrived before this time, had not the troops been retarded in their march by the swelling of the river Asopus, in consequence of the heavy rain that had fallen²⁷⁶. When informed of the disaster of their countrymen, by some fugi-

270. Id. lib. ii. cap. iv.

271. Id. *ibid*.

272. Thucyd. lib. ii. cap. iv.

273. Id. *ibid*.

274. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. iv.

275. Id. *ibid*.

276. Thucyd. lib. ii. cap. v.

tives,

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tives, the Thebans resolved to turn their arms against the Plataeans without the city, unsuspectingly employed in the labours of husbandry; and to attempt to seize prisoners, in order to exchange for such of their unfortunate division, as might still be alive²⁷⁷.

But the Plataeans, apprehensive of some such design, dispatched a herald to the Theban invaders, representing to them the injustice of the hostile attempt already made; they having treacherously endeavoured to take the city before any declaration of war, and while the treaty of peace remained unviolated²⁷⁸. The Plataeans next required the Thebans to beware of offering any violence to their citizens living in the country; declaring, if they so did, that they would put all the Theban prisoners to the sword²⁷⁹.

The Thebans, in consequence of this threat, retired out of the Plataean territory: but the justly enraged Plataeans, regardless of their implied promise of safety to the Theban prisoners, put them all to death; as soon as they had brought into the city the husbandmen, the implements of agriculture, and their most valuable effects, from the country²⁸⁰. The number of Theban prisoners massacred amounted to one hundred and eighty; and among these was Erymachus, who had concerted with the Plataean traitors the surprize of the city²⁸¹.

. The Plataeans having thus executed vengeance on their ambitious and perfidious enemies, dispatched a third messenger to Athens (for they had sent two

277. Id. *ibid*.

278. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

279. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. v.*

280. Id. *ibid*.

281. Thucyd. *ubi sup*.

before),

before), and restored to the Thebans their dead undertruce²⁸². And then they regulated the affairs of their republic in the manner most suitable to their present situation²⁸³.—A few observations, my lord, will here be necessary.

The Plataeans had dispatched a messenger to Athens on the first irruption of the Thebans; and a second, as soon as they were defeated and made prisoners²⁸⁴. But the Athenians, being still ignorant of the fate of those prisoners, had sent a herald to Plataea, on the arrival of the second messenger, with orders, that no punishment should be inflicted on the Theban captives, until the Athenian administration had sent its determination concerning them²⁸⁵. The herald, however, on his arrival, found they had all been put to death²⁸⁶. Yet the Athenians, notwithstanding this too hasty proceeding, carried to Plataea a supply of provisions; left a garrison in the city; and brought away, together with the women and children, all the hands that would be useless in a siege²⁸⁷.

After this surprize of Plataea, so manifest a breach of the general peace, the Athenians made all necessary preparations for immediate war²⁸⁸. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates also took similar measures; and both parties were employed in dispatching ambassadors to the Persian monarch, Artaxerxes Longimanus, and other barbarian powers, with whom they had any hope of forming beneficial treaties: nor did they spare any pains to draw

282. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. vi.

283. Id. *ibid*.

284. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. vi.

285. Id. *ibid*.

286. Thucydid. *ubi sup*.

287. Id. *ibid*.

288. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. vii.

PART I. into their alliance those Grecian cities, which had hitherto maintained their independency²⁸⁹.

Beside the ships already fitted out for the Lacedæmonian league, in Italy and Sicily, the confederates there were ordered to furnish a new quota, that the whole number of armed ships might amount to five hundred sail²⁹⁰. They were also ordered to get a certain sum of money in readiness; but, in other respects, to remain quiet: and, until their preparations were completed, never to admit within their ports, at a time, above one Athenian vessel²⁹¹.

The Athenians likewise made a careful survey of the strength of their own confederacy, and sent pressing embassies to the people seated round the western coast of Peloponnesus; to the Corcyræans, to the Cephallenians, to the Acarnanians, and to the Zacynthians²⁹²: sensible, that if these maritime people were in their interest, they might advantageously attack the hostile peninsula on all sides²⁹³.

The hearts of both parties, not a little elated, were eager for war. For it is natural for man, on the commencement of every important undertaking, to be sanguine of success. The young men especially, who at that time were numerous in Peloponnesus; numerous also in Attica, were, for want of experience, fond of the rupture²⁹⁴. And all the rest of Greece stood attentively at gaze, on this contention between its two principal states²⁹⁵.

289. Id. *ibid.*

290. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

291. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. vii.*

292. Id. *ibid.*

293. Thucyd. *ubi sup.*

294. Id. *Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. viii.*

295. Id. *ibid.*

Many

Many responses of oracles were bandied about; the soothsayers sung abundance of predictions among those states that were going to enter on the hostile competition, and even in the states that were yet neutral²⁹⁶. The sacred island of Delos had lately been shaken by an earthquake, a phenomenon, that had never occurred within the memory of man²⁹⁷. It was said, and indeed believed, this was a prognostic of something extraordinary to happen; and all other "accidents of an uncommon nature," observes Thucydides²⁹⁸, "were sure of being wrested to the same meaning²⁹⁹:"—So agitated were the minds of the Greeks at the prospect of that domestic war into which they were going to enter.

The states in league with the two rival powers, at the beginning of the hostile struggle, are thus enumerated by Thucydides:—In league with the Lacedæmonians were all the people within the Corinthian isthmus, the whole Peloponnesian body, except the Argives and Achaïans³⁰⁰; "for these had treaties subsisting with both parties³⁰¹." Without Peloponnesus, were confederated with the Lacedæmonians, the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambracians, Leucadians, and Anactorians³⁰². In league with the Athenians, were the Chians, Les-

296. Thucydid. ubi sup.

297. Id. ibid.

298. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. viii.


299. Id. ibid.

300. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. ix.

301. Id. ibid. It appears, however, that the people of Pallene, an Achaïan city, took early part with the Lacedæmonians. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. ix.

302. Thucydid. ubi sup. Of these, they were supplied with shipping by the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pallenians, Eleans, Ambracians, and Leucadians; with cavalry, by the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians (Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. ix.). The other confederates furnished them with infantry. Id. ibid.

bians,

PART I.  bians, Platæans; the Messenians of Naupactus; most of the Acarnanians; and the Corcyræans, Zacynthians, and all the people and states tributary to them in many countries; namely, the people of the maritime parts of Caria; the Dorians bordering upon the Carians; Ionia; the Hellespont; the Grecian cities on the coast of Thrace; all the islands lying between Peloponnesus and Crete; and all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera³⁰³. Such were the alliances on both sides, my lord, and such the ability of both parties for war.

303. Id. lib. ii. cap. ix. Of those, they were supplied with shipping by the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyræans (Thucyd. lib. ii. cap. ix.). The other allies supplied them with foot, and with money (Id. ibid.). By the Thessalians (though not included in this enumeration, of the Athenian confederates), they were furnished with cavalry, in consequence of an ancient league (Thucyd. lib. ii. cap. xxii.). I shall here take occasion to remark, that, in the foregoing enumeration of the Athenian confederates, no mention is made of the Samians or Eubœans; and that Samos and Eubœa, being conquered islands, and not far distant from Attica, seem at this time to have been considered as part of the Athenian territory.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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